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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis is about reasoning processes that occur in practice, for instance when
a diagnostic expert performs his or her task. We shall start with an (informal)
discussion of reasoning processes.
1.1 Reasoning processes
In a very broad sense, reasoning can be seen as an activity of an agent, resulting in
a change of the agent's mental state. This mental state at least captures the agent's
informational attitude besides other mental attitudes considered in the agent liter-
ature, e.g., motivational attitudes such as desires, intentions and plans (see [WJ95]
or [Bra87]). This thesis focuses on informational attitudes, leaving motivational
attitudes untouched. Such an informational attitude may consist of, for instance,
knowledge, beliefs, or assumptions the agent has. Although the status of these kinds
of information is dierent, we will consider the abstract features relevant to all of
them. In this thesis, we will sometimes use the terms `knowledge' (`knows') or `belief'
(`believes'), but only as synonyms for `information', so these terms do not impose
a special status on the information of the agent. We will use the word `agent' only
in the sense of `reasoner' or `reasoning entity', so we will not assume an agent has
any special properties (such as pro-activeness or social ability, often assumed in the
multi-agent literature; see for example [WJ95]).
We will call the part of the agent's mental state capturing information, an infor-
mation state. An important assumption we will make, is that reasoning is a discrete
process: starting from an (initial) information state, the agent invokes some kind of
reasoning mechanism to arrive at a new information state, from which it again may
perform some reasoning, possibly ad innitum.
The study of classical modes of reasoning is at least as old as the syllogisms of
Aristotle, and has led to various systems such as natural deduction. The reasoning
we will consider in this thesis is allowed to involve phenomena of a more complex
nature such as reasoning with defaults (plausible assumptions), revision, interaction
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(with the environment, through observations or communication), and introspection
(meta-level reasoning). In general, both the reasoning path followed and the outcome
of such reasoning processes may depend on decisions dynamically taken during the
reasoning process.
Consider an agent that wants to buy a ticket for the lm Rocky XIV. It has
knowledge about movies in general, and about making reservations. But it also
knows that in general, reservations are unnecessary. So by default, it decides not
to reserve a seat. Then, however, it hears from a friend agent that Rocky lms are
always very popular. So, it decides to nd out how long the lm has been playing.
To this end, it consults a newspaper and nds out that it is the rst week. Therefore,
it decides to make a reservation anyway.
In this scenario, we see an agent performing many forms of reasoning in an
integrated fashion. It does classical reasoning, it performs default reasoning, it
reasons about observations, it communicates, and it revises its knowledge on the
basis of observation results and communicated information. The decision to perform
an observation (looking in the paper) not only changed the reasoning path, but also
changed the nal outcome of the reasoning process. These are the kinds of practical
reasoning, where the (internal) dynamic behavior of the agent may both inuence
the reasoning path and its nal conclusions, that are the subject of the work reported
here. The aim of this thesis is to present a general framework in which reasoning
processes are formalized semantically (in an abstract way), and can be specied and
studied.
1.2 Formalizing reasoning processes
In the eld of nonmonotonic reasoning, many particular formalisms have been de-
ned and studied, such as default logic (see [Rei80b]), autoepistemic logic (see
[Moo85]), circumscription (see [McC80]), and nonmonotonic logic I and II (see
[MD80] and [MD82]). After it became clear that none of these (or other) approaches
would be the perfect account of commonsense reasoning, people started investigat-
ing general abstract properties of nonmonotonic reasoning. This line of research,
started with a paper by Gabbay ([Gab85]), considers inference relations. The idea
is that any form of nonmonotonic reasoning gives rise to a relation j

, called an
inference relation, between (sets of) formulae and formulae, where A j

' means that
' can be concluded from the premises in A by using this form of reasoning. Each
of the formalisms mentioned above indeed denes an inference relation (for most of
them there are actually a number of variants). By abstracting from the particu-
lar formalisms dening such inference relations, general properties of nonmonotonic
reasoning can be and actually have been studied. It proved to be a fruitful perspec-
tive, leading to the hallmark paper by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor ([KLM90]);
the inference relations of that paper (relations between formulae) were generalized to
consequence operations (functions from potentially innite sets of formulae to poten-
tially innite sets of formulae) and studied in [Mak94]. Many interesting phenomena
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of (nonmonotonic) reasoning can be (and have been) studied in the framework of
inference relations and consequence operations. However, this framework only con-
siders (purely functional) input{output behavior of reasoning. It focuses on the nal
product of reasoning: what can be derived in the end? In this thesis, we will also
be interested in how these nal conclusions are reached. In particular, two aspects
of reasoning will be focussed on: nondeterminism and dynamics, to be explained
below. In line with the study of consequence relations, we will investigate these
aspects in an abstract sense, only on a lower (or more detailed) level of abstraction
(see Section 1.3).
Nondeterminism
In formalization of reasoning using consequence operations, the focus is on the func-
tional input{output behavior of a reasoning agent: it starts with a certain initial
set of beliefs, and after reasoning it has a unique (usually) dierent set of beliefs.
What actually happens in many forms of non-classical reasoning processes, is that
there may be several possible sets of conclusions. This phenomenon occurs in for-
malizations of nonmonotonic reasoning (where these sets of conclusions are called
extensions or expansions), in belief revision (removing a formula from a belief set in
a minimal fashion is possible in dierent ways), and in the selection of observations
to make. To arrive at a single set of conclusions, the agent must perform some op-
eration on the set of possible sets of conclusions (like selecting one, or intersecting
them). Such a reduction step entails a loss of information. Some people have an
ambivalent or even negative attitude towards multiple extensions (some feel that
the existence of multiple extensions shows that the reasoning formalism is wrong).
However, in practical reasoning it is often the case that decisions taken during the
reasoning process may lead to a dierent set of conclusions. This happens when (de-
fault) assumptions are made (and we have to choose which assumptions to make),
when communicating with others (do we believe what the other person tells us?),
when we get new information contradicting earlier beliefs or assumptions (and we
have to decide which of our beliefs to give up). As this nondeterministic behavior is
ubiquitous in complex reasoning, we want to study it in its own right.
Dynamics
The second aspect of practical reasoning that has, in our opinion, received too
little attention in the past, is the importance and inuence of the dynamics of the
reasoning process. Reasoning is a process performed by an agent, taking time.
Usually, the agent starts with some initial facts, then applies some rules (or another
mechanism) to arrive at a dierent information state, from which it may again
deduce conclusions. During this process, the agent goes through a number of possible
information states; the process may even never end. The agent may also make
decisions regarding its own reasoning process. Such meta-level reasoning may result
in dierent goals, in the decision to apply a default or to perform an observation.
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This kind of control knowledge has not been taken very seriously yet in the abstract
study of reasoning. We share the view also put forward in [Ben91a] that integrating
(dynamic) process aspects into the semantics of logical systems is more transparent
and fruitful than trying to abstract from them (this is put into practice in e.g.
[Eth87] but also implicitly in [Gab82]). This dynamic perspective ts into the recent
general trend in logic towards studying the dynamics of information (witnessed by
e.g., [Ben96a]), where we have a special interest in nonmonotonic reasoning from the
standpoint of Articial Intelligence. Studying the dynamics of reasoning allows us
to investigate properties other than those referring just to input and output of the
reasoning: does the reasoning end; is a conclusion drawn soon; how are conclusions
drawn? Furthermore, making process aspects explicit is a rst step towards resource-
bounded reasoning, in which not only the mental capacities (like memory) of the
agent are limited, but there is also limited time. Given time constraints, the agent
may for example decide to focus on particular aspects of the domain.
We will take these two aspects, nondeterminism and reasoning dynamics, seri-
ously, and we will analyze and formalize them both semantically and syntactically.
On the one hand, this is inspired by an interest in these phenomena (occuring in
practical reasoning) in their own right. By providing a formalization and speci-
cation framework of practical reasoning that takes into account nondeterminism
and dynamics, we are able to study and compare dierent forms of reasoning, using
mathematical and logical tools. This may have an inuence on the static view of
reasoning as well. Static properties of a certain form of reasoning can be seen to be
`caused', in a sense, by a (more rened) property of the nondeterministic view, or
by a dynamic property. So the study of nondeterminism and dynamic aspects may
further our understanding of the static view on reasoning. On the other hand, if we
want to model, specify, study and reason about agents in dynamic environments,
where the world the agent is reasoning about is changing, where information from
other agents may come in at dierent points in time, where decisions have to be
made in time, etcetera, a nondeterministic and dynamic view of reasoning will be
required. A purely static view, if at all possible, will be insucient to deal with all
of these phenomena. Most of the material in this thesis will deal with the reasoning
of one agent (with the exception of Section 8.1). The case of multiple agents will be
an interesting (but potentially much more dicult) extension of the present work.
These two perspectives on reasoning, as exhibiting nondeterministic behavior and
as a dynamic process, are part of a more general framework of levels of abstraction
of looking at, and specication of, reasoning, which we will describe below.
1.3 Levels of abstraction
Reasoning processes can be described at many levels of abstraction. The consequence
operations mentioned before provide a very high-level description: given some initial
knowledge of the agent, they give the nal set of conclusions reached, abstracting
1.3 Levels of abstraction 5
from how they were formed. On the other hand, we could give a detailed specication
of a reasoning system (by giving an implementation in a programming language, or
by describing the physical layout of a brain performing the reasoning). But there
are intermediate levels of abstraction. Given the fact that often multiple possible
sets of conclusions (or belief sets) are possible, we could describe the behavior of
the agent by giving, for an initial set of beliefs, the possible belief sets (containing
possible conclusions), where we still abstract from how these sets were reached.
Entering a more detailed description level, we could also indicate the sequence of
intermediate states the agent went through in deriving or computing these possible
sets of conclusions (we will call such a sequence a reasoning trace). But we could
also describe a reasoning system that generates these sequences (in the description
of systems we could again identify many levels of abstraction, from a description in
a high-level specication language, an implementation in a lower-level programming
language, to a complete physical description of an agent; we will not consider these
abstraction levels here and incorporate all of these abstractions in one level).
These possibilities lead to a hierarchy of levels of abstraction in the description
of reasoning (going from more abstract to less abstract):
1. Specication of a nal intended conclusion set
Given a set of initial facts, a unique resulting nal set of conclusions is specied,
disregarding the specic underlying possible (incomplete) belief sets, the spe-
cic reasoning patterns leading to them, and the reasoning system generating
them.
2. Specication of a set of intended belief sets
Given the initial facts, a set of possible belief sets is specied, abstracting
from the specic reasoning patterns leading to them, and the reasoning system
generating them.
3. Specication of a set of intended reasoning traces
Given the initial facts, a set of reasoning traces, leading to intended belief
sets, is specied, abstracting from the specic reasoning system generating
these patterns.
4. Specication of a reasoning system
A reasoning system is specied that, given a set of initial facts as input, can
generate the intended reasoning patterns.
Reasoning can be formalized both syntactically and semantically. The discussion
above refers to syntactical descriptions (for example with sets of conclusions), but
the same notions can be described in semantical terms. We will give a number of
examples of descriptions of reasoning at these dierent levels, both in syntactical
and in semantical terms.
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Level 1
At level 1, we could give a semantic formalization in terms of a set of intended models
for a set of initial facts. This is what happens in preferential logic (see e.g., [Sho87]):
given the premises, all models of the premises which are minimal in some preference
ordering are selected as intended models. The corresponding set of conclusions is
formed by all formulae that are true in all these intended models.
Level 2
As an example of a description at level 2, we could take autoepistemic logic or default
logic, in which, given a theory, there can be multiple expansions or extensions. In
this case also, there are semantical counterparts, in which a preference ordering on
sets of models is given. The minimal sets in the ordering describe the intended
conclusions semantically: given such a minimal set of models, the formulae that
hold in all models in the set correspond to an extension (see e.g., [BS94], [Voo93]).
Level 3
Specication at level 3 is given in, for instance, argumentation systems (see e.g.,
[Pol87], [Lou87], [PS96], [Pra97]), where, during the argumentation, arguments in
favor and against a fact are given, and counterarguments against arguments. The
construction of arguments and counterarguments can be seen as a process. But also
the alternative characterization of extensions for default logic in terms of sequences
of theories (already given in [Rei80b]) can be seen as a specication of reasoning
traces (we will develop this viewpoint in more detail later on; the presentation
will be semantical). In dynamic semantics ([Gro95], [Vel96]) the eect of incoming
information on the information state of an agent is studied; it is explicitly specied
in which order information is coming in. This means the agent goes through a
sequence of information states (a new information state arises with every new piece
of information coming in): traces are specied in a semantical way. Also in step-logic
([Elg88]), there is an explicit notion of steps in a reasoning (or derivation) process
taking place in time. Finally, the cut operator in Prolog is a good example of a
dynamic operator inuencing the reasoning process. In [Lin97] a semantics of the
cut operator in situation calculus is given, where reasoning as an explicit process in
time is modeled. We will give a more thorough survey of some of these approaches
and a comparison with our own work at a later stage.
Level 4
Specication at level 4 involves describing a system which reasons. This can be
a description of an agent in a high-level specication language, a description of a
computer program in any programming language, a blueprint of a machine, or even a
description of a human being. Specication of a reasoning system occurs frequently
within the eld of knowledge-based systems and multi-agent systems, see for instance
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[BLRT94] for a formally specied agent reasoning about design. In [TT92] a formal
architecture of a compositional reasoning system is given, which can perform default
reasoning.
Connections
Of course there exist connections between the levels in the sense that from a spec-
ication of a lower level of abstraction a specication of each of the higher levels
can be determined (in a canonical manner; these connections will be made precise
in Chapter 2). For example, given a specication of intended belief sets (level 2),
there are ways to arrive at a nal set of conclusions (level 1), for example by taking
the intersection, or by choosing one of the belief sets. Or, given a set of intended
reasoning traces (level 3), one can take a kind of limit, provided that the traces
converge in some sense, to arrive at possible belief sets (level 2). The specication
at a lower level gives in some sense a renement or specialization of the specication
at the higher level (as in the case of conventional software specications at dierent
levels of abstraction). Given specications of two dierent levels, relative verication
should be possible: to establish whether the lower level specication indeed renes
the higher level one. At a lower level dierent specications can rene the same
higher level specication. As a parallel one may think of development of programs
using the method of (top down) stepwise renement, e.g., according to Dijkstra's
approach [Dij76]. Note however that other methods (other than top down stepwise
renement) are possible as well.
Much work has been done on formalization and specication of reasoning at lev-
els 1 and 4. By formalization of reasoning we mean that mathematical objects are
dened that are an abstraction (at a certain level) of the reasoning. Consequence
operations, for example, are mathematical objects that are an abstraction (at level
1) of reasoning. In Chapter 2, we will dene mathematical objects that are ab-
stractions of reasoning at lower levels. To describe these objects, we could of course
use general mathematical terms (and we often will). However, we will also dene
specialized (logical) languages for specifying these objects. Such languages will be
called specication languages. Just as a software specication language allows the
user to precisely describe a software system (at a certain level of abstraction), our
specication languages allow the user to precisely describe a mathematical object.
In this sense, they are no dierent from any logic with semantics: a statement in a
logic `species' its semantics. In this way, propositional logic can be seen as a speci-
cation language for sets of valuations (as an example, the formula p_q species the
set of valuations in which either p or q is true). Our specication languages describe
the mathematical objects that formalize reasoning at a certain level of abstraction.
In this thesis, we will provide approaches to bridge the gap between the highly ab-
stract level 1 and the highly detailed level 4 by developing levels 2 and 3, with most
emphasis on level 3.
8 Introduction
1.4 Conclusions and related work
In this chapter, we have introduced a hierarchy of abstraction levels at which rea-
soning (in its broadest sense) can be described. The highest level of abstraction,
level 1, was inspired by the work on abstract (nonmonotonic) consequence relations
(such as the studies of Gabbay, [Gab85], Shoham, [Sho87], and Kraus, Lehmann, and
Magidor [KLM90]) and inference operations (see for example [Mak89] and [Mak94]).
The latter paper (but also [Voo93]) already suggests to look at intended belief sets
abstractly. Specifying reasoning by giving a reasoning system of course occurs often
in Articial Intelligence.
1.5 Outline of the thesis
We will now give the reader an overview of the further contents of this thesis. In
Chapter 2 the rst three levels are formalized semantically. For level 3, this for-
malization involves an operator that assigns sets of reasoning traces to each set of
input facts. A language for specifying reasoning on level 3 must therefore be able
to describe these traces. In Chapter 3 three example specication languages are
treated. One of these, based on temporal logic, will be the subject of the larger
part of this thesis. The use of temporal logic is based on the observation that the
process of reasoning can be seen as a process taking place in time, and that there-
fore reasoning traces can be seen as a kind of temporal models, in which a state
at a certain time point must reect the information the agent has at that point.
Temporal logics of information can be used to specify temporal models which are
interpreted as reasoning traces. A number of variants of temporal logic are treated
in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 the usefulness of these temporal logics is established by
showing that a number of existing forms of reasoning can be specied in these logics.
Restricted versions of these logics are executable, which means that a specication
in such a restricted variant can be directly executed (or equivalently, a model can be
constructed). This is the content of Chapter 6. The expressiveness (in a more formal
logical sense) of two specication languages, one based on temporal logic and one
on default logic, is treated in Chapter 7. Then Chapter 8 discusses two applications
of the theory developed so far, one of which is the specication and verication of
compositional multi-agent systems, and one of which is the formalization of an ap-
proximate classication task needed for ecological monitoring. Some logical themes,
among which axiomatizability, decidability and complexity of one of the temporal
logics, are treated in Chapter 9. Chapter 10 further explores the syntactical side of
the formalization of level 2 given in Chapter 2. Finally, in Chapter 11 we summarize
the main ideas of this thesis and draw some general conclusions. Also, a perspective
on further research is sketched.
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Chapter 2
Semantics of Reasoning
In Chapter 1, a framework of four levels of abstraction for the description of reasoning
was briey introduced. A semantical formalization of the rst three levels is given
in this chapter, along with a number of examples.
We will start the formal description of the three levels of abstraction by introduc-
ing the basic ingredients needed in all three. First of all, there must be a language
in which information about the reasoning domain of the agent can be expressed. So,
we will assume that the reasoning agent has a language L, in which the information
it has (beliefs or knowledge) can be stated. Sets of initial facts are also given in this
language. Although no special requirements have to be imposed on this language, it
could for instance be a language of propositional logic, or predicate logic, or modal
logic. If L is a logical language, there is often a notion of (classical) consequence or
provability. In such cases, an operator which assigns to a set of formulae the set of
all of its consequences, will be denoted by C
L
.
As mentioned before, the agent's mental state must incorporate the information
the agent has (knows, or believes). The part of the mental state holding this in-
formation, will be called an information state. Therefore, the second assumption is
that there exists a set, IS, of possible information states of the agent. Since these
states hold the information of the agent, there must be a notion capturing the fact
that a sentence in the language is contained in an information state. We will assume
the existence of an operator Th, which assigns to each information state the set of
sentences it holds: Th : IS ! P(L), where P(L) denotes the powerset of L. For an
information state M , the set Th(M) is called the theory of M .
The beliefs of an agent change as a consequence of internal mental operations
the agent performs. These operations include reasoning, but also the agent may
communicate, perform observations and revisions, and it may sometimes simply
forget things. In one situation an agent may have more (or less) information than in
another. To be able to compare information in dierent situations, we will assume
that the set of information states, IS, is equipped with a partial order (that is, a
relation satisfying reexivity, antisymmetry and transitivity), denoted . For two
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information states M and N , if M  N , this will mean that in state N , the agent
has more information than (or the same information as) in state M . Often, the
operator Th will be monotone, meaning that Th(M)  Th(N) whenever M  N .
This will not be required, however. (It may be the case that the ordering  is
based on information about the world only, whereas Th(N) also contains epistemic
information: information about which information is known; this kind of information
is not monotone.)
A second requirement is that it is possible to aggregate the information from an
increasing sequence of information states. If the agent traverses a linearly ordered
sequence of states, the information it has is increasing. Therefore, we can consider
all the information it gains during the reasoning. There should be an information
state that holds precisely all this information. Formally, we will require that each
linearly ordered (with respect to ) subset A of information states has a least upper
bound, lub(A) in IS. Thirdly, given a number of information states, the agent may
sometimes wish to keep only the information common to all of them. Hence, it will
be assumed that any set of information states A, has a greatest lower bound, glb(A).
For ease of reference, the requirements are listed below.
Denition 2.1 (Information state frame) An information state frame is a tu-
ple hL; C
L
; IS;;Thi, where
 L is a set, called a language.
 C
L
is a function P(L)! P(L), satisfying
1. X  C
L
(X) (inclusion)
2. C
L
(C
L
(X)) = C
L
(X) (idempotence)
3. X  Y ) C
L
(X)  C
L
(Y ) (monotony)
 IS is a set, the elements of which are called information states.
  is a partial order on IS, such that for each non-empty A  IS, the greatest
lower bound glb(A) of A with respect to (IS;) exists, and if (A;) is a linear
order, there is a least upper bound lub(A) with respect to (IS;). The ordering
 is called the information order.
 Th is a function IS ! P(L). For M 2 IS, the set Th(M) is called the theory
of M .
We will give some examples of information state frames. In all of them, let P be
a nite or denumerably innite set of of propositional atoms.
Denition 2.2 (Two-valued states) The language L is equal to P , and C
L
is
the identity function. A (two-valued) propositional valuation is a function m : P !
f0; 1g.
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1. The set IS
2val
consists of all valuations.
2. The truth-values 0 (false) and 1 (true) are ordered as follows: 0  1 and 0  0,
1  1. For two valuations m and n we dene m  n if and only if m(p)  n(p)
for all p 2 P .
3. Dene Th : IS
2val
! P(L) by Th(m) = fp 2 P j m(p) = 1g.
It is straightforward to check that  is a partial order and that greatest lower
bounds and least upper bounds (for any set, not just for linearly ordered sets) exist:
just take the minimum (or maximum) per atom. The frame of two-valued states is
often used under the closed world assumption: the facts that have been veried are
true, all others are false by default.
This asymmetry between positive and negative information does not occur in
three-valued states.
Denition 2.3 (Three-valued states) Let L be the propositional language based
on P .
1. A partial (or three-valued) model for the language L is a function m : P !
f0; 1; ug. This assignment can be extended to arbitrary propositional formulae
according to the following tables (these are the Strong Kleene semantics):
:
0 1
1 0
u u
^ 0 1 u
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 u
u 0 u u
_ 0 1 u
0 0 1 u
1 1 1 1
u u 1 u
! 0 1 u
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 u
u u 1 u
IS
3val
denotes the set of all partial models for L.
2. The operator C
L
is strong semantic consequence: C
L
(X) = f' j for all partial
models m, if m( ) = 1 for all  2 X , then m(') = 1g.
3. The truth-values 0 (false), 1 (true), and u (unknown) are ordered as follows:
u  0, u  1, and u  u, 0  0, 1  1. For two partial models m and n, we
dene: m  n, m(p)  n(p) for all p 2 P .
4. Dene Th : IS
3val
! P(L) by Th(m) = f' 2 L j m(') = 1g.
It is straightforward to check that  is a partial order. For a non-empty set of
partial models A, the greatest lower bound, glb(A), is given by:
glb(A)(p) =
8
<
:
1; if m(p) = 1 for all m 2 A;
0; if m(p) = 0 for all m 2 A;
u otherwise.
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For a linearly ordered set A  IS, the least upper bound, lub(A), is given by:
lub(A)(p) =
8
<
:
1; if m(p) = 1 for some m 2 A;
0; if m(p) = 0 for some m 2 A;
u otherwise.
Since in a linearly ordered set, no two dierent partial models m, n can exist
with m(p) = 1 and n(p) = 0 for some p 2 P , the lub exists. If m  n, then it holds
Th(m)  Th(n); this is a consequence of the persistence theorem for partial logic.
Proposition 2.4 (Persistence) Suppose n  m are partial models. For every
propositional formula ', the following holds:
n(') = 1 ) m(') = 1
n(') = 0 ) m(') = 0:
One disadvantage of partial models is their inability to express disjunctive infor-
mation without committing to either of the disjuncts. That is, if (under the strong
Kleene semantics) m(' _  ) = 1, then either m(') = 1 or m( ) = 1 (or both).
So an agent cannot believe a disjunction without believing one of the disjuncts.
Furthermore, tautologies are not necessarily true in a partial model, for example,
if m(p) = u, then m(p _ :p) = u. In some situations, this may be a disadvantage
of partial logic, but sometimes this may be desired (not all agents have to know
all tautologies). An approach without these (arguable) disadvantages, uses sets of
two-valued models.
Denition 2.5 (Epistemic states)
1. The language L is the propositional language based on P , with the standard
consequence operator Cn of propositional logic.
2. An information state is a set of propositional valuations. The set of these
information states is denoted as IS
ep
.
3. The ordering  on the set of information states IS
ep
, is dened by: M  N ,
N M .
4. The function Th is dened by: Th(M) = f' 2 L j m j= ' for all m 2Mg.
Since set-inclusion is a partial order, its converse () is also a partial order. The
least upper bound of a (not necessarily linearly ordered) set A of information states,
is given by lub(A) =
\
M2A
M . The greatest lower bound of a set A of information
states, is given by glb(A) =
[
M2A
M . As was the case for three-valued models, the
operator Th is monotone: we have Th(M)  Th(N) whenever M  N .
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Notice that for any information state M , its theory contains all tautologies.
Furthermore, if we dene M = fm j m j= p or m j= qg, then p _ q 2 Th(M),
whereas neither p 2 Th(M) nor q 2 Th(M).
The previous examples (Denitions 2.2, 2.3 and 2.5) involve semantical notions
(models of a language), but this is not a requirement, as the next example illustrates.
Denition 2.6 (Syntactic states) Let L again be a propositional language with
consequence operator Cn. Let IS
syn
consist of all sets (of propositional formulae of
L) closed under propositional consequence, that is, IS
syn
= fS  L j Cn(S) = Sg,
where Cn(S) = f' 2 L j S j= 'g. Dene the ordering  by S  T , S  T . The
function Th is the identity: Th(S) = S.
Given these denitions, for a (not necessarily linearly ordered) set A  IS
syn
it
holds that lub(A) = Cn(
[
S2A
S) and glb(A) =
\
S2A
S.
In a sense, the syntactic states of Denition 2.6 are the syntactical counterpart
to the epistemic states of Denition 2.5. Let us denote the function Th of IS
ep
by
Th
ep
and the one of IS
syn
by Th
syn
. Given an epistemic state M 2 IS
ep
, dene
S(M) = Th
ep
(M). It is easy to see that Cn(S(M)) = S(M) so that S(M) 2 IS
syn
.
Furthermore, Th
syn
(S(M)) = Th
ep
(M). Going the other way, let S 2 IS
syn
be a
syntactic state. Dene M(S) = Mod (S), where Mod (S) = fm j m is a valuation
such that m j= ' for all ' 2 Sg. Then M(S) 2 IS
ep
and Th
ep
(M(S)) = Th
syn
(S).
This means that any description of reasoning involving epistemic states, can be
phrased equivalently using syntactic states, and vice versa.
We are now ready to formalize the rst three levels of abstraction.
2.1 Level 1: nal conclusion set
A description of reasoning at level 1 involves specication of a nal set of conclusions,
given a set of initial facts. This can be formalized by an operator that assigns
information states (holding these nal conclusions) to sets of formulae.
Denition 2.7 (Final belief state operator) A nal belief state operator
(FBSO) is a function  : P(L)! IS.
Given a set of initial facts X  L, the reasoning process of the agent gives rise
to a unique information state, (X), containing the conclusions Th((X)). Many
examples of FBSOs occur in the literature, of which three are described below.
One of the most well-known FBSOs is the consequence operator Cn of a classical
logic. Given the information state frame of Denition 2.6, the consequence operator
of propositional logic is easily seen to be a nal belief state operator.
A preferential logic ([Sho87], [Sho88], [Mak94]) consists of a classical logic, given
by a language L, a model class Mod, and a satisfaction relation j=  L  Mod,
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together with a partial order < on Mod. A model m 2 Mod is called a minimal
model of a set of formulae A  L, denoted m j=
<
A, if m j= A (meaning that m j= '
for all ' 2 A), and there is no other model in Mod which is smaller than m in the
ordering < which satises A.
Example 2.8 (Preferential logic) Let hL;Cn; IS
ep
;;Thi be the information
state frame of Denition 2.5. Given a preferential logic (L;Mod; j=;<), dene

<
(X) = fm 2 Mod j m j=
<
Xg.
Based on this FBSO, a nonmonotonic entailment relation j

can be dened by
A j

' , ' 2 Th(
<
(A)). Although the technical details dier, the notion of
preferential logic and the entailment relation dened here, are very similar to those
in [KLM90] (see also Sections 9.2 and 9.3). There are also examples of syntactically
dened FBSOs (these will be studied more thoroughly in Chapter 10).
The eld of belief revision is concerned with the addition and removal of informa-
tion to or from a set of beliefs ([AGM85] is the most inuential paper in this area).
This phenomenon is modeled by expansion, contraction and revision operators. An
expansion operator + is a function that assigns to a set of beliefs K, and a formula
', a new set of beliefs, K + ', the addition of ' to K. Removal of information
is modeled by a contraction operator  
.
, that assigns to a set of beliefs K and a
formula ', a new set of beliefs K  
.
', which is the result of removing ' from K.
Expanding a set of beliefs K by a formula ' may result in an inconsistent belief
set (if :' was a member of K). Revision operators also add a formula to a set of
beliefs, but without causing inconsistency. [AGM85] gives a number of postulates
that these operators should satisfy, commonly called the AGM postulates for belief
revision (see Example 10.44, where the postulates for contraction are given).
Example 2.9 (Belief revision) Let IS
syn
,  and Th be as in Denition 2.6, and
let + be an expansion operator and  
.
be a contraction operator, satisfying the AGM
postulates. For a formula ' 2 L, dene the following two operators:

+'
(X) = Cn(X) + '

 '
(X) = Cn(X) 
.
':
The AGM postulates ensure that the result of expansion or contraction of an in-
formation state, is again an information state (specically, it is closed under propo-
sitional consequence).
The denition of a nal belief state operator is quite general, and admits all
sorts of operators, however ill-behaved. A number of requirements can be posed on
FBSOs that ensure better behavior.
Denition 2.10 (Properties of FBSOs) Let  : P(L) ! IS be a nal belief
state operator.
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1. The operator  satises inclusion if for all X  L: X  Th((X));
2. The operator  satises monotony if for all X;Y  L: X  Y ) (X) 
(Y ).
3. The operator  satises cautious monotony if for all X;Y  L: X  Y 
Th((X))) (X)  (Y ).
4. The operator  satises cut if for all X;Y  L: X  Y  Th((X)) )
(Y )  (X).
5. The operator  satises invariance if for all X  L: (X) = (C
L
(X)).
The properties given above are certainly not meant as mandatory requirements
for any FBSO. The operator 
 '
of Example 2.9, for example, should remove part of
the input, and should therefore not satisfy inclusion. The operator associated with
a preferential logic (which is meant to describe nonmonotonic reasoning) should in
general not satisfy monotony. Let us review the examples to see which properties
are satised by them.
It is well-known that the operator Cn of propositional logic satises all proper-
ties. The operator 
<
of a preferential logic satises inclusion, invariance and cut.
Under certain restrictions (smoothness ; see [KLM90]) it satises cautious monot-
ony. Monotony is in general not satised, although it is possible, depending on the
partial order <. The expansion operator 
+'
satises all properties (it is shown in
[AGM85] that the only expansion operator possible assigns Cn(X [ f'g) to X and
'). The contraction operator 
 '
does not satisfy inclusion, but satises invariance,
cautious monotony, and cut (the properties of monotony, cautious monotony, and
cut are usually dened only for operators satisfying inclusion). It does not need to
satisfy monotony.
An FBSO  based on the information states of Denition 2.5, is called a model
operator in [EHT95] (see also [Her94]) if it satises inclusion.
2.2 Level 2: set of belief sets
A description of reasoning on level 2 involves specication of possible belief sets,
given the initial facts. This can be formalized by an operator that assigns a set of
information states (each holding the information of one possible belief set) to each
set of formulae.
Denition 2.11 (Multiple belief state operator) A multiple belief state oper-
ator (MBSO) is a function   : P(L)! P(IS).
Given a set of initial factsX  L, the reasoning process of the agent may lead to a
number of possible information states, which together form  (X). These information
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states are possible views on the domain, sanctioned by the reasoning, given the initial
facts. Such operators have not been studied extensively in the literature (but see
[Mak94], where extension family operators are dened and [Voo93] where extension
operations are dened), even though the phenomenon that a set of initial facts may
have more than one intended outcome, occurs often in nonmonotonic reasoning. We
will give some examples.
Example 2.12 (Default logic) A thorough introduction to default logic will be
given in Section 3.1, and the reader unfamiliar with default logic is invited to read
that section rst. Let D be a set of defaults. For X  L, let Ext(D;X) denote
the set of Reiter extensions of the default theory hD;Xi. Dene the operator B
dl
D
by B
dl
D
(X) = Ext(D;X). Given the information state frame of syntactic states of
Denition 2.6, this denes a multiple belief state operator. A semantic version  
dl
D
of this operator can be dened by  
dl
D
(X) = fMod(E) j E 2 Ext(D;X)g (see the
discussion after Denition 2.6). This semantic operator  
dl
D
can also be given a
direct denition, in the spirit of preferential logic. A preference relation <
D
on sets
of models is introduced in [Eth87], along with a notion of D-stability of a set of
models. In [Eth87] it is shown that  
dl
D
(X) = fM  Mod (X) j M is <
D
-minimal
and D- stableg.
In this same fashion, autoepistemic logic (see [Moo85], [Kon94]) gives rise to an
MBSO. Again, we defer an introduction of autoepistemic logic to later (Section 5.6).
Example 2.13 (Autoepistemic logic) Consider the information state frame of
Denition 2.6, but with a propositional modal language L, and Cn denotes modal
provability in the minimal modal logic K. Dene the operator B
ael
by B
ael
(X) =
fS  L j S is an autoepistemic expansion of Xg.
The last example is again taken from belief revision.
Example 2.14 (Belief revision) Let the information state frame again be the one
of Denition 2.6. Given a set A of propositional formulae that is closed under propo-
sitional consequence, and a formula ', dene A ? ' = fB j B  Anf'g;Cn(B) = B
and B is minimal with respect to these requirements g. Dene the MBSO  
 '
by
 
 '
(X) = Cn(X) ? '. The information states in  
 '
(X) all represent ways of
removing ' from X , while retaining as much of X as possible. A priori, there is no
preference for any of these possibilities (if there is more than one).
One can formulate properties of multiple belief state operators, as was done for
nal belief state operators previously. Some of these properties are generalizations
of properties of FBSOs, but others are specic for MBSOs.
Denition 2.15 (Properties of MBSOs) Let   : P(L) ! P(IS) be a multiple
2.2 Level 2: set of belief sets 19
belief state operator.
1. The operator   satises inclusion if for all X  L: X  Th(M) for all
M 2  (X);
2. The operator   satises non-inclusiveness if for all X  L and M , N 2  (X):
M  N )M = N ;
3. The operator   satises invariance if for all X  L:  (X) =  (C
L
(X)).
The properties of monotony, cautious monotony and cut can also be generalized,
see Chapter 10. The operators of Example 2.12, 2.13 and 2.14 all satisfy invariance.
Inclusion is satised by the operators of default logic and autoepistemic logic, not
by the belief revision operator. Non-inclusiveness is not satised by the operator of
autoepistemic logic, but it is satised by the other two.
Multiple belief state operators give a description of reasoning at level 2. There
are a number of well-established possibilities of abstraction of an MBSO, yielding a
level 1 description. The sceptic approach retains only that information common to
all possible information states. The choice approach chooses one of the information
states. Both possibilities fall under a more general scheme we will describe below.
Denition 2.16 (Selection operator) A selection operator is a function s : P(IS)
! P(IS) such that
 s(A)  A,
 s(A) 6= ; whenever A 6= ;.
If for every A  IS, the set s(A) contains exactly one element, we call s single-valued.
Denition 2.17 (FBSO associated to an MBSO)
1. For a multiple belief state operator   : P(L) ! P(IS), the associated nal
belief state operator 
 
: P(L)! IS is dened by 
 
(X) = glb( (X)). Let a
selection operator s be given. Then the nal belief state operator 
s
 
associated
to   and s, is dened by 
s
 
(X) = glb(s( (X))).
2. For a given FBSO  : P(L) ! IS, dene  

= f  j   is an MBSO with

 
= g.
The operator 
 
is in a sense sceptical: it only yields information common in all
possibilities of  , but as much of this as possible. The conclusions given by the FBSO
associated to the operator  
dl
of default logic, are also called the sceptical conclusions
in default logic. The operator 
 
 '
associated to the MBSO of Example 2.14 yields
a special kind of contraction, called full meet contraction in [AGM85].
Before performing this operation of taking the information common in the pos-
sible information states, a selection operator allows us to consider only a subset of
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possibilities. This subset can consist of the `best' possible information states, that is,
most interesting, most descriptive, most probable, most preferred, etc. By taking the
identity function as selection operator, we again get 
 
. If we take a single-valued
selection operator s, i.e., one which assigns a singleton information state to each
non-empty set of information states, we get the choice approach. If s( (X)) = fY g,
then 
s
 
(X) = glb(s( (X))) = glb(fY g) = Y 2  (X).
In general, for an FBSO , the set  

may contain many MBSOs. It contains
at least one trivial operator  , dened by  (X) = f(X)g.
Given a multiple belief state operator   that satises certain properties, one can
ask whether these are transferred to corresponding properties of 
s
 
. Some of these
correspondences are given below (see also Chapter 10).
Proposition 2.18 (Transfer of properties from level 2 to level 1) Let a mul-
tiple belief state operator  , a selection operator s and their associated nal belief
state operator 
s
 
be given.
1. If   satises invariance, then 
s
 
satises invariance.
2. Suppose the operator Th is monotone (N  M ) Th(N)  Th(M)). If  
satises inclusion, then 
s
 
satises inclusion.
Proof: Straightforward. 2
2.3 Level 3: set of reasoning traces
A description of reasoning processes at level 3 involves specication of a set of
reasoning traces. Reasoning is viewed, on level 3, as a stepwise process. The agent
starts, having a certain information state, and performs some operation(s) on this
information state, yielding a new information state. In this new state, the agent may
again perform some operation(s). This results in a sequence of information states.
The operation performed on an information state may be an elementary inference
step in some classical logic, it may be application of a default rule (or some other
nonmonotonic inference), but it may also be an observation or a communication
act. During the reasoning, the world the agent reasons about, may either change or
remain the same. If the world remains the same, the agent's knowledge about this
world changes as a result of obtaining new information, drawing new conclusions and
making new default assumptions. If the world changes, then this provides additional
reasons for the agent's knowledge to change: observations (and communications)
performed before may later be invalidated by new observations.
A reasoning process may go on forever, or it may terminate. To make the for-
malization uniform, we will nevertheless represent such a nite process as an innite
sequence, but one in which from a certain index onwards, nothing changes. The
natural numbers (0, 1, 2, ...) are denoted by N.
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Denition 2.19 (Reasoning trace)
1. A reasoning trace M is a sequence (M
i
)
i2N
where M
i
2 IS for all i 2 N.
ViewingM as a function from N to IS, we will sometimes denoteM
i
asM(i).
The set of all reasoning traces is denoted as Traces(IS).
2. A reasoning trace M is called end-conservative if there exists an index k 2 N
such that M
i
 M
i+1
for all i  k (where  is the ordering of IS). If k = 0,
then M is simply called conservative.
3. A reasoning traceM is called eager if for all s 2 N: M
s
=M
s+1
)M
s
=M
t
for all t > s.
In an end-conservative reasoning trace, no information is lost from a certain
index onwards. This means that the agent may not forget or revise its knowledge.
Finite processes (in which M
i
is constant from some index onwards) are certainly
end-conservative. Eager processes model reasoning of an agent that never waits:
if at a certain transition the information state is not changed (the agent has not
performed any reasoning) then this must mean that the agent is nished.
For many reasoning processes, we are interested in the conclusions reached dur-
ing this process. This is not always the case: for an agent continually performing
observations (or communications) in a changing world, conclusions reached during
some stage may be incorrect later (when the world has changed). For a nite pro-
cess, however, there is a clear notion of the nal conclusions. The exact property
a reasoning process has to satisfy for such a notion of \nal conclusions", or \limit
model" to make sense, is end-conservativity.
Denition 2.20 (Limit model) Let M be an end-conservative trace, where k is
an index as mentioned in Denition 2.19. The limit model lim M of M, is dened
as: lim M = lub(fM
i
j i  kg).
Note that for end-conservative traces, lim M is well-dened as fM
i
j i  kg is
a linearly ordered set with respect to the ordering on IS. The least upper bound of
such a set is assumed to exist by Denition 2.1. The denition is independent of the
particular index k taken.
Given a set of initial facts, the reasoning trace certainly does not have to be
uniquely determined. In the presence of default knowledge, there are often multiple
choices of which default conclusions to add. But also observations or communica-
tion may lead to dierent traces, based on what is observed (communicated). The
(internal) reasoning behavior of an agent can be captured by the set of all possible
reasoning traces it can generate.
Denition 2.21 (Reasoning frame operator) A reasoning frame operator is a
function T : P(L) ! P(Traces(IS)), such that for all X  L, for all traces M 2
T (X): Th(M
0
) = C
L
(X). If T (X) consists of (end-)conservative traces for each
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X  L, then T is called (end-)conservative. If T (X) consists of eager traces for each
X  L, then T is called eager.
The requirement on the function T makes sure that a trace starts with the informa-
tion state holding the input facts.
Reasoning frames operators are generated by any (step-wise) form of reasoning.
We will give some examples.
Example 2.22 (Proof systems) Consider a classical Hilbert-style proof system,
with axioms and derivation rules. A proof in such a system consists of a sequence
of formulae, where each formula is either an axiom, or the result of the application
of a derivation rule to some formula(e) earlier in the sequence. Let the information
states be sets of formulae (not necessarily closed under classical consequence), with
the ordering of set inclusion. The closure operation is the identity function. In the
reasoning trace corresponding to the construction of such a proof, the information
state (of the agent) at a certain index consists of the formulae in the proof until and
including the formula derived at that index. The reasoning trace is conservative (as
the sets of derived formulae form a non-decreasing sequence); as it is not forbidden
to prove a formula twice in the same proof, the trace need not be eager (although one
could restrict oneself to eager traces). Viewing this as a reasoning process without
input, one could dene a reasoning frame operator that assigns the set of all traces
as dened above, to the empty set, and assigns the empty set of traces to all other
input sets. Alternatively, one could see the axioms as the input, or one could allow
extra premises to be input. The traces would then start with an information state in
which all axioms (all extra premises) are known to the agent. The traces are further
constructed as sketched above. See Section 5.4 for a semantical treatment of proof
systems.
Another example of a form of reasoning is design.
Example 2.23 (Design) Consider a software agent that gets as its input a partial
design (of, for instance, an artifact; this partial design may be empty), together with
a number of requirements the complete design has to fulll. The task of the agent
is to complete the partial design, fullling the requirements. At each reasoning
step, the agent may instantiate a parameter of the design (such as the height of
the object), and check if no requirement has been violated yet. Also, the agent may
decide that the requirements are too strict (or contradictory), and communicate with
its user to negotiate about the requirements. A run of this system, starting with the
input partial design together with the requirements, and yielding a complete design,
can be formalized as a reasoning trace. Usually, there is more than one possible
complete design, so we can take the set of all reasoning traces corresponding to
a run of the system leading to a complete design. A reasoning frame operator is
dened by assigning to a set of inputs (a partial design and requirements), the set
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of all traces corresponding to a run of the system on this input (see [BLRT94] and
[BLT96]).
In Chapter 3, some more examples are treated.
Besides the properties of individual traces mentioned in Denition 2.19, there
are other interesting properties of reasoning frame operators.
Denition 2.24 (Properties of reasoning frame operators) Let T be an end-
conservative reasoning frame operator.
1. The operator T satises non-inclusiveness, if for all X  L and M , N 2
T (X):
lim M lim N ) lim M = lim N :
2. The operator T satises uniqueness of traces, if for all X  L and M , N 2
T (X):
lim M = lim N )M = N :
3. The operator T satises invariance if for all X  L: T (X) = T (C
L
(X)).
The rst property is analogous to the property with the same name for MBSOs,
and the second property species that from an initial state, there can not be two
dierent ways of reaching the same conclusions. Again, these properties are certainly
not supposed to hold for all reasoning frame operators.
Reasoning frame operators describe reasoning at abstraction level 3. For traces
which are not end-conservative, there is no (natural) notion of a limit information
state, so it makes no sense to aim at a level 2 description of the same reasoning
process. For frames consisting of end-conservative traces, there is a natural way of
abstracting a level 3 description into a description on level 2.
Denition 2.25 (MBSO associated to reasoning frame operator)
1. Let T be an end-conservative reasoning frame operator. Dene the MBSO  
T
by
 
T
(X) = flim M jM 2 T (X)g:
2. Given an MBSO  , dene T
 
= fT j T is an end-conservative reasoning frame
operator such that  
T
=  g.
Given an end-conservative reasoning frame operator, there is a unique associated
MBSO. Going the other way, there are in general many dierent sequences leading
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from an initial state to a nal state, so T
 
may contain many reasoning frames.
There is (as was the case when going from FBSOs to MBSOs) a trivial way of
associating a trace with a pair (X;M) where M 2  (X): the rst state in the trace
is an information state N capturing the initial facts (Th(N) = C
L
(X)), and all
conclusions of M are drawn in one step: all other states in the trace are equal to M .
Assigning to each X  L the set of such traces for each pair (X;M) with M 2  (X),
yields an end-conservative reasoning frame operator in T
 
.
There are again correspondences between properties of a reasoning frame oper-
ator, and properties of the associated MBSO.
Proposition 2.26 (Transfer of properties from level 3 to level 2) Let T be
an end-conservative reasoning frame operator.
1. If T satises non-inclusiveness, then  
T
satises non-inclusiveness;
2. If T satises invariance, then  
T
satises invariance.
3. If T is conservative and Th is monotone then  
T
satises inclusion.
Both the space T
 
dened above and the space  

(of MBSOs whose associated
MBSO is ) may be quite large. One can dene a parameterization of these spaces
to gain more insight in their structure (see [EHT95]).
2.4 Conclusions and related work
In this chapter, we have given a semantical formalization of the rst three levels of
abstraction of Chapter 1. That is, we have given a class of (mathematical) objects
that are abstractions (at dierent levels) of the processes of reasoning that may occur
in the real world. This involved the notion of an information state, but as the exact
nature of these states is not essential, we have left them abstract. Examples were
given of information states, and of FBSOs, MBSOs and reasoning frame operators.
When we take the information states to be sets of formulae, then FBSOs are just
consequence operations (see [Mak94]). The extension family functions of [Mak94]
and the extension operations of [Voo93] are MBSOs under the same information
state frame. Our selection functions are briey mentioned as choice functions in
[Mak94], although the choice mechanism in particular nonmonotonic logics occurred
earlier (as, for instance, for default logic, [Rei80b]). The level 3 description, using
traces, is new, to our knowledge, in the eld of (nonmonotonic) reasoning (with the
possible exception of step-logic, see Section 5.8). Trace semantics for processes in
general (not necessarily reasoning processes) is of course known from process algebra
(see for instance [BW90]), and the temporal semantics of programs (see for instance
[Kro87]) can also be seen as such, if we view a (linear) temporal model as a trace.
This perspective will play a role in later chapters. There are also logics for modeling
(database) updates (such as transaction logic, see [BK93, BK95]) or the behavior
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of object-oriented systems (such as Troll, see [JSHS96]) with a semantics based on
traces. These two approaches (and some others) are described and illustrated in
[EEF
+
98].
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Chapter 3
Specication of Reasoning
Reasoning can be formalized semantically on dierent levels of abstraction by nal
belief state operators, multiple belief state operators, and reasoning frame operators.
In this section, a number of well-known specication languages for these (mathe-
matical) objects will be described. A specication language consists of a (formal)
language, together with a semantics, that is, a way of assigning a mathematical
structure to (sets of) sentences of the language. If these mathematical structures
are, for instance, reasoning traces, then a theory (set of sentences) in the specica-
tion language species (a set of) reasoning traces. The language can then be called a
specication language for level 3. The use of a suitable specication language is that
it gives a precise, insightful and succinct way of identifying a set of (mathematical)
objects. To get back to an example we gave earlier, the formula p _ q is a precise,
insightful and succinct way of identifying the set of all valuations in which either p
or q is true, or both. We shall start by showing that default logic is a specication
language for levels 1, 2 and 3.
3.1 Default logic
Reiter's default logic ([Rei80b], see also [ Luk90], [Eth87]) is a nonmonotonic logic
which aims at formalizing defeasible reasoning. The basic idea is that an agent has
two kinds of knowledge. Firstly, it has knowledge (about the world) of which it is
certain: this knowledge consists of facts and general rules which are certainly true,
called the axioms. Secondly, it has a number of default rules: rules whose conclusion
is not certain, given the premise, but usually, or normally true. The generic example
of such a rule is that birds normally y. The defeasibility of this rule lies in the fact
that not all birds y: the generic (but not normal) exception to this rule is the
penguin Tweety, who does not y.
Let L be a propositional language (we will restrict ourselves to the propositional
case, although the denitions in [Rei80b] are for rst-order predicate logic). A default
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rule is an expression
( : 
1
; : : : ; 
n
=)
where , 
1
through 
n
and  are propositional formulae of L. The formula 
is called the prerequisite of the rule, 
1
; : : : ; 
n
are the justications, and  is the
conclusion. The intended reading of this expression is:
if you believe , and 
1
through 
n
are consistent with what you believe,
then you can conclude .
The complexity of default logic (both computationally and conceptually) is caused
by the justications: the 
i
may be consistent with what you believe now, but may
become inconsistent later (when adding other default conclusions). So, in order
to determine if a rule may be applied now, it is necessary to know which other
conclusions will be added. This phenomenon determines the necessity of the xpoint
construction in the denition below.
An agent performing default reasoning has axioms and default rules. Formally,
a default theory is a pair hD;W i, where D is a set of default rules, and W is a set
of propositional formulae. Using the default rules, the agent extends W to a set of
conclusions (formulae), called an extension. This can in general be done in multiple
ways. The denition of an extension below is not Reiter's original denition, but a
(slight) variant of a denition shown to be equivalent in [Rei80b].
Denition 3.1 (Extension of a default theory) Let hD;W i be a default the-
ory.
1. A set of sentences E is an extension of hD;W i if E =
1
[
i=0
E
i
where the sets E
i
are dened as follows:
E
0
= Cn(W ); and for i  0:
E
i+1
= Cn(E
i
[ f j (; 
1
; : : : ; 
n
)= 2 D; 2 E
i
and :
j
=2 E for 1  j  ng):
2. The set of extensions of hD;W i is denoted by Ext(D;W ).
3. If a formula ' occurs in all extensions of hD;W i, it is called a sceptical conse-
quence of hD;W i. If ' occurs in at least one extension, it is called a credulous
consequence.
Note the dependence of the sets E
i
on the set E. It is straightforward to check
that for an extension E, it holds that E = Cn(E), E
i
= Cn(E
i
), and E
i
 E
i+1
for
i 2 N.
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Denition 3.2 (Trace of an extension) For an extension E, let the sets E
i
be
dened as in Denition 3.1. The sequence fMod(E
i
)g
i2N
is called the trace of E,
and is denoted as Tr(E).
The name `trace' of an extension is of course not a coincidence: given the in-
formation states IS
ep
of Denition 2.5, a sequence fMod(E
i
)g
i2N
is a reasoning
trace. Now let a set of defaults D be xed. For every set of propositional for-
mulae X , one can consider the default theory hD;Xi. Now dene an operator
Tr
D
: P(L)! P(Traces(IS
ep
)) by
Tr
D
(X) = fTr(E) j E 2 Ext(D;X)g:
It is easy to check that this is a reasoning frame operator. Viewed this way, default
logic (specically, sets of defaults) oers a specication language for reasoning frame
operators. The reasoning frame operators thus specied enjoy a number of properties
(which are straightforward to prove):
Proposition 3.3 (Properties of default logic reasoning frame operators)
Let D be a set of default rules.
1. For any X  L and E 2 Ext(D;X), the trace of E is conservative and eager.
2. The reasoning frame operator Tr
D
satises non-inclusiveness, uniqueness of
traces and invariance.
Another property of the trace Tr(E) of an extension E, is that lim Tr(E) = Mod (E).
Let us recall the denition of the operator  
dl
D
from Example 2.12:  
dl
D
(X) =
fMod(E) j E 2 Ext(D;X)g. This operator is the MBSO associated with Tr
D
,
i.e.,  
Tr
D
=  
dl
D
. This means that default logic can also be viewed as a specication
language for MBSOs. In fact, Reiter's original denition did not use traces, but a
xpoint operator.
Proposition 3.4 (Reiter's original denition) Let hD;W i be a default theory.
Dene an operator  : P(L) ! P(L) as follows. For S  L, (S) is the smallest
set satisfying:
D1 W  (S);
D2 (S) = Cn((S));
D3 If (; 
1
; : : : ; 
n
)= 2 D,  2 (S) and :
1
; : : : ;:
n
=2 S, then  2 (S).
A set of formulae E is an extension if and only if (E) = E.
Proof: See [Rei80b]. 2
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As the operator  depends on the default theory hD;W i, it can be denoted by

hD;W i
. Then the operator B
dl
D
(of Example 2.12) can also be dened by B
dl
D
(X) =
fE  L j 
hD;Xi
(E) = Eg. It is easily seen that the FBSO 
B
dl
D
associated with
B
dl
D
gives the sceptical conclusions:

B
dl
D
(X) = glb(B
dl
D
(X)) =
\
fE j E 2 B
dl
D
(X)g =
\
fE j E 2 Ext(D;X)g:
A set of defaults thus species an FBSO 
B
dl
D
. As default logic can be used to specify
reasoning frame operators, MBSOs and FBSOs, it oers a specication language for
reasoning processes at levels 1, 2 and 3.
3.2 Logic programming
The eld of logic programming originally studied subsets of predicate logic that
can be executed ([Kow74]). Gradually, with the introduction of negation as fail-
ure, it became part of the elds of knowledge representation and nonmonotonic
reasoning. One of the main impetuses of the eld was the development of ecient
implementations of logic programming languages, like PROLOG. We will give a
brief introduction to positive logic programming; other variants will be discussed
later (in Section 5.3). We will use the information state frame of two-valued states
of Denition 2.2.
Denition 3.5 (Positive logic program) Let P be a set of propositional atoms.
A positive logic program is a set of rules of the form p
0
 p
1
; : : : ; p
n
, where p
i
2 P
for 0  i  n. When n = 0, p
0
 is called a fact.
A rule p
0
 p
1
; : : : ; p
n
has the following meaning: if the reasoning agent has
derived the atoms p
1
; : : : ; p
n
, then it can also derive p
0
. The intuitive semantics of
a program is that an atom is true if it can be derived from the program, and false
otherwise (this is the negation as failure).
Denition 3.6 (Immediate consequence operator) Let Q be a positive logic
program. Dene the immediate consequence operator T
Q
: IS! IS by:
T
Q
(m)(p) =
8
<
:
1 if m(p) = 1 or if there is a rule p p
1
; : : : ; p
n
2 Q
such that m(p
i
) = 1 for 1  i  n ;
0 otherwise
The immediate consequence operator denes what the agent can derive in one
reasoning step. A reasoning trace associated with a logic program thus arises natu-
rally as the repeated application of this operator.
Denition 3.7 (Reasoning frame operator of a logic program) Let Q be a
positive logic program. For a valuation n 2 IS
2val
, dene the sequence tr
Q
(n) =
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fm
i
g
i2N
by
m
0
= n , and for i  0 :
m
i+1
= T
Q
(m
i
):
Given a set of inputs X  P , let m
X
be the valuation dened by: m
X
(p) = 1 i
p 2 X . Now dene the reasoning frame operator T
Q
by
T
Q
(X) = ftr
Q
(m
X
)g:
It is well-known that a trace of a logic program is conservative and eager. The
reasoning frame operator of a positive logic program is very well-behaved. For
every set of input facts, there is a unique trace, so the reasoning frame satises
non-inclusiveness and uniqueness of traces. The associated MBSO,  
T
Q
, is sim-
ple:  
T
Q
(X) = flim tr
Q
(m
X
)g, and its associated FBSO, which we will denote
by  to avoid nested subscripts, is given by (X) = lim tr
Q
(m
X
). The valuation
lim tr
Q
(m
X
) is what is classically considered to be the semantics of a programQ[X
(where an atom p 2 X is identied with a fact p  ). There is also a denition of
this semantics that does not use traces (or the immediate consequence operator).
Proposition 3.8 (Minimal model of a positive program) For a positive logic
program Q, consider the set A(Q)  IS, dened as
A(Q) = fm 2 IS j m j= p
1
^ : : : ^ p
n
! p
0
for every rule p
0
 p
1
; : : : ; p
n
2 Qg:
Then A(Q) has a minimum (with respect to (IS;)), denoted by Minmod(Q), and
it holds:
Minmod(Q) = lim tr
Q
(m
;
):
This means that we can also directly dene (X) = Minmod (Q [X).
Logic programming (with positive programs) oers a specication language for
reasoning on levels 1, 2 and 3, although it is a language with restricted expressiveness:
for level 2, for instance, only MBSOs containing a single information state can be
dened. Many extensions of positive logic programming exist which allow a set of
input facts to have more than one trace. These extensions invariably allow default
negation in a rule, and we will consider some extensions later on (Section 5.3).
3.3 Temporal logic
A reasoning process performed by an agent was assumed to be a stepwise process.
The following is a simple but important observation:
The steps in a reasoning process are steps in time.
32 Specication of Reasoning
In this view, the agent starts to reason at the rst point in time, with a set of
initial beliefs, and applies its reasoning mechanism, going to the next point in time,
again applies its reasoning mechanism to the information state it has at that point
in time, again going to a next point in time, and so on. A reasoning trace can thus
be regarded as a temporal model, where the natural numbers are the mathematical
formalization of time. (Of course it is a choice to model time in this way; a choice
which is often made in temporal specication of processes | see for example [Eme90]
| and which will turn out to allow many interesting phenomena to be described.
However, dierent models of time | see for example [Ben91b] |, for example innite
towards the past or dense, could also make sense and might be required for describing
some relevant features of reasoning processes.) A reasoning frame is then a set of
temporal models. This temporal element is implicitly present in default logic and
logic programming, but we want to make this explicit. A natural candidate for a
language to specify sets of temporal models, is (some variant of) temporal logic.
The idea of using temporal logic to specify processes, is of course not new. In
theoretical computer science, many temporal logics for specifying and reasoning
about the behavior of processes have been proposed and studied (see for instance
[Eme90, MP92]). However, the behavior specied in these temporal logics, is not
reasoning behavior but the behavior of (hardware) processors in a computer system.
For instance, a state of a processor (at a certain point in time) is very dierent from a
mental (information) state of a reasoning agent (which generally contains uncertain
and partial information). Therefore, new temporal logics should be introduced and
studied which are suited in particular for describing the behavior over time of a
reasoning agent. The next chapter describes a number of possibilities for such a
temporal logic. Properties and suitability of these logics are studied in later chapters.
3.4 Conclusions and related work
We have shown that both default logic and logic programming can be seen as spec-
ication languages for the mathematical formalizations of reasoning of Chapter 2,
on the rst three levels of abstraction. The denition of the trace of an extension,
although not called trace, is already in [Rei80b], and the notion of the immediate
consequence operator being applied iteratively to the empty set (generating a trace),
is also known (see for example [Prz90]). However, the interpretation of both frame-
works as specication languages on level 3 (and maybe also on level 2), is novel to
our knowledge.
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Chapter 4
Temporal Logics of
Information
Temporal logic can be used to specify processes, and to reason about their properties.
The idea of using temporal logic as a specication language was briey introduced in
the previous chapter. In this chapter, a number of temporal logics will be introduced
that are specically geared towards reasoning processes. After dening a number
of suitable temporal logics, at the end of this chapter a general denition is given
of the reasoning frame operator dened by a temporal theory in one of these logics.
Chapter 5 describes a number of forms of reasoning that can be specied in one of
these logics.
When designing a logic capable of describing the behavior of reasoning processes
over time, at least two important decisions have to be made: what is a state in a
reasoning process, and which formalization of time is suited best for the purpose?
To start with the rst question, a state should be an information state, and we have
seen a number of possibilities in Chapter 2. In order for a temporal logic to be a
specication language for level 3, it should be able to describe traces. One obvious
choice for the formalization of time, is to use linear discrete time with a starting
point, structures isomorphic to the natural numbers (or even the natural numbers
themselves). But another possibility is to use branching time structures. One branch
in such a structure also denes a reasoning trace. In theoretical computer science
there has been much debate whether time should be modeled as linear or branching
(towards the future) (e.g., see [BRR89]). The most important dierences between
these two approaches are that linear time logics have in general a lower complexity
but also less expressivity than the corresponding branching time logics.
Given these choices to be made on the nature of states and time, many dierent
temporal logics can be dened. Rather than setting up a general framework in which
these choices are parameters, we will describe a number of concrete temporal logics.
Logics based on a dierent choice of these parameters, can be dened by analogy.
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4.1 Temporal epistemic logic
In an information state, the agent has certain knowledge or belief. Epistemic modal
logics are intended to describe knowledge and belief of rational agents. The temporal
logic presented in this section, temporal epistemic logic (TEL), uses the epistemic
modal logic S5 to describe the information states of the agent. There has been much
discussion about the use of S5 for capturing the knowledge of an agent. We will take
the same position as taken by [FHMV95], namely that the appropriate formalization
of knowledge depends on the `application'. For many of our purposes, S5 is suitable
for playing that role and will be used, but for other purposes (such as the temporal
view on proof systems in Section 5.4), other logics will be used (such as partial logic,
see Section 4.2).
The temporal epistemic logic introduced in this section is meant to describe the
temporal epistemic behavior of the agent as seen from the outside, it is not the logic
to be used by the agent itself. (This use of logic is called external in [FHMV95];
see also the extensive discussion of these two uses of logic in [Lev90], where our use
is called objective. To quote from that paper: \Thus, logic is being used here as
a specication tool to describe a reasoner rather than as a calculus to be used by
one." TEL's intended use is exactly as such a \specication tool".)
As TEL is dened `on top of' S5 (TEL is the result of temporalizing S5, in the
terminology of [FG92]), we will rst give a brief introduction to S5.
4.1.1 S5
Propositional logic will be taken as the basic logic in which the agent can describe
its knowledge. A modal operator K is used to denote the agent's knowledge. The
agent may perform both positive and negative introspection.
Denition 4.1 (Epistemic language) Let P be a (nite or countably innite)
set of propositional atoms. The language L
S5
is the smallest set closed under:
 if p 2 P then p 2 L
S5
;
 if ';  2 L
S5
then K';' ^  ;:' 2 L
S5
.
Furthermore, we introduce the following abbreviations:
' _   :(:' ^ : ); '!   :' _  ;M'  :K:';>  p _ :p;?  :>:
If every atom occurring in a formula ' is in the scope of a K operator, we call '
subjective.
An example of a subjective formula is :Kp ^K(q ! p), whereas K(p ^ q) _ s
is not subjective. In the rest of this chapter we will only be interested in subjective
formulae since they describe (just) the knowledge and ignorance of the agent. On this
subset of subjective formulae, S5 coincides with the logic KD45, which is sometimes
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considered to be the logic of belief (the extra axiom of S5, K'! ', is valid in KD45
whenever ' is subjective).
In the usual S5 semantics, a model is a triple (W;R; ) where W is a set of
worlds, R is an equivalence relation on W and  is a function that assigns a propo-
sitional valuation to each world in W . In the case of one agent, however, we may
restrict ourselves to normal S5-models, in which the relation is universal (each world
is accessible from every other world), and worlds are identied with propositional
valuations (see [MH95] for a proof of soundness and completeness of S5 with respect
to these semantics). This is no longer true in the case of more than one agent.
Denition 4.2 (S5 semantics) A propositional valuation of signature P is a func-
tion from P into f0; 1g where 0 stands for false and 1 for true. The set of such
valuations will be denoted by Val(P ). A normal S5-model M is a non-empty set
of valuations. The truth of an S5-formula ' in such a model, evaluated in a world
m 2M , denoted (M;m) j=
S5
', is dened inductively:
(M;m) j=
S5
p , m(p) = 1, for p 2 P
(M;m) j=
S5
' ^  , (M;m) j=
S5
' and (M;m) j=
S5
 
(M;m) j=
S5
:' , it is not the case that (M;m) j=
S5
'
(M;m) j=
S5
K' , (M;m
0
) j=
S5
' for every m
0
2M
We have the following elementary results for subjective formulae:
Proposition 4.3 (Subjective formulae)
1. Let ' be a subjective formula. For a normal S5-model M and m
1
;m
2
2M it
holds:
(M;m
1
) j=
S5
', (M;m
2
) j=
S5
':
We dene M j=
S5
' i (M;m) j=
S5
' for some, or, equivalently, all m 2M .
2. An S5-formula ' is subjective if and only if it is equivalent to a formula of the
form K' with ' 2 L
S5
.
3. For any propositional formula  and S5-models M , N :
(M j=
S5
K & M  N)) N j=
S5
K
where  is the information order on IS
ep
.
Proof: Straightforward. 2
Note that a normal S5-model is the same as an epistemic state from IS
ep
of De-
nition 2.5, with the exception of the empty set, which is not an S5-model. Whenever
we talk about S5-models in the rest of this thesis, we will mean normal S5-models.
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4.1.2 Temporalizing S5
In S5, we can talk about the knowledge (or belief) of the agent at a xed point in
time. In order to describe past and future of the agent's knowledge, we introduce
temporal operators P , H , F , G, Y , X and 2, standing for \sometimes in the past",
\always in the past", \sometimes in the future", \always in the future", \at the
previous point in time", \at the next point in time" and \always" respectively. Note
that we do not want to talk about the agent's knowledge of the future and past, but
about the future and past of the agent's knowledge. Therefore temporal operators
need never occur within the scope of the epistemic K operator. This is reected in
the denition of the temporal epistemic language.
Denition 4.4 (Temporal epistemic language) The languageL
TEL
is the small-
est set closed under
 if ' 2 L
S5
is subjective, then ' 2 L
TEL
;
 if ;  2 L
TEL
then  ^ ;:; P; F; Y ;X 2 L
TEL
.
Again, the abbreviations for _, !, > and ? are introduced, as well as:
G  :F:;H  :P: and 2  H ^  ^G:
Based on the set of natural numbers as the ow of time and the notion of nor-
mal S5-model as formalization of a state, the following semantics is introduced for
temporal epistemic logic (TEL):
Denition 4.5 (Semantics of TEL) A TEL-model M is a sequence (M
t
)
t2N
of
normal S5-models. The truth of a formula ' 2 L
TEL
in M at time point t 2 N,
denoted (M; t) j= ', is dened inductively as follows:
(M; t) j= ' , M
t
j=
S5
', if ' 2 L
S5
(M; t) j= ' ^  , (M; t) j= ' and (M; t) j=  
(M; t) j= :' , it is not the case that (M; t) j= '
(M; t) j= P' , 9s 2 N such that s < t and (M; s) j= '
(M; t) j= F' , 9s 2 N such that t < s and (M; s) j= '
(M; t) j= Y ' , t > 0 and (M; t  1) j= '
(M; t) j= X' , (M; t+ 1) j= '
A formula ' is true in a model M , denoted M j= ', if for all t 2 N; (M; t) j= '. A
set of formulae T is true in a model M, denoted M j= T , if M j= ' for all ' 2 T .
If ' is true in all models we write j= ' (' is valid), and we write T j= ' (' is a
semantical consequence of T ) if for all models M and t 2 N; (M; t) j= T implies
(M; t) j= '. We will sometimes write M(t) for M
t
.
In Section 9.1, TEL is studied in more detail. In the next section we will impose
an extra restriction on our models.
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4.1.3 Conservativity
We want to use temporal formulae for describing the behavior of a reasoning agent.
The reasoning will be assumed to be conservative, that is, the agent's knowledge
increases as it is reasoning. Although the actual implementation of the reasoning
behavior may involve backtracking or the addition of extra assumptions which may
later be retracted, we are interested only in the increase of knowledge over time.
This presupposes a world which does not change.
It is easy to see that a temporal model is just a trace in the information state
frame hL;Cn ; IS
ep
;;Thi of Denition 2.5. This provides us with a denition of
conservativity of temporal models.
Denition 4.6 (Conservative models | TELC)
1. A TEL-model M is called conservative if it is conservative as a trace in the
information state frame of Denition 2.5, that is, if
M
s
M
s+1
8s 2 N:
2. Validity and semantical consequence restricted to the class of conservative
models (TELC-models) is denoted by j=
c
. The resulting logic will be called
TELC.
Note that for any conservative model M , time point s 2 N and propositional
formula ': if (M; s) j= K', then for t > s also (M; t) j= K'. This means that
whenever a propositional formula is known, it will remain known in the future. This
is of course not the case in general for non-propositional formulae. If we dene M
by M
0
= Val(P ) and M
i
= Mod(fpg) for i > 0 (where Mod (fpg) is the set of
propositional valuations in which p is true), then (M; 0) j= M:p and (M; 0) j=
KM:p but (M; 1) j= Kp so (M; 1) 6j= M:p and (M; 1) 6j= KM:p (and even
(M; 1) j= K:M:p).
The notion of a limit model of a conservative temporal epistemic model is dened
according to Denition 2.20.
Denition 4.7 (Limit model of a TELC-model) Let M be a TELC-model.
The limit of M is dened by:
lim M =
\
fM
s
j s 2 Ng:
The limit model of a TELC-model should reect all the conclusions the agent
has drawn over time (and nothing more). When the set of atoms P is innite,
however, it may be the case that although M
i
is non-empty for all i 2 N, the limit
is empty (and, therefore, not an S5-model). A special condition on temporal models
eliminates this possibility.
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Denition 4.8 (Closed model)
1. An S5-model M is closed if there is a consistent set of propositional formulae
T such that
M = fm 2 Val(P ) j m j= ' for all ' 2 Tg:
2. A TELC-model M is closed if M
s
is closed for all i 2 N.
The term `closed' is not arbitrary. If we dene an operator Cl : P(Val(P )) !
P(Val(P )) by
Cl(M) = Mod(Th(M))
where for a set A of propositional formulae, Mod (A) = fm 2 Val(P ) j m j=
' for all ' 2 Ag and Th(M) = f' j ' a propositional formula such that m j=
' for all m 2 Mg then Cl is a (Kuratowski) closure operator in the topological
sense (see for instance [War72]) and a model M is closed if and only if Cl(M) = M .
Furthermore, one can dene a metric on propositional valuations. Fix an enumera-
tion p
0
; p
1
; : : : of P , and dene d : Val(P )Val(P )! R by
d(m;n) =

0 if m = n
2
 j
if j is the smallest index such that m(p
j
) 6= n(p
j
):
Then d is a metric on Val(P ) and the closed S5-models are exactly the sets which
are closed with respect to the topology induced by d.
It is easy to see that in case P is nite, all S5-models are closed: for an S5-model
M , the set of propositional formulae T required in Denition 4.8 can be dened as
follows (it is even a singleton):
T = f
_
f
^
fp : m j= pg ^
^
f:p : m j= :pg j m 2Mgg:
Proposition 4.9 Let M be a closed TELC-model. Then lim M is an S5-model,
and for all propositional formulae ', and s 2 N:
(M; s) j= FK',M j= FK', lim M j=
S5
K'
or, equivalently,
Th(lim M) =
1
[
s=0
Th(M
s
):
Proof: The equivalence (M; s) j= FK' , M j= FK' follows straightforwardly
from conservativity and the denition of the F -operator, and does not depend on
closedness. Now suppose M is a closed TELC-model. This means that for ev-
ery s 2 N there must exist consistent sets T
s
of propositional formulae, such that
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M
s
= Mod(T
s
). Without loss of generality, these sets T
s
can be taken closed under
propositional consequence. As M is conservative, it must hold that T
0
 T
1
 : : : .
Then
1
[
s=0
T
s
is closed under propositional provability, and we have:
Th(lim M) = Th(
1
\
s=0
M
s
) (by denition of lim)
= Th(
1
\
s=0
Mod (T
s
)) (by assumption)
= Th(Mod(
1
[
s=0
T
s
))
= Cn(
1
[
s=0
T
s
)
=
1
[
s=0
T
s
(as
1
[
s=0
T
s
is closed under provability)
=
1
[
s=0
Th(M
s
) (by denition of T
s
and its closure under
provability):
It is easy to see that this implies that for all propositional formulae ' we have
M j= FK' , lim M j=
S5
K'. To show that lim M is an S5-model (i.e., that it
is non-empty), we only have to show that Th(lim M) is consistent in propositional
logic. This is equivalent to consistency of
1
[
s=0
Th(M
s
). If we can deduce falsity from
1
[
s=0
Th(M
s
), then by compactness, we can deduce it from a nite subset, which must
be contained in Th(M
s
) for some s 2 N. But this contradicts the fact that M
s
is
an S5-model. 2
4.2 Temporal partial logic
In the previous section, we introduced a temporal logic based on S5-models as in-
formation states. The variant of this logic using three-valued models as information
states is the subject of this section. So, we assume the information state frame
hL; C
L
; IS
3val
;;Thi of Denition 2.3.
Partial propositional logic can be temporalized in a way analogous to S5. In the
case of S5, there is an operator (K) referring to the knowledge of the agent, and
we only considered subjective formulae, which are essentially boolean combinations
of formulae K' with ' 2 L
S5
. For partial logic, we also introduce an operator,
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C, denoting the agent's knowledge. For a propositional formula ', the formula C'
means that the agent knows ' (this C-operator should not be confused with the
operator for `common knowledge' in epistemic logic with more than one agent, see
[FHMV95]).
Denition 4.10 (Temporal partial language) Let P be a (nite or countably
innite) set of propositional atoms. The language L
TPL
is the smallest set closed
under:
 if ' is a propositional formula then C' 2 L
TPL
;
 if ,  2 L
TPL
then  ^ , :, P, F , X, Y  2 L
TPL
.
Again the abbreviations for _, !, >, ?, H , G and 2 are introduced (see Deni-
tion 4.4).
The semantics of TPL are analogous to TEL.
Denition 4.11 (Semantics of TPL) A TPL-model is a sequence (M
t
)
t2N
where
M
t
2 IS
3val
for all t 2 N. We will often writeM(t) forM
t
. The truth of a formula
' 2 L
TPL
in M at time point t 2 N, denoted (M; t) j= ', is dened inductively as
follows:
(M; t) j= C , M
t
() = 1, if  is a propositional formula
(M; t) j= ' ^  , (M; t) j= ' and (M; t) j=  
(M; t) j= :' , it is not the case that (M; t) j= '
(M; t) j= P' , 9s 2 N such that s < t and (M; s) j= '
(M; t) j= F' , 9s 2 N such that t < s and (M; s) j= '
(M; t) j= Y ' , t > 0 and (M; t  1) j= '
(M; t) j= X' , (M; t+ 1) j= '
A formula ' is true in a modelM , denotedM j= ', if for all t 2 N; (M; t) j= '. For
a set of formulae T , (M; t) j= T means that (M; t) j= ' for all ' 2 T . If ' is true in
all models we write j= ' (' is valid), and for a set of formulae T we write T j= ' ('
is a semantical consequence of T ) if for all modelsM and t 2 N; (M; t) j= T implies
(M; t) j= '.
The C-operator allows us to express for instance that a propositional formula  is
unknown: :C ^ :C: is true in a partial model exactly when  has the value
unknown in the model.
We are again interested in conservative models. A TPL-modelM is conservative
if it is conservative as a trace in IS
3val
, i.e. if M
s
M
s+1
for all s 2 N, where  is
the information ordering on three-valued models of Denition 2.3.
Denition 4.12 (TPLC) Validity and semantical consequence restricted to the
class of conservative models (TPLC-models) will be denoted by j=
c
.
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As in the case of conservative TELC-models, the following holds: if M is a
conservative TPL-model, ' is a propositional formula, and for some s 2 N we have
(M; s) j= C', then for all t > s it holds that (M; t) j= C'.
The notion of a limit model of a conservative temporal partial model is again
dened according to Denition 2.20.
Denition 4.13 (Limit model of a TPLC-model) Let M be a TPLC-model.
The limit of M is dened by:
lim M(a) =
8
<
:
1 if there exists t 2 N such that M
t
(a) = 1
0 if there exists t 2 N such that M
t
(a) = 0
u otherwise
In temporal partial logic, the limit always contains exactly what has been derived
in time: for every propositional formula ' it holds:
M j= FC' , lim M(') = 1
M j= FC:' , lim M(') = 0:
Of course, there are many other temporal logics like TEL (TELC) and TPL
(TPLC), using other kinds of information states. In the next section, we will look
at branching time logics.
4.3 From linear to branching time
The temporal logics described in the previous two sections were based on linear
time. The dynamic behavior of a reasoning agent is formalized by a set of linear
time models. During the reasoning, the agent in a sense chooses one of these models.
A dierent way of formalization of the variety of patterns is by branching time
temporal models, where each branch represents one of the patterns.
Formalization by a set of linear time models has the advantage of a very simple
model structure. But the disadvantage is that the possible choices and the time
points at which they should be made are not covered explicitly in the formalization
itself. Branching time models represent these choices as points where the ow of time
branches. In this section, we will dene a branching time logic, parameterized by
the logic which is to be temporalized (this could be S5 or partial logic, or any other
logic). In the area of temporal specication of processes in theoretical computer
science, branching time logics have also been dened (and there has been, or is
still, a debate about the relative merits of linear and branching time; we hope this
section furthers the understanding of their interrelation somewhat), the most well-
known of which are CTL (see [EC82]) and CTL

(see [CES83]; an introduction and
comparison of both logics is given in [ES89]).
Given the fact that these approaches are formalizations of (more or less) the
same phenomenon, it is natural to study formal connections between them. The
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branches of a branching time temporal model can be viewed as linear time mod-
els. On the other hand, it may be possible to aggregate linear time models into
a branching time model. In [ET94a] universal (algebraic) constructions were de-
ned in category-theoretic terms, which enabled the study of these approaches and
connections between them. In this thesis, we will not treat this more general case.
Instead, the constructions of [ET94a] in the case of temporal models are given and
logical properties of these constructions are investigated.
4.3.1 Branching time logic
TEL is the result of temporalizing S5 over the natural numbers. Here, a class of time
structures will be dened which describe branching time. Such time structures will
be called ows of time. The logic that is to be temporalized, is kept abstract: we
assume an information state frame (Denition 2.1) is given which supplies us with
a language L
0
, states (IS) and a way of knowing which formulae are true in a state
(Th). We start by dening the ows of time.
4.3.1.1 Flows of time
Denition 4.14 (Flow of time) A (discrete) ow of time (T;<) is a pair consist-
ing of a nonempty set T of time points, and a binary relation < on T T , called the
immediate successor relation that is irreexive, antisymmetric and intransitive. For
s; t 2 T the expression s < t denotes that t is an immediate successor of s, and that
s is an immediate predecessor of t. We denote the (irreexive) transitive closure of
this binary relation < by . A ow of time is called linear if  is a total ordering.
Denition 4.15 (Sub-ft and branch)
1. A ow of time (T
0
; <
0
) is called a sub-ft (sub-ow of time) of a ow of time
(T;<) if T
0
 T and <
0
=< \ (T
0
 T
0
).
2. A sub-ow of time T
0
is right or successor (respectively left or predecessor)
complete in T with respect to t 2 T
0
if for all u 2 T with t  u (respectively
u t) it holds that u 2 T
0
.
3. A branch in a ow of time T is a sub-ft B = (T
0
; <
0
) of T such that:
(a) 
0
= \ (T
0
 T
0
) is a total ordering on T
0
 T
0
.
(b) Every s 2 T
0
with a successor in T also has a successor in T
0
:
for all s 2 T
0
; t 2 T : s < t) there is a t
0
2 T
0
: s < t
0
.
(c) Every t 2 T
0
with a predecessor in T also has a predecessor in T
0
:
for all s 2 T; t 2 T
0
: s < t) there is an s
0
2 T
0
: s
0
< t.
(d) For all s 2 T
0
; t 2 T; u 2 T
0
: s t u) t 2 T
0
.
Notice that branches can be viewed as linear temporal models.
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Denition 4.16 (Minimal element, root, path)
1. An element t of T is called a minimal element if there exists no s 2 T with
s < t. We call t a root if for all u 2 T it holds that u = t or t u.
2. We call T well-founded if there do not exist innite descending chains of ele-
ments s
i
< s
i 1
.
3. A (nite) path is a nite sequence of point s
0
; : : : ; s
n
such that s
i
< s
i+1
for
all 0  i  n   1. We call s
0
the starting point and s
n
the endpoint of the
path.
We will make additional assumptions on the ow of time: that it describes a
discrete tree structure where time branches in the direction of the future, and where
time is innite towards the future.
Denition 4.17 (Tree and forest)
1. The following properties on ows of time are dened:
(a) Successor existence
Every time point has at least one successor:
for all s 2 T there exists a t 2 T such that s < t.
(b) Rooted
A ow of time is rooted if it has a root.
(c) Left linear
For all t the set of s with s t is totally ordered by .
2. A ow of time is called a tree if it is rooted and left linear.
3. A ow of time is called a forest if it is well-founded and left linear.
Note that a forest is just a disjoint union of trees. From now on we will assume
all ows of time to be forests satisfying successor existence.
Observation 4.18 Suppose T is a forest. Every non-minimal element has a unique
predecessor. For every non-minimal t 2 T there is a unique minimal element m with
m  t and a unique path with t as end point and m as starting point; this path
gives a nite ordered enumeration of fs j s tg [ ftg.
The number of elements in the path from t to its corresponding minimal element,
minus one, is called the depth of t. Using this depth function the time points of a
branch may be identied with N. We will sometimes, if no confusion can arise, use
the same character < to denote two dierent relations on dierent sets, for example
as in (T;<) and (T
0
; <).
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4.3.1.2 Temporal models
A temporal model is based on a ow of time, with an information state associated
to each point in time.
Denition 4.19 (Temporal model) Let (T;<) be a ow of time. A temporal
model M based on ow of time (T;<) is a triple (M; T;<), where M is a mapping
M : T ! IS:
So at any point in time we have an information state describing which knowledge
the reasoning process has deduced at that time. We will usually refer to M as a
temporal model based on (T;<). If ' is a formula from L
0
, and t is a time point in
T , and ' 2 Th(M(t)), then we say that in the modelM at time point t the formula
' is true.
Denition 4.20 The temporal model M
0
is a submodel of M if (T
0
; <
0
) is a sub-
ow of time of (T;<) with M(t) = M
0
(t) for all t 2 T
0
. We also call M
0
the
restriction of M to T
0
, denoted by Mj
T
0
. If T
0
is a branch of T then M
0
is called
a branch of M. For a temporal model M, the set of its branches is denoted by
Br(M).
4.3.1.3 Temporal formulae and their interpretation
We will now dene the temporal language L
T
in terms of the language L
0
using
temporal operators to describe truth of formulae over time. Because our temporal
models based on forests have a more dierentiated structure towards the future than
towards the past, we will need more operators describing the future than the past.
Essentially, we have taken the operators of CTL (see [BPM83]). Also, we do not
want any interaction between formulae of L
0
and temporal formulae. Therefore the
formulae of L
0
are \shielded" by an operator C (not to be confused with the operator
C for partial temporal logic dened earlier).
Denition 4.21 (Temporal language) The temporal language L
T
is dened to
be the least set such that:
1. ' 2 L
0
) C' 2 L
T
;
2. ';  2 L
T
) :'; ' ^  ; ' _  ; '!  2 L
T
;
3. ' 2 L
T
) O' 2 L
T
(where O 2 f9F;8F; 9G;8G; 9X;8X; P;Hg).
A temporal theory is a subset of L
T
.
The temporal language is similar to a modal propositional language where the
atomic propositions consist of the C operator applied to a formula in L
0
. In these
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denitions, for a temporal modelM based on (T;<), t 2 T , and  2 L
T
, (M; t) j= 
means that  is true in M at time point t.
Denition 4.22 (Semantics) Let a temporal model M based on (T;<), and a
time point t 2 T be given, then inductively dene:
1. for  2 L
0
: (M; t) j= C,  2 Th(M(t)):
2. for ';  2 L
T
:
(M; t) j= :' , it is not the case that (M; t) j= '
(M; t) j= ' ^  , (M; t) j= ' and (M; t) j=  :
3. for ' 2 L
T
:
(M; t) j= 9F' , 9s 2 T [t s & (M; s) j= ']
(M; t) j= 9G' , there exists a branch including t such that
for all s in that branch: [t s) (M; s) j= ']
(M; t) j= 9X' , 9s 2 T [t < s & (M; s) j= ']
(M; t) j= P' , 9s 2 T [s t & (M; s) j= ']:
Furthermore, we introduce the following abbreviations:
' _  
def
:(:' ^ : );
'!  
def
:' _  ;
> 
def
C _ :C (for some  2 L
0
);
? 
def
:>;
8F' 
def
:9G(:');
8G' 
def
:9F(:');
8X' 
def
:9X(:'); and
H' 
def
:P (:'):
For a temporal model M, by M j= ' we mean (M; t) j= ' for all t 2 T and by
M j= K we mean M j= ' for all ' 2 K, where K is a set of temporal formulae.
The class of temporal models M for which M j= K will be denoted by Mod(K).
The property of successor existence can be axiomatized by the formula 9F(>).
If in a model M the formula P (>) is true at time point t then t must have a
predecessor.
The denitions given above can be instantiated by giving an information state
frame to be temporalized. For instance, if we take IS
ep
then we get a branching
time variant of TEL. The C operator can then be replaced by the K operator: a
temporal model M is then a mapping T ! IS
ep
, and for a propositional formula 
and time point t 2 N we have: (M; t) j= C ,  2 Th(M
t
) ,M
t
j=
S5
K. If we
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take the information state frame of three-valued models, then the C-operator here
has the same meaning as the C-operator of Section 4.2.
In the rest of this section, we will explore some connections between linear time
and branching time semantics.
4.3.2 Homomorphisms and persistency
As mentioned before, we assume the models to be forests satisfying successor exis-
tence. In this sectionM andM
0
denote temporal models based on the ows of time
(T;<) and (T
0
; <
0
) respectively. As we are interested in linear and branching time
models, we need a way of relating models and we will do this using a special class
of functions between models, called homomorphisms. Let two information states
m;n 2 IS be equivalent, denoted by m  n, if Th(m) = Th(n).
Denition 4.23 (Homomorphism) A (total) function f : T ! T
0
is called a
homomorphism of M to M
0
if
1. s < t) f(s) < f(t);
2. M(s) M
0
(f(s));
3. If s is a minimal element of T then f(s) is minimal element of T
0
.
A homomorphism preserves the temporal ordering <, information states (up
to equivalence), and minimal elements. Intuitively, a homomorphism can embed
a model in a bigger model and it can identify points which have the same (up to
isomorphism) path from their corresponding minimal elements. If a branching occurs
at a certain point in time and there are equivalent information states at a number
of next points, then we can defer the branching at this point by identifying these
next points. If such a situation does not occur in a model (we shall later call such
a model closed) then a homomorphism with this model as its domain can only be
injective (in the branching time logic CTL a structure with this property is called
deterministic, see [GK94]).
Lemma 4.24 Let f :M!M
0
be a homomorphism.
1. The following conditions are satised:
(a) For all t 2 T and s
0
2 T
0
with s
0
< f(t) there exists an s 2 T with s < t
and f(s) = s
0
.
(b) For all t 2 T and s
0
2 T
0
with s
0
 f(t) there exists an s 2 T with s t
and s
0
= f(s).
(c) For all s; t 2 T it holds:
f(s) < f(t) i there exists a u < t with f(u) = f(s).
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(d) For all s; t 2 T it holds:
f(s) f(t) i there exists a u t with f(u) = f(s).
(e) If s
0
2 T
0
is not in the image of f , then all t
0
with s
0
 t
0
are not in the
image either.
2. The following are equivalent:
(a) f is injective.
(b) for all s; t 2 T it holds that s < t if and only if f(s) < f(t).
3. Let t 2 T be given with path P from a minimal element r to t. Then f [P ] is
the path from f(r) to f(t) and f is a bijection between P and f [P ].
4. f is a surjective homomorphism to the submodel f [M] M
0
j
f [T ]
of M
0
.
5. If B is a branch in M then f is injective on B, and f [B] is a branch of M
0
;
the restriction fj
B
of f to B is an isomorphism from B onto f [B].
Proof: We only prove some of the above statements.
1a. Suppose s
0
< f(t), then f(t) is not minimal, therefore t is not minimal in M
and thus has a (unique) predecessor s and therefore f(s) < f(t) and f(s) = s
0
.
1e. Suppose s
0
< t
0
and t
0
= f(t). From 1a it follows that f(s) = s
0
for some s.
Therefore all immediate successors of s
0
are not in the image, and by induction none
of the t
0
with s
0
 t
0
are in the image of f . The other parts of the proof are similar.
2. For any homomorphism f it holds that s < t ) f(s) < f(t) for all s and t, so
suppose also f(s) < f(t) ) s < t for all s and t, but f not injective. Then there
exist s; t 2 T with f(s) = f(t), which can be taken at minimal depth (distance from
the minimal elements); this depth is the same for s as it is for t, equal to the depth
of f(s). If s and t are root of their components, then there are s
0
; t
0
with s < s
0
and t < t
0
, and thus f(s) < f(s
0
) and f(t) < f(t
0
), but as f(s) = f(t) we also have
f(s) < f(t
0
) from which it follows that s < t
0
which is impossible since they are in
dierent components. Let s and t now not be minimal elements. Then there are
s
0
; t
0
with s
0
< s and t
0
< t but f(s
0
) 6= f(t
0
), since s and t were at minimal depth.
But then f(s
0
) and f(t
0
) are both predecessors of f(s), which is impossible in a tree.
Now suppose f is injective and suppose we have s; t with f(s) < f(t). Then t is
not a root, so it has a predecessor t
0
, and then f(t
0
) < f(t) so it must hold that
f(s) = f(t
0
) but then s = t
0
and therefore s < t. 2
We are interested in preservation of truth of formulae under these homomor-
phisms:
Denition 4.25 Let f :M!M
0
be a homomorphism.
1. The forward persistency property for a formula  (under f) is dened by
(M; t) j= ) (M
0
; f(t)) j= 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H P 9F 8F 9G 8G 9X 8X
preserves forward
persistency
+ + +   +   +  
preserves backward
persistency
+ +   +   +   +
Table 4.1: Preservation of persistency.
for all time points t 2 T .
The backward persistency property for a formula  (under f) is dened by
(M; t) j= ( (M
0
; f(t)) j= 
for all time points t 2 T .
If  is both forward and backward persistent, we call it two-sided persistent.
2. We say a logical connective X or temporal operator Y preserves forward (back-
ward) persistency (under f) if for any forward (backward) persistent formula(e)
 and  (under f) also the formulae X, X, Y () are forward (backward)
persistent (under f).
We say a logical connective X or temporal operator Y reverses forward (back-
ward) persistency (under f) if for any forward (backward) persistent formula(s)
 and  (under f) the formulae X, X, Y () are backward (forward) per-
sistent (under f).
The following theorem gives an overview of all preservation properties with re-
spect to persistent formulae (see also Table 4.1).
Theorem 4.26 Let f :M!M
0
be a homomorphism.
1. Any temporal atom C is two-sided persistent under f .
2. The temporal operators H and P preserve forward and backward persistency
under f .
3. The temporal operators 9F; 9G and 9X preserve forward persistency, but not
backward persistency under f . The temporal operators 8F;8G and 8X pre-
serve backward persistency, but not forward persistency under f .
4. The logical connectives ^ and _ on temporal formulae preserve both forward
and backward persistency under f . The logical connective : on a temporal
formula reverses forward and backward persistency under f .
If the temporal formula  is backward (forward) persistent and  forward
(backward) persistent then !  is forward (backward) persistent (under f).
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Proof:
1. This is trivial, since M
0
(f(t)) M(t) for all t 2 T .
2. For the operator P we do the following. Suppose  is forward persistent and
(M; t) j= P (). Then for some s with s t it holds (M; s) j= . By forward
persistency of  we have (M
0
; f(s)) j= . From s  t it follows f(s)  f(t).
So there exists an s
0
 f(t) with (M
0
; s
0
) j= , i.e., (M
0
; f(t)) j= P ().
Next the case of  backward persistent: from (M
0
; f(t)) j= P () it follows
that there exists an s
0
2 T
0
with s
0
 f(t) such that (M
0
; s
0
) j= .
From Lemma 4.24 it follows that there is an s 2 T with s
0
= f(s) and s t.
Now we can apply the backward persistency of  and conclude that (M; s) j= 
and so (M; t) j= P (). The proof for H is similar.
3. Suppose  is forward persistent and (M; s) j= 9F(). Then there is some t 2 T
with s t such that (M; t) j= . This implies f(s) f(t) and (M
0
; f(t)) j= 
and therefore (M
0
; f(s)) j= 9F().
- Suppose  is forward persistent and (M; s) j= 9G(). So there is a branch
B in M with s on B and for all t 2 B with s  t it holds (M; t) j= .
Then B
0
:= f [B] is a branch with f(s) 2 B
0
. Now take a point t
0
2 B' with
f(s)  t
0
, say t
0
= f(t), then s  t and therefore (M; t) j= . The forward
persistency of  ensures that (M
0
; f(t)) j= , so (M
0
; t
0
) j= . It follows that
(M
0
; f(s)) j= 9G().
The operators 8G and 8F work similar (but reversed). Also the proofs for the
operators 9X and 8X are similar.
The homomorphism in Figure 4.1 shows the negative results.
t t#
#
#
c
c
c
t
t
t
t t t
t t
............................
............................
  
6  6  6 
1
2
M
t
t t t
t t
t tt
.
-
............................
............................
#
#
#
c
c
c
f
  
6  6  6 
3
M
0
Figure 4.1: Example for negative transfer results.
In this picture,M
1
M
2
, f(1) = f(2) = 3 and  is a formula of L
0
true in the
upper models, but not true in the lower ones. Now C is two-sided persistent,
and (M; 1) j= 8F(C), 8G(C) and 8X(C), but (M
0
; f(1)) 6j= 8F(C),
8G(C) and 8X(C), so these formulae are not forward persistent. Also,
(M
0
; f(2)) j= 9F(C), 9G(C) and 9X(C) but (M; 2) 6j= 9F(C), 9G(C)
and 9X(C), so these formulae are not backward persistent.
4. We show how the connective : works. Suppose the temporal formula  is
backward persistent, and assume (M; t) j= :, then (M; t) 6j=  and because
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 is backward persistent we have (M
0
; f(t)) 6j=  whence (M
0
; f(t)) j= :. So
: is forward persistent. The proof for the other case is analogous.
2
Theorem 4.26 can be used to build up formulae that are forward or backward
persistent. For instance, for a formula ' 2 L
0
, the formula 9F(:P (8G(:9F(C'))))
is forward persistent, whereas 9F(P (:8G(9F(C')))) in general is not. Another
example: the formula C' ! 8G(C'), expressing conservativity, is not forward
persistent. The homomorphism in Figure 4.2 shows this. However, conservativity
can be dened by the set of persistent formulae P (C')! C' for all ' 2 L
0
.
x x x x..........................................
' ' ''
. -
f
x x x x
x x x
..........................................
..........................................
S
S
S
S
S
S
' ' ''
6 ' 6 ' 6 '
Figure 4.2: Example: conservativity does not transfer.
Theorem 4.27 Let f :M!M
0
be a homomorphism.
If  is backward persistent then
M
0
j= )M j= :
If f is surjective and  is forward persistent, then
M j= )M
0
j= :
If f is surjective and  is two-sided persistent then
M j= ,M
0
j= :
So our notion of homomorphism (as we will see, strong enough to perform the
algebraic constructions we have in mind) is too weak to ensure preservation of truth
for all formulae. As the example in the proof of Theorem 4.26 shows, requiring only
surjectivity is not enough. When identifying two points, there may be more branches
through the image than through either of the two points, destroying truth of some
formulae. So we need a stronger requirement:
Denition 4.28 A homomorphism f :M!M
0
is called branch-surjective if for all
t 2 T and B
0
2 Br(T
0
): if f(t) 2 B
0
then there exists a branch B 2 Br(M) such that
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t 2 B and f [B] = B
0
. A homomorphism which is surjective and branch-surjective is
called strongly branch-surjective.
As the denition suggests, branch-surjectivity does not imply surjectivity. IfM
0
consists of only one component, then this is the case. Branch-surjective homomor-
phisms preserve truth:
Proposition 4.29 For a branch-surjective homomorphism f :M!M
0
, a tempo-
ral formula ' and t 2 T :
(M; t) j= ', (M
0
; f(t)) j= ':
Proof: It is easy to show that the operators 9F, 9G and 9X preserve backward
persistency under branch-surjective homomorphisms and that the operators 8F, 8G
and 8X preserve forward persistency under branch-surjective homomorphisms. Since
then any operator preserves two-sided persistency under branch-surjective homomor-
phisms, all formulae must be two-sided persistent under branch-surjective homomor-
phisms. 2
In the literature there are some dierent notions of homomorphism. In [Ben91b],
a homomorphism is a surjective function which preserves < (dened on ows of
time, not on models). Thus a surjective homomorphism in our sense corresponds to a
homomorphism which maps minimal elements to minimal elements in Van Benthem's
sense. In [Ben91b] also the notion of a p-morphism is dened as a homomorphism
which satises the additional \backward clause":
8t
1
2 T; t
0
2 T
0
(f(t
1
) < t
0
) 9t
2
2 T (t
1
< t
2
^ f(t
2
) = t
0
));
8t
1
2 T; t
0
2 T
0
(t
0
< f(t
1
)) 9t
2
2 T (t
2
< t
1
^ f(t
2
) = t
0
)):
The second part of this clause is satised by our homomorphisms (see Lemma 4.24,
1a), and implies that minimal elements are mapped to minimal elements. The rst
part is equivalent to branch-surjectivity. So our notion of branch-surjective homo-
morphism is equivalent to the notion of p-morphism (between forests) in [Ben91b].
Similar notions (between structures) can also be dened for CTL

(see for in-
stance [GK94]). Loosely speaking, a homomorphism from M to M
0
in our sense
corresponds to a simulation relation from M to M
0
([GK94]). They have a similar
result as Theorem 4.27 for the CTL

fragment containing only 8, respectively 9.
We intend to use homomorphisms in a number of algebraic constructions on mod-
els, combining linear models into branching time models, and combining branching
time models.
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4.3.3 Algebraic constructions on temporal models
In this section, we will describe a number of constructions on temporal models. The
names for these constructions are taken from [ET94a], where they have a general
category-theoretic denition. There are two basic constructions. The rst one ag-
gregates a number of models into one branching time model, which is called the
coproduct of those models.
Denition 4.30 (Coproduct) Let (M
i
)
i2I
be a set of branching time models.
Then the coproduct P of this set is a branching time temporal model such that
1. The ow of time of P is the disjoint union of the ows of time of (M
i
)
i2I
.
2. For a time point t in P , we have that P(t) =M
i
0
(t), whereM
i
0
is the unique
model which contains t.
Since a branching time model is a disjoint union of trees, the disjoint union of a
number of branching time models is again a branching time model (see Figure 4.3).
It is easy to see that for every model M
i
, there is an injective homomorphism
M
i
! P mapping M
i
into its copy in P .
Figure 4.3: Coproduct.
The coproduct formalizes the behavior of a reasoning agent which can take either
of the constituting models, but in a very inecient way: the same branch may be
in multiple models. We are interested in models which are ecient representations
of behavior. Homomorphisms identify parts of a model, so a model is maximally
ecient if no homomorphism can map it to a more ecient model.
4.3 From linear to branching time 53
Denition 4.31 (Closed model) A branching time model M is called closed if
any homomorphism f :M!M
0
is injective.
There is a more direct criterion for closedness.
Proposition 4.32 Let M be a model, then the following are equivalent:
1. M is closed.
2. For all s; t and t
0
with s < t, s < t
0
and M(t)  M(t
0
) it holds that t = t
0
,
and for minimal elements r; r
0
with M(r) M(r
0
) it holds that r = r
0
.
Proof: Suppose M is closed but there are s; t 6= t
0
with s < t, s < t
0
and M(t) 
M(t
0
). Dene a homomorphism f on T which is identity except that f(t) = f(t
0
).
Let the successor relation on T
0
= f [T ] be dened by u < v i there are u
0
and v
0
in T
with u = f(u
0
) and v = f(v
0
) and u
0
< v
0
. LetM
0
be dened byM
0
(f(s)) M(s).
Since f is surjective and identity except on t and t
0
where M(t) = M(t
0
), this is
well-dened. It is easy to check that the model M
0
based on (T
0
; <) is a forest.
Now f is not injective, so M is not closed, which it was supposed to be. If there
are roots r; r
0
with M(r)  M(r
0
) then this same construction can be applied.
Conversely, suppose the second condition is satised, but M is not closed. Then
there is a homomorphism f : M ! M
0
which is not injective. Therefore, there
must be t 6= t
0
with f(t) = f(t
0
). One can take these points at a minimal distance
from their roots (and that is the same distance, equal to the distance to the root of
f(t) = f(t
0
)). If they are roots, then M(t)  M
0
(f(t))  M
0
(f(t
0
))  M(t
0
) and
then the second condition is violated. If they are not roots, then stillM(t) M(t
0
).
Furthermore they have immediate predecessors s < t and s
0
< t
0
. Then f(s) < f(t)
and f(s
0
) < f(t
0
) = f(t). Then it must hold that f(s) = f(s
0
), and as above then
also M(s)  M(s
0
). But as t and t
0
were chosen at minimal depth it must hold
that s = s
0
, and then the second condition is violated again. ThereforeM must be
closed. 2
So in a closed model there are no two dierent minimal elements with equivalent
information state, and any two dierent successors of a point have a non-equivalent
information state.
For every model there exists a closed model into which it can be mapped by a
surjective homomorphism. This model is unique up to isomorphism.
Proposition 4.33 For every branching time model M there exists a closed model
cl(M), called the closure of M, such that there is a surjective homomorphism from
M to cl(M).
Proof: The idea in the construction of this closure is to identify common initial sub-
branches (up to information state equivalence) with each other as much as possible
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(see Figure 4.4).
M1 M2
M3
M4
M5
M4
M5
M2
M3
M1
M2
M3
Figure 4.4: Closure.
Let M be based on (T;<). Dene an equivalence relation  on T as follows:
s  t i s
0
< s and t
0
< t and s
0
 t
0
and M(s)  M(t), or s and t are root and
M(s) M(t). (This is an inductive denition on the depth of the points s and t.)
Now let S be the set of equivalence classes T= , dene N on S by N ([s]) M(s)
(this is well- dened), where [s] is the equivalence class of s. For two equivalence
classes k
1
and k
2
, dene k
1
< k
2
i there is an s in k
1
and a t in k
2
with s < t.
Notice that two elements can only be equivalent if they are at the same distance from
the root. It is easy to check that the ordering < on S is irreexive, antisymmetric
and intransitive. The proofs of well-foundedness and left-linearity of (N ; S;<) are
straightforward and omitted.
Now we will check that the mapping h which takes an element s of T to its class
in S is a homomorphism:
1. if s < t in T then [s] < [t] by denition.
2. N ([s]) M(s) by denition.
3. Take an s 2 T which is a root, and suppose [s] is not a root, then there is a
t  s which is not a root, but then it can not hold that s  t.
By denition h is surjective. Using Proposition 4.32, the proof of closedness of N is
straightforward. 2
Using the constructions of coproduct and closure, we can dene a new construc-
tion, the joint closure. The idea is that we want to merge a number of temporal
models into a new one, which is a most ecient representation of the possibilities
given by these models.
Denition 4.34 Let S be a set of models. The joint closure jcl(S) of S is the
closure of the coproduct of S.
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4.3.4 Logical connections
In this subsection we investigate the logical properties of the constructions of the
previous subsection. First we consider some persistency results of formulae under
coproducts and joint closures. Next we will discuss four specic classes of models and
introduce associated semantic satisfaction relations, and their mutual connections.
One of these classes is the class of linear time models. We will discuss the connections
with that class in some more detail.
Proposition 4.35 Suppose T is a disjoint union of isolated T
i
, and M a temporal
model based on T . Then for t 2 T
i
:
(M; t) j= ' , (Mj
T
i
; t) j= '
M j= ' , fMj
T
i
j i 2 Ig j= ':
Proof: Straightforward. 2
As an immediate consequence we have persistency under the coproduct construc-
tion.
Corollary 4.36 Let (M
i
)
i2I
be a set of temporal models and P their coproduct.
1. For any formula ' and t 2 T
i
it holds
(P; t) j= ' , (M
i
; t) j= '
P j= ' , for all i 2 I it holds M
i
j= ':
2. Let T be a temporal theory, then P is a model of T if and only if for every
i 2 I the model M
i
is a model of T.
Because the joint closure is built from a coproduct followed by a surjective ho-
momorphism, and the coproduct construction behaves well under persistency, we
have persistency under joint closure in the following sense.
Corollary 4.37 Let C be the joint closure of the indexed set of models (M
i
)
i2I
,
whereM
i
is based on T
i
. For t 2 T
i
, t
0
denotes the corresponding time point in the
joint closure.
Every formula ' that is forward persistent under surjective homomorphisms satises
(M
i
; t) j= ' ) (C; t
0
) j= '
M
i
j= ' for all i 2 I ) C j= ':
Every formula ' that is backward persistent under surjective homomorphisms sat-
ises
(C; t
0
) j= ' ) (M
i
; t) j= '
C j= ' ) M
i
j= ' for all i 2 I:
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Every formula ' that is two-sided persistent under surjective homomorphisms sat-
ises
(C; t
0
) j= ' , (M
i
; t) j= '
C j= ' , M
i
j= ' for all i 2 I:
In the class BT of all branching time models we distinguish two subclasses,
namely LT, the class of linear time models and CL, the class of closed models. Since
it is easy to establish that linear time models are closed we have
LT  CL  BT:
There are other connections as well. Every branching time model can be mapped by
a surjective homomorphism onto a closed one. Moreover, all branches in a branching
time model are linear models, and together they cover the whole ow of time. For
any set of models S, its joint closure jcl(S) can be constructed. From these classes
of models we can dene corresponding satisfaction relations.
Denition 4.38 Let S be a class of branching time temporal models. For any
temporal formula ', dene:
S j=
BT
' , (8M 2 BT :M2 S )M j= ')
S j=
CL
' , (8M 2 CL :M2 S )M j= ')
S j=
LT
' , (8M 2 LT :M2 S )M j= ')
S j=
JCL
' , jcl(S) j= ':
Obviously, we have that, for instance, S j=
LT
' , S \ LT j=
BT
'. These de-
nitions may seem rather unusual, but are probably more familiar when considering
the interesting case when S is the set of all branching time models of a temporal
theory T. Then S j=
BT
' means that ' is a branching time semantical consequence
of T. Furthermore, S j=
LT
' means that ' is a linear time consequence of T.
There are some apparent logical relations between these notions:
Proposition 4.39 Let S be a class of branching time temporal models. Then the
following holds for all temporal formulae ':
S j=
BT
') S j=
CL
')

S j=
LT
'
S j=
JCL
':
Proof: This is an easy consequence of the denition of the notions j=
BT
, j=
CL
, j=
LT
,
and j=
JCL
, together with the former observation that LT  CL  BT and the fact
that jcl(S) 2 CL for any S (which follows from its denition, Denition 4.34, and
the denition of closure in Proposition 4.33). 2
A main question is how dierent these four notions are, and, in general, what the
relations are. There is a real dierence between linear time models and the others
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because they satisfy the following axioms expressing indistinguishable future:
9X' $ 8X'
9F' $ 8F'
9G' $ 8G':
The joint closure of a set of (linear) time models will not in general satisfy these
axioms. Any branching time model satisfying these axioms can in fact be mapped
uniquely to a linear one.
First we need the following connection between a model M and its collection
of linear time submodels (its branches) Br(M). This notion is extended to a class
of models S: the set of all branches of models in S is denoted by Br(S). In the
following theorem isomorphism () is a relation among temporal models. It means
that the ows of time are isomorphic with corresponding (equivalent) information
states.
Theorem 4.40 Let M be any model. Then jcl(Br(M))  cl(M). In particular,
M is closed if and only if jcl(Br(M)) M.
Proof: See [ET94a]. 2
A model M in a set of models S is called a nal model in S, if for every model
M
0
2 S there is a unique homomorphism f : M
0
! M. We have the following
result on the existence of nal models of a theory. For a class of models S the class
of models S

is dened by
S

= fjcl(S
0
) j S
0
 Sg:
In particular, S

contains the joint closure jcl(S) of all models in S, but it also
contains the closure of each individual model: forM2 S, we have that jcl(fMg) =
cl(M).
Theorem 4.41 Let T be a temporal theory that is forward persistent under sur-
jections and S a set of models of T. Then S

is a set of models of T and the joint
closure jcl(S) of all models of S is a nal model of T in S

.
Proof: See [ET94a]. 2
A class of models S is closed under submodels if for each model in the class, all
of its submodels are also in the class. In particular, in that case we have Br(S)  S.
A class S is closed under surjections if whenever M is in S and f : M ! N is
a surjective homomorphism, N is also in S. After these preparations we are able
to establish the following theorem that gives more precise connections between the
dierent semantic satisfaction relations.
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Theorem 4.42 Let S be a class of models, and ' any formula.
1. If S is closed under submodels, and ' is forward persistent under surjections,
then
S j=
BT
', S j=
LT
':
2. If S is closed under surjections and ' is backward persistent under surjections,
then
S j=
BT
', S j=
CL
':
3. If S is a set, then
S

j=
BT
') S j=
JCL
':
If, moreover, ' is backward persistent, then
S

j=
BT
', S j=
JCL
':
4. If ' is forward persistent, then
Br(S) j=
LT
') S j=
BT
':
If, moreover, Br(S)  S, then
S j=
LT
', Br(S) j=
LT
', S j=
BT
':
If, in addition, Br(S

) = Br(S), then
S j=
LT
', S j=
BT
', S

j=
BT
':
5. If S is a set and Br(S) = Br(S

)  S and ' is both forward and backward
persistent, then
S j=
LT
', S j=
JCL
':
Proof:
1. Assume S j=
LT
'. Suppose an M in S is given. Because S is closed under
submodels, Br(M) j= '. By forward persistency of ' we also have M j= '.
We have proven
S j=
BT
', S j=
LT
':
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2. Assume S j=
CL
'. Let M in BT be given with M in S. Then there is a
surjective homomorphism of M onto its closure cl(M) in CL. Because S is
closed under surjective homomorphisms we have cl(M) 2 S, and therefore
cl(M) j= '. By persistency of ' we haveM j= '. We have proven
S j=
BT
', S j=
CL
':
3. The rst implication is trivial. Assume ' is backward persistent and S j=
JCL
'.
Let M be any model in S

. Then we can mapM in jcl(S). Since jcl(S) j= ',
and ' is backward persistent we have M j= '. Therefore
S j=
BT
', S j=
JCL
':
4. Suppose ' is forward persistent, and Br(S) j=
LT
' then every branch in every
model in S satises ', and can be mapped into this model. Therefore by
persistence S j=
BT
'.
Assume, moreover, Br(S)  S, then it is trivial that S j=
BT
' implies Br(S) j=
LT
', and that this is equivalent to S j=
LT
'.
Assume, in addition, Br(S

) = Br(S), then the previous result can be applied
to S

. It follows that
S

j=
LT
', Br(S

) j=
BT
', S

j=
BT
':
5. This follows from the two previous points.
2
In Corollary 4.37 and Theorems 4.41 and 4.42, properties are established for
formulae which are forward or backward persistent under (possibly surjective or in-
jective) homomorphisms. The question arises whether there are formulae persistent
under these special homomorphisms but not under any homomorphism. This turns
out to be not the case:
Proposition 4.43 A formula is forward (backward) persistent under surjective /
injective homomorphisms if and only if it is forward (backward) persistent under
any homomorphism.
Proof:
 First we will prove the case for forward persistency under surjections. Suppose
' is forward persistent under surjective homomorphisms, but not under any ho-
momorphism. Then there is a (non-surjective) homomorphism f : M ! M
0
with
t 2 T such that (M; t) j= ' but (M
0
; f(t)) 6j= '. Now construct the model N which
consists of a copy of M and for every point s of M
0
not in the image of f a branch
B of M
0
with s 2 B (disjoint from the copy of M and disjoint from every other
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such branch). Then it is easy to see that (N ; t) j= '. Let g : N ! M
0
be the
function which maps the copy of M to f [M] in M
0
, and which maps every added
branch to the same branch in M
0
. Then g is a homomorphism and g is surjective
and (M
0
; g(t)) 6j= '. This is in contradiction with the assumption that ' was for-
ward persistent under surjective homomorphisms. Therefore ' is forward persistent
under any homomorphism. The proof for backward persistency under surjective ho-
momorphisms uses the same construction.
 Now for the case of backward persistency under injective homomorphisms. Sup-
pose ' is backward persistent under injective homomorphisms, but not under any
homomorphism. Then there is a (non-injective) homomorphism f :M!M
0
with
t 2 T such that (M
0
; f(t)) j= ' but (M; t) 6j= '. Now construct a model N by taking
a copy ofM and adding the following: for every point s ofM, and for every branch
B
0
of M
0
with f(s) 2 B
0
, if there is no equivalent branch B in M with s 2 B, then
we add such a branch in N . Now let h : M ! N be the injective homomorphism
which maps M to its copy in N . Let g : N !M
0
be the homomorphism (!) which
maps h(s) to f(s) and the branches from M
0
in N to their counterparts in M
0
. Of
course the model N and the homomorphism g are constructed in such a way that
g is branch-surjective, and we can use Proposition 4.29: since (M
0
; f(t)) j= ' and
f(t) = g(h(t)) and g is branch-surjective, we have (N ; h(t)) j= ', but as h is injective
and ' is backward persistent under injections we have (M; t) j= ', contradicting
the assumption. Thus ' must be backward persistent under any homomorphism.
The proof for forward persistency under injective homomorphisms uses the same
construction. 2
Theorem 4.42 describes some cases in which the dierent satisfaction relations
are equal. The question still remains whether they are not in general always equal.
This is not the case:
Proposition 4.44 In general j=
BT
6=j=
CL
, j=
CL
6=j=
LT
, j=
CL
6=j=
JCL
. Moreover, for
each of these inequalities we can nd a temporal theory T such that for some ' we
have Mod (T) j=
X
' but not Mod (T) j=
Y
'.
Proof: We have already remarked that S j=
LT
9X' $ 8X' for any class S; it is
easy to see that this does not hold for the other consequence relations. Let us look
at j=
BT
and j=
CL
. Take any model m 2 IS and let  2 L
0
be such that there exist
k; l 2 IS with  2 Th(k) and  =2 Th(l) (thus the information state frame should not
be trivial). Dene the following two formulae:
at
0
:= H(?)
at
1
:= P (>) ^HH(?):
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It is easy to see that at
0
is true in a point if and only if it is a minimal element and
at
1
is true in a point if and only if it is a successor of a minimal element. Now dene
T := fat
i
! C' j ' 2 Th(m); ' 2 L
0
; i = 0; 1g [
fat
i
! :C' j ' =2 Th(m); ' 2 L
0
; i = 0; 1g [
fat
0
! 9F(9F(C))g, and
' := at
1
! 9F(C):
If M is a closed model of T then all initial points and their immediate successors
must be equivalent to m, but as M is closed, it must have a unique root r with
one immediate successor s. Then (M; r) j= 9F(9F(C)), so there exists a point t
with r  t and (M; t) j= 9F(C), but then (M; s) j= 9F(C) since s is the only
immediate successor of r. Thus M j= ', and we have proved Mod (T) j=
CL
'. Now
consider the branching time model in Figure 4.5.
t
t
t
t t t
t t
t
............................
............................
#
#
#
c
c
c
l l
k k k
lm
m
m
Figure 4.5: Counterexample.
In this model, the minimal element and its immediate successors are equivalent
to m and a k state is reachable from the root in at least two steps (remember that
 2 Th(k)), so this model is a model of T. But the upper successor of the root is a
successor of a minimal element but has only l states reachable (in which C is not
true), so it is not a model of '. We have proven that Mod(T) 6j=
BT
'.
Now we will look at j=
CL
and j=
JCL
. Let m 2 IS and let  2 L
0
be such that
there exist k; l 2 IS with  2 Th(k) and  =2 Th(l) (thus the underlying information
state frame should not be trivial). Dene
T := fat
0
! C' j ' 2 Th(m); ' 2 L
0
g [
fat
0
! :C' j ' =2 Th(m); ' 2 L
0
g:
Let the information state frame be such that IS is a set (for instance propositional
logic). Then we can take jcl(Mod (T)) which has a unique root r (with information
state equivalent to m), in which for each point the set of its immediate successors
consists of one state for each information state (up to equivalence). This model
contains a branch starting at r in which each point has k as its information state.
So jcl(Mod (T)) j= at
0
! 9F(C) which gives Mod (T) j=
JCL
at
0
! 9F(C). Now
consider the linear model N consisting of a root with information state equivalent
to m and all the other points have information states equivalent to l. Then this is a
closed model of T but N 6j= at
0
! 9F(C) so Mod (T) 6j=
CL
at
0
! 9F(C). 2
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Suppose we have a set of models S (possibly the set of models of some tem-
poral theory) which describes some form of reasoning. The branches of models in
S represent valid reasoning paths. Often, we are interested in formulae from L
0
which become true in every reasoning path (we will call them sceptical conclusions),
and formulae which become true in at least one reasoning path (we will call them
credulous conclusions). Formally, we could dene these conclusions as follows:
S j

scep
 , S j=
BT
8F(C)
S j

cred
 , S 6j=
BT
8F(:C)
for  2 L
0
.
A formula 8F(C) or 8F(:C) preserves backward persistency (see Theorem
4.26), and we can use Theorem 4.42 to give some more connections. For example,
if S is closed under surjections (this is the case, for instance, if S is the set of
branching time models of a theory which consists of forward persistent formulae),
then S j

scep
, S j=
CL
8FC.
4.3.5 Final remarks
Branching time temporal models can be used to describe the behavior of dynamic
processes, such as the reasoning processes of reasoning agents. The linear models
usually describe a possible reasoning pattern, and a set of such models can be used
to describe possible patterns. These models may be described by a temporal theory.
Another way of describing possible behavior is by a branching time process which
branches at any time a pattern can continue in more than one way. These models
can also be axiomatized by a temporal theory. In this subsection we have tried to
identify a uniform manner in which to relate these dierent kinds of models. A
number of operations like the coproduct, closure and joint closure which perform a
kind of merging of models into a nal model were dened. Therefore, out of a set of
linear models we can construct a branching time model which incorporates all the
linear models. This can then be transformed by homomorphisms into a model which
is closed. In that model all decisions that have to be made during a process (which
branch to take) are moved as far backward in time as possible. This gives the most
ecient representation of the multitude of possible paths.
The results of this section will be used later on (in Section 5.2) to give a branching
time semantics to default logic.
In [Spa90], a reduction from linear time logic to branching time logic is given,
by translating formulae from linear time logic into formulae from branching time
logic. The translation replaces the F -operator by 8F, and forces \linear behavior" on
subformulae (meaning that 8F and 9F should be equivalent). The idea of viewing
a linear time model as a (simple) branching time model, and the construction of the
set of linear time models Br(M) of branches of the model M, occur in [Spa90].
Theorem 4.26 in fact gives formation rules for persistent formulae. An interesting
question is whether these rules generate all persistent formulae. Of course, the
formula 8GC _ :8GC can not be formed by these rules, but is equivalent to
4.4 Minimal models and minimal entailment 63
C _ :C which is formed by these rules. The question can be phrased as follows:
is every forward/backward persistent formula equivalent to a formula generated by
the rules for forward/backward persistent formulae of Theorem 4.26?
4.4 Minimal models and minimal entailment
In order to specify reasoning in a temporal logic, one can write down a set of tem-
poral formulae that constrain the behavior of the reasoning process. Often, such
formulae prescribe that the agent must draw a certain conclusion in certain circum-
stances. For example, there may be a rule stating that if the agent knows  now,
then it should know  from the next point in time onwards. In general, we do not
wish to specify all the conclusions the agent should not draw in certain circum-
stances (this problem is similar to the frame problem in logics of action and change,
see for instance [MH69], [Hay73], [Sho88]). A possible solution to this problem is to
maximize the agent's ignorance over time, or to minimize the change in the agent's
information state over time, given the temporal formulae it should obey. This max-
imization or minimization can be formalized by introducing a preference ordering
on temporal models, which favors models with less knowledge. Instead of all models
of the temporal description, one can restrict oneself to the minimal models of the
description with respect to such an ordering. There are several alternatives possible
for the denition of such an ordering. We will treat a few of them in this section.
For a broader discussion of minimization of models, see for instance [Ben89].
4.4.1 Global minimality of knowledge and MTEL
We will take the logic TELC (see Denition 4.6) as a starting point. The rst
ordering that we will introduce maximizes the agent's ignorance over time, given
the temporal formulae it should obey. This maximization can be formalized by
introducing a preference ordering on temporal models, which favors models with
less knowledge. So we make the explicit assumption that \all the agent knows" is
what is dictated by the temporal formulae. Apart from the temporal aspect, this
is similar in spirit to the theory of epistemic states of Halpern and Moses [HM85b],
introduced to formalize the notion of \only knowing '". The global minimality
criterion compares temporal models pointwise.
Denition 4.45 (Minimal models and entailment)
1. We dene the ordering 
g
on TELC-models by dening for M;N :
M
g
N , for all s 2 N :M
s
 N
s
where  is the ordering on IS
ep
. We write M
g
N if M
g
N and M 6= N .
2. A TELC-model M is a 
g
-minimal model of a set of formulae T , denoted
M j=

g
T , if
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 M j= T , and
 for any conservative model N , if N j= T and N 
g
M then N =M.
3. For a set of TEL-formulae T and a formula ', we say ' is a 
g
-minimal
consequence of T , denoted T j=

g
', if for all 
g
-minimal models M of T ,
M j= ' holds. This preferential logic is called MTEL.
The `g' in the notation 
g
stands for `g lobal'. We can use a temporal theory T
to describe the reasoning process of an agent. In general, this set of formulae will
dictate that the agent knows some objective formulae at certain points in time. In
order to avoid having to state (within T ) that many other formulae have to remain
unknown to the agent (neither known to be true nor known to be false), we want to
make the assumption that \all the rest is unknown as much as possible". The above
ordering and minimal consequence formalize this. Thus the minimal models of T are
the intended models of T , describing the intended behavior of the agent over time.
We can then use minimal consequence to infer properties of this reasoning process.
Proposition 4.46 (Closedness of minimal models) Let T be a set of TEL-
formulae, and let M be a TELC-model. If M j=

g
T , then M is closed (see
Denition 4.8).
Proof: Suppose M j=

g
T . Dene the model N by N
i
= Mod (Th(M
i
)) for all
i 2 N. It is easy to prove that Mod (Th(M
i
))  M
i
so N 
g
M. Furthermore,
by induction on the complexity of formulae , it is straightforward to prove that for
any i 2 N, and for any formula ' it holds that (M; i) j= ' , (N ; i) j= '. So
N j= T . As M is a minimal model of T , it follows that M = N , which means that
M
i
= Mod (Th(M
i
)), so M
i
is closed for all i. We conclude that M is closed. 2
This means that Proposition 4.9 always applies to minimal models: the limit
contains exactly the knowledge which is derived at some point in the temporal
model.
Note that the notion of minimal entailment strengthens the notion of conservative
entailment in the sense that T j=
c
 implies T j=

g
 . An easy example, even
without temporal operators, shows that it is a proper extension: although Kp 6j=
c
:Kq we do have Kp j=

g
:Kq.
The formula K ! GK describing the rule at the beginning of this section,
now has the correct (intended) models. The only minimal model of K ! GK
itself is the sequence fVal(P )g
i2N
, in which the agent knows nothing (besides the
tautologies) over time. The only minimal model of (K ! GK) ^ K is the
sequence Mod ();Mod ( ^ );Mod ( ^ ); : : : .
The denition of the ordering 
g
depended on the ordering of the information
states IS
ep
. If we take the ordering  on partial states of IS
3val
(see Denition 2.3),
we get an ordering on TPLC-models (see Denition 4.12), and we can dene minimal
consequence in a completely analogous way.
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4.4.2 Global minimality with equal limits
The ordering 
g
prefers models in which the knowledge over time is minimal. A
variant of this ordering also compares knowledge over time, but with a xed limit.
That is, given the nal conclusions, models are preferred in which these conclusions
are reached as late as possible. The intuition behind this ordering is similar to
the intuition behind 
g
, and it seems dicult to prefer one to the other on purely
intuitive grounds. In Chapter 5, we will see their similarities and dierences when
used to describe a number of existing forms of reasoning.
Denition 4.47 Dene the ordering 
gel
on TEL-models by
N 
gel
M, lim N = lim M and for all s 2 N :M
s
 N
s
The letters `gel' in the notation 
gel
stand for `g lobal, with equal l imits'. This
ordering can of course be dened on TPL-models in the same way.
The preferential logic based on this ordering again uses conservative models, but
only those that are, in addition, closed (see Denition 4.8).
Denition 4.48 (MTEL*)
1. A conservative closed model M is a 
gel
-minimal model of a set of formulae
T , denoted M j=

gel T , if
 M j= T , and
 for any closed conservative model N , if N j= T and N 
gel
M, then
N =M.
2. A formula ' is a 
gel
-minimal consequence of a set of formulae T , denoted
T j=

gel ', if M j= ' for every model M such that M j=

gel T . This
preferential logic is called MTEL*.
At this moment, it may be dicult to get a good understanding of these two
preference orderings and the eect they have on entailment. In Section 4.5, this will
be claried.
4.4.3 Sequential minimal change
The previous two orderings were based on the intuition that the knowledge of the
agent should be minimal, given the fact that it satises a description given by tem-
poral formulae. They were used only with conservative models. The last preference
criterion we will treat can be used with non-conservative models. The idea is that
the change of knowledge through time should be minimal. Given a state the agent
is in, if a temporal formula prescribes the agent to change its knowledge at the next
point in time, it will do so in a minimal fashion. So, rst of all we need to establish
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a notion of minimal change of an information state, and this will depend on the
denition of information state. We will treat the epistemic states of IS
ep
and the
partial states in IS
3val
. Given an information state M , we want to compare other
information states on the basis of how similar they are to M . To this end, given M ,
we introduce an ordering 
M
on information states where N
1

M
N
2
intuitively
means that N
1
is more similar to M than N
2
.
Denition 4.49
1. Let M 2 IS
ep
. Dene an ordering 
M
on IS
ep
as follows:
N
1

M
N
2
, N
1
4M  N
2
4M
where 4 denotes the symmetric dierence (A4B = (A [ B) n (A \ B)).
2. Let m 2 IS
3val
. Dene an ordering 
m
on IS
3val
as follows:
n
1

m
n
2
, Di (n
1
;m)  Di (n
2
;m)
where Di (m;n) = Lit(m)4 Lit(n) and Lit(m) = fp j m(p) = 1g [ f:p j
m(:p) = 1g.
These orderings enjoy a number of properties.
Proposition 4.50
1. The ordering 
M
(
m
) is a partial order.
2. For any M 2 IS
ep
it holds
M 
M
N for all N 2 IS
ep
:
The same is true for 
m
.
Proof:
1. Reexivity and transitivity of 
M
are almost immediate from the denition.
Now suppose N
1

M
N
2
and N
2

M
N
1
. Then N
1
4M = N
2
4M . We will
prove that N
1
 N
2
. Let m 2 N
1
be arbitrary. If m =2M , then m 2 N
1
4M
so m 2 N
2
4M . As m =2M , this means m 2 N
2
. If m 2M , then m =2 N
1
4M
so m =2 N
2
4M . As m 2 M , this means m 2 N
2
. Analogously, N
2
 N
1
, so
N
1
= N
2
, proving antisymmetry of 
M
. For 
m
, an analogous proof shows
that Lit(n
1
) = Lit(n
2
) from which n
1
= n
2
follows.
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2. This is immediate, since M 4M = ; (or, Lit(m)4Lit(m) = ;).
2
The latter property expresses the fact that the information state most similar to
M , is M itself.
We now consider models which change as little as possible as time goes on. This
means that the information state at time point t+ 1 should be as similar to the one
at time point t as possible.
Denition 4.51 Let M;N be TEL-models, and let
k = supfj 2 N j M
i
= N
i
for all i < jg:
Dene
M
sc
N , k =1 or k > 0 and M
k

M
k 1
N
k
:
The denition of this ordering is analogous for TPL-models.
The letters `sc' in 
sc
stand for `sequential change'. Based on this preference
ordering, we can again dene a minimal entailment.
Denition 4.52 (SCTEL)
1. A TEL-model M is a 
sc
-minimal model of a set of formulae T , denoted
M j=

sc
T , if
 M j= T , and
 for any TEL-model N , if N j= T and N 
sc
M, then N =M.
2. A formula ' is a 
sc
-minimal consequence of a set of formulae T , denoted
T j=

sc
', if M j= ' for every modelM such thatM j=

sc
T . This preferen-
tial logic is called SCTEL.
4.5 Characterization of minimal models
In this section, we will try to get a better understanding of the notions of minimal
entailment dened in Section 4.4. We will do this by studying minimal models of
special classes of theories. These theories are sets of formulae that prescribe applying
some kind of inference rule. They are generally of the form !  where  describes
some precondition, and  describes the resulting state.
The results are stated and proved for the minimal entailment notions based on
TEL, although analogous results are true for the notions based on TPL. First of all,
we consider MTEL.
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Denition 4.53 (MTEL special formulae)
1. A TEL-formula is called an input formula in MTEL, if it of the form K
1
_
: : : _K
n
for propositional 
i
. It is called a reasoning formula in MTEL, if it
is of the following form:
('
1
^ : : : ^ '
n
)! ( 
1
_ : : : _  
k
)
where
'
i
= K
i
1
_ : : : _K
i
l(i)
_ :FK
i
1
_ : : : _ :FK
i
m(i)
and
 
i
= XK
i
or  
i
= X:K
i
for propositional formulae 
i
j
, 
i
j
, 
i
, and n; k; l(i);m(i)  0.
2. A reasoning formula ('
1
^ : : :^'
n
)! ( 
1
_ : : :_ 
k
) is applicable in a TELC-
model M at point i 2 N, if (M; i) j= '
1
^ : : : ^ '
n
.
3. Dene  
0
i
= K
i
if  
i
= XK
i
and  
0
i
= :K
i
if  
i
= X:K
i
. An S5-model
M is said to satisfy the conclusion of a reasoning formula ('
1
^ : : : ^ '
n
) !
( 
1
_ : : : _  
k
) (with '
i
and  
i
as above) if M j=  
0
1
_ : : : _  
0
k
.
The input formulae describe the initial facts the agent may know. The reasoning
formulae describe the eect of applying a rule. The left side of the implication refers
to what the agent knows presently, but it may also refer to formulae that the agent
will never know in the future. For theories consisting of these formulae, we can give
a characterization of their minimal models.
Proposition 4.54 Let T be a theory consisting of input formulae and reasoning
formulae of TEL. Then for any conservative TEL-modelM, the following holds:
M j=

g
T
,
1. M
0
is a -minimal model of the input formulae in T , and
2. For each i 2 N, M
i+1
is a -minimal element of the set of S5-models which
are -extensions ofM
i
satisfying the conclusions of the reasoning formulae of
T applicable in M at time point i.
Proof: \(": Suppose the above items 1. and 2. hold. We have to prove that M
is a model of T , and then that it is minimal.
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 Let  = K
1
_ : : : _ K
n
be an input formula in T . Then M
0
is a model of
, so M j= K
i
for some i, and by conservativity, (M; t) j= K
i
for all t 2 N, so
(M; t) j=  for all t 2 N. Now let  = ('
1
^ : : :^'
n
)! ( 
1
_ : : :  
k
) with the '
i
;  
i
as in Denition 4.53. Suppose (M; t) j= '
1
^ : : : ^ '
n
. Then this rule is applicable
inM at t, soM
t+1
satises its conclusion, which means that there is a  
i
such that
either
-  
i
= XK
i
andM
t+1
j= K
i
. Then (M; t+1) j= K
i
so (M; t) j= XK
i
, whence
(M; t) j=  
1
_ : : : _  
k
.
-  
i
= X:K
i
and M
t+1
j= :K
i
. Then (M; t+ 1) j= :K
i
so (M; t) j= X:K
i
,
whence (M; t) j=  
1
_ : : : _  
k
.
So M j= T .
 Suppose N is a conservative TEL-model such that N 
g
M and N j= T . Let
t
0
be the smallest index for which N
t
0
 M
t
0
. Since N
0
must satisfy the input
formulae (N j= T ), andM
0
is a minimal model satisfying them, it must be the case
that t
0
> 0. Take a reasoning formula  = ('
1
^ : : : ^ '
n
) ! ( 
1
_ : : : _  
k
) which
is applicable at t
0
  1 in M. Then we claim it is applicable in N at t
0
  1. As  is
applicable inM at t
0
  1, we have (M; t
0
  1) j= '
1
^ : : :^'
n
. Now take any '
i
. If
(M; t
0
 1) j= K
i
j
for some j, then, sinceM
t
0
 1
= N
t
0
 1
we have (N ; t
0
 1) j= K
i
j
so (N ; t
0
  1) j= '
i
. Otherwise, it must be the case that (M; t
0
  1) j= :FK
i
j
for
some j. As N 
g
M, this means that (N ; t
0
  1) j= :FK
i
j
, so (N ; t
0
  1) j= '
i
.
As N j= T , it must be the case that (N ; t
0
 1) j=  
1
_ : : :_ 
k
. But this means that
N
t
0
is an extension of N
t
0
 1
=M
t
0
 1
(conservativity) satisfying the conclusions of
formulae applicable in M at t
0
  1. Since M
t
0
is a minimal such extension, it must
hold that M
t
0
= N
t
0
, contradicting the denition of t
0
. We conclude that such a
model N does not exist, so that M is a 
g
-minimal model of T .
\)": Suppose M j=

g
T .
 AsM j= T , it must be the case thatM
0
is a model of the input formulae. Suppose
it is not minimal, suppose N  M
0
is a model of the input formulae. Dene the
model N by N
0
= N and for i > 0: N
i
=M
i
. Then obviously N 
g
M, and N is
conservative. As N satises the input formulae andN is conservative,N satises the
input formulae. Now take a reasoning formulae  = ('
1
^ : : :^'
n
)! ( 
1
_ : : :_ 
k
)
and suppose for some t 2 N that (N ; t) j= '
1
^: : :^'
n
. Take any '
i
; if (N ; t) j= K
i
j
then (M; t) j= K
i
j
. If (N ; t) j= :FK
i
j
, then since M
i
= N
i
for i > 0, also
(M; t) j= :FK
i
j
. This means that (M; t) j=  
1
_ : : :_  
k
. As, again,M
i
= N
i
for
i > 0, we have that (N ; t) j=  
1
_ : : :_ 
k
. Thus, N is a model of T , in contradiction
with M j=

g
T . This means that M
0
is a minimal model of the input formulae.
 Let i 2 N. It is easy to see that M
i+1
is an extension of M
i
satisfying the
conclusions of reasoning formulae applicable in M at time point i. Suppose it is
not minimal, suppose N is smaller. Now dene a model N by N
i+1
= N and
N
j
= M
j
for j 6= i. It is easy to check that N is a conservative model for which
N 
g
M. It is also easy to check that N satises the input formulae. So let
 = ('
1
^ : : : ^ '
n
) ! ( 
1
_ : : : _  
k
) be a reasoning formula from T . Suppose
that (N ; s) j= '
1
^ : : : ^ '
n
for some s 2 N. It is straightforward to check that
(M; s) j= '
1
^ : : : ^ '
n
; this uses the fact that N 
g
M, that N
j
= M
j
for
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j 6= i and conservativity. We will rst treat the case when s 6= i. This means
that (M; s) j=  
j
for some j. But since M
s+1
= N
s+1
, we have (N ; s) j=  
j
, so
(N ; s) j=  
1
_: : :_ 
k
. Now let us look at the case when s = i. Since  is applicable in
M at time point i, N
i+1
= N satises the conclusion of . If there is a  
j
= XK
j
such that N j= K
j
, then (N ; i) j=  
j
. Otherwise, there is a  
j
= X:K
j
with
N j= :K
j
so (N ; i) j=  
j
. We have proved that N j= T which contradicts the fact
that M was a 
g
-minimal model of T . This means that M
i+1
is minimal. 2
By restricting the format of the rules further, we get the following characteriza-
tion.
Corollary 4.55 (Non-disjunctive conclusions) Let T be a theory consisting of
input formulae of the form K and reasoning formulae of the form '
1
^ : : :^'
n
!  ,
with the '
i
and  as in Denition 4.53. Then for any TELC-model M:
M j=

g
T
,
1. M
0
= Mod (f j K 2 Tg), and
2. For each i,M
i+1
= Mod (Th(M
i
)[f j there is a rule '
1
^: : :^'
n
! XK 2 T
and (M; i) j= '
1
^ : : : ^ '
n
g), provided M
i+1
j= :K for those  for which
there is a rule '
1
^ : : : ^ '
n
! X:K 2 T applicable in M at time i.
Proof: Using Proposition 4.54, we only have to prove that its conditions 1 and 2
correspond to the above conditions.
1. Let M = Mod(f j K 2 Tg). Then obviously, M is a model of the input
formulae. Let N be another model of the input formulae, then M  N : take
a valuation m 2 N . Take K 2 T arbitrarily, then since N j= K, we have
m j=  so m 2 M . We have proved that M is the only minimal model of the
input formulae, which proves the equivalence of this condition with condition
1 of Proposition 4.54.
2. Let M = Mod (Th(M
i
) [ f j there is a rule '
1
^ : : : ^ '
n
! XK 2 T and
(M; i) j= '
1
^ : : : ^ '
n
g). Now suppose N is a -minimal -extension of M
i
satisfying the conclusions of the reasoning formulae of T applicable in M at
time point i. Then M  N . Take a valuation m 2 N . SinceM
i
 N , we have
m 2 M
i
, so m j= Th(M
i
). As N satises the conclusions of applicable rules,
m satises the conclusions of the form K of applicable rules. Thus, m 2M .
Furthermore, as N satises the conclusions (of applicable rules) of the form
:K, and M  N , also M satises them.
If M
i+1
satises the condition 2 above, then it obviously satises condition 2
of Proposition 4.54. If M
i+1
satises condition 2 of Proposition 4.54, then it
must coincide with M , which then satises condition 2 above.
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2
If there is no future part in the left hand side of the implications, then minimal
models are unique.
Corollary 4.56 Suppose T is a theory as in Corollary 4.55, with the extra restric-
tion that for every rule '
1
^ : : : ^ '
n
!  , '
i
= K
i
1
_ : : : _K
i
l(i)
. If a minimal
model of T exists, it is unique.
Proof: Using the characterization of Corollary 4.55, we can prove by induction
that for two minimal models M and N , it must be the case that M
i
= N
i
. The
crucial observation is that any reasoning formula in T is applicable in M at point i
if and only if this is the case in N . 2
So reasoning formulae act as a kind of rules under the semantics of MTEL: an
implication of the form !  can be read as the rule \if  is the case, then conclude
".
For MTEL* (Denition 4.48), we can get a characterization result for a larger
class of formulae.
Denition 4.57 (MTEL* special formulae) The MTEL input formulae are
also the MTEL* input formulae. Reasoning formulae in MTEL* are also formulae
of the form ('
1
^ : : :^'
n
)! ( 
1
_ : : :_ 
k
), where the  
i
are as in Denition 4.53,
and
'
i
= K
i
1
_ : : : _K
i
l(i)
_ :FK
i
1
_ : : : _ :FK
i
m(i)
_ FK
i
1
_ : : : _ FK
i
n(i)
for propositional formulae 
i
j
, 
i
j
and 
i
j
, and n; k; l(i);m(i)  0. The notions of ap-
plicability and satisfaction of a conclusion are dened analogously to Denition 4.53.
We again have a characterization result.
Proposition 4.58 Let T be a theory consisting of input formulae and reasoning
formulae of MTEL*. Then for any conservative closed TEL-modelM, the following
holds:
M j=

gel T
,
1. M
0
is a -minimal model of the input formulae in T , and
2. For each i 2 N, M
i+1
is a -minimal element of the set of S5-models which
are -extensions ofM
i
satisfying the conclusions of the reasoning formulae of
T applicable in M at time point i.
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Proof: The proof is completely analogous to the proof of Proposition 4.54. The
second part of the \(" part of this proof needs the following claim:
If N 
gel
M and N
i
=M
i
for all i  n, then if a reasoning formula ' is applicable
in M at time point n, it is also applicable in N at time point n.
First of all, (M; n) j= K , (N ; n) j= K since M
n
= N
n
. If (M; n) j= :FK
then (N ; n) j= :FK as N
j
M
j
for all j > n. Lastly, if (M; n) j= FK, then (by
closedness!) lim M j= K, so lim N j= K, whence (closedness!) (N ; n) j= FK.
2
So under the semantics of MTEL*, an even larger class of formulae act as rules.
It also follows from Proposition 4.54 and Proposition 4.58 that MTEL and MTEL*
yield the same results (minimal models) on theories containing only input formulae
and MTEL reasoning formulae. On MTEL* reasoning formulae, they act dierently:
consider the formula FKp ! XKp. The model M with M
s
= Val(P ) for all s, is
a minimal model in both MTEL and MTEL*. But MTEL* has a second minimal
model N with N
0
= Val(P ) and N
s
= Mod(fpg) for s > 0.
Corollaries 4.55 and 4.56 also hold for MTEL*.
The third minimality semantics proposed, is SCTEL.
Denition 4.59 (SCTEL special formulae) A SCTEL reasoning formula is a
formula of the form ('
1
^ : : : ^ '
n
)! ( 
1
_ : : : _  
k
) where
'
i
= K
i
1
_ : : : _K
i
l(i)
_ :K
i
1
_ : : : _ :K
i
m(i)
and
 
i
= XK
i
or  
i
= X:K
i
for propositional 
j
i
, 
j
i
, 
i
, and n; k; l(i);m(i)  0. The notions of applicability and
satisfaction of a conclusions is again dened analogously to Denition 4.53.
Proposition 4.60 Let T be a theory containing only SCTEL reasoning formulae.
Suppose that for every S  T the following holds: if f'
1
^ : : :^'
n
j ('
1
^ : : :^'
n
)!
( 
1
_ : : : _  
k
) 2 Sg is S5-satisable, then f 
0
1
_ : : : _  
0
k
j ('
1
^ : : : ^ '
n
) !
( 
1
_ : : : _  
k
) 2 Sg is S5-satisable. Then for any TEL-model M, the following
holds:
M j=

sc
T
,
For each i 2 N, M
i+1
is an S5-model which is 
M
i
-minimal among models satisfying
the conclusions of the reasoning formulae of T applicable in M at time point i.
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Proof: \)": Suppose M j=

sc
T , but it is not the case that M
i+1
is minimal.
Then there is an S5-model N such that N 
M
i
M
i+1
satisfying the applicable
rules. Now dene a TEL-model N as follows. For j  i, set N
j
= M
j
, and let
N
i+1
= N . Now take the set of rules ('
1
^ : : : ^ '
n
) ! ( 
1
_ : : : _  
k
) for which
N j= '
1
^ : : :^ '
n
. This set is obviously satisable, so the assumption on T implies
that the set  
0
1
_ : : : _  
0
k
is S5-satisable. Let N
i+2
be any S5-model satisfying
 
0
1
_ : : : _  
0
k
. Now we can again look at the set of rules whose left-hand side is
applicable in N
i+2
. This set is satisable, so we can nd a suitable N
i+3
, etcetera.
It is easy to check that the resulting model N is a model of T , and furthermore, that
N 
sc
M. This is in contradiction with the assumption thatM was a 
sc
-minimal
model of T , so M
i+1
must satisfy the right-hand side of the equivalence.
\(": Suppose we have a TEL-modelM for which the right-hand side of the equiv-
alence holds. It is straightforward to check that M j= T . Now suppose there exists
a model N of T with N 
sc
M and N 6= M. Then there is an index k such that
N
j
=M
j
for j < k, and N
k

M
k 1
M
k
(and N
k
6=M
k
). But obviouslyN
k
satises
the formulae  
0
1
_ : : : _  
0
k
for the rules ('
1
^ : : : ^ '
n
)! ( 
1
_ : : : _  
k
) such that
M
k 1
= N
k 1
j= '
1
^ : : : ^ '
n
, contradicting the assumption. Thus, M is minimal
and M j=

sc
T . 2
For future use (Section 8.1) we give a similar characterization result for temporal
partial logic. The admissible formulae are shifted one step in time (instead of `present
implies next', they are `yesterday implies current'), and allow looking back one extra
point in time. The notions of `applicable formula', and `satisfying the conclusions of
applicable rules' are dened as would be expected.
Proposition 4.61 Let T be a set of formulae of temporal partial logic of the form
V
	! ', where 	 only contains formulae of the form Y Y Ck, :Y Y Ck, Y Ck, and
:Y Ck, where k is a literal, and ' is either Ck (k again a literal) or :Ca ^ :C:a
(for a an atom). Furthermore, suppose that for any set S  T , if
V
f
V
	 j (
V
	!
') 2 Sg is satisable, then
V
f' j (
V
	! ') 2 Sg is satisable. Then the following
statements are equivalent for every TPL-modelM:
1. M is a 
sc
-minimal model of T ;
2. (M; 0) j= T , and for each i 2 N, the partial model M
i+1
is 
M
i
-minimal
among all models satisfying the conclusions of the rules applicable at time
point i+ 1;
3. (M; 0) j= T , and for each literal k and i 2 N, we have that k is true in M
i+1
if and only if either
 there is a formula
V
	! Ck in T such that (M; i+ 1) j=
V
	, or
 there is no formula
V
	 ! C:k (if k = :a then read C:k as Ca) or
V
	! :Ca ^ :C:a (if k is either a or :a) with (M; i+ 1) j=
V
	, and
k is true in M
i
.
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Proof: The proof of equivalence of the rst two statements is completely analogous
to the proof of Proposition 4.60; the formulae here are just shifted one point in time
and the extra (:)Y Y Cl conjuncts change nothing in the proof.
Now the equivalence between the second and third statement. If we considerM
and a time point i, then there are a number of rules applicable at time i+ 1. Now
take M
i
and change a literal if there is an applicable rule changing it. Call the
result M . It is easy to see that this M is exactly the (unique) model satisfying the
description in the third statement. It always exists since the applicable rules form
(by denition) a satisable set of left hand sides, and therefore their right hand sides
are not inconsistent (by the assumption in the proposition). It is also straightforward
that M is the only model 
sc
-minimal among models satisfying right hand sides of
applicable rules. 2
The third statement in the above proposition opens the way to a completion
procedure: the exact conditions for a literal to be true can be described in temporal
partial logic, using the monotonic, classical semantics of TPL. This means that for
any theory T , we can form its completion T
0
, such that the 
sc
-minimal models of
T are the (classical) models of T
0
. Then we can use classical entailment on T
0
to
nd the SCTEL-consequences of T . We will describe this completion technique (for
slightly more general theories) in Section 8.1.
The minimal change criterion gives belief revision complying with the AGM
postulates [AGM85].
Proposition 4.62
1. Expansion: Suppose M
0
6j= K:. Then M j=

sc
XK,M
j
=M
0
n fm 2
M
0
j m 6j= g 8j > 0. If M j=

sc
XK, then Th(M
1
) = Cn(Th(M
0
[ fg).
2. Contraction: M j=

sc
X:K,
8
<
:
M
j
=M
0
8j if M
0
j= :K
M
j
=M
0
[ fmg for some m such that
m 6j=  otherwise.
If M j=

sc
X:K, then Th(M
1
) is a maximal deductively closed subset of
Th(M
0
) n fg.
3. Revision: Suppose M
0
j= K: and M j=

sc
XK. Then M
j
= fmg for
some m such that m j=  (for all j > 0).
Proof:
1. \)": Dene N
0
= M
0
and N
j
= N
0
n fm 2 N
0
j m 6j= g for j > 0. Then
obviously N j= XK. Furthermore, N
1

M
0
M
1
: let w 2 N
1
4M
0
, then
w 2 M
0
nN
1
so w 6j=  so w =2M
1
asM
1
j= K. Thus we have w 2 M
1
4M
0
.
But as M j=

sc
XK, it must be the case that M
1
= N
1
. For j > 1 the
statement is now easy to prove.
\(": Analogous and straightforward.
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Suppose M
1
= fm 2 M
0
j m j= g. We have to prove that Th(M
1
) =
Cn(Th(M
0
[ fg).
\": Suppose Th(M
0
) [ fg j= . Let m 2 M
1
, then m 2 M
0
so m j=
Th(M
0
) and m j= . But then m j= . We have that  2 Th(M
1
).
\": Suppose  2 Th(M
1
), so 8m 2 M
0
: (m j=  ) m j= ) so 8m 2 M
0
:
m j= !  so !  2 Th(M
0
) so  2 Cn(Th(M
0
) [ fg).
2. The case when M
0
j= :K is easy, so suppose M
0
j= K.
\)": Suppose M j=
leqltr
:K, then there exists m 2 M
1
n M
0
such that
m 6j= . Dene N
0
= M
0
, N
j
= M
0
[ fmg for j > 0. It is easy to see
that N j= :K. Furthermore, N
1

M
0
M
1
: take w 2 N
1
4M
0
, then
w = m 2 M
1
nM
0
 M
1
4M
0
. But M j=
leqltr
:K, so N
1
= M1. The
statement for j > 1 is easy.
\(": straightforward.
Now suppose M j=

sc
X:K. If M
0
6j= K, then it is straightforward to
check that Th(M
1
) is a maximal deductively closed subset of Th(M
0
) n fg,
since Th(M
1
) = Th(M
0
) n fg. So suppose M
0
j= K. Then we know that
M
j
=M
0
[ fmg for some m such that m 6j= .
 SupposeM
1
j= , thenM
0
j= , so  2 Th(M
0
) and  6=  sinceM
1
6j= .
 Obviously, Th(M
1
) is deductively closed.
 Maximality: Suppose there is a deductively closed set of formulae T with
Th(M
1
)  T  Th(M
0
)nfg. Then there is a  2 T such that  =2 Th(M
1
).
But  6=  so  2 Th(M
0
). We claim that  !  2 Th(M
1
): choose k 2M
1
:
if k 2M
0
then k j=  so k j=  ! . If not, then k = m. As  2 Th(M
0
) and
 =2 Th(M
1
), it must be the case that m 6j= . But that implies m j=  ! .
As  !  2 Th(M
1
)  T , we have  !  2 T and with  2 T we get  2 T ,
in contradiction with our assumption. This means such a T can not exist.
3. Suppose M
0
j= K: and M j=

sc
XK. Dene N
0
= M
0
and N
j
= fmg
for an arbitrary m 2 M
1
(for j > 0). Then N j= XK, and N
1

M
0
M
1
:
take k 2 N
1
4M
0
. If k 2 N
1
nM
0
, then k = m 2M
1
nM
0
. If k 2M
0
n N
1
then k j= : so k =2 M
1
so k 2 M
0
nM
1
. This implies, with M j=

sc
XK,
that M
1
= N
1
. The statement for j > 1 is straightforward.
2
The above proposition implies that belief revision induced by the minimal change
criterion satises the AGM postulates. Expansion of a theory by a formula  can only
be done by adding  and closing the result under Cn [Gar92b]. The second item in
the above proposition shows that contraction is done via a \maxichoice contraction
function" (deleting  from a theory yields a maximal deductively closed subset
not containing ; see [AGM85]), which implies (by a result from [AGM85]) that the
postulates are satised. From the third item of Proposition 4.62 it is straightforward
to show that revision of a theory by a formula  in SCTEL can be seen as contraction
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of the theory by :, followed by expansion by . The Levi-identity ensures that the
resulting revision satises the AGM postulates (see [AGM85]).
4.6 Temporal logic as a specication language
In the previous sections, a number of temporal languages (TEL and TPL) and a
number of notions of modelhood of a theory (j=, j=
c
, j=

g
, j=

gel and j=

sc
) were
dened, and it was suggested that these temporal logics could be used as specication
languages. But that means that a temporal theory should give rise to a reasoning
frame operator, analogously with the reasoning frame operator denition for default
logic and logic programming of Sections 3.1 and 3.2. A temporal theory, together
with a notion of modelhood, gives rise to a set of temporal models (the set of models
of the theory). These temporal models are sequences of information states, and are
thus traces. In order to dene a reasoning frame operator, we can assign to a set
of initial facts the set of all temporal models of the theory whose rst state (in the
sequence) contains exactly these initial facts.
Denition 4.63 (Reasoning frame operator of a theory) Let S be a set of
formulae of TEL (or TPL), and let  be a relation of modelhood between a class of
temporal models C and formulae of TEL (respectively, TPL). The reasoning frame
operator specied by S, denoted T
S
, is dened by
T
S
(X) = fM 2 C j M  S and Th(M
0
) = Cn(X)g
for all sets of propositional formulae X .
Although temporal logic induces reasoning frame operators in a very natural
manner, it can also be used to specify multiple belief state operators using the
techniques of Chapter 2 (Denition 2.25).
Denition 4.64 (MBSO of a theory) Let S be a set of formulae of TEL (or
TPL), and let  be a relation of modelhood between a class of temporal models C
and formulae of TEL (respectively, TPL). The MBSO specied by S, denoted B
S
, is
dened by
B
S
(X) = flim M2 C j M  S and Th(M
0
) = Cn(X)g
for all sets of propositional formulae X .
Of course, using the denitions of Chapter 2, we can also dene an associated FBSO.
In the next chapter, some example theories are given that specify various forms
of reasoning in this way.
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4.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we have dened a number of temporal logics of information. These
logics can serve to describe the changes over time of the information of a rational
agent. There are many choices that can be made for the design of these logics,
yielding many dierent logics. First of all, choices have to be made regarding the
nature of a state of information. This can be a Kripke model, or a partial model, or
we can draw from any other information state frame of Chapter 2. One option we
would like to explore in the future is to use an epistemic modal logic dierent from
S5. One may not want to impose the strong principles of (positive and negative)
introspection on the knowledge of the agent, so one could use S4 or T instead.
Also, approaches based on the distinction between implicit and explicit belief could
be used (see for instance [Lev84]; [FHMV95] contains an overview), where implicit
knowledge satises the S5 axioms, but the explicit knowledge need not even be closed
under logical consequence.
Another interesting extension of the logics described here is the addition of an
`actual' world. The logics of this chapter model the change of belief only; there is
no changing real world. The S5-models at a point in time do not have an actual
world (and indeed, we have taken a fragment of S5, containing only the subjective
formulae, which does not refer to the real world). If we dene an information state
to be a pair consisting of an S5-model, together with a propositional model (this
yields a KD45 formalization; if the propositional model must be an element of the
S5-model, we get S5), and we base the temporal language on the full S5-language
(not just the subjective part), then we could model the change of the world and the
agent's beliefs about this world. One of the reasons we have not done this, is that we
wanted to focus on the agent's beliefs proper rst. This new variant would allow us
to model observation and communication of the agent with the world. For example,
if the agent wants to observe whether p holds in the world, this could be described
by the formulae p ! X(Kp) and :p ! X(K:p), where the observation takes one
step in time.
Third, the ontology of time can be varied. In this chapter, we have devoted
attention to a very simple structure of time, the natural numbers, and a branching
time variant. But there are other possibilities. We could drop the assumption that
there is a starting point in time. It may also be useful to consider dense time, which
may be used to model the gradual formation of beliefs, but which is also needed
if there is an outside world that is modeled, in which dense time is called for (for
example if there are other agents or events that are not necessarily synchronized).
But even circular time can be thought of (for instance for an agent that needs to think
the same things every week). Of course also the interaction between the information
states and time can be varied. The property of conservativity is an example of such
an interaction, which is sometimes useful, and sometimes is not.
Lastly, even with the same semantical objects, the language can be varied. For
the temporal part, we have taken a standard tense-logical language. We could also
dene a Since and Until operator. In the case of branching time, we could incorporate
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all the CTL

-operators (instead of only the CTL-operators). The language we
dened did not allow us to reason about the knowledge the agent has about time
(a formula like K(Kp! G(Kp)), expressing the fact that the agent knows that its
belief of p will persist in time, is not in our language). It would be interesting to
allow the agent to reason about its own reasoning in time. Such choices aect the
expressiveness and the complexity of the logic.
We dened a number of semantical `lters' to obtain preferred (or intended)
models of a formula, by dening orderings on temporal models, and by considering
only minimal models of a formula according to these orderings (notice that this
model-selection actually denes an FBSO according to Example 2.8: reasoning about
reasoning is of course also a form of reasoning, subject to the same considerations
of Chapters 1 and 2). A number of characterization results were given in order to
clarify the behavior of the dierent forms of minimal entailment.
One extension we have not mentioned before is the extension to more than one
agent. This would allow the description of the progression of a complete multi-agent
system over time. In Chapter 8.1, an extension of temporal partial logic to more
agents is described, but this is a `at' extension, in which beliefs are never nested:
an agent can not reason about the beliefs of other agents. In principle, such an ex-
tension would be easy: we can take S5-models for more than one agent (sometimes
called S5
(n)
-models), and a language with a dierent K-operator for every agent.
We could even take more extended formalizations of multiple agents, taking into
account knowledge, belief, actions, abilities, opportunities, desires, intentions, etc.
(see for instance [Lin96], [RG92] or [Sin94]). The diculties arise in the generaliza-
tion of the preference orderings (more generally, in the denition of the information
ordering). We already mentioned the fact that MTEL (and MTEL*) can be seen
as temporalizations of the logic Ground S5 of `only knowing' (see [HM85b]; Ground
S5 is dened formally in Section 9.2.2). This approach has been generalized to the
case of more than one agent (see [Hal97]), and these results can probably be used
to dene a version of MTEL for many agents.
4.8 Related work
Temporal logic per se has a long tradition, and we refer the interested reader to, for
instance, [Ben91b] or [Gol92]. In theoretical computer science, temporal logic has
been used to specify and reason about programs (or processes) (see [Kro87], [Eme90]
and [MP92]). The dierence with our logics is mainly in the information states: for
processes, these consist of the values of program (process) variables, whereas our
states contain knowledge of the agent. Knowledge of processes is modeled by the
approach of Halpern and Moses ([HM90], see also [FHMV95]). This is based on the
notion of a run of a system consisting of a number of processes (and an environment),
which is basically a sequence of states, where a state is a tuple of the local states of
the processes. The epistemic accessibility relation is xed as soon as we have a set of
runs: a process i at a given point (r;m) (where r is a run and m is a natural number
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| the time point) considers possible all points (r
0
;m
0
) where its local state is the
same as in (r;m). So the notion of a state is central, and the knowledge of a process
is derived from it, in contrast to our logics, where a state is uniquely determined by
the knowledge contained in it. This can be modeled in their approach, however, as
shown in [FHMV95], by dening a state to be a set of (known) propositions.
Another logic of belief over time is the temporal belief logic (TBL) of [FW97].
It has the same model of time (the natural numbers) as MTEL. However, the states
are essentially syntactical: at any point in time, a set of propositions is associated to
every agent (there may be more than one agent). This set is the set of propositions
the agent believes at that point in time. The logic is used to reason about systems
specied in MetateM, which can alternatively be seen as the executable version
of TBL. We will come back to MetateM after discussing the executability of our
temporal logics (in Chapter 6).
The logic TEMA (Temporal Epistemic Meta-level Architecture) of [HMT94] was
designed specically to formalize the reasoning process of a meta-level architecture.
It is a temporalization (using labeled branching time structures) of S5P

, a modal
epistemic logic which contains, apart from a knowledge and a belief operator, a
specic class of operators that denote possible assumptions. The formula P
i
', for
example, means that ' is a possible assumption within frame of mind i. In temporal
S5P

-models that obey \downward reection", all possible assumptions are added to
the beliefs of the agent at some next point(s) in the future. The class of S5P

-models
forms an information state frame, where the ordering reects an increase in belief. As
such, the approach of [HMT94] falls within the general framework described in this
chapter. One of the problems with temporal S5P

-models is that there may be many
unintended models, in which the agent may form new beliefs without good reason:
the agent may come to belief , although there were no new possible assumptions
previously that imply . In a meta-level architecture, new object-level beliefs only
arise through assumptions at the meta-level (excluding derived beliefs and direct
observations). Using a minimality preference ordering such as the ones introduced
in this chapter may eliminate these unintended models.
There are a number of other logics in which the beliefs of agents over time
can be described, among which the already mentioned [RG92] and [Sin94]. In the
presence of these `powerful' logics, it may seem that MTEL is useless. However,
the high expressivity of the above logics comes with some logical drawbacks: many
of them do not have a known complete axiomatization, and they have a very high
(computational, if not conceptual) complexity. This is in contrast to the nice logical
properties of TEL (See Section 9.1). Furthermore, we will see in Chapter 5 that
many forms of nonmonotonic reasoning can be described in TEL augmented with a
preference ordering. This is not (directly) possible in any of the above logics (and
they were indeed not dened for this purpose, in contrast to MTEL).
There are a number of approaches that are intended to model the eect of in-
coming information on the information state of an agent, called dynamic semantics
or update semantics ([Gro95, Vel96]; for a more general discussion of logical dynam-
ics, see [Ben96a]). The basic idea is that every formula has an associated action
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which has an eect on information states (for example incorporating the belief in
that formula in the information state of an agent): the semantics of such a formula
is the change of information state its action induces. In some of these approaches,
one could have a formula of the form ['] , which means that  is true whenever
the agent learns the information in '. Such approaches could be called dynamic
logics of information and the dierence with our temporal logics of information is
like the dierence between dynamic logic and temporal logic. The most important
dierences are that: (1) actions are not explicitly modeled or specied in temporal
logic, and (2) the history of change is not explicitly modeled in dynamic logic. The
meaning of the formula ['] implicitly incorporates an assumption of minimality:
when updating with ', the agent does not learn anything besides (not caused by) '.
This is not the case in our non-minimal temporal logics (TEL, TELC, and TPLC),
where a temporal model may contain knowledge which is not specied by a formula
it satises: there are models of, for instance, the formula Kp, in which also at some
point in time Kq holds. When using minimal entailment, this does not occur (the
precise details depend in the precise ordering): the 
g
-minimal model of Kp has no
time point at which Kq holds (or any other formula not implied by p). There are also
some variants of dynamic semantics where entailment of the form '
1
; : : : ; '
n
j=  is
investigated, where the order of '
1
; : : : ; '
n
is important: that is the order in which
the agent receives new information. This denes in a sense a trace of information
states, where each new state in the trace is induced by the new information. A
similarity between our logics and many of the above dynamic approaches, is that
the information states are often modal models. Sometimes they are just sets of
propositional valuations (just as our normal S5-models; this is the case in [Vel96]),
sometimes they are modal partial models (see [Jas94]), but they can also be `increas-
ing' sequences of structures containing higher-order beliefs about other agents (as
described in [Gro95]). There may be many interesting connections between dynamic
and temporal approaches to modeling information change; we leave that for further
research.
There are two other approaches that are based on ideas about the importance
of dynamic aspects of reasoning that are very similar to our own, namely step-logic
(or, more generally, active logics, see [Elg88] or [EP90]) and the situation calculus
semantics for logic programs (see [LR96]). We will not discuss these approaches
here, as it will be more convenient to do so at the end of Chapter 5.
One eld of research that has to be mentioned here is nonmonotonic temporal
reasoning, which is concerned with commonsense reasoning about actions and change
in the world (see [SS95] for an overview). In particular the approach of chronological
minimization (see [Sho88]) is quite similar to our own: there we also see temporal
models, with a preference relation to select the intended models. The logic SCTEL,
based on the ordering 
sc
formalizes the same intuition that everything stays the
same as much as possible: a successor state is preferred if it is more similar to the
current state. In a sense, both our and Shoham's approach try to minimize change,
Shoham's approach geared towards the physical world, our approach meant for the
internal epistemic state of an agent. This also dictates the dierence in what a state
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is. The other preference relations (which will be used more extensively than 
sc
in
the rest of this thesis), do not immediately seem to have a meaningful equivalent
in the physical world. Later, dierent variants of Shoham's ordering have been
proposed (see [SS95]).
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Chapter 5
Reasoning Processes in
Temporal Logic
In the previous chapter, a number of variants of temporal logic were introduced
and proposed as a specication language for reasoning processes. In this chapter,
we give some examples of forms of reasoning which can be specied in temporal
logic. The reasoning frame operators thus specied will be given explicitly wherever
appropriate.
5.1 Default logic: the linear case
In this section, we will show how the reasoning behavior of an agent reasoning with
default logic can be specied in temporal logic. As we mentioned in Section 3.1,
default reasoning has an essential temporal element. To be more specic, as the
agent is reasoning she has to assess a specic type of condition (the justication) in
default rules to be applied, that cannot be fullled only on the basis of what has been
derived until that moment. After application of a default rule, only in the future of
the reasoning process can it be veried whether this condition of the applied default
rule was justied or unjustied. This suggests that a default rule can be given an
interpretation as a temporal rule with one of its conditions referring to the future
of the reasoning process. It seems that the process of actually constructing a set
of coherent assumptions is reected in Reiter's approach to a certain extent, but
without making the essential temporal element explicit.
As the translation into temporal logic yields a temporal semantics, this indirectly
gives semantics to default logic. The main contribution of this semantics for default
logic when compared to other approaches is that the temporal element in default
reasoning is made explicit in the semantics. This enables better insight in the in-
herent dynamic nature of default reasoning. In a sense, the temporal rules prescribe
the agent to perform the action of applying a default rule.
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The temporal interpretation has two other benets besides giving a natural se-
mantics to default logic. The rst one is that we can express and reason about
temporal properties of the reasoning process. It may, for instance, be interesting to
know which conclusions can be drawn before a certain point in time. Secondly, it is
possible to use classical temporal logic to reason about default theories. Even though
the translation is into MTEL, which uses a minimization of models, in general it may
be possible to derive interesting properties even without minimization.
The next section describes the translation of a default theory into a temporal
theory.
5.1.1 A temporal interpretation of default logic
Let  = hD;W i be a default theory. A trace of a default reasoning process based
on  is described by a sequence of epistemic states with increasing information (as
formalized in Section 3.1), and the semantics of our temporal logics are based on
these traces. The translation of  into temporal logic should therefore specify which
properties a default reasoning temporal model should have. The initial state of a
default reasoning temporal model M (and therefore all subsequent states as well)
includes the knowledge in W ; therefore M should be a model of fK j  2 Wg.
Suppose a default rule ( : 
1
; : : : ; 
n
)= is given with propositional formulae
, 
1
; : : : ; 
n
,  and  is known to be true in M at time point t; i.e., (M; t) j=
K. If the default rule is applicable then its consequent is required to be true
in the next state (and by conservativity in all subsequent states); i.e., (M; t) j=
XK. What remains is how to express whether application of the default rule is
justied. The requirement is that the 
i
are consistent in the context of the reasoning
process, including the part of the context yet to be generated by further reasoning
steps. Since the reasoning is conservative, this means that there should be no future
state where :
i
is generated for any i. In the temporal logic we designed this is
quite easy to express: it is required that (M; t) j= :FK(:
i
). If we compare this
to the translation of the justication for nonmonotonic modal logics as dened in
[MST93], LM
i
(the agent should know that it considers 
i
possible), one sees that
our translation is the dynamic variant of their translation. The agent considers 
i
possible just in case she never derives :
i
. Summarizing, for our temporal model
we require: if  is known to be true at time point t and for no i is :
i
known to
be true at any time point after t, then  should be known to be true at the time
point t + 1. Note that, as S5 coincides with KD45 on subjective formulae, one can
read `believes' for `knows' in the above discussion. In temporal epistemic logic, this
translates into the formula:
K ^ :FK(:
1
) ^ : : : ^ :FK(:
n
)! XK:
This leads us to the following denition:
Denition 5.1 (Temporal interpretation mapping for default theories)
Let  = hD;W i be a default theory.
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1. The mapping  , associating with any default rule ( : 
1
; : : : ; 
n
)= its tem-
poral interpretation, is dened by
 : ( : 
1
; : : : ; 
n
)= 7! K ^ :FK(:
1
) ^ : : : ^ :FK(:
n
)! XK:
The set (D) is called the temporal interpretation of the set of default rules
D.
2. The temporal interpretation of W is dened by (W ) = fK j  2Wg.
3. The temporal interpretation of the default theory  is dened by:
() = (D) [ (W ):
The temporal interpretation of  ensures that any default rule which is appli-
cable, is actually applied. However, we also want to make sure that these default
conclusions are the only ones which are added to the knowledge of the reasoner.
As will be seen in the next section, this can be accomplished by taking the mini-
mal temporal models of the interpretation of the default theory, with respect to the
ordering 
g
dened in Section 4.4.
5.1.2 Semantical correspondences
In the previous section we dened a correspondence between (sets of) default rules
and (sets of) temporal formulae at a syntactic level, and we gave an informal sketch of
the semantics behind this syntactic translation. In this section we will give a formal
treatment of the related semantical correspondence between Reiter extensions and

g
-minimal temporal models, induced by the interpretation mapping  .
The semantical correspondence will be such that the minimal temporal models
of the temporal theory are the traces of the extensions of the default theory. This
means that if the temporal model M corresponds to the extension E (with the sets
E
i
dened as in Denition 3.1), thenM
i
contains the knowledge of E
i
and the limit
lim M contains the knowledge of E:
M
t
= Mod (E
t
) E
t
= Th(M
t
)
lim M = Mod (E) E = Th(lim M):
Before proving this correspondence, we give an example.
Example 5.2 Let  = hD;W i be a default theory in the language with P =
fa; b; c; d; eg, dened by
D = f(a : b)=b; (d : c)=c; (b : :c)=eg; and
W = fa; d; b! :cg
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This default theory has two Reiter extensions:
Firstly, E = Cn(fa; d; b;:c; e; b! :cg) is a Reiter extension:
E
0
= Cn(W );
E
1
= Cn(E
0
[ fbg) = Cn(fa; b;:c; d; b! :cg);
E
2
= Cn(E
1
[ feg) = Cn(fa; b;:c; d; e; b! :cg);
E
3
= Cn(E
2
[ ;) = E
2
;
E
i
= E
2
for all i > 3;
and
E =
1
[
i=0
E
i
= E
2
:
A second Reiter extension is F = Cn(fa; d; c;:b; b! :cg):
F
0
= Cn(W );
F
1
= Cn(F
0
[ fcg) = Cn(fa;:b; c; d; b! :cg);
F
2
= Cn(F
1
[ ;) = F
1
;
F
i
= F
1
for all i > 2;
and
F =
1
[
i=0
F
i
= F
1
:
The temporal epistemic model M which corresponds with E, and the model N
corresponding with F are shown in Figure 5.1.
a
b
c
d
e
1 1 1 1 : : :
u 1 1 1 : : :
u 0 0 0 : : :
1 1 1 1 : : :
u u 1 1 : : :
1 1 1 1 : : :
u 0 0 0 : : :
u 1 1 1 : : :
1 1 1 1 : : :
u u u u : : :
M N
Figure 5.1: Minimal models of ().
In this picture, time runs from left to right. Only the atoms are shown, where a 1
means the atom is known inM
t
, a 0 means that the negation of the atom is known,
and a u means that neither the atom nor its negation is known (which means that
M
t
contains a valuation in which the atom is true and one in which it is false).
Thus, for example,M
0
contains all valuations m for which m(a) = 1 and m(d) = 1.
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It is easy to verify that both M and N are conservative, and that (W ) is true
at all points. Furthermore, the temporal rules translating the default rules are:
Ka ^ :FK(:b)! XKb
Kd ^ :FK(:c)! XKc
Kb ^ :FKc! XKe:
Both models satisfy these rules. Moreover, both models minimally satisfy the re-
quirements (with respect to the ordering 
g
between temporal epistemic models).
The correspondence between the Reiter extensions and the epistemic states can be
described by
E
t
= Th(M
t
) F
t
= Th(N
t
)
E = Th(lim M) F = Th(lim N ):
In the following two Propositions 5.3 and 5.4 we will treat the two directions
of the correspondence between Reiter extensions of a default theory and minimal
temporal models of its temporal interpretation. Of course we can never hope to
nd a model of an inconsistent extension. Therefore we will assume that the set of
axioms of a default theory is consistent, as this ensures that the extensions, if any
exists, are consistent.
Proposition 5.3 Let  = hD;W i be a default theory andM a 
g
-minimal tempo-
ral model of (). Then the set E dened by E = Th(lim M) is a Reiter extension
of . Moreover, E
t
= Th(M
t
) for all t 2 N.
Proof: LetM be a 
g
-minimal temporal model of (). First of all, observe that
() is a theory consisting of input and reasoning formulae satisfying the condition
of Corollary 4.55. This means that M
0
= Mod (f j K 2 ()g), and for each
i, M
i+1
= Mod (Th(M
i
) [ f j there is a rule F
1
^ : : : ^ F
n
! XK 2 () and
(M; i) j= F
1
^ : : :^F
n
g). Dene E = Th(lim M). We will prove that E
i
= Th(M
i
)
by induction on i 2 N, where the E
i
are as dened in Denition 3.1.
 By denition, E
0
= Cn(W ) and Cn(W ) = Th(Mod(W )) = Th(Mod(f j K 2
()g) = Th(M
0
).
 Now suppose E
n
= Th(M
n
). Then E
n+1
= Cn(E
n
[ f j ( : 
1
; : : : ; 
k
)= 2
D; 2 E
n
and :
j
=2 E for 1  j  kg). For a rule ( : 
1
; : : : ; 
k
)= 2 D, we have
 2 E
n
if and only if (M; n) j= K, and :
j
=2 E i lim M 6j= K:
j
. As M is
closed by Proposition 4.46, this is equivalent to (M; n) j= :FK:
j
. But this means
that E
n+1
= Cn(Th(M
n
) [ f j there is a rule F
1
^ : : : ^ F
n
! XK 2 () and
(M; i) j= F
1
^ : : : ^ F
n
g) = Th(Mod(Th(M
n
) [ f j there is a rule F
1
^ : : : ^ F
n
!
XK 2 () and (M; i) j= F
1
^ : : :^ F
n
g) = Th(M
n+1
). But then it is easy to see
that E is a Reiter extension of , since
S
1
i=0
E
i
=
S
1
i=0
Th(M
i
) = Th(lim M) = E.
The second equality follows from the closedness of M, see Proposition 4.9. 2
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Proposition 5.4 Let  = hD;W i be a default theory with W consistent and E
a Reiter extension of . Then the temporal epistemic model M dened by M =
(Mod (E
t
))
t2N
is a 
g
-minimal temporal model of () with lim M = Mod (E).
Proof: Let E be a Reiter extension of . Dene M = (Mod(E
t
))
t2N
. It is
straightforward to check that lim M = Mod (E), using the fact that
S
1
i=0
E
i
= E,
which follows as E is an extension. As in the proof of Proposition 5.3, it is the case
that for any default  = (; 
1
; : : : ; 
k
)= 2 D, it holds that  2 E
n
and no 
j
2 E
if and only if () is applicable in M at time point n. Using the characterization of
Corollary 4.55, one can easily check that M j=

g
(). 2
We are now ready to state our main correspondence result between Reiter exten-
sions and minimal temporal models (relying of course on Propositions 5.3 and 5.4),
and the relation between their respective (sceptical) entailment relations.
Theorem 5.5 (Semantic correspondence) Let  = hD;W i be a default theory
with W consistent and let
M ( ()) = fM j M is a 
g
-minimal temporal model of ()g:
1. By
(E) = (Mod (E
t
))
t2N
and
	(M) = Th(lim M)
two bijective mappings
 : Ext()! M (())
	 : M ( ()) ! Ext()
are dened that are each other's inverse. In other words, the equations
M = (Mod (E
t
))
t2N
E = Th(lim M)
dene a one-to-one correspondence between E 2 Ext() and M2 M (()).
2. For any propositional formula ':
' is a sceptical consequence of , () j=

g
FK('):
This interpretation yields temporal semantics to default logic: given a default
theory , its semantics is given by M ( ()). Note that no minimal models of ()
exist if W is inconsistent (the default theory is classically inconsistent), or if  has
no extensions (the default theory is nonmonotonically inconsistent). This is similar
to other semantics for default logic.
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A theory () species default reasoning with the default theory . It gives rise
to the reasoning frame operator T
()
as dened in Denition 4.63:
T
()
(X) = fM j M j=

g
() and Th(M
0
) = Cn(X)g:
All minimal models M of () actually have the same initial state M
0
, in which
the agent believes the axioms of , and nothing more. This means that T
()
only
assigns non-empty sets of traces to sets X whose propositional closure is equal to
the set of axioms of . So the above operator is not equal to the reasoning frame
operator Tr
D
of Chapter 3. By changing the notion of minimal model somewhat
(essentially only allowing comparison of temporal models with the same initial state),
the reasoning frame operator associated with the theory (D) is equal to Tr
D
. This
adapted notion of minimal model is introduced in Section 6.1 and is also used in
Section 7.1.
In Theorem 5.5, we used 
g
-minimal consequence to derive properties of the
form FK('), the sceptical conclusions. But we can also infer other properties. For
instance, we have that () j=

g
FK ! FK just in case  belongs to every
extension containing . Dene at
4
= PPPP> ^ HHHHH?. Then we have that
() j=

g
at
4
! K exactly when  has been concluded at time point 4 in the trace
of every extension. As a last example, () j=

g
K ! Y K' whenever ' is always
derived before  .
We will now give some examples of monotonic reasoning about default logic.
This reasoning will be done on TELC-models (see Denition 4.6). In Section 9.1.1
a proof system for validities on TELC-models is given.
Suppose we have the two default theories hf( : )=g; fgi and hf( : )=g; fgi.
Their temporal interpretations are K ^ (K ^ :FK: ! XK) and K ^
(:FK: ! XK), which are equivalent on TELC-models, verifying that the two
default theories are equivalent, in the sense that they have the same extensions. (In
the proof system of Section 9.1.1, the equivalence of these two temporal formulae is
easy to prove.)
Consider a default theory  = hD;W i such that for some formulae '; , we have
that ' 2 W , and there is a default (' : )= 2 D. Then (') = K' 2 () and
((' : )=) = K' ! XK 2 (). Since we have K';K' ! XK j=
c
FK, it
immediately follows that () j=

g
FK, i.e. that  is a sceptical consequence of
.
As a last example, consider a normal default rule (p : q)=q. The temporal
interpretation is Kp ^ :FK:q ! XKq. By temporal reasoning we have that Kp^
:FK:q ! XKq j=
c
FKp ! (FKq _ FK:q) which expresses the fact that if the
prerequisite of the normal default rule is derived, then either the consequent or its
negation will eventually be derived too (and this is independent of other default
rules and axioms).
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5.1.3 MTEL* and weak extensions
The proof of the correspondence between 
g
-minimal models and extensions is based
on the characterization result of minimal models of special kinds of theories, notably
Corollary 4.55. As this corollary also holds for MTEL*, the proof of the following
proposition is completely analogous to the proofs of Propositions 5.3 and 5.4.
Proposition 5.6 (Semantic correspondence for MTEL*) Theorem 5.5 re-
mains true when `
g
-minimal' is replaced with `
gel
-minimal', and `j=

g
' is replaced
with `j=

gel '.
In MTEL* we can also specify a variant of default logic, based on so-called weak
extensions (introduced in [MT89]; see also [MT93]). In this variant, the reading of
a default rule is changed, specically the reading of the prerequisite. In order for
a default rule ( : )= to be applicable, it is no longer required that you believe
 now (i.e., you have derived it using the axioms and other default rules), but it is
sucient that you believe  at some future time (i.e.,  is believed in the limit). We
start by giving the denition of a weak extension.
Denition 5.7 (Weak extension) Let  = hD;W i be a default theory.
1. A set of sentences E is a weak extension of  if E =
S
1
i=0
F
i
where the sets
F
i
are dened as follows:
F
0
= Cn(W ); and for i  0:
F
i+1
= Cn(F
i
[ f j ( : 
1
; : : : ; 
n
)= 2 D; 2 E
and :
j
=2 E for 1  j  ng):
2. The set of weak extensions of  is denoted by Ext
w
(D;W ).
3. If a formula ' occurs in all weak extensions of , it is called a weak sceptical
consequence of .
The new reading of (the prerequisite of) a default rule suggests a new translation.
Denition 5.8 Let  = hD;W i be a default theory.
1. The mapping  from default rules to TEL-formulae is dened by
 : ( : 
1
; : : : ; 
n
)= 7! FK ^ :FK(:
1
) ^ : : : ^ :FK(:
n
)! XK:
2. The mapping  is extended to default theories by
(D) = f() j  2 Dg;
(W ) = (W ); and
() = (D) [ (W ):
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This translation species default reasoning with weak extensions.
Proposition 5.9 Let  = hD;W i be a default theory with W consistent.
1. Suppose M is a 
gel
-minimal model of (). Then the set E = Th(lim M)
is a weak extension of , and F
i
= Th(M
i
) for all i 2 N (where the sets F
i
are as in Denition 5.7).
2. Suppose E is a weak extension of . Then the temporal model M dened by
M = (Mod (F
t
))
t2N
is a 
gel
-minimal model of ().
3. For any propositional formula ':
' is a weak sceptical consequence of , () j=

gel FK':
Proof: This proof is essentially analogous to the proofs of Propositions 5.3 and
5.4, using the fact that Corollary 4.55 also holds for MTEL*, and the fact that for
closed models, it holds that (M; i) j= FK if and only if lim M j=
S5
K. 2
In MTEL*, nothing prevents us from mixing the two kinds of reading of the
prerequisites. One can consider rules of the form
K ^ FK ^ :FK(:
1
) ^ : : : ^ :FK(:
k
)! XK!
in which a prerequisite  is interpreted according to the traditional reading, and a
prerequisite  which has the weak interpretation. Instead of interpreting all prereq-
uisites in a default theory in the same way, one can distinguish between weak and
strong prerequisites. This suggests a new, more exible, variant of default logic we
briey describe.
Denition 5.10 (Weak/strong default logic)
1. A WS-default theory is a pair hD;W i where W is a set of propositional for-
mulae, and D is a set of expressions (called WS-default rules) of the form
(;  : 
1
; : : : ; 
k
)=!
where , , 
1
through 
k
, and ! are propositional formulae.
2. A set of propositional formulae E is a WS-extension of hD;W i if E =
S
1
i=0
G
i
where the sets G
i
are dened as follows:
G
0
= Cn(W ); and for i  0:
G
i+1
= Cn(G
i
[ f! j (;  : 
1
; : : : ; 
n
)=! 2 D; 2 G
i
;  2 E;
and :
j
=2 E for 1  j  ng):
In the literature a number of approaches to giving semantics to default logic
exist. In the next section we will compare them with our temporal approach.
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5.1.4 Other approaches to semantics for default logic
In this section we will compare our approach with other approaches to semantics for
default logic, as known from literature: [Gab82], [Eth87], [BS94], [MST93], [ACP97],
and [LS92].
Comparison with Gabbay
In [Gab82] an approach to nonmonotonic logic is described where intuitionistic logic
is used as a basis. The semantics are described by Kripke models (in the form of
temporal frames) where the accessibility relation is a pre-ordering on the worlds
according to (time) points that describe the stages in the reasoning (a well-known
approach to the semantics of intuitionistic logic; see [Kri65]). This idea of using
temporal frames to represent the ow of time of the reasoning process itself is in
common with our approach. However, there are dierences as well. As Gabbay's
approach does not use epistemic states, one always has to commit to justications:
it is not possible to express that the truth value of a justication  should be left
open in the future of the reasoning process. In our approach there is a choice: either
one can choose to commit to justications or not. The second case is described in
the current section, while a slight modication of the temporal translation of the
default rules will enable our approach to commit to justications. This will not be
worked out here. A second dierence with Gabbay's approach is that we do not give
temporal interpretations to classical connectives such as negation and implication,
whereas the intuitionistic approach does: e.g., : is true at a time point if and only
if for all future time points  is false. A third dierence is that in our case there
is a time dierence (in principle of one step) between the conclusion  of a default
rule ( : )= and its condition . In Gabbay's approach both  and  refer to the
same time point, while only  is interpreted in a temporal manner. We interpret
both  and  in a temporal manner. This essentially means that in Gabbay's
approach default reasoning steps are not counted by the time measure as used. This
dierence has rather far-reaching implications for the models. In Gabbay's case the
conclusions of the reasoning process are meant as those statements that are true at
all time points of the intended model, whereas in our case they are the statements
that are (`become') known to be true at some time point of the model, i.e., that
are known to be true in the limit model. Gabbay's logic does not yield semantics
for Reiter's default logic. In [ Luk90], pp. 149-154, a critical analysis is given of
Gabbay's approach.
Comparison with Etherington
In [Eth87] it is argued that a semantics of default logic in terms of typical semantic
structures as known is not possible, because the outcome of a default reasoning pro-
cess essentially depends on the way knowledge is extended (see page 497 of [Eth87]),
and this requires knowledge that is not inherent in typical semantical structures.
Precisely this view was our motivation to model the traces of the reasoning process
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explicitly in our semantics. Etherington's semantics has some similarities and some
dierences with our approach. The main similarity is that our minimal temporal
models correspond to (maximal) chains in the sense of Etherington's preference or-
dering. A maximal element with respect to Etherington's ordering corresponds to
our notion of limit model. Actually we dene the (temporal) ordering relation be-
tween states in the reasoning process in a logical manner by temporal axioms (the
temporal translations of the default rules), whereas Etherington gives a more ad hoc
denition of his preference relation. Our notion of minimality with respect to the
usual renement relation corresponds to what in Etherington's case is also hidden
in the denition of the preference relation, namely that nothing else can happen
than what is based on (generated by) the given defaults (a kind of groundedness-
condition).
Comparison with Besnard and Schaub
The approach of Besnard and Schaub [BS94] is similar to an earlier approach to
semantics for Reiter's default logic by Schaub [Sch91]. Instead of pairs of classes
of interpretations, one for the formulae in an extension, one for the justications,
Besnard and Schaub use classes of Kripke models with one actual world, where
the formulae of an extension have to be true in the actual worlds, and the worlds
reachable from the actual world are used for the justications. Also an ordering <
D
0
is dened on classes of Kripke models, which depends on the defaults in the default
theory. Although both in their approach and ours, Kripke models are used, the way
in which they are used is quite dierent, not to mention the fact that we use epistemic
states, and Besnard and Schaub use two-valued models for the extensions. As in
Etherington's approach, maximal chains in their ordering correspond to our minimal
temporal models, and Besnard and Schaub also give a more ad hoc denition of their
precedence relation. As we want our models to reect the reasoning path which leads
to an extension, it was natural to use a linear time model, and as at any point in
time, not all facts will be known when reasoning, the use of epistemic states seems
justied. Both their approach and ours use minimization of models with respect to
a preference relation. Their ordering <
D
0
depends on the default theory, whereas
our ordering 
g
is structurally dened, independent of the defaults.
Comparison with Marek, Schwarz and Truszczynski
There is a long tradition of research into modal nonmonotonic logics starting with
[MD80]. With every modal logic of knowledge (of belief) one can associate a non-
monotonic logic based on it. Given a theory I in the modal language, an expansion
T is a theory in this language satisfying a certain xpoint denition. These expan-
sions play a role similar to the role extensions play in default logic. For a number of
modal logics (most notably a logic called S4F), it is possible to translate a default
theory  into a theory I

such that expansions of I

correspond to extensions of .
The translation of a default rule is quite similar to our denition: a rule ( : )= is
translated into the modal formula L ^ LM ! , where M = :L: by denition
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([MST93], see also [MT89, MT92, ST94, Sch95b]). This rule is to be read as: if you
know  and you know  is possible, then  is true. The essential dierence with
our approach is that the modal rule of [MST93] can be seen as a static (closure)
condition on the beliefs of the agent. Any set of beliefs that can be regarded as the
set of beliefs of a rational introspective agent (that is, it must be an expansion),
must be closed under the default rules. Our translation, in contrast, emphasizes
the dynamic (behavioral) aspect. A minimal temporal epistemic model does not
describe a belief set of an agent, but a reasoning trace of a rational introspective
agent. The limit of such a model corresponds to a (nal) belief set. Thus, our logic
does not fall into the general framework of Marek, Schwarz, and Truszczynski. Our
underlying (monotonic) logic, temporal epistemic logic, is essentially just standard
S5, with a straightforward temporalization over the natural numbers. So we use sim-
pler techniques than the approach of [MST93] which is based on S4F (or a modal
logic in-between the logics N and S4F. In [ACGP96] it is shown that, with a slight
adaptation of the xpoint equation and the translation, logics between KD4 and
KD4Z can also be used).
Comparison with Amati, Aiello and Pirri
The idea of Marek, Schwarz and Truszczynski is taken even further in [ACP97],
where it is shown that extensions correspond to certain theorems in the modal
logic KD4Z. The xpoint for extensions is expressible in the language. Thus, the
xpoint is not a construction on top of the logic, but extensions correspond to
xpoints expressed in the language, provable in KD4Z. Again, however, this is a
static description of the set of beliefs of an agent. Our perspective is dierent: we
want to make the construction an explicit temporal process as performed by the
agent.
Comparison with Lin and Shoham
In [LS92] a bimodal logic of knowledge and assumptions is described. Since this
logic is treated in more detail in Section 5.5, we will not say too much about it here.
Suce it to say that the major dierence between our approach and theirs is again
in the perspective: their perspective is static, with a characterization result that
implicitly gives a dynamic description. In our approach, the dynamic perspective
is the most important, and the static notion of limit is derived from the dynamic
notions.
5.1.5 Concluding remarks
In this section we have given a temporal interpretation to the notion of a justication
in a default rule. This enables one to use concepts from temporal logic to study
default reasoning. Of course such a translation does not automatically imply that
the problems of default logic will be solved at once. Temporal epistemic logic with
minimality has its own complexity.
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The interpretation and correspondence yield a temporal semantics for default
logic. Although other approaches in the literature for giving semantics to default
logic exist, we feel that making the temporal aspect explicit in a formalism where the
dynamics of the reasoning process (choosing the default assumptions) have an impact
on the nal outcome, gives a clear and intuitively appealing meaning to default logic.
A similar underlying idea was later also used in an approach of Lin and Reiter to
give semantics for logic programming in the Situation Calculus ([LR96]; see also
Section 5.8).
In [HMT95] temporalized epistemic default logic (TEDL) is introduced. A sim-
ilarity with the approach introduced here is that a dynamic perspective on default
reasoning is used. However, there are two dierences. The rst dierence is that
TEDL formalizes a default logic quite dierent from Reiter's default logic: in TEDL
the justications refer only to the current state of knowledge; knowledge that is
acquired at later points in time is not taken into account. The notion of extension,
or nal conclusion set, is dened in a constructive manner; no x point denition
is used. This implies that the conclusion sets are dierent from Reiter extensions:
a TEDL-conclusion set E may be based on (generated by) consequents of default
rules for which the prerequisite is included in E, but the negation of the justication
is also in E. A second dierence is that the semantics of TEDL is dened using
labeled branching time temporal models.
5.2 Default logic: the branching time case
In the previous section, we gave a translation of default theories into linear time
logic. Using the ideas and techniques from Section 4.3, we will give a specication
of default logic in a branching time variant of MTEL. We will see that (under a
particular topological condition, called extension completeness) one branching time
model can be constructed in which precisely all possible lines of reasoning (and the
resulting conclusion sets) can be represented (even though they might be mutually
contradictory). The semantics of the default theory can be dened on the basis of
this single model. In particular, we show how sceptical and credulous entailment
relations can be dened on the basis of this model.
5.2.1 Minimal branching time epistemic logic
The branching time temporal logic we will use, is essentially the branching time
variant of MTEL. In Section 4.3, a branching time logic was dened, parameter-
ized by the choice of the underlying information state frame. The information
state frame we choose here is IS
ep
(see Denition 2.5) restricted to closed (De-
nitiondf:closedmodel) models. The C-operator used in Section 4.3, is replaced by
a K-operator; the semantics of the C-operator when using IS
ep
coincides with the
semantics of the S5-operator K when we view an information state from IS
ep
as an
S5-model. The resulting logic, branching time epistemic logic, can be seen as the
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result of temporalizing S5 using branching time models, just as TEL is the result of
temporalizing S5 using the natural numbers as ow of time.
In the specication of default logic in temporal logic, we used an ordering on
temporal models. When extending that approach to the branching time case, we
also need to extend the ordering 
g
of MTEL to branching time models. The basic
idea is the same: we compare the states pointwise, using the ordering  of the
information state frame. To be able to do a pointwise comparison of two models,
they have to be based on the same ow of time.
Denition 5.11 The ordering 
g
br
between branching time temporal models is de-
ned by: M
g
br
N if they have the same ow of time andM(t)  N (t) for all time
points t.
This ordering can be used to dene minimal models and minimal entailment,
analogously to Section 4.4.
Denition 5.12 For a set K of temporal formulae, we say that a temporal model
M is a 
g
br
-minimal model of K if M j= K and whenever a model N 
g
br
M is a
model of K then N =M. If T is a temporal theory, then by MLT(T) we denote the
set of all 
g
br
-minimal linear time models of T.
The branches in a branching time model represent traces, and under certain
circumstances these traces may have a limit, so that we can talk about the limit of
a branch in a model. These limits exist if the traces are conservative.
Denition 5.13 (Limits in a conservative model) LetM be a temporal model.
1. M is conservative if M(t) M(s) whenever t s.
2. The limit of a branch B in a model M, denoted lim
B
M, is the limit of B
viewed as a trace in IS
ep
(according to Denition 2.20). If B = M, we will
simply write lim M.
5.2.2 Interpreting default logic in branching time temporal
logic
In Section 5.1 a translation of default theories into temporal theories of linear time
temporal epistemic logic was given. The translation into branching time temporal
epistemic logic uses the same temporal interpretation of a default rule ( : )=:
If the agent knows  now, and  remains consistent in the future, then
it may conclude  at the next point in time.
The question is how we should interpret consistency in the future, and what the next
point in time is: should  be consistent in all or in some possible futures (branches),
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and should  be concluded in all or in some next points? As each branch should
represent a valid default reasoning path, we want the above default applicability rule
to be satised by every branch in a model. This means that if the agent knows 
at some point in time, and there is a future (a branch) starting at this point along
which  remains consistent, then on the next point in time on this branch,  must
be concluded. We can not express this directly in our branching time logic, but
we can do it by describing the rule one point later: if the agent knows  at the
previous point in time, and there is a branch along which : is not known, then
we have to conclude  now. In conservative models (and we will require models to
be conservative),  is known at the previous point in time if and only if it is known
sometimes in the past. Furthermore, : is not known along some branch precisely
if it is not the case that : is known sometimes in the future along all branches.
The translation of a default rule ( : )= then becomes
P (K) ^ :8F(K:)! K:
In case there are more justications, 
1
; : : : ; 
n
, the translation is P (K) ^
:8F(K:
1
_ : : : _ K:
n
)! K, but for clarity we will consider only defaults with
one justication in the remainder of this section. Instead of reducing the class of
models to the class of conservative models, we will add formulae P (K)! K (for
 propositional) that ensure conservativity. As was the case in the previous section,
the axioms of the default theory can just be prexed by a K-operator.
As we do not want any extra conclusions in the corresponding model than those
which have to be drawn, we will take the minimal models with respect to 
g
br
.
Denition 5.14 (Branching time interpretation of a default theory) Let 
= hD;W i be a default theory. Dene
Cons = fP (K)! K j  a propositional formulag;
D
0
= fP (K) ^ :8F(K:)! K j ( : )= 2 Dg; and
W
0
= fK j  2 Wg:
The temporal interpretation of  is the temporal theory T

= Cons [D
0
[W
0
. The
set of minimal linear time models of T

is denoted by MLT().
On linear time models, T

does the same as () (see Denition 5.1).
Theorem 5.15 Let  = hD;W i be a default theory.
1. If M is a minimal linear time temporal model of T

, then Th(lim M) is a
Reiter extension E of . Moreover, E
i
= Th(M
i
) for all i 2 N.
2. If W is consistent and E is a Reiter extension of , then the temporal model
M dened by M = (Mod (E
i
))
i2N
is a minimal linear time temporal model of
T

with Th(lim M) = E.
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Proof: This result is essentially the same as Propositions 5.3 and 5.4. We will
only make some remarks about the dierent translation. It is easy to see that
on linear models, :F (K:) is equivalent to :8F(K:). We will show that any
conservative linear model satises K^:F (K:)! XK if and only if it satises
P (K) ^ :8F(K:) ! K. Suppose that M j= K ^ :F (K:) ! XK and
that for some t 2 N, (M; t) j= P (K) ^ :8F(K:). Remark that (M; t) j= P (K)
implies that t > 0. Then it easily follows (given conservativity) that (M; t   1) j=
K ^ :F (K:), so (M; t   1) j= XK whence (M; t) j= K. Now suppose that
M j= P (K) ^ :8F(K:) ! K and for some t 2 N, (M; t) j= K ^ :F (K:).
Then (M; t + 1) j= P (K) ^ :8F(K:), so (M; t + 1) j= K. It follows that
(M; t) j= XK. 2
For the case of lines of default reasoning that do not stabilize after a nite number
of steps, topological properties of the space of reasoning patterns become relevant.
Before dening a metric on the space of linear time models, we recall the following
well-known topological denitions. A sequence (a
i
)
i2N
in a metric space X with
metric d is called convergent with limit a 2 X if for each " > 0 there exists an
N 2 N such that for all i  N it holds that d(a
i
; a) < ". A subset Y of X is called
closed if for every convergent sequence in X with all a
i
in Y , its limit is included in
Y .
Denition 5.16 (Metric) Dene the following metric d on the set of linear time
models LT: for M;N linear models:
d(M;N ) =

0 if M = N
2
 i
where i = supfj 2 N j 8k  j :M
k
= N
k
g, otherwise.
It is easy to see that the metric space (LT; d) is complete, i.e., that every Cauchy-
sequence has a limit. The following denition will play an important role in the next
subsection:
Denition 5.17 (Extension complete) A default theory  is called extension
complete if MLT() is a closed subset of the metric space (LT; d).
Proposition 5.18 Every default theory with a nite set of defaults is extension
complete.
Proof: A default theory  with a nite set of defaults has nitely many extensions
(this follows easily from the fact that every extension is the propositional closure of
W and the set of generating defaults, see [Rei80b]), so by Theorem 5.15 MLT() is
nite. In a metric space, all nite sets are closed. 2
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As an example of a default theory which is not extension complete, let  =
hD;W i, with
D = f: b=bg [ f(a
i
: a
i+1
)=a
i+1
j i 2 Ng [ f(a
i
: :a
i+1
)=:a
i+1
j i 2 Ng and
W = fa
0
g [ fb! a
i
j i 2 Ng:
This (normal) default theory has innitely many extensions: F = Cn(W [ fbg) and
for each n 2 N, E
(n)
= Cn(W [ fa
i
j i  ng [ f:a
n+1
g). In this example, the
linear time models corresponding to these extensions form a convergent sequence in
(LT; d), but its limit is the model (M
t
)
t2N
, withM
t
= Mod (W [fa
i
j i 2 Ng), which
is not in MLT() (see Figure 5.2). In Figure 5.2, we have indicated the (non-trivial)
formulae that are true in the various time points, where a formula is not repeated if
it was true earlier.
a0 b, ai
a0 ‰ a1, ‰ b
a0 a1 ‰ a2, ‰ b
a0 a1 a2 ‰ a3, ‰ b
a0 a1 a2 a3 ‰ a4, ‰ b
a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 M
Figure 5.2: Traces of a theory which is not extension complete.
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5.2.3 Joint embeddings of linear time models of default the-
ories
The previous section provided semantics for default reasoning in the form of a set of
linear time models that represent the possible default reasoning patterns. An alter-
native manner of representing these reasoning patterns is by means of one branching
time model, where each branch represents one alternative reasoning pattern (with
a Reiter extension as its limit). This provides semantics for default reasoning in
the form of one \standard" model. The aim of this section is for any given default
theory to indeed construct such a branching time model, under certain conditions
(viz. extension completeness). To this end we apply the constructions of Section 4.3
to the model theory of the temporal translation of default theories.
Section 4.3 gave some results on preservation of modelhood by the constructions
of closure, coproduct and joint closure. In addition to those, we need results about
minimal modelhood. In the sequel, let C denote the coproduct of a set of models
C (see Denition 4.30). The coproduct construction preserves minimal models.
Proposition 5.19 Let K be a temporal theory and let B be a set of models. Then
all models in B are minimal models of K if and only if B is a minimal model of K.
Proof: Suppose B is a set of minimal models of a temporal theory K, and let B
be its coproduct. Since the evaluation of a formula in a point depends only on the
connected component in which it lies, it is easy to see that B is a model of K. Now
suppose that there is a smaller model M of K. Then there is a point s 2 M such
that M
s
 (B)
s
. This point s is an element of one of the models N in B. Now
let us look at the model M
0
which is the restriction of M to the ow of time of
N . It is easy to verify that M
0

g
br
N and that M
0
is a model of K, contradicting
the assumption that B contains only minimal models of K. Thus, B is a minimal
model of K.
For the other direction, suppose B contains a model M which is not a minimal
model of K. If it is not a model of K, then it is easy to see that B can not be a
model of K. Otherwise there is a model N 
g
br
M which is a model of K. Consider
B
0
= (B n fMg) [ fNg. Then B
0

g
br
B and B
0
is a model of K, so B is not
a minimal model of K. 2
As we want to study minimal models of T

and connections between them, the
following proposition is useful:
Proposition 5.20 Let  be a default theory, and let f : M ! M
0
be a homo-
morphism such that for every branch B
0
in M
0
, there is a branch B in M such that
f [B] = B
0
. If M is a minimal model of T

then M
0
is also a minimal model of T

.
Proof: SupposeM has ow of time (T;<) andM
0
has ow of time (T
0
; <
0
). First
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we will show that M
0
is a model of T

. Unfortunately, we can not use Proposi-
tion 4.29, since f is not necessarily branch-surjective. Take a point s
0
2 T
0
. Then
s
0
lies on at least one branch, say B
0
. Given the requirement on f , there must be a
branch B in M such that f [B] = B
0
. Note that B
0
is an isomorphic copy of B. It
follows that (M
0
; s
0
) j= W
0
and (M
0
; s
0
) j= Cons (remember that Cons  T

; see
Denition 5.14).
Now take a rule P (K) ^ :8F(K:) ! K in D
0
, and suppose (M
0
; s
0
) j=
P (K) ^ :8F(K:) . This means that there must exist a branch B
0
in M
0
such
that s
0
lies on B
0
, there is a t
0
2 B
0
with t
0
 s
0
and M
0
(t
0
) j= K, and for all
u
0
2 B
0
: if s
0
 u
0
then M
0
(u
0
) 6j= K:. Given the requirement on f , there is a
branch B in M with f [B] = B
0
. Thus, there is a (unique) s 2 B with f(s) = s
0
, and
it is easy to verify that (M; s) j= P (K) ^ :8F(K:). But then (M; s) j= K, as
M is a model of T

, and therefore (M
0
; s
0
) j= K. We have proved that M
0
is a
model of T

.
Suppose thatM
0
is not minimal, then there exists a model N
0

g
br
M
0
, such that
N
0
j= T

. We will dene a model N of T

which is smaller than M, contradicting
the hypothesis that M is minimal. Let N be based on the ow of time (T;<),
and dene N (s) = N
0
(f(s)). Then N (s) = N
0
(f(s))  M
0
(f(s)) = M(s) (the
denition of homomorphism in fact only requires that M
0
(f(s))  M(s), but for
closed models equivalence implies equality), and there is at least one point u
0
2 T
0
such that N
0
(u
0
) 6= M
0
(u
0
). But as f is certainly surjective, there is a u 2 T
with f(u) = u
0
, so we have that N (u) 6= M(u). Take a point s 2 T , then the
path from the root of the tree in which s lies is mapped isomorphically to the path
from a root to f(s), so since N
0
is a model of Cons and W
0
, it is easy to see that
(N ; s) j= Cons [ W
0
. Now take a rule P (K) ^ :8F(K:) ! K in D
0
and
suppose (N ; s) j= P (K) ^ :8F(K:). This means that there is a branch B in
N on which s lies, such that there is a t  s with N (t) j= K and for all u 2 B
with s  u, N (u) 6j= K:. But then f [B] is a branch in N
0
with f(t)  f(s) and
N
0
(f(t)) j= K, and for all u
0
2 B
0
with s  u
0
it must be the case that u
0
= f(u)
for some u 2 B with s  u, so N (u) = N
0
(f(u)) 6j= :K. As N
0
is a model of D
0
,
we have N
0
(f(s)) j= K, so that N (s) j= K. Thus N is a model of D
0
, so it is a
model of T

, in contradiction with the hypothesis that M was a minimal model of
T

. We have proved that M
0
is a minimal model of T

. 2
Sometimes properties of branching time temporal models can be related to prop-
erties of the linear time models that are their branches. In our case we have the
following results for the property of being a minimal model of T

.
Theorem 5.21 Let  be a default theory.
1. IfM is a (branching time) temporal model such that Br(M)  MLT(), then
M is a minimal model of T

.
2. Suppose  is extension complete and B  MLT(). If f : B ! M is a
surjective homomorphism, then M is a minimal model of T

.
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Proof:
1. Suppose Br(M)  MLT(). By denition, MLT() consists of (linear) min-
imal models of T

, so the same holds for Br(M). By Proposition 5.19,
the coproduct Br(M) is a minimal model of T

. Now dene the function
f : Br(M)!M mapping every branch in Br(M) into M. It is easy to see
that f satises the requirement of Proposition 5.20, soM is a minimal model
of T

.
2. We will show that Br(M)  MLT(), from which the desired result follows by
part 1. Take any branch D ofM, and assume (without loss of generality) that
it has the natural numbers as ow of time. Now take an arbitrary n 2 N. Since
f is surjective, there must be a point s 2 B such that f(s) = n. This point s
must lie on a branch D
0
of B, and this D
0
is a linear time model in B. From
the denition of homomorphism, it follows that f maps this branch up to point
s isomorphically onto D (up to point n). This means that d(D;D
0
)  2
 n
. As
n was chosen arbitrarily, we can nd a sequence of linear time models in B
that have D as their limit. The models of B are in MLT(), which is closed
as  is extension complete. This means that D 2 MLT(). By part 1 we have
that M is a minimal model of T

.
2
It can easily be shown that in general minimal models of T

can have branches
that are not in MLT(). Therefore, the class of all minimal branching time models
of T

cannot be considered a suitable semantics for default logic (this is dierent,
however, for normal default theories; see Subsection 5.2.5). Consider the default
theory  = hD;W i with D = f(> : a)=a; (> : c)=b; (a : c)=c; (a : :c)=:cg and
W = ;, and the model M of Figure 5.3. In Figure 5.3 we have again indicated the
a, b
c
‰ c
c
‰ c
...
...
Figure 5.3: Minimal model with non-minimal branches.
(non-trivial) formulae that are true in the various time points, where a formula is
not repeated if it was true earlier (so in the points labeled c and :c, also a and b are
true). It can easily be checked that M is a model of T

, and that it is minimal (if
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any true formulae are deleted anywhere, the result is not a model of T

). However,
the lower branch is not a minimal linear time model of T

. This can be seen either
by considering the smaller model where b is deleted from the second point onwards
(which would still be a model of T

), or by verifying that its limit model (in which
a; b and :c are known), does not correspond to an extension of . The equivalence
of these two methods follows from Theorem 5.15.
Given the set of linear time minimal models MLT() of a temporal interpretation
T

of a default theory, these models can be jointly embedded in their coproduct
MLT(), which also is a minimal model of T

. This provides one model to describe
the complete semantics of the default theory. However, this model may contain a lot
of redundant information: all branches at least have the same starting point, but in
the coproduct a copy is included of this (actually identical information state) starting
point for every branch. Moreover, branches can contain longer initial subsequences
that are identical. In a coproduct these are not shared but present in a copy for
each of the branches. A more compact form of a joint embedding of the minimal
linear time models can be obtained by taking the closure of this coproduct, that is,
by taking the joint closure of MLT().
Denition 5.22 The joint closure jcl(MLT()) of MLT() is shortly denoted by
LT


.
Theorem 5.23
1. Let  be a default theory and S  MLT() a set of minimal linear time
models of T

. Then the joint closure jcl(S) of S is a closed minimal temporal
model of T

. If S is closed (in (LT; d)), then Br(jcl(S)) = S.
2. The statement of item 1 holds in particular for the set MLT() of all minimal
linear time models of T

: the model LT


is a minimal model of T

and if 
is extension complete, then Br(LT


) = MLT().
Proof: The joint closure jcl(S) is closed by denition, and the (unique) homomor-
phism f mapping S into jcl(S) is surjective, so jcl(S) is a minimal model of T

by
Theorem 5.21, second part. Now suppose S is closed. Using a similar argument as
in the proof of Theorem 5.21, second part, one can show that every branch of jcl(S)
can be approximated by elements of S, which is closed and therefore contains such
a branch. If  is extension complete, then by denition MLT() is closed. 2
The aim of this section was to nd a branching time model containing just
the Reiter extensions of  as limits of its branches. The following theorem shows
that for an extension complete default theory  the model LT


indeed fullls this
requirement.
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Theorem 5.24 Let  = hD;W i be an extension complete default theory with W
consistent.
1. For every minimal linear time model of T

there is a unique homomorphism
into LT


; this homomorphism is injective.
2. There is a bijection from the set Ext() of all Reiter extensions of  onto the
set Br(LT


) of branches of LT


. More precisely, the mapping 	 : Ext() !
Br(LT


) dened by 	(E) = (Mod (E
i
))
i2N
, has the inverse  : Br(LT


) !
Ext() dened by (B) = Th(lim
B
LT


). Furthermore, for every i 2 N it
holds (B)
i
= Th(B
i
).
Proof:
1. Every modelM of MLT() is mapped by inclusion (which is a homomorphism)
into MLT() which is mapped into LT


. The composition of these two ho-
momorphisms is again a homomorphism. If there are two homomorphisms
f; g mapping M into LT


, then f [M] and g[M] are two isomorphic branches
in a closed model, so these images must coincide as an easy consequence of
Proposition 4.32. But this means that f and g are equal. It can easily be
checked that a homomorphism from a linear model is always injective. Note
that extension completeness is not needed here.
2. From Theorem 5.23 we have that Br(LT


) = MLT(), and Theorem 5.15
established a bijection between MLT() and Ext().
2
For the existence of a closed temporal model containing as branches just the
minimal linear time models of a given default theory, the condition of extension
completeness is not only sucient, but also necessary, as is shown in the following
proposition.
Proposition 5.25 For any default theory  the following are equivalent:
1.  is extension complete.
2. There exists a closed model M with Br(M) = MLT().
Proof: From 1 to 2 is easy: the required model is LT


. For the other direction,
suppose we have a closed model M with Br(M) = MLT(). Take a converging se-
quence fB
1
;B
2
; : : : g of models in MLT(), with limit B. The models in the sequence
are all present as branches inM, and asM is closed, if two models in the sequence
have an initial common subbranch, then these are mapped onto the same subbranch
in M. Take any initial subbranch of B, then we can nd a model B
i
with the same
initial subbranch, the image of which is inM. If we extend this initial subbranch by
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one point, then we can again nd a model B
j
with this initial subbranch. Its image
inM then extends the image of the subbranch of B
i
, asM is closed. In this fashion
we nd that B is a branch of M, and therefore is in MLT(). 2
So if a default theory  is not extension complete, then LT


contains a branch
which is not a member of MLT(). Such a branch does not correspond to an ex-
tension. This means that the use of a temporal model construction as introduced
here heavily depends on the topological properties of the given default theory: con-
structions fullling the requirements we imposed are not possible for non-extension
complete default theories. However, recall Proposition 5.18, stating that this can
only occur in the case of an innite set of defaults. For almost all applications of
default logic, the condition of extension completeness is fullled due to niteness of
the set of defaults.
5.2.4 Semantic entailment relations
Minimal semantic entailment relations based on the model LT


and on the minimal
linear models can be dened.
Denition 5.26 Let  be an extension complete default theory, and let ' be a
formula. Dene
 j

LT
' , 8M[M is a minimal linear time model of T

)M j= '];
 j

LT

' , LT


j= ':
For a certain class of formulae we can give logical relations between these entail-
ment relations. Using Theorem 4.26, the following is easy to establish.
Proposition 5.27 For any default theory , its temporal interpretation T

is back-
ward persistent under any homomorphism.
The following theorem gives more precise connections between the two semantic
consequence relations.
Theorem 5.28 Let T

be the temporal interpretation of an extension complete
default theory  and let ' be a propositional formula.
1. If ' is backward persistent (under injections), then
 j

LT

')  j

LT
':
2. If ' is propositional, then
 j

LT

8F(K'),  j

LT
8F(K'):
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Proof:
1. Suppose  j

LT

' and let M be a minimal linear time model of T

. By
Theorem 5.24, rst part, there is an injective homomorphism f mapping M
into LT


. Take any time point s of M, then since LT


j= ', in particu-
lar (LT


; f(s)) j= '. As ' is backward persistent under injections, we have
(M; s) j= '. This proves that M j= ', and therefore  j

LT
'.
2. If ' is propositional, it is easy to see that 8F(K') is backward persistent
under any homomorphism, using Theorem 4.26. So the left to right direction
follows by part 1. For the other direction, by Theorem 5.23 we have that
Br(LT


) = MLT(). Take a point s in LT


, and a branch B through s.
Then B 2 MLT(), so (B; s) j= 8F(K'), which means there must be a point
s  t with B(t) j= K'. But then also (LT


)
t
j= K'. As the branch was
arbitrary, we have (LT


; s) j= 8F(K'). This proves that LT


j= 8F(K'), so
 j

LT

8F(K').
2
We will show in Theorem 5.29 how these formulae 8F(K') are related to sceptical
entailment.
The model LT


of an extension complete default theory  gives an overview
of both all possible reasoning paths from a default theory (the branches) and the
resulting conclusion sets (the limit models). Therefore in principle it contains all
information that is relevant for an intended semantics. As a special case, the sceptical
and credulous entailment relations (see Denition 3.1) can be based on this model.
We dene (LT


)
!
as the set of the limit models of all branches of LT


, i.e., (LT


)
!
=
flim
B
LT


j B is a branch of LT


g.
Theorem 5.29 Let  be an extension complete default theory, r the root of LT


and let ' be a propositional formula.
1. The following are equivalent:
(a) ' is a sceptical consequence of .
(b) (LT


)
!
j= '.
(c) (LT


; r) j= 8F(K').
(d) (L; s) j= 8F(K') for every minimal linear time model L of  with root
s.
2. The following are equivalent:
(a) ' is a credulous consequence of .
(b) lim
B
LT


j= ' for some branch B.
(c) (LT


; r) j= 9F(K').
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(d) (L; s) j= 9F(K') for some minimal linear time model L of  with root s.
(e) (L; s) j= 8F(K') for some minimal linear time model L of  with root s.
Proof:
1. From Theorem 5.24, we know that the function 	 : Ext()! Br(LT


) dened
by 	(E) = (Mod(E
i
))
i2N
, is a bijection. Now for any propositional ', we have
that ' 2 E , ' 2
S
E
i
, Mod (E
i
) j= ' for some i, lim ((Mod (E
i
))
i2N
) j=
' (this uses the fact that the sets Mod (E
i
) are closed S5-models). From these
facts, it is easy to see that 1a and 1b are equivalent. The equivalence of 1b
and 1c is immediate. From Theorem 5.23 we know that Br(LT


) = MLT(),
from which we get the equivalence of 1c and 1d.
2. These equivalences can be proved analogously to those in part 1. The equiv-
alence of 2d and 2e is an easy consequence of the semantic denitions of 9F
and 8F.
2
Using the model LT


we can dene many more dierent consequence relations.
Sceptical and credulous entailment use the formulae 8F(K') and 9F(K'), but our
temporal language is much more expressive. We can check for instance whether a
certain propositional formula is true in every branch at a point with depth less than
5 (with the formula 8G8G8G8G(K')).
In the case of normal default theories, there are even stronger connections be-
tween linear minimal models, branching time minimal models and the joint closures
of these classes. We will treat them in the next subsection.
5.2.5 The case of normal default theories
A normal default rule is a default rule of the form ( : )=, and a default theory
consisting of solely normal default rules is called a normal default theory. In [ET94b]
we pointed out a branching time temporal semantics for the normal case only. Most
of the results there follow as a special case of the general case in this subsection.
If  is normal, the minimal temporal models of T

can be characterized com-
pletely by their branches.
Theorem 5.30 Let  be a normal default theory. Then M is a minimal temporal
model of T

if and only if Br(M)  MLT().
Proof: The right to left direction is Theorem 5.21. Note that the counterexample
for the other direction following this theorem (see Figure 5.3) is based on a default
theory with a non-normal default. So let us prove the other direction. Suppose M
is a minimal model of T

but has a branch B which is not a minimal model of T

.
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Consider the homomorphism f mapping B, seen as a linear time model, intoM. As
M j= T

and T

is backward persistent under homomorphisms (Proposition 5.27),
we have that B j= T

. As it is not a minimal model of T

by assumption, there
must exist a linear time model N of T

such that N 
g
br
B. Suppose B and N are
based on the ow of time s
0
< s
1
< s
2
< : : : . Let us consider the rst point of time
s
n
(from the roots) at which N and B are dierent. If N (s
0
)  B(s
0
), then dene a
new modelM
0
based on the same ow of time asM but withM
0
(s
0
) = N (s
0
) and
M
0
(t) =M(t) for all t 6= s
0
. It can easily be checked thatM
0
is a model of T

and
M
0

g
br
M, which is impossible since M was minimal.
Now suppose n > 0 so N (s
i
) = B(s
i
) for i < n and N (s
n
)  B(s
n
). Construct
a model M
0
based on the same ow of time as M but with M
0
(s
n
) = N (s
n
) and
M
0
(t) =M(t) for t 6= s
n
. We will show that M
0
j= T

. It is clear that M
0
j= W
0
,
as this is evaluated per time point, and both M j= W
0
and N j= W
0
. To show that
M
0
j= Cons , it is sucient to show that M
0
is conservative. The only interesting
case is for a point t  s
n
. But the path from s
n
to the root of its component is
unique (Observation 4.18), and as s
n
lies on B, it must be the case that t = s
i
for
some i < n. Then we haveM
0
(s
i
) = N (s
i
)  N (s
n
) =M
0
(s
n
), as N is conservative
(N j= Cons).
Now take a rule P (K) ^ :8F(K:) ! K (remember that  is normal). It
is easy to see that if at a point in M the left hand side is false, it will also be
false in the corresponding point of M
0
(this uses conservativity of M
0
). So the
only possibility of this rule to be false in M
0
, is at time point s
n
. We will show
that this cannot occur. So suppose we have (M
0
; s
n
) j= P (K) ^ :8F(K:). As
M
0
(t) =M(t) for t 6= s
n
and the truth of the formula P (K)^:8F(K:) does not
depend on the information state at the current point in time, it easily follows that
(M; s
n
) j= P (K)^:8F(K:). This implies (M; s
n
) j= K, so (B; s
n
) j= K. This
means (by conservativity of B) that (B; s
i
) 6j= K: for all i 2 N. AsN 
g
br
B, we also
have that (N ; s
i
) 6j= K:, so (N ; s
n
) j= :8F(K:). Since (M; s
n
) j= P (K), we
have (B; s
n
) j= P (K), from which it follows that (N ; s
n
) j= P (K) (N (s
i
) = B(s
i
)
for i < n). So (N ; s
n
) j= P (K) ^ :8F(K:). As N j= D
0
, we get (N ; s
n
) j= K,
and from M
0
(s
n
) = N (s
n
) we conclude that (M
0
; s
n
) j= K. We have shown
that M
0

g
br
M and M
0
j= T

, which contradicts the assumption that M is a
minimal model of T

. This means that B must be a minimal model of T

, so
Br(M)  MLT(), which concludes the proof. 2
For the case of closed models this implies the following characterization result of
closed minimal temporal models.
Proposition 5.31 Suppose  is an extension complete normal default theory and
M a temporal model. Then M is a closed minimal temporal model of T

if and
only if M is the joint closure of a set B of minimal linear time models of T

.
Proof: The joint closure of a set B of minimal linear time models of T

is a
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closed minimal temporal model of T

by Theorem 5.23 (extension completeness and
normality of  is not used). For the other direction, by Theorem 4.40, M is the
joint closure of its branches. These branches are minimal linear time models of T

by Theorem 5.30. 2
For extension complete normal default theories, the model LT


also has stronger
properties.
Denition 5.32 (Final minimal model) The model F is called a nal minimal
temporal model of T

if it is a nal model in the class of minimal models of T

(see
Subsection 4.3.4, below Theorem 4.40), that is, if it is a minimal temporal model of
T

and for each minimal temporal modelM of T

there is a unique homomorphism
f :M! F .
We have the following result showing that in the normal case, we have a nal model
semantics for default logic:
Theorem 5.33 Let  be a normal extension complete default theory. Then LT


is
a (unique) nal minimal temporal model of T

, so for every minimal temporal model
of T

there is a unique homomorphism into LT


; for closed minimal temporal models
of T

this homomorphism is injective. The model LT


is also the joint closure of
all minimal temporal models of T

.
Proof: By denition, LT


is the joint closure of MLT(), so using Proposition 5.31
we have that it is a minimal temporal model of T

. Now consider any minimal
temporal model M of T

. By Theorem 5.30 it follows that Br(M)  MLT(), and
from Theorem 5.23 it follows that Br(LT


) = MLT(). The required unique homo-
morphism maps every branch ofM into its (unique) place in LT


. This uniqueness
follows from the closedness of LT


. By Denition 4.31, any homomorphism from a
closed model is injective. 2
When a default theory is normal and extension complete, semantics can be dened
by taking all linear minimal models of T

, by taking all branching time minimal
models of T

, or by taking the unique nal minimal temporal model, LT


, that
incorporates all these possibilities in the most ecient manner.
A theory T

species default reasoning using the default theory . It gives rise
to a reasoning frame operator, but we can not directly use Denition 4.63, since it
was geared towards linear time temporal logic. But as a branching time model can
be seen as a (compact) representation of traces (this role is played by the branches),
such an operator is easy to dene:
T
T

(X) = fB j B 2 Br(LT


) and Th(B
0
) = Cn(X)g:
In the case of normal default theories, the denition is more like Denition 4.63, as
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we then have
T
T

(X) = fB j B 2 Br(M);M j=

g
br
T

and Th(B
0
) = Cn(X)g:
Let us briey review what we have done in this section. We described the con-
struction of a branching time temporal model in which all minimal linear time models
are incorporated. Under a topological condition (extension completeness), which is
always satised for nite default theories, this model contains only branches which
are minimal linear time models. For any normal default theory satisfying the same
condition, this model contains not only all minimal linear models of the temporal
interpretation, but also all minimal branching time models. In this case we have a
linear, branching time and nal model semantics for default logic.
5.3 Logic programming
In Section 3.2, we introduced positive logic programs and their semantics and associ-
ated reasoning frame operator. In this section, we will show that logic programming
can be specied in temporal logic. Many extensions of the basic paradigm of minimal
models of positive programs exist; we will consider the semantics of stable generated
models of extended generalized logic programs, introduced in [HW97b].
A logic program consists of facts and deduction rules. Facts correspond to sen-
tences of a suitably restricted language, and deduction rules correspond to non-
schematic (Gentzen) sequents. While facts express extensional knowledge, rules
express intensional knowledge. A set of facts can be viewed as a database whose
semantics is determined by its minimal models: a fact is true if it is a member of
this set, and false otherwise. In the case of logic programs, minimal models are not
adequate because they are not able to capture `groundedness', i.e. the directedness
of rules. Therefore, stable models in the form of certain xpoints have been proposed
by Gelfond and Lifschitz ([GL88]) as the intended models of normal logic programs.
In [HJW97], this notion was generalized by presenting a denition which is neither
xpoint-based nor dependent on any specic rule syntax: stable generated models.
We will start by introducing stable generated models, after which we will study
the relation with our temporal semantics.
5.3.1 Preliminaries
Our presentation of stable generated models will be (slightly) dierent from the
presentation in [HW97b]. In logic programming, rules are usually allowed to contain
(free) variables. In most treatments however, including the one based on stable
generated models, semantically a rule with free variables is equivalent to the set of
ground instantiations of the rule. A ground instantiation of a rule is the result of
substituting ground terms from the Herbrand base for all of its free variables; the
Herbrand base of a program is the smallest set containing all constants occuring in
the program and closed under formation of terms using function symbols occuring
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in the program. In view of this equivalence we will give a purely propositional
presentation. The models used in [HW97b], are Herbrand interpretations, which
are essentially just sets of literals. The denition of stable generated models uses
only coherent Herbrand interpretations, in which an atom and its negation cannot
both occur. As such, a coherent Herbrand interpretation I is isomorphic to a partial
model m via the correspondence
8l 2 Lit(P ) : (l 2 I , m(l) = 1)
where Lit(P ) = P [ f:a j a 2 Pg. We will use partial models in our presentation.
To the propositional language we add one more connective, namely weak nega-
tion, which will be denoted as  . The interpretation of weak negation in a partial
model is dened by the following table:
 
0 1
1 0
u 1
Program rules are presented as sequents.
Denition 5.34 (Sequent) A sequent s is an expression of the form
F
1
; : : : ; F
m
) G
1
; : : : ; G
n
where F
i
; G
j
are formulae in the propositional language extended with weak nega-
tion, for i = 1; : : : ;m and j = 1; : : : ; n. The body of s, denoted by Bs, is given by
fF
1
; : : : ; F
m
g, and the head of s, denoted by Hs, is given by fG
1
; : : : ; G
n
g. Seq
denotes the set of all sequents.
For a sequent ) F with empty body we also write more simply F .
Dene XLit(P ) = Lit(P ) [ f l j l 2 Lit(P )g. We will often drop the argument
P . A number of classes of sequents will be dened. The most general class for which
stable generated models are dened is EGLP (extended general logic programs). The
class ELP is the class of rules in extended logic programs (the word extended means
that one can use, besides negation by failure, also classically negated, or strongly
negated, atoms). The class EDLP allows disjunctive conclusions. More formally,
dene:
1. EGLP = Seq.
2. EDLP = fs 2 Seq j Bs  XLit;Hs  Litg.
3. ELP = fs 2 Seq j Bs  XLit;Hs  Lit;#Hs = 1g.
A sequent s is true in a partial model m, denoted m j= s, if m(
W
Hs) = 1
whenever m(
V
Bs) = 1. The set of partial models of a set of sequents S, denoted
112 Reasoning Processes in Temporal Logic
Mod (S), is dened by Mod(S) = fm 2 IS
3val
j m j= s for all s 2 Sg. With respect
to a set of partial models M , we write M j= F i m(F ) = 1 for all m 2 M . We
dene the set S
M
of all sequents from a sequent set S which are applicable in M by
S
M
= fs 2 S jM j=
^
Bsg
We will now dene a semantics for logic programs based on [HW97b].
5.3.2 Stable generated models
A sequent s may have several meanings. The traditional meaning of a sequent,
based on classical model theory, is given by the formula
V
Bs !
W
Hs and the
usual model relation. Our intuitive understanding of rules suggests another meaning
which interprets a sequent as a rule for generating factual (extensional) knowledge.
We consider a model of a set S of sequents as intended if it can be generated
bottom-up starting from zero information by an iterated application of the sequents
s 2 S. This intention is captured by notion of a stable generated model. The
subsequent denition is a generalization of the notion discussed in [HW97b]. This
notion generalizes the answer set semantics of [GL90]. In the sequel, we need the
notion of an `interval' of partial models. For two partial modelsm
1
and m
2
, we dene
[m
1
;m
2
] = fn 2 IS
3val
j m
1
 n  m
2
g, where  is the information ordering on
IS
3val
. Furthermore, if hY;<i is a partial order, then Min(Y;<) denotes the set of all
minimal elements of Y , i.e. Min(Y;<) = fx 2 Y j there is no x
0
2 Y such that x
0
<
xg.
Denition 5.35 (Stable generated model) Let S  EGLP . A partial model
m is called a stable generated model of S if there is an ordinal  and a chain of
partial models n
0
 n
1
 : : :  n

such that m = n

, and
1. n
0
(p) = u for all p 2 P .
2. For successor ordinals  with 0 <   , n

is a -minimal -extension of
n
 1
satisfying the heads of all sequents whose bodies hold in [n
 1
;m], i.e.,
n

2 Min(fn 2 IS
3val
j n
 1
 n, and n(
_
Hs) = 1, for all s 2 S
[n
 1
;m]
g;):
3. For limit ordinals   , n

= sup

fn

j  < g.
We say that n is generated by the S-stable chain n
0
 : : :  n

.
The stable entailment relation is dened as follows:
S j=
s
c
F , m(F ) = 1 for all stable generated models m of S:
The denition of a stable chain allows chains of any length. However, this is not
necessary.
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Proposition 5.36 ([HW97b]) Every stable chain can be shortened or extended
to a chain isomorphic to the natural numbers, generating the same stable model.
For purposes of comparison, we also give the denition of the answer set se-
mantics of [GL91], generalizing the stable model semantics of [GL88]. We use the
presentation with sets of literals here.
For B  XLit, let B
 
denote the set of literals which occur weakly negated in
B, i.e., B
 
= fk 2 Lit j  k 2 Bg, and let B
+
= fk 2 Lit j k 2 Bg.
Denition 5.37 Let I  Lit, and S  EDLP . Then the Gelfond-Lifschitz trans-
formation of S with respect to I is dened as
S
I
= fB
+
) H j (B ) H) 2 S, and B
 
\ I = ;g
and the generalized Gelfond-Lifschitz operator  
S
is dened as follows:  
S
(I) collects
all minimal models of S
I
, i.e.  
S
(I) = Min(Mod (S
I
);). A set I  Lit is called an
answer set of S, if I 2  
S
(I).
On (non-disjunctive) extended logic programs, answer sets correspond to stable
generated models, with the exception of the inconsistent answer sets.
Proposition 5.38 Let S  ELP . If I is a coherent answer set, then the partial
model m dened by m(l) = 1 , l 2 I is a stable generated model of S. If m is a
stable generated model of S, then the set I = fl 2 Lit j m(l) = 1g is an answer set
of S.
Proof: The statement is proved in [HW97b] for normal logic programs (in which
no classical negation is used). It is straightforward to generalize this to extended
programs. 2
For disjunctive programs, with or without classical negation, stable generated
models do not generally coincide with answer sets, as the following example shows.
Example 5.39 Let S = f) a; b; a ) b;  a ) ag. Let m
0
be the model in
which m
0
(a) = m
0
(b) = u, m
a
the model in which m(a) = 1 and m(b) = u, and
m
ab
the one in which m(a) = m(b) = 1. We show that m
ab
is a stable generated
model of S by giving a stable chain for it. The chain must start with m
0
. Then
S
[m
0
;m
ab
]
= f) a; bg. One of the two minimal extensions of m
0
is m
a
which we take
as second model in the chain. Then S
[m
a
;m
ab
]
= fa ) b;) a; bg, and a minimal
extension of m
a
satisfying b gives the nal model m
ab
. On the other hand, fa; bg
is not a minimal model of the Gelfond-Lifschitz reduct of S with respect to fa; bg,
which is f) a; b; a) bg, since fbg is a model of it. In fact, S has no answer sets.
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We recall some notions and results from [HW97a] that will be used in the rest
of this section. Two programs P and Q are said to be stable equivalent, denoted as
P 
st
Q, if P and Q have the same stable generated models. A rule s 2 EGLP has
normal form if s = F
1
; : : : ; F
m
) G
1
; : : : ; G
n
, where every F
i
is a disjunction of
literals from XLit, and every G
j
is a literal from XLit. The sequent s has special
normal form if it has normal form and every F
i
is a literal. In [HW97a] it is shown
that every program can be transformed into a stable equivalent program whose rules
have normal form. Let Fin(Seq) = fX : X  Seq and X is nite g.
Denition 5.40 (Transformation rule, [HW97a]) A relation r  Fin(Seq) 
Fin(Seq) is said to be an admissible transformation rule if r is decidable and for
every program P  EGLP , and s 2 P , fX;Y g  Fin(Seq) such that r(Y;X) the
condition P 
st
(P   Y ) [ X is satised. Let R = fr
1
; :::; r
m
g be a nite set of
admissible transformation rules, and P;Q programs. The relation  !
R
between
logic programs is dened as follows: P  !
R
Q i there is a rule r 2 R, Y  P ,
X;Y 2 Fin(Seq) such that r(Y;X) and Q = (P Y )[X . Let  !
?
R
be the transitive
closure of  !
R
. P can be transformed into Q by the rule system R if P  !
?
R
Q.
Lemma 5.41 ([HW97a]) Let P  EGLP , and s 2 P , F 
V
Bs, and G 
W
Hs.
Then P 
st
(P   fsg) [ fBs) Gg 
st
(P   fsg) [ fF ) Hsg.
Lemma 5.42 ([HW97a]) Let P  GLP , and s 2 P , s = Bs ) F
1
^ F
2
. Then
P 
st
(P   fsg) [ fBs) F
1
; Bs) F
2
g.
Corollary 5.43 ([HW97a]) There is a nite set R of admissible transformation
rules such that for every nite extended general logic program P there exists a
program Q in normal form such that P  !
?
R
Q.
Corollary 5.44 ([HW97a]) For every nite extended general logic program P
there exists a program Q in normal form such that P 
st
Q.
From here on, we will also assume that for a rule F
1
; : : : ; F
m
) G
1
; : : : ; G
n
, no
F
i
contains a pair l; l. Such an F
i
is a tautology, and can be eliminated from the
body altogether (without changing the semantics).
5.3.3 A temporal interpretation of logic programming
We would like to specify the behavior of an agent reasoning with a logic program.
That is, as was the case for default logic, we are looking for a translation of logic
programs into a theory of temporal logic. Since a logic program only allows us to
derive literals, we will use partial logic. We rst prove a lemma.
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Lemma 5.45 For a rule F
1
; : : : ; F
p
) G
1
; : : : G
q
in normal form, and partial models
n and m, we have:
[n;m] j= F
1
; : : : ; F
p
, for all 1  i  p there is l
i
2 F
i
: l
i
2 Lit and n(l
i
) =
1; or l
i
=  k for some k 2 Lit and m(k) 6= 1.
Proof: \(": Let j be a partial model such that n  j  m, and let 1  i  p.
Suppose there is an l
i
in F
i
with l
i
2 Lit and n(l
i
) = 1, then by persistence (see
Proposition 2.4) j(l
i
) = 1. Otherwise there is an l
i
in F
i
with l
i
=  b (and b 2 Lit)
and m(b) 6= 1. But then j(b) 6= 1 so j(l
i
) = 1. This means that j(F
i
) = 1 so
j(F
1
^    ^ F
p
) = 1. We conclude that [n;m] j= F
1
^    ^ F
p
.
\)": Suppose there is an F
i
with 8l 2 F
i
: if l 2 Lit then n(l) 6= 1 and if l =  b
with b 2 Lit then m(b) = 1. Dene the partial model j by setting, for l 2 Lit:
j(l) =
8
<
:
n(l) if n(l) 6= u
1 if   l 2 F
i
u otherwise.
One can easily check that n  j  m. Now take l 2 F
i
. If l 2 Lit then  l =2 F
i
, so
j(l) = n(l) 6= 1. Otherwise, l =  b for b 2 Lit , so j(b) = 1, and j(l) 6= 1. Thus,
j(F
1
^    ^ F
p
) 6= 1, whence [n;m] 6j= F
1
^    ^ F
p
. 2
This lemma suggests a translation for a sequent in normal form. A disjunction
F
i
should be translated as a disjunction. The disjunction is true if there is a literal
true in the current point, or if there is a weakly negated literal which is not true at
the limit state. The formal denition follows below.
Denition 5.46 Let s 2 EGLP be in normal form, say s = F
1
; : : : ; F
n
) G
1
; : : : ;
G
m
, with F
i
= b
i
1
_    _ b
i
l(i)
_  c
i
1
_    _  c
i
m(i)
and G
j
= d
j
for 1  j  j
0
for a
j
0
with 0  j
0
 m and G
j
=  e
j
for j
0
< j  m, where each b
i
; c
i
; d
i
, and e
i
is a
member of Lit and l(i);m(i); k; j  0. Dene the function  as follows
(F
i
) = Cb
i
1
_    _ Cb
i
l(i)
_ :FCc
i
1
_    _ :FCc
i
m(i)
;
(d
i
) = XCd
i
;
( e
i
) = :XCe
i
; and
(s) = (F
1
) ^    ^ (F
n
)! (G
1
) _    _ (G
m
):
For P  EGLP in normal form, (P ) = f(s) j s 2 Pg.
The following proposition shows that the translation is faithful (e.g., it preserves
semantics).
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Proposition 5.47 Let P  EGLP be in normal form, then
1. For every stable generated model n of P , generated by the chain n
0
 n
1
 : : : ,
the temporal partial model (M
t
)
t2N
, dened by M
t
= n
t
for all t 2 N, is a

g
-minimal model of (P ), and lim M = n.
2. For every minimal temporal partial model (M
t
)
t2N
of (P ), the model lim M
is a stable generated model of P , generated by the stable chain M
0
;M
1
; : : : .
Proof: Suppose we have a sequence (M
t
)
t2N
of partial models. Then obviously,
this can be seen either as a chain of models, or as a temporal partial model. If
we can show that the requirements for being a P -stable chain are equivalent to
the requirements for being a minimal temporal partial model of (P ), then we are
done. In order to show this, we need the following representation result for MTPL,
analogous to Proposition 4.54. The notions of input and reasoning formulae for
MTPL are the same as those for MTEL, when the K-operator is replaced by a C-
operator. Now let T be a theory consisting of input formulae and reasoning formulae
of MTPL. Then for any conservative TPL-model M, the following holds:
M j=

g
T
,
1. M
0
is a -minimal model of the input formulae in T .
2. For each i 2 N, M
i+1
is a -minimal element of the set of partial models which
are -extensions ofM
i
satisfying the conclusions of the reasoning formulae of
T applicable in M at time point i.
We will not give a proof here, since it is analogous to the proof of Proposition 4.54.
It is easy to see that (P ) does not contain input formulae, so that M
0
must
be a -minimal model of the empty set, which means it must assign u to all atoms,
which is the rst requirement for a stable chain.
For a rule s, it is also straightforward to check that a partial model satises
W
Hs if and only if it satises the conclusion of (s) (in the sense corresponding to
Denition 4.53). Now suppose s = F
1
; : : : ; F
n
) G
1
; : : : ; G
m
, and for some j
0
2 N,
(s) is applicable in (M
t
)
t2N
at j
0
. This means that (M; j
0
) j= (F
1
)^: : :^(F
n
). Let
1  i  n be arbitrary. Then (M; j
0
) j= (F
i
). If F
i
= b
i
1
_  _b
i
l(i)
_ c
i
1
_  _ c
i
m(i)
,
then (M; j
0
) j= Cb
i
1
_  _Cb
i
l(i)
_:FCc
i
1
_  _:FCc
i
m(i)
. Now if (M; j
0
) j= Cb
i
j
for
some j, then b
i
j
2 F
i
and b
i
j
2 Lit and M
j
0
(b
i
j
) = 1. If not, then (M; j
0
) j= :FCc
i
j
for some j. But this means that lim M(c
i
j
) 6= 1, whereas  c
i
j
2 F
i
and c
i
j
2 Lit.
Now Lemma 5.45 gives us that [M
j
0
; lim M ] j= F
1
; : : : ; F
n
. Likewise, we can prove
that if [M
j
0
; lim M ] j= F
1
; : : : ; F
n
, then (M; j
0
) j= (F
1
) ^ : : : ^ (F
n
). But this
means that the second requirement above is equivalent to the second requirement
for being a stable chain. 2
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We will give an example.
Example 5.48 (Continued example) The temporal translation of Example 5.39
is:
fXCa _XCb;Ca! XCb;:FCa! XCag:
This theory has only one minimal model:
time
atoms
0 1 2 3 : : :
a u 1 1 1 : : :
b u u 1 1 : : :
It is easy to see that this model corresponds to the stable generated model of the
original program and to the stable chain generating it.
So logic programming (with stable generated semantics) can be specied in tem-
poral logic. For a logic program P in normal form, the temporal theory (P ) induces
a reasoning frame operator according to Denition 4.63:
T
(P )
(X) = fM j M is a temporal partial model and M j=

g
(P ) and
Th(M
0
) = Xg:
In fact, T
(P )
(X) is only non-empty for X = ;.
The translation into temporal logic simplies the proof of the following proposi-
tion, which continues the discussion on normal forms at the end of Section 5.3.2.
Proposition 5.49 For every extended general logic program P , there exists a stable
equivalent program Q which is in special normal form, i.e., all its rules are of the
form F
1
; : : : ; F
m
) G
1
; : : : ; G
n
where the F
i
and G
j
are in XLit.
Proof: Let P  EGLP . By Corollary 5.44, P can be transformed into a stable
equivalent program P
0
in normal form. Then we can delete, for every rule, any
F
i
in the body which contains a complementary literal pair fl; lg with l 2 Lit.
Let the result be P
00
. Now consider any rule s 2 P
00
, say s = F
1
; : : : ; F
m
)
G
1
; : : : ; G
n
, and suppose that F
k
= b
1
_ : : : _ b
l(k)
_  c
1
_ : : : _  c
m(k)
for some
1  k  m. Then (s) = (F
1
) ^ : : : ^ (F
m
) ! (G
1
) _ : : : _ (G
n
) and (F
k
) =
Cb
1
_ : : : _ Cb
l(k)
_ :FCc
1
_ : : : _ :FCc
m(k)
. But in temporal partial logic, the
connectives behave classically: for any temporal model M and t 2 N it holds that
(M; t) j= ^ ( _ )!  if and only if (M; t) j= ^ !  and (M; t) j= ^  ! .
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This means that we may replace (s) by the rules
(F
1
) ^ : : : ^ Cb
1
^ : : : ^ (F
m
) ! (G
1
) _ : : : _ (G
n
);
.
.
.
(F
1
) ^ : : : ^ Cb
l(k)
^ : : : ^ (F
m
) ! (G
1
) _ : : : _ (G
n
);
(F
1
) ^ : : : ^ :FCc
1
^ : : : ^ (F
m
) ! (G
1
) _ : : : _ (G
n
);
.
.
.
(F
1
) ^ : : : ^ :FCc
m(k)
^ : : : ^ (F
m
) ! (G
1
) _ : : : _ (G
n
):
Let T be the temporal theory obtained from (P
00
) by performing the above oper-
ation until there are no more disjunctions on the left hand side of any implication.
Then T contains only formulae of the form Ca
1
^: : :^Ca
n
^:FCb
1
^: : :^:FCb
m
!
XCd
1
_ : : :_XCd
k
_:XCe
1
_ : : :_:XCe
l
. But such a formula is the translation of
the rule a
1
; : : : ; a
n
; b
1
; : : : ; b
m
) d
1
; : : : ; d
k
; e
1
; : : : ; e
l
. This means we can
nd a program Q such that (Q) is exactly T . This Q has special normal form.
Furthermore, P is stable equivalent to P
0
, which in turn is equivalent to P
00
. Stable
models of P
00
correspond to minimal temporal models of (P
00
), which is equivalent
to T (and therefore has the same minimal temporal models). But T = (Q), so
the minimal temporal models of T correspond to stable generated models of Q. We
conclude that Q is stable equivalent to P . 2
We have shown that logic programs can be translated (via a normal form) to
formulae of minimal temporal partial logic in a modular way (the translation of a
program is the union of the translations of its sequents). The translation preserves
the semantics (in the sense of Proposition 5.47). But how about the other direc-
tion, i.e., is there a modular translation of minimal temporal partial logic into logic
programs (endowed with the stable generated semantics)? For this question to be
answered positively, it is sucient (and necessary) that temporal formulae in a nor-
mal form can be translated. First of all, formulae with nested temporal operators
are in general not expressible in logic programming. The formula XXXCa has one
minimal temporal model, which assigns 1 to a from time point 3 onwards, and u to a
before 3, and u to any other literal, at any point in time. It is not hard to see that this
model can not correspond to a stable generated model of a program. Let us restrict
the language by only considering formulae which are built up, using boolean con-
nectives, from formulae of the form XC;GC; FC;C, where  is propositional.
Essentially, the temporal language is then a propositional language using the above
formulae as its propositional atoms. Therefore, any temporal formula is equivalent
to a formula in conjunctive normal form, and we may focus on the disjuncts. As only
conservative models are considered, it is the case that GC is equivalent to XC.
We may thus concentrate on disjunctions containing C, :C, FC, :FC, XC,
and :XC. It can be checked that the C-operator distributes over conjunction and
disjunction, e.g. C( ^ ) is equivalent to C ^ C, and C( _ ) is equivalent to
C _ C. This means that an atom C is equivalent to C
0
, where 
0
is a con-
junctive normal form (or disjunctive normal form) of . We may then distribute
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the C operator over the conjunctions and disjunctions. Furthermore, in conservative
models the temporal operators distribute over conjunctions and disjunctions of C
formulae. So we can even restrict ourselves to disjunctions of formulae of the form
Ck, :Ck, FCk, :FCk, XCk, and :XCk, where k is a literal. Any disjunction not
containing atoms of the form Ck or :FCk, and not containing :Ck and FCk for
the same literal k, can be translated faithfully to a sequent. Consider a disjunction
of the following form (for clarity, we include only one of each sort of temporal atom):
:Ca _ FCb _XCc _ :XCd
where a; b; c; d 2 Lit. This is equivalent to the implication
Ca ^ :FCb  ! XCc _ :XCd;
which is just the translation of the sequent
a; b) c; d:
So how about the other two sorts of atoms? An easy example of a formula
that cannot be translated is Ca. Its only minimal temporal partial model assigns
1 to a and u to any other atoms, for every time point. However, any stable chain
starts with the empty set. So, no logic program has a stable chain equivalent to
this minimal temporal partial model. One might think that the only formulae that
cannot be translated, are formulae that have a minimal temporal partial model M
for which M
0
does not correspond to the empty set. This is not true, however, as
witnessed by the following set of formulae:
(1) XCa
(2) Ca! XCb
(3) Ca ^ Cb! XCc
(4) Ca ^ :Cb! XCd
(5) Ca ^ Cb ^ Cc! XCd:
The conjunction of these formulae has two minimal models:
M :
0 1 2 3 : : :
a u 1 1 1 : : :
b u u 1 1 : : :
c u u u 1 : : :
d u u 1 1 : : :
N :
0 1 2 3 : : :
a u 1 1 1 : : :
b u 1 1 1 : : :
c u u 1 1 : : :
d u u u 1 : : :
These models cannot both correspond to stable chains of the same program. Since
they have the same limit model, the same sequents are applicable with respect to
[;; Lit(lim M)] as with respect to [;; Lit(lim N )]. Since fag must be an exten-
sion of the empty set satisfying the heads of clauses whose bodies is satised in
[;; Lit(lim M)], it is impossible that fa; bg is a minimal such extension. Both of
these minimal models start with a partial model corresponding to the empty set.
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Note that formula (4) above uses an atom :Cb on the left of the implication (cor-
responding to Cb in the disjunction). So the answer to the general question of
translatability of minimal temporal partial logic into logic programming with stable
generated models is that only a restricted part of minimal temporal partial logic can
be translated back.
Proposition 5.47 states that logic programs endowed with the stable generated
semantics can be faithfully translated into minimal temporal partial logic. This im-
mediately also means that we can translate non-disjunctive extended logic programs
with the answer set semantics into minimal temporal partial logic.
Corollary 5.50 (Answer sets in temporal logic) For every non-disjunctive ex-
tended logic program S the following holds:
1. For every coherent answer set I of S, there is a 
g
-minimal temporal partial
model of (S) such that its limit corresponds to I .
2. For every 
g
-minimal temporal partial model M of (S), the set of literals
true in lim M is a coherent answer set of S.
Proof: This is immediate from the correspondences of Propositions 5.38 and 5.47.
2
It is easy to see that this result is also true for 
gel
-minimal models. Using
the latter semantics, we can also embed logic programs with supported models into
temporal partial logic (for more information about supported models, the other
semantics, and logic programming in general, the interested reader is referred to for
instance [Apt90] or [Llo87]). The translation needed is dierent (analogously to the
dierence between the translation of default logic with Reiter extensions and default
logic with weak extensions into MTEL*).
Proposition 5.51 Dene the translation  on non-disjunctive sequents without
classical negation as follows
(q
1
; : : : ; q
m
; r
1
; : : : ; r
n
) p) =
FCq
1
^ : : : ^ FCq
m
^ :FCr
1
^ : : : ^ :FCr
n
! XCp:
For a set S of such sequents, dene (S) = f(s) j s 2 Sg. Then for every non-
disjunctive logic program without classical negation S the following holds:
1. For every supported model I of S, there is a 
gel
-minimal temporal partial
model of (S) such that its limit corresponds to I .
2. For every 
gel
-minimal temporal partial model M of (S), the set of atoms
true in lim M is a supported model of S.
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Proof: In [MT93], the following translation dl from logic programs of the above
sort into default logic is given:
dl(q
1
; : : : ; q
m
; r
1
; : : : ; r
n
) p) =
q
1
^ : : : ^ q
m
: :r
1
; : : : ;:r
n
p
;
and dl(S) = fdl(s) j s 2 Sg. Supported models of S (in the traditional denition) are
in a one-to-one correspondence with weak extensions of the default theory hdl(S); ;i.
On the other hand, we have given a translation  from default theories to TEL-
formulae, such that there is a correspondence between weak extensions of a theory
and
gel
-minimal models of the translation. Composing these two translations yields
the TEL-formula (for the above sequent):
FK(q
1
^ : : : ^ q
m
) ^ :FKr
1
^ : : : ^ :FKr
n
! XKp
Furthermore, FK(q
1
^ : : :^ q
m
) is equivalent (on conservative models) to FK(q
1
)^
: : :^FK(q
m
). The result then follows from a correspondence between 
gel
-minimal
temporal epistemic models and 
gel
-minimal temporal partial models for formulae
that use only objective formulae which are literals. 2
The temporal semantics of logic programs presented here has some similarities
with the approach of Lin and Reiter ([LR96]) who give a semantics of logic programs
in the situation calculus. We will discuss their approach and compare it with ours
in Section 5.8.
5.4 A classical proof system
In this section we will apply our approach of temporal specication of reasoning to a
relatively simple type of reasoning: based on a classical proof system. We will show
how proof rules can be represented by temporal formulae. As an example, consider
Modus Ponens:
A A! B
B
Here A and B are meta-variables ranging over the set of formulae, and A ! B
is a term structure built from them using the logical connective !. We want the
temporal models to reect the proof process, such that an information state at
a certain point in time reects what has been derived up to that moment. The
temporal interpretation of such a proof rule we have in mind is the following:
For any formulae A and B, if in the current information state both A
and A ! B have been derived then in a next information state B is
derived.
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This interpretation of modus ponens is formalized by the following temporal axiom
scheme (for all formulae A and B):
C(A) ^ C(A! B)! 9XC(B):
However, in most information state frames (certainly the ones of Chapter 2), if the
formulae A and A ! B are in the theory of a current state then so is B. As
we want to describe the steps of reasoning by time steps this is undesirable. One
solution is to take as information states just sets of formulae, not necessarily closed
under propositional provability. We prefer, nevertheless, states of a more semantical
nature. An option is to extend the notion of partial model to the notion of valuation
of all formulae, in a manner similar to [BM92], see also [San85]. For each formula ' of
the original language, we dene a new atom at
'
, and then we take the propositional
language induced by these new atoms as our new language. So if L
P
denotes the
set of formulae based on a set of propositional atoms P , then we dene a new set
of atoms P
0
= fat
'
j ' 2 L
P
g. So we have a natural bijection '! at
'
between L
P
and P
0
. Notice that P is embedded in P
0
by P 3 p ! at
p
2 P
0
. We will use the
branching time logic of Section 4.3 based on the information state frame IS
3val
of
partial models (see Denition 2.3) with L
P
0
as the language.
We can now describe any instance of the proof rule Modus Ponens by a temporal
formula as follows:
C(at
'
) ^ C(at
'! 
)! 9XC(at
 
):
This allows us to give a temporal axiomatization of a proof system. In addition we
need a temporal translation of the initial axioms: the theory from which conclusions
are to be drawn. Suppose K is any set of formulae of L
P
. Let at(K) be the set of
atoms corresponding to the formulae in K. We require that these atoms are true
at each moment of time. Therefore, for any such formula ' we can simply add the
formula C(at
'
) to our temporal theory.
After these preparations we are ready to formalize the translation of the proof
rules into temporal formulae:
Denition 5.52
1. By Forterm we denote the set of term structures built up from (meta-) variables,
ranging over L
P
, by use of the logical connectives. A proof system PS is a set
of proof rules of type (A
1
; : : : ; A
k
)=B where the A
i
; B 2 Forterm. Let a proof
rule PR : (A
1
; : : : ; A
k
)=B be given en let MV
PR
be the set of meta-variables
occurring in A
1
; : : : ; A
k
and B. A mapping  : MV
PR
! L
P
is called a meta-
variable assignment. Any meta-variable assignment  can be extended in a
canonical manner to a substitution mapping


: Forterm! L
P
such that 

substitutes formulae for the meta-variables of MV
PR
in any term
structure of Forterm.
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The temporal translation of a proof rule PR of type (A
1
; : : : ; A
k
)=B is the set
T
PR
of instances of temporal formulae dened by:
fC(at


(A
1
)
) ^ : : : ^ C(at


(A
k
)
)! 9XC(at


(B)
) j
 meta-variable assignment for PRg:
The temporal translation T
PS
of PS is dened by: T
PS
=
S
PR2PS
T
PR
.
2. Let K be any set of objective formulae of L
P
. The temporal translation T
K
of
K is dened by: T
K
= fC(at
'
) j ' 2 Kg.
3. We have to make sure that once a fact has been established, it remains known
at all later points (conservativity); this can be axiomatized by the temporal
theory
Cons = fPC(a)! C(a) j a 2 P
0
g:
The overall translation of proof rules and theory is dened by:
Th
PS ;K
= T
PS
[ T
K
[ Cons :
Some proof systems may consist of both proof rules and axioms; these may be
incorporated by adding them to the theory K.
The temporal theory Th
PS ;K
prescribes that certain conclusions have to be
drawn at certain point in time. Analogously to the case of default logic in (branching
time) temporal logic, we want those conclusions to be the only ones. To this end,
we will consider minimal models of this theory. The ordering is the same as the
one used in Section 5.2 (see Denition 5.11), but with a dierent information state
frame: for two branching time partial models M;N , we have M
g
br
N if they are
based on the same ow of time and for all time points s: M(s)  N (s), where  is
the information order on IS
3val
.
A rst observation about this temporal theory Th
PS ;K
is that there exist tempo-
ral partial models of it. Such a model could be constructed incrementally, starting
with a root, adding its successor partial models in the next step, and any time the
model has been constructed up until a certain level, one can construct the next level
by adding successor partial models to those at the current level. This is possible
since the formulae of Th
PS ;K
prescribe existence of successors, obeying certain prop-
erties. It is easy to see that these properties are never contradictory since only truth
of certain atoms is prescribed. Taking such a model and changing the truth value
of atoms which are not prescribed to be true by Th
PS ;K
to undened, points out
a manner to establish the existence of minimal models of Th
PS ;K
. In the following
theorem, K `
PS
' denotes the fact that ' is derivable from K in the system PS,
where this notion is dened as usual. We will assume that there are no proof rules
with empty premise: the conclusions of such a rule can always be considered as part
of the initial axioms K.
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Theorem 5.53 Let PS be any proof system and K any set of formulae of L
P
. Let
M be a minimal temporal partial model of Th
PS ;K
. For any formula ' of L
P
it
holds
K `
PS
',M j= :P (>)! 9FC(at
'
):
Proof: \)" Suppose K `
PS
' and suppose that  
1
; : : : ;  
n 1
;  
n
, with  
n
= ', is
a proof for '. For a non-minimal element t 2 T (we assume M is based on (T;<))
it holds trivially that (M; t) j= :P (>) ! 9FC(at
'
), so let r be a minimal element
in T . We shall prove the following by induction:
For every 1  i  n there is a time point s reachable from r such that at
 
1
; : : : ; at
 
i
are true in M at time point s.
i = 1:  
1
has to be an element of K (remember that we assumed that rules never
have an empty premise) and as M is a model of T
K
, at
'
has to be true in M at
time point r.
i ! i + 1: suppose that s is a time point reachable from r and that at
 
1
; : : : ; at
 
i
are true in M at time point s. If  
i+1
is an element of K then the same argument
as above yields that at
 
i+1
must be true in M at point s, so assume that  
i+1
is
the result of applying a proof rule PR to a subset of the formulae  
1
; : : : ;  
i
(say

1
; : : : ; 
k
). Then there is a rule C(at

1
) ^ : : : ^ C(at

k
) ! 9XC(at
 
i+1
) in T
PS
which has to be true in M at point s. As at

1
; : : : ; at

k
are true in M at point s,
there has to be a successor t to s in which at
 
i+1
is true. The rules in Cons ensure
that at
 
1
; : : : ; at
 
i
have to be true in M at point t too.
Taking n for i we have that there must be a point s reachable from r such that
at
 
n
is true in M at point s. It follows that (M; s) j= :P (>)! 9FC(at
'
).
\(" Suppose there is a formula ' and a minimal element r such that (M; r) j=
9FC(at
'
) although K 0
PS
'. Take the formula ' at minimal depth, i.e., if s is a
point at minimal depth for which (M; s) j= at
'
, then there is no formula  such
that there is a point t at smaller depth than s with (M; t) j= at

but K 0
PS
. As
M is a minimal model of Th
PS ;K
, if at
'
were undened inM at point s, a formula
in Th
PS ;K
would become false. If this is a formula from T
K
then it has to be the
formula C(at
'
), but then ' is in K and therefore K `
PS
'. If it is a formula in
Cons then it must be the rule PC(at
'
)! C(at
'
) at time point s. This means that
at
'
is true in a point at smaller depth, which was not the case. Therefore, it must
be a rule of T
PS
, say C(at

1
) ^ : : : ^ C(at

k
) ! 9XC(at
'
) which will become false
in a point t with t < s. But as at

1
; : : : ; at

k
have to be true in M at point t and t
is at smaller depth than s, we must have that K `
PS

1
; : : : ;K `
PS

k
. But there
is a proof rule in PS which can be applied to 
1
; : : : ; 
k
yielding ', and therefore
K `
PS
'. This shows that such a formula can not exist. 2
Note that for a minimal temporal partial model of Th
PS ;K
the partial models of
time points which are minimal elements (according to Denition 4.16), are the same
(atoms corresponding to formulae of K are true, other atoms are undened). In this
way a semantics is dened which can be seen as a generalization of the manner in
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which modal and temporal semantics can be given to intuitionistic logic (see [Gab82],
[Kri65]). This approach can be used for any proof system.
The rules in Th
PS ;K
only prescribe truth of atoms of P
0
, never truth of a nega-
tion. Minimal models of this theory therefore never assign false to any atom. This
corresponds to the fact that a proof system (in the classical sense) only establishes
validity of formulae. It makes the use of partial models seem unnecessary: the in-
formation state frame IS
2val
of two-valued states (Denition 2.2) could have been
used. But systems have also been dened to `prove' non-validity (see for example
[Cai78] for a Hilbert-style system). An example of such a `non-proof' rule would be
that if A can not be proved, then A ^ B can not be proved. We would be able to
formulate this as
C(:at
A
)! 9XC(:at
A^B
):
The class of branching time models is large: a branching time model consists of
any set, with an ordering that denes a forest, and a labeling function. There are
many ways in which this class can be reduced, for instance by placing constraints
on the underlying set T of time points, and/or by constraining the cardinality of
minimal elements and successors. Let us now suppose that the class of branching
time models has been constrained to such a degree that it forms a set. Then we
have the following.
Proposition 5.54 The set of models of the temporal theory Th
PS ;K
has a nal
model F
PS ;K
.
Proof: The theory Th
PS ;K
consists of formulae which are forward persistent under
any homomorphism (this easily follows from Theorem 4.26). Then Theorem 4.41
can be applied. 2
If we have a proof '
1
; : : : ; '
n
of which (only) the rst k formulae are axioms
from K, then a proof trace is a sequence (M
i
)
i=0:::n k
of partial models such that
Lit(M
i
) = fat
'
j
j j = 1; : : : ; k + ig. In such a trace the partial model M
i
reects
exactly the formulae which have been derived up until the i
th
step of the proof.
It is easy to see that, although such a proof trace itself is in general not a model
of Th
PS ;K
, it can always be embedded in the nal model F
PS ;K
. Note that for a
branch B of a minimal model, the limit model lim
B
F
PS ;K
corresponds to the set
of all conclusions drawn in that reasoning pattern; this is a subset of the deductive
closure of K under PS (since we allow non-exhaustive reasoning patterns).
These proof sequences correspond to the traces assigned to the axioms by the
reasoning frame operator we can associate to Th
PS ;K
, in a manner similar to what
was done for the branching time case of default logic.
T
Th
PS;K
(X) = fB j there is a temporal partial model M such that
B 2 Br(M);M j=

g
br
Th
PS ;K
and Th(B
0
) = Cn(X)g:
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5.5 GK
The logic GK of knowledge and justied assumptions
1
was introduced by Lin and
Shoham in [LS92]. The reason we consider this logic here, is that both default logic
and autoepistemic logic can be embedded in it, hence it can claim, to a certain
degree, to be a general logic of defeasible reasoning. Also, a correspondence result
between this logic and MTEL* will yield an embedding of autoepistemic logic into
MTEL*. We will rst give a brief account of GK; this will be based on (but not
exactly equal to) the presentation of [ST94] rather than directly on [LS92], since
the former is, in our opinion, more intuitive, and also makes the connection with
MTEL* easier.
The language of GK is a propositional modal language, with two modal operators,
K (for knowledge) and A (for assumptions). The formula A' means that the agent
has assumed '. A GK-model is a triple (w;M
K
;M
A
), where w is a propositional
valuation (the actual world), and M
K
and M
A
are sets of propositional valuations
such that M
A
 M
K
. The truth of a formula in a model is dened inductively,
where for a propositional formula ' we have (w;M
K
;M
A
) j=
GK
' if w j= ' (in
propositional logic). The boolean cases are standard, and for the modal operators
the semantical clauses are as follows:
(w;M
K
;M
A
) j=
GK
K' , (v;M
K
;M
A
) j=
GK
' for all v 2M
K
(w;M
K
;M
A
) j=
GK
A' , (v;M
K
;M
A
) j=
GK
' for all v 2M
A
:
The requirement on models that M
A
M
K
corresponds to the validity of K'! A'
for propositional ': everything known is also assumed.
Lin and Shoham introduce a preference ordering on GK-models which favors
models with less knowledge, under equal assumptions. For a model M = (w;M
K
;M
A
),
let K(M) = f j  propositional and M j=
GK
Kg and A(M) = f j  proposi-
tional and M j=
GK
Ag. If M = (w;M
K
;M
A
) and N = (v;N
K
; N
A
) then M is
GK-preferred over N if
 K(M)  K(N), and
 A(M) = A(N).
where  denotes strict inclusion. For a set of formulae S, the model M is a minimal
model of S if it is a model of S and there is no model of S GK-preferred over
M. The minimal models are not yet the intended models; an extra criterion is
imposed. A model M is a preferred model of S if it is a minimal model of S and
K(M) = A(M). This corresponds to the intuition that the assumptions must be
justied, or grounded, (they must be known) in a preferred model. Finally, semantic
entailment is dened by
S j=
GK
' , ' holds in all preferred models of S:
One of the key results in [LS92] is the following characterization result for pre-
ferred models similar to our results in Section 4.5:
1
The letters GK stand for `Grounded Knowledge'.
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Theorem 5.55 (Lin and Shoham) Let S be a set of formulae of the form
K ^A ^ :A
1
^ : : : ^ :A
n
! K'
where ; ; 
1
; : : : ; 
n
and ' are propositional formulae, n  0, and both K and
A may be absent. A model M is a preferred model of S if and only if:
1. K(M) = A(M), and
2. K(M) =
S
1
i=0
E
i
where the E
i
are dened as follows:
(a) E
0
= Cn(f' j K' 2 Sg), and for i  0:
(b) E
i+1
= Cn(E
i
[ f' j there is a formula K^A ^:A
1
^ : : :^:A
n
!
K' 2 S such that  2 E
i
,  2 A(M), and 
1
; : : : ; 
n
=2 A(M)g).
This theorem is of course very similar to the characterization results for minimal
models in Section 4.5.
The key idea behind the correspondence between GK and MTEL* is that a for-
mula A' corresponds to the formula FK': in temporal logic, a (justied) assump-
tion is a formula that has to be derived at some point in time, but not necessarily
before it is used in the derivation of another formula. So consider the following
translation 
 of formulae of the form described in Theorem 5.55 to TEL-formulae:

(K') = K', and

(K ^A ^ :A
1
^ : : : ^ :A
n
! K') =
K ^ FK ^ :FK
1
^ : : : ^ :FK
n
! XK':
This is a faithful embedding, as the next theorem shows.
Theorem 5.56 Let S be a set of formulae of the form described in Theorem 5.55.
Then
1. if M is a preferred model of S, then there exists a 
gel
-minimal TELC-model
N of 
(S) with Th(lim N ) = K(M).
2. if M is a 
gel
-minimal TELC-model of 
(S), then the GK-model N = (w;
lim M, lim M), where w is any propositional valuation, is a preferred model
of S.
Proof: We need the following characterization result for 
gel
-minimal models. A
TELC-modelM is a 
gel
-minimal model of a theory S consisting of formulae of the
form K' and K ^ FK ^ :FK
1
^ : : : ^ :FK
n
! XK' if and only if
M
0
= Mod(f' j K' 2 Sg); and for i  0 :
M
i+1
= Mod(Th(M
i
) [ f' j there is a formula
K ^ FK ^ :FK
1
^ : : : ^ :FK
n
! XK' 2 S with
M
i
j= K; lim M j= K, and lim M 6j= K
1
; : : : ;K
n
g):
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This result is not proved in Section 4.5, but it easily follows from Proposition 4.58
using similar arguments as in the proof of Corollary 4.55 (which is almost the above
characterization result, but for MTEL). With this characterization and Theorem 5.55
the proof is straightforward. 2
The theory 
(S) again species a reasoning frame operator that formalizes rea-
soning with GK, according to Denition 4.63:
T

(S)
(X) = fM j M j=

gel

(S) and Th(M
0
) = Cn(X)g:
Lin and Shoham give a faithful translation of default theories into GK (where
preferred models of the translation correspond to extensions). The composition of
their translation and the above translation 
 is equal to our translation  of default
theories into TEL-formulae, which was faithful with respect to MTEL*. In [LS92],
also a faithful translation from autoepistemic logic (see [Moo85]) into GK is given.
This immediately gives us a translation of autoepistemic theories into TEL-formulae.
Alternatively, there is a translation of autoepistemic logic into default theories, which
is faithful if weak extensions are used (see [MT93]). Then we can use our translation
of default logic with weak extensions into MTEL*. The composition of these two
translations would yield the same result as the route we will be taking. We will rst
briey introduce autoepistemic logic.
5.6 Autoepistemic logic
The language of autoepistemic logic is a propositional modal language with a modal
operator L for belief; this language is denoted by L
L
. First we need the notion of a
stable set (originally proposed in [Sta93]; see also [MT93]).
Denition 5.57 A set of sentences S  L
L
is a stable set if
1. S is closed under propositional consequence.
2. For any ' 2 L
L
, if ' 2 S then L' 2 S.
3. For any ' 2 L
L
, if ' =2 S then :L' 2 S.
For a stable set S, the set of purely propositional formulae in S, called the kernel of
S, is denoted as ker(S).
For every set of propositional formulae T , there is a unique stable set S such
that T = ker(S) (see [MT93]).
Now let I be a set of sentences in L
L
. A set of L
L
-formulae S is a stable expansion
of I , if
S = Cn(I [ fL' j ' 2 Sg [ f:L' j ' =2 Sg)
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where Cn is propositional consequence. It was proved in [Kon88b] that any set of
L
L
formulae can be converted into a set with the same stable expansions, whose
formulae are in the normal form:
L ^ :L
1
^ : : : ^ :L
n
! 
where ; 
1
; : : : ; 
n
and  are propositional. This means that we can assume, with-
out loss of generality, that L
L
theories are in normal form. For such theories, the
following translation is dened in [LS92]:
L ^ :L
1
^ : : : ^ :L
n
! 
=)
A ^ :A
1
^ : : : ^ :A
n
! K:
It is proved in [LS92] that a consistent stable set S of L
L
formulae is a stable
expansion of a set I of L
L
-formulae in normal form if and only if there is a preferred
model M of the translation of I such that K(M) = ker(S).
Now we can use our translation 
 (dened just above Theorem 5.56) to arrive
at an embedding of autoepistemic logic in MTEL*.
Theorem 5.58 Let I be a set of L
L
-formulae in normal form. Dene I
0
as
I
0
= fK' j ' 2 I , for propositional 'g [
fFK ^ :FK
1
^ : : : ^ :FK
n
! XK j L ^ :L
1
^ : : : ^ :L
n
!  2 Ig:
A consistent stable set of L
L
formulae S is a stable expansion of I if and only if
there is a 
gel
-minimal model M of I
0
such that Th(lim M) = ker(S).
Proof: The translation is the composition of 
 and the translation of autoepistemic
logic into GK. The statement of the theorem follows from the faithfulness of both.
Alternatively, the translation of autoepistemic logic into default logic (with weak
extensions, see [MT93]) can be composed with our translation of default logic (with
weak extensions) into MTEL* (see Proposition 5.9), to give the same correspondence.
2
The theory I
0
induces the reasoning frame operator associated with autoepistemic
reasoning with the autoepistemic theory I , according to Denition 4.63:
T
I
0
(X) = fM j M j=

gel I
0
and Th(M
0
) = Cn(X)g:
The dierent embeddings for default logic and autoepistemic logic give a tem-
poral view of their dierence ([LS92] gives a knowledge/assumption view). The
correspondence for default logic is
( : 
1
; : : : ; 
n
)=
()
K ^ :FK:
1
^ : : : ^ :FK:
n
! XK
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and the autoepistemic correspondence is
L ^ :L:
1
; : : : ;:L:
n
! 
()
FK ^ :FK:
1
^ : : : ^ :FK:
n
! XK:
This means that the dierence lies in the temporal interpretation of the premise :
in default logic, it has to be known (derived) now in order to be used, whereas in
autoepistemic logic, it is sucient if it is derived sometimes (in the future).
The MTEL* input and reasoning formulae are thus a generalization of both
default logic and autoepistemic logic rules. Mixing of these two is allowed, and
disjunctive conclusions are allowed. In Section 5.3, it was shown that disjunctive
logic programs (with stable generated semantics) can be faithfully translated into
MTEL*. However, it will turn out that the above translation of GK into MTEL*,
when extended in the obvious way to handle disjunctive conclusions, is no longer
faithful. The next section treats disjunctive rules in logic programming, GK, and
default logic.
5.7 Disjunctive rules
In Section 5.3 it was shown that logic programs with the stable generated semantics
can be faithfully translated into temporal partial logic with 
g
-minimal models. It
is straightforward to show that we can also take 
gel
-minimal models. For extended
logic programs (whose rules do not contain disjunction in the head) the stable gen-
erated models coincide with answer sets ([GL91]). For disjunctive logic programs
example 5.39 shows that stable generated models do not coincide with answer sets.
This also means that the translation of logic programs into temporal partial logic
does not in general preserve the answer set semantics.
There is also a variant of default logic which allows disjunctive conclusions. Of
course, a default rule may have a disjunction in the conclusion. If the conclusion
is for example p _ q, then the formula p _ q will be in an extension if the rule was
applicable. What disjunctive conclusions formalize, is that a commitment to one of
the disjuncts should be made. A conclusion pjq (where the symbol `j' separates the
disjunctive conclusions) means that when the rule is applicable, either the formula
p or the formula q should be concluded, not only the formula p _ q. We will briey
describe disjunctive default logic, as introduced in [GLPT91].
A disjunctive default is an expression of the form ( : 
1
; : : : ; 
n
)=
1
j : : : j 
n
,
where ; 
i
and 
j
are propositional formulae.
Denition 5.59 ([GLPT91]) Let D be a set of disjunctive defaults and E a set of
sentences. Min
E
(D) is the set of all minimal deductively closed sets M satisfying the
following condition for every ( : 
1
; : : : ; 
m
)=
1
j : : : j
n
2 D: if  2 M , and :
1
;
: : : ; :
m
=2 E, then f
1
; : : : ; 
n
g\M 6= ;. E is an extension of D if E 2 Min
E
(D).
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Note that there is no mention of a set W of axioms. This is not a severe limitation
since an axiom ' can be written as a default rule ( : )=' which is always applicable
(this presupposes that a default rule may have an empty set of justications!). Al-
ternatively, the denition can easily be adapted to include a set W of axioms. The
denition clearly generalizes the original xed point denition (Proposition 3.4) of
an extension. The function  translating default theories into TEL can be extended
to handle disjunctive rules in a straightforward manner.
Denition 5.60 Dene the mapping  from defaults to TEL-formulae by
 : ( : 
1
; : : : ; 
m
)=
1
j : : : j
n
7!
K ^ :FK(:
1
) ^ : : : ^ :FK(:
m
)! XK
1
_ : : : _XK
n
:
The 
g
-minimal models (or the 
gel
-minimal models) of the  translation of a
default theory do not necessarily correspond to its extensions. This is not surprising,
since disjunctive default logic has the same behavior as answer sets. If a program
rule a
1
; : : : ; a
n
; b
1
; : : : ; b
m
) c
1
; : : : ; c
k
(where the a
i
, b
i
and c
i
are classical
literals) is translated into the default rule
a
1
^ : : : ^ a
n
: :b
1
; : : : ;:b
m
c
1
j : : : jc
k
then there is a one-to-one correspondence between answer sets of the program and
extensions of the translation (see [GLPT91]).
Of course, the temporal interpretation of default logic was inspired by the other
denition of extension (Denition 3.1, with the sets E
i
), which is equivalent to
the xed point denition. However, it turns out that if we generalize the former
denition (Denition 3.1) to the disjunctive case, we get a notion of extension which
is not equivalent to the above denition (Denition 5.59).
Denition 5.61 Let D be a set of disjunctive defaults. A deductively closed set E
of sentences is a generated extension of D if there is a sequence E
0
 E
1
 : : : of
deductively closed sets of sentences such that
1. E
0
= Cn(;);
2. E
n+1
is a minimal extension of E
n
satisfying the following closure condition:
if ( : 
1
; : : : ; 
k
)=
1
j : : : j
l
2 D,  2 E
n
, and :
1
; : : : ;:
k
62 E then
f
1
; : : : ; 
l
g \ E
n+1
6= ;.
and E =
1
[
n=0
E
n
.
It is easy to see that this denition coincides with Denition 3.1 of an extension
if D consists of non-disjunctive rules. We can use the default translation of the
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example of Section 5.3 to show that the two denitions of extension and generated
extension are dierent.
Example 5.62 Let D = f( : )=ajb; (a : )=b; ( : :a)=ag. Then E = Cn(fa; bg) is a
generated extension of D: E
0
= Cn(;), E
1
= Cn(fag), E
2
= Cn(fa; bg), E
i
= E
2
for
i > 2. But E is not an extension. It does satisfy the closure condition with respect
to itself, but Cn(fbg) also satises it, so Min
E
(D) = fCn(fbg)g.
The translation,
XKa _XKa
Ka! XKb
:FKa! XKa
has one 
g
-minimal model, corresponding to the generated extension. This is not a
coincidence, as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 5.63 Let D be a set of disjunctive defaults, and (D) its translation
into TEL-formulae. Then a set of sentences E is a generated extension if and only
if it is equal to Th(lim M) for some 
g
-minimal model of (D). Moreover, this
correspondence between a generated extension E of D and a 
g
-minimal model
M of (D) can be chosen such that E
i
= Th(M
i
), where the sets E
i
are as in
Denition 5.61. The correspondence also holds when taking 
gel
-minimal models of
(D).
Proof: The proof is completely analogous to the proofs of Propositions 5.3 and
5.4 for the non-disjunctive case, using Proposition 4.54 directly, instead of its Corol-
lary 4.55. 2
The obvious generalization of the translation of default theories into GK to the
disjunctive case, leads to a correspondence between preferred models and extensions
(not generated extensions). For the non-disjunctive case, we have a quite homoge-
neous picture: logic programs with stable generated models are equivalent to logic
programs with answer sets, which can be translated into default logic, which in turn
can be translated into GK and MTEL, all preserving semantics. It seems that there
are at least two dierent approaches to the generalization of rules under these se-
mantics to the case of disjunctive rules. The rst approach is the `static' approach of
GK, answer sets, and extensions in the sense of [GLPT91], and the other one is the
`generated' approach of stable generated models, generated extensions, and MTEL.
The question then arises whether we can also specify the extension / answer set /
preferred model semantics for disjunctive rules in MTEL. The answer is yes, by elimi-
nating the temporal nature of the translation. All reasoning should be done instantly.
The new translation of default logic then takes a default ( : 
1
; : : : ; 
n
)=
1
j : : : j
m
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to the formula
K ^ :FK(:
1
) ^ : : : ^ :FK(:
m
)! K
1
_ : : : _K
n
:
Notice that the only dierence with  is that there is no X-operator in front of
the conclusions. Now we of course have to prove that this translation is faithful,
i.e., that the limits of 
g
-minimal models of the translation of a default theory are
extensions of this theory. Rather than doing that, we will give a general embedding
of GK-formulae in MTEL*.
The general idea is (like before) that assumptions are beliefs to be deduced later,
that is, a formula A' should be translated by FK'. There are a number of things to
remark here. First of all, apart from the question whether they are desirable, nested
modalities in GK are not necessary: a formula with nested modalities can always
be transformed into a formula without them (using equivalences like AK  K).
Next, we already remarked that all deduction should be done at one point in time,
and we can choose the rst point. This means that all formulae (about knowledge)
should be true only at the rst point in time. If we introduce the notation at
0
as an
abbreviation for H? then we should only use formulae of the form at
0
!  (note
that the formula at
0
is true only in the rst point in time). We are now ready to
dene the translation. Call a GK-formula subjective if every atom is in the scope of
a modal operator.
Denition 5.64 Dene the mapping 

0
from subjective GK-formulae without nes-
ted modalities to TEL-formulae by


0
: ' 7! (at
0
! ('[A=FK]))
where '[A=FK] denotes the result of substituting the operators FK for A through-
out '.
A GK-model corresponds to a temporal epistemic model if its knowledge is equal
to what is known at time point 0 in the temporal model, and its assumptions are
equal to those things becoming known at some point in time.
Lemma 5.65 Suppose we have a GK-model M and a closed TEL-modelN such that
K(M) = Th(N
0
) and A(M) = Th(lim N ). Then for every subjective GK-formula '
without nested modalities it holds:
M j=
GK
', N j= 

0
('):
Proof: For a formula of the form K (with  propositional), we have M j=
GK
K
,  2 K(M) , N
0
j= K , (N ; 0) j= K. For a formula of the form A (with 
propositional) we have M j=
GK
A ,  2 A(M) , lim N j= K , (N ; 0) j= FK
(using Proposition 4.9). Every subjective GK-formula without nested modalities is
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a boolean combination of such formulae K and FK, so we have
M j=
GK
', (N ; 0) j= '[A=FK]:
But (N ; 0) j=  , N j= at
0
!  for any TEL-formula  , so
M j=
GK
', N j= 

0
(')
as required. 2
Using this lemma we can prove that there is a correspondence between preferred
models of a GK-formula and 
gel
-minimal models of its 

0
-translation.
Theorem 5.66 Let S be a set of subjective GK-formulae without nested modalities,
and 

0
(S) its translation into TEL.
1. If M is a preferred model of S, then the TELC-model N dened by
N
i
= Mod (K(M)) for i  0
is a 
gel
-minimal model of 

0
(S).
2. If N is a 
gel
-minimal model of 

0
(S) then the GK-model M = (w;N
0
;N
0
),
where w is any valuation, is a preferred model of S.
Proof: We will prove the two directions:
1. Suppose M is a preferred model of S. Dene N by N
i
= Mod (K(M)) for i  0.
Then M and N satisfy the assumption of Lemma 5.65, which means that
M j= 

0
(S). Now suppose it is not 
gel
-minimal, that is, there exists a model
N
0
with N
0

gel
N and N
0
j= 

0
(S). Let M
0
be dened as (w;N
0
0
; lim N
0
),
where w is any valuation. Then N
0
and M
0
again satisfy the requirements of
Lemma 5.65, so M
0
j=
GK
S. As N
0

gel
N and N is constant, it must be the
case that N
0
0
 N
0
. This means that K(M
0
)  K(M) and A(M
0
) = A(M)
which contradicts the fact that M is a preferred, and thus minimal, model of
S. Therefore, N is a 
gel
-minimal model of 

0
(S).
2. Suppose N is a 
gel
-minimal model of 

0
(S), and dene M = (w;N
0
;N
0
),
where w is any valuation. First of all, N must be constant, that is, N
i
= N
0
for all i > 0. For suppose not, then N
k
 N
k+1
for some index k. Consider
the model N
0
dened by:
N
0
i
= N
i
for i  k
N
0
k+1
= N
k
N
0
i
= N
i 1
for i > k + 1:
This just means that we have duplicated the state at time point k. It is easy
to check that N
0
is a conservative model, and as N is conservative, one can
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prove that N
0

gel
N . Furthermore, N
0
0
= N
0
and lim N
0
= lim N , so for
any propositional formula , we have
(N
0
; 0) j= K , (N
0
; 0) j= K and
(N
0
; 0) j= FK , (N
0
; 0) j= FK:
But this means that N
0
j= 

0
(S), which contradicts the fact thatN was a 
gel
-
minimal model of 

0
(S). Thus, N is constant. This means thatN
0
= lim N , so
N and M satisfy the requirement of Lemma 5.65. This gives us that M j=
GK
S.
From the denition, we have K(M) = A(M), so we only have to check that
M is a minimal model of S. So suppose it is not, suppose we have a model
M
0
which is GK-preferred to M and a model of S. Then K(M
0
)  K(M) and
A(M
0
) = A(M). Dene a TELC-model N
0
by setting N
0
0
= Mod (K(M
0
)) and
N
0
i
= N
i
for i > 0. Then obviously N
0

gel
N . Furthermore, N
0
and M
0
satisfy the requirement of Lemma 5.65, so N
0
j= 

0
(S), contradicting the fact
that N was a 
gel
-minimal model of 

0
(S).
2
The theorem means that under the embedding 

0
, MTEL* behaves the same as
GK on non-nested subjective formulae. In particular, they behave the same on the
general disjunctive GK-rules (generalizing the disjunctive variants of both default
logic and autoepistemic logic) of the form
K ^ A ^ :A
1
^ : : : ^ :A
n
! K'
1
_ : : : _K'
m
:
The dierence between the translations 
 and 

0
clearly shows that the two dier-
ent interpretations of disjunctive conclusions are caused by interpreting them in an
essentially temporal or essentially non-temporal way.
5.8 Conclusions and related work
The results of this chapter show that temporal logic of information, in its various
forms (using some kind of minimization; linear or branching; epistemic or partial), is
well-suited for specifying a wide range of reasoning processes. The main use of these
temporal specications is to be able to formally reason about the reasoning process
of an agent. Properties of the reasoning process may be of interest for verication
purposes. Another possible use is to establish equivalence of two descriptions of
reasoning (for instance, to detect equivalence of two default theories).
When the specication of the reasoning is in a temporal logic with preferential
entailment, then the reasoning (about the reasoning process) may be done either
in the preferential temporal logic directly, but also in the underlying (monotonic)
temporal logic. The advantage of using the underlying logic is that it may be com-
putationally less complex, and that it may have an axiomatic system which the
preferential logic might lack. On the other hand, it might be insuciently strong
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to derive all (relevant) properties of the reasoning process. In Section 9.1 some of
these issues are discussed for MTEL and TEL.
Another advantage of temporal specication of reasoning is that it can provide
a formal semantics. The translation of default theories into temporal logic provides
default logic with a (temporal) semantics (both linear and branching time).
Furthermore, it is possible to describe `mixed' forms of reasoning. For example,
an agent may be described which uses default rules and auto-epistemic rules in the
same line of reasoning.
We have given temporal interpretations of a number of well-known nonmonotonic
reasoning methods, such as default logic, autoepistemic logic and logic programming.
These interpretations were preserving in the sense that the limit models of the tem-
poral interpretation corresponded to the classical static interpretations. Thus, in a
sense we have embedded these logics in MTEL (MTEL*). There are other logics into
which we can embed these nonmonotonic approaches. Default logic, autoepistemic
logic and some semantics of logic programming can also be embedded into GK. In
fact, we can use complexity results to show that any logic complete for the com-
plexity class in which many nonmonotonic formalisms reside (see Chapter 9.1) has
the property that all these formalisms can be embedded (polynomially) into it. The
added value of our temporal logics is that they make explicit the (semi-)constructive
nature of reasoning, often implicitly present.
This interest in the dynamics of reasoning is also present in two other approaches.
One of them is the interpretation of logic programs in the situation calculus of Lin
and Reiter ([LR96]). The basic idea is that the application of a program clause is
an action in the situation calculus, with the eect of enlarging the set of known
literals. The frame problem (facts only become known as an eect of a program
clause application action, otherwise they remain as they were) is then solved using
the technique of [Rei91]. The interesting thing is to see how a program clause is
translated into the situation calculus. First of all, every predicate F (~x) is translated
to a situation calculus predicate F (~x; s) so that a predicate can be true or not in
a situation. A situation in the situation calculus should be compared to a point in
time in our own temporal interpretation of logic programs. A clause of the form
F (~x) :   G
where G is a sequence of predicates and negated (weakly) predicates which may
contain variables, is translated into
G[s]! F (~x; do(A(~x); s)):
Here G[s] is the translation of G (we will come back to this), A is the name of
the action of applying this sequent (every action must have a name in the situation
calculus), and do is the function that returns the new situation that results from
the application of an action in a situation. If we interpret do(A(~x); s) as the next
situation, then this translation is very similar to our temporal form
conditions ! X conclusions.
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In fact, this similarity goes even further if we consider the translation of G. Not
bothering with the variables (we can always take ground instantiations), suppose
G = a
1
; : : : ; a
n
; b
1
; : : : ; b
m
, where   stands for weak negation (usually written
not). Then the translation G[s] is
G[s] = a
1
(s) ^ : : : ^ a
n
(s) ^ :(9s
0
)b
1
(s
0
) ^ : : : ^ :(9s
0
)b
m
(s
0
):
The parts :(9s
0
)b
1
(s
0
) play the role of looking into the future (some axioms are used
for the situation calculus which ensure that all situations are the eect of apply-
ing actions to the initial state) and are analogous to our :FK(b
1
)! One dierence
between their approach and ours is that they use situations, and we use natural
numbers. In fact, this probably makes our approach more similar to the approach
of Wallace ([Wal93]), also discussed in [LR96]. One proof of the usefulness of their
approach, is that dynamic control aspects can be modeled (which is also one of the
aspects of reasoning we hope to be able to model using temporal logic). This is
shown, for example, by the ability to model the Prolog cut operator (!) in the
situation calculus ([Lin97]). In this formalization, the ability to name the action of
applying a clause, is used in an essential manner. Since our temporal interpreta-
tion does not use explicit names for the action of applying a sequent, it would be
interesting to see if we can still model the cut operator in our interpretation.
The second approach based on ideas similar to our own, is step-logic (now called
active logic in general; see [Elg88, EP90, NKP94]). To quote from [NKP94]:
Most common sense reasoning formalisms do not account for the passage
of time as the reasoning occurs, and hence are inadequate from the point
of view of modeling an agent's ongoing process of reasoning.
One of their interests is in modeling limited reasoning, in which an agent does not
necessarily (immediately) know all logical consequences of its knowledge; but rea-
soning about the time left to do more reasoning is another possibility. Their model
of time is the set of natural numbers, and the most important objects in step-logic
are a kind of time sensitive inference rules. A good example of such a rule is the
interpretation of modus ponens:
i : : : : ; ; ! 
i+ 1 : : : : ; 
The interpretation is that for any time point i, if  and  !  have been derived
at that time point, then  is derived at time point i + 1. Note the similarity with
our temporal interpretation of modus ponens in Section 5.4:
C(at

) ^ C(at
!
)! 9XC(at

):
Step-logic is essentially a syntactical framework (but see [NKP94]), and the set of
formulae derived at some point in time is in general not closed under provability;
in our semantical approach, we have to make a change in signature, introducing
atoms of the form at

, in order to achieve this. Another example is a rule allowing
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negative introspection (which takes one step in time). One can also dene the
following interesting rule:
i : : : :
i+ 1 : : : : ;Now(i + 1 )
which allows the agent to look at the clock. Another interesting rule is inheritance,
which corresponds to conservativity in our framework:
i : : : : ; 
i+ 1 : : : : ; 
which should of course never hold for the Now predicate. One last sort of rule is the
observation rule:
i : : : :
i+ 1 : : : : ; 
if  is observed at time i + 1. The formulae that are observed at time points are
represented by a function OBS mapping time points to nite sets of formulae. In
our framework, we would represent this by rules of the form
at
i
! 9X(K)
where at
i
is a formula true exactly at time point i in all temporal models (see
Denition 9.19). Alternatively, we could use 8X if we want the observation to be
made always. Formally, an inference function INF is dened which takes a history
(a nite sequence of states, where a state is a pair of nite sets, one holding the
observations at that time point, one holding the derived formulae of that time point)
to a nite set of (new) histories which are one-step extensions of the original. This
means that the construction of histories is a truly constructive process: the rules may
refer to the history, but never to the future. This means that a temporal translation
of Reiter's default logic as we have done in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 is not possible in
step-logic. The way nonmonotonic reasoning of the agent can be modeled is by
modeling the backtracking behavior of the agent in search of the `correct' default
extensions (this in fact models default reasoning at a lower level of abstraction than
we have done in this chapter). In step-logic, the agent can apply a default, and later
nd out that that leads to inconsistency (which can be handled in the syntactic
states), and then `forget' the conclusion of the default and try other possibilities.
Step-logic is more general in that it is rst-order and has some features (like looking
at the clock or making observations) that we did not treat in Section 5.4. These
latter features could also be dened. In fact, the temporal inference rules of step-
logic can in general be translated into formulae of temporal partial logic (certainly
the ones only referring to i and i+ 1, but one can think also of more dicult rules
using complex temporal expressions). And in the temporal domain, our approach
is more general, since we can also refer to the future (their temporal format is a
restriction of ours).
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Chapter 6
Execution of Temporal
Theories
In the previous chapter, it was shown that many forms of reasoning can be specied
in some temporal logic of information. An execution mechanism for such speci-
cations would thus yield a general implementation for reasoning patterns. So what
does execution of a temporal theory mean? Execution of a theory should lead to
behavior which satises the theory. Thus, execution should yield a model of the
theory. It is sometimes required that the execution mechanism can, in principle,
nd all models of the theory. A temporal logic with such an execution algorithm is
called an executable temporal logic (see [BFG
+
96]). In this section, executability of
a class of temporal theories is discussed. First, an algorithm is given which can nd
minimal models of temporal theories of a restricted form. Then, a compositional
reasoning system is described which implements this algorithm.
6.1 An algorithm for executing theories of reason-
ing
The algorithm to be presented below will nd minimal models of a temporal theory.
As the temporal language, we will take TEL, and as model class the class of closed
conservative TEL models. The preference ordering we will take is a slight variation
on 
g
. The ordering 
g
prefers models in which the overall knowledge is minimal,
the rst point in time included. This means that also the knowledge at time point 0
is minimized. We introduce an ordering here which only compares models with the
same initial state. That is, for a xed initial state, the subsequent knowledge over
time is minimized. (There is no inherent reason to prefer either of the two orderings.
We have chosen this variant here to retain compatibility with [ET96a].)
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Denition 6.1 The ordering 
g
0
on closed TELC models is dened by
M
g
0
N ,M
0
= N
0
and M
g
N :
To give an example of how this ordering works, if we take the translation  of
default rules into TEL-formulae dened earlier, then the 
g
0
-minimal models of (D),
for a set of default rules D, correspond to extensions of default theories hD;W i, for
all possible W . Or, in this preferential temporal logic, a set of defaults D species
the reasoning frame operator Tr
D
of Section 3.1 in accordance with Denition 4.63.
We will restrict ourselves to a specic kind of theories, consisting of rules very
similar to the reasoning formulae of Section 4.5. The correctness of the algorithm
is in fact based on a characterization result very similar to those presented in that
section.
Apart from the temporal operators already introduced, we dene an additional
operator that refers to the rst time point.
Denition 6.2 The temporal operator H
0
is dened by
(M; t) j= H
0
', (M; 0) j= ':
The new operator was in fact already expressible, since H
0
' is equivalent to
2(H(?)! '). We are now ready to introduce theories of reasoning.
Denition 6.3 (Theory of Reasoning) A theory of reasoning is a set consisting
of temporal formulae of the form  ^  ^ ' ^  ! X(K); where
 =
V
fH
0
(K) j  2 Ag for a nite set of propositional formulae A,
 =
V
f:H
0
(K) j  2 Bg for a nite set of propositional formulae B,
' =
V
f:F (K) j  2 Dg for a nite set of propositional formulae D,
 =
V
fK j  2 Fg for a nite set of propositional formulae F , and
 is a propositional formula.
These theories of reasoning will be studied further in Section 7.1.
In order to execute a theory of reasoning we interpret its temporal rules as
inference rules. If the condition of such a rule is met, we introduce its conclusion
at the next step. The condition of the rule pertaining to the initial facts and the
present can be checked in a straightforward manner. The only problem is the part
referring to the future, '. The way to deal with them is to either a) assume they will
be met and add the conclusion; in this case we will have to check at all later steps
that they are indeed met, or b) assume they are not met; in this case we do not add
the conclusion. In this case ' must be violated at some later time. If this does not
happen than the execution is not correct. If the theory of reasoning is innite, it is
in general not possible at any point in time to be sure we are executing correctly.
Notice that a reasoning formula is not of the form \past implies future", a form
used often for executable temporal logic (see [Gab89]). Of course we could move the
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future part to the right of the implication. Using the notation of Denition 6.3 we
would obtain a rule
 ^  ^  ! X(K) _
_
fF (K) j  2 Dg
which is clearly in the desired format. To execute this rule if the conditions are met,
we could either introduce  at the next moment in time, or introduce one of the
elements of D at any future time point. But this is not the correct way of executing
such a formula, since the conjuncts of ' are meant as a kind of consistency check: if
:F (K) is true, then : remains consistent with the agent's beliefs. So they should
be declarative and not imperative. So instead of the slogan \declarative past implies
imperative future" ([Gab89]) we use the slogan \declarative past and future imply
imperative future".
We will now informally describe the general algorithm for executing a theory of
reasoning Th . We use predicates never true() and next() where  is proposi-
tional, and sometimes true(D), where D is a nite set of propositional formulae.
Intuitively, the predicate never true() expresses a constraint over the future that
 may not become true, the predicate sometimes true(D) expresses a constraint
over the future that at least one of the formulae in D should become true in the
future, and the predicate next() expresses the fact that we should add the formula
 to the set of conclusions at the next point in time.
We assume that we have a set of initial facts.
Algorithm 6.4
1. Mark all rules as unused, set all predicates to false, and set t to 0.
2. If the current facts are contradictory, backtrack to the previous time point.
3. Check all constraints never true(). If  is entailed by the current facts, back-
track to the previous time point.
4. For each unused rule
 ^  ^ ' ^  ! X(K);
where
 =
V
fH
0
(K) j  2 Ag for a nite set of propositional formulae A,
 =
V
f:H
0
(K) j  2 Bg for a nite set of propositional formulae B,
' =
V
f:F (K) j  2 Dg for a nite set of propositional formulae D,
 =
V
fK j  2 Fg for a nite set of propositional formulae F , and
 is a propositional formula;
do:
If all formulae in F are entailed by the current facts, and all formulae in A
are entailed by the initial facts, and all formulae in B are not entailed by the
initial facts then this rule is applicable: mark this rule as used and do either
of:
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 introduce next() and constraints never true() for each  2 D, or
 introduce a constraint sometimes true(D).
If we backtracked to this time point, make a choice for all the applicable rules
at this time point which has not been made before. If this is not possible,
backtrack one more step. If this is not possible (t = 0) then abort.
5. t := t + 1; If there are formulae of the form next(), then introduce  and
delete next() for all of them; goto 2. If there are no such formulae, then
check for each constraint sometimes true(D) whether some  2 D is entailed
by the current facts; if not, backtrack one step. Otherwise a minimal model
has been found.
If for all constraints sometimes true(D), some  2 D is entailed by the facts
at some point in time, the execution of the algorithm is called correct.
If at each step new formulae are added, we can never be sure during execution,
whether the execution will be correct. However, in case the theory of reasoning is
nite, there will be a point in time when no new facts are added: then the execution
will be correct. This is always the case when the propositional language contains a
nite number of atoms: then there is a nite number of non-equivalent propositional
formulae; if this number is n, then after n steps of the algorithm, no new facts can
be added. For correct executions we have the following:
Theorem 6.5 Let a theory of reasoning Th be given. For an execution of the
algorithm for Th , let T
i
denote the set of propositional formulae derived at time
point i. Dene a reasoning trace (M
i
)
i2N
by M
i
= Mod(T
i
). Let T be the set of
these traces for all possible correct executions of the algorithm for Th . Then T is
exactly the set of 
g
0
-minimal models of Th .
We will not give a detailed proof of this theorem. There is a characterization
theorem for 
g
0
-minimal models very similar to Corollary 4.55 (the condition on the
rst state has to be dropped). The algorithm nds the models thus characterized
by a kind of depth-rst search process.
The generality of this algorithm depends on the generality of reasoning theories
as a specication language, studied in the next chapter (Section 7.1). Applying this
algorithm to the theory of reasoning of a default theory (where the initial facts are
the axioms), we obtain an algorithm very similar to the ones meant especially for
default logic: it picks a subset of so-called generating defaults, and checks whether
it indeed induces an extension.
A special class of theories of reasoning is obtained when we do not allow consis-
tency checks (the set D in Denition 6.3 is empty). The induced reasoning process
will then be monotonic, and the algorithm will be much more ecient.
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In specic instances of theories of reasoning one would like to make the algorithm
more ecient. This can be done by using heuristic knowledge to make smart choices
at each point in time. In particular, if at the current point in time one of the  2 D is
already entailed by the facts, only the second choice in the algorithm makes sense. In
the case of default logic, one could use priorities between default rules or specicity
of rules to restrict the number of possible choices (see [Bre94a]). The set of possible
runs of our algorithm can be parameterized by selection functions. Such functions
describe the choices which have to be made at each point in time (in a similar fashion
as in [TT92]). Then the \good" selection functions make use of heuristic knowledge
to guide the reasoning process.
6.2 A compositional reasoning system for execut-
ing theories of reasoning
Implementations of agents that can reason in a defeasible manner need to include an
implemented nonmonotonic reasoning system. In dierent applications, agents may
need dierent types of nonmonotonic reasoning. Therefore, it is useful to develop
a generic reasoning system that covers dierent types of nonmonotonic reasoning
(as opposed to implementations for one specic nonmonotonic formalism as in e.g.,
[Nie96], [RS94] or [CMT96]). This can be done by a reasoning system that executes
theories of reasoning, which may describe dierent forms of reasoning. The develop-
ment of such a generic reasoning system can be made in a transparent manner if a
central role is played by an implementation-independent design specication based
on current software engineering principles, such as compositionality and informa-
tion hiding. In this section, a compositional reasoning system is introduced which
implements Algorithm 6.4.
The system was developed using the compositional modeling environment de-
sire (framework for DEsign and Specication of Interacting REasoning components;
see [BJT98, BDJT95, BTWW95]). This environment for the development of com-
positional reasoning systems and multi-agent systems has been successfully used to
design various types of reasoning systems and multi-agent systems and applications
in particular domains. The desire software environment oers a graphical editor,
an implementation generator and an execution environment to execute specications
automatically. In its use to build complex reasoning systems, desire can be viewed
as an advanced theorem proving environment in which both the knowledge and the
control of the reasoning can be specied in an explicit, declarative and compositional
manner. We will give a brief description of this framework.
6.2.1 A specication framework for compositional systems
The basic structure of a (compositional) multi-agent system in desire is a hierarchi-
cal structure of components, in which each component is assigned a task or process
to perform. To give an example, we may have a top component diagnosis, which is
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a process performing diagnosis. The task `diagnosis' could be composed of two sub-
tasks: determining a candidate hypothesis (a disease, or a malfunctioning part of a
system), and then testing that hypothesis. Our component diagnosis may have sub-
components hypothesis determination and hypothesis validation which perform these
respective tasks. The latter component may again contain some subcomponents
performing the (possible) subtasks of selecting observations to make, performing
these observations, and interpreting the results. Whether a component counts as an
agent depends on a number of characteristics: its autonomy, social ability, reactivity,
and pro-activeness ([WJ95]). The top component, diagnosis, in this example, might
be an agent able to communicate with other agents, which completely controls the
execution of its subcomponents, which should not be considered to be agents.
Components of course do not work in isolation, they have to be able to exchange
information. To this end, all components have an input interface and an output
interface, which contains facts in some input, respectively output, language. These
facts are essentially atomic statements in a predicate language, along with their
truth value: true, false or unknown. The information exchange takes place by ac-
tivating information links, which transfer facts from one component's interface to
another component's interface (possibly performing a translation: dierent inter-
faces may use dierent languages). Given a component C, an information link of C
may transfer information from C's input interface to the input interface of a sub-
component, or from the output interface of a subcomponent to C's output interface,
or, lastly, from the output interface of a subcomponent to the input interface of
(usually another) subcomponent. To control the activation of these links, C con-
tains task control knowledge, which also contains knowledge about when and how
to activate C's subcomponents. Of course, components at the lowest level do not
contain subcomponents. Such components are called primitive (in contrast to the
others, which are called composed), and usually contain a knowledge base.
In order to structure the process of building such a system, in the framework
desire knowledge of process composition and knowledge composition is explicitly
modeled and specied. To give the reader a structured but concise view of these
types of knowledge, we quote a relevant portion from [BJT98]. The quote (which
is not in quotation marks) ranges from the next paragraph until the last paragraph
before Subsection 6.2.2.
6.2.1.1 Process composition
Process composition identies the relevant processes at dierent levels of (process)
abstraction, and describes how a process can be dened in terms of lower level
processes.
6.2.1.1.1 Identication of processes at dierent levels of abstraction Pro-
cesses can be described at dierent levels of abstraction; for example, the processes
for the multi-agent system as a whole, processes within individual agents and the
external world, processes within task-related components of individual agents. Dif-
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ferent views can be taken: a task perspective, and a multi-agent perspective. The
task perspective refers to the view in which the processes needed to perform an overall
task are distinguished. These processes (or sub-tasks) are then delegated to appro-
priate agents and the external world. The multi-agent perspective refers to the view
in which agents and one or more external worlds are rst distinguished and then
the processes within them, including agent-related processes such as management of
communication, or controlling its own processes.
Specication of a process The identied processes are modeled as compo-
nents. For each process the types of information required as input, and resulting as
output, are identied as well. This is modeled as input and output interfaces of the
components.
Specication of abstraction levels The identied levels of process abstrac-
tion are modeled as abstraction / specialization relations between components at
adjacent levels of abstraction: components may be composed of other components or
they may be primitive. Primitive components may be either reasoning components
(for example based on a knowledge base), or, alternatively, components capable of
performing tasks such as calculation, information retrieval, optimization, et cetera.
The identication of processes at dierent abstraction levels results in specication
of components that can be used as building blocks, and of a specication of the sub-
component relation, dening which components are a sub-component of a which
other component. The distinction of dierent process abstraction levels results in
process hiding.
6.2.1.1.2 Composition relation for processes The way in which processes
at one level of abstraction are composed of processes at the adjacent lower abstrac-
tion level is called composition. This composition of processes is described by the
possibilities for information exchange between processes (static view on the composi-
tion), and task control knowledge used to control processes and information exchange
(dynamic view on the composition).
Information exchange Knowledge of information exchange denes which
types of information can be transferred between components and the information
links by which this can be achieved.
Task control knowledge Components may be activated sequentially or they
may be continually capable of processing new input as soon as it arrives (awake).
The same holds for information links: information links may be explicitly activated
or they may be awake. Task control knowledge species under which conditions
which components and information links are active (or awake). Evaluation criteria,
expressed in terms of the evaluation of the results (success or failure), provide a
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means to guide further processing. Task control knowledge can be specied to con-
strain the number of possible process traces that can be generated. Depending on
the application, task control knowledge can be specied in dierent ways, varying
from rather open approaches that entail almost no constraints on the behavior (e.g.,
when all components and links are made awake), to a strictly prescribed sequence
of activations of components and links. Task control is specied separately for each
process abstraction level. The degree to which behavior is constrained by task con-
trol can dier for these abstraction levels, and can dier between components within
one abstraction level. For example, at the top level of a system, agents and the links
between agents may be not constrained in their behavior (which realizes their au-
tonomy), and within an agent at a lower process abstraction level, task control may
specify a xed sequence of activation of components and links.
6.2.1.2 Knowledge composition
Knowledge composition identies the knowledge structures at dierent levels of
(knowledge) abstraction, and describes how a knowledge structure can be dened
in terms of lower level knowledge structures. The knowledge abstraction levels may
correspond to the process abstraction levels, but this is not often the case; often the
matrix depicted in Figure 6.1 shows more than a one to one correspondence between
process abstraction levels and knowledge abstraction levels.
6.2.1.2.1 Identication of knowledge structures at dierent abstraction
levels The two main structures used as building blocks to model knowledge are:
information types and knowledge bases. Knowledge structures can be identied and
described at dierent levels of abstraction. At the higher levels the details can be
hidden. The resulting levels of knowledge abstraction can be distinguished for both
information types and knowledge bases.
Information types An information type denes an ontology (lexicon, vocab-
ulary) to describe objects or terms, their sorts, and the relations or functions that
can be dened on these objects.
Knowledge bases A knowledge base denes a part of the knowledge that is
used in one or more of the processes. Knowledge bases use ontologies dened in
information types. Which information types are used in a knowledge base denes a
relation between information types and knowledge bases.
6.2.1.2.2 Composition relation for knowledge structures Information
types can be composed of more specic information types, following the principle of
compositionality discussed above. Similarly, knowledge bases can be composed of
more specic knowledge bases. The compositional structure is based on the dierent
levels of knowledge abstraction that are distinguished, and results in information and
knowledge hiding.
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6.2.1.3 Relation between process composition and knowledge composi-
tion
As shown in Figure 6.1, compositionality of processes and compositionality of knowl-
edge are two dierent dimensions. Each process in a process composition uses knowl-
edge structures. Which knowledge structures are used for which processes is dened
by the relation between process composition and knowledge composition. The com-
positional knowledge structures can be related to one or more compositional process
structures, where needed; the cells within the matrix depicted in Figure 6.1 dene
these relations. Note that not all cells need to be lled in this matrix. For exam-
ple, in a special case where knowledge composition is completely dependent on the
process composition the matrix in Figure 6.1 shows only a diagonal of lled cells.
of knowledge
compositionality
compositionality
of processes
-
?
Figure 6.1: Compositionality of processes and compositionality of knowledge.
For a more thorough and detailed description of compositional design using desire,
we refer the interested reader to [BDJT95, BJT98, BTWW96].
6.2.2 A generic compositional nonmonotonic reasoning sys-
tem
The system described here will try to nd a minimal model of a given theory. The
system at present only handles rules in which all propositional formulae are actually
literals, so no `real' propositional reasoning is necessary. The system searches for
a model by incrementally trying to nd a next state for a nite initial part of a
(possible) model. The reasoning task of nding minimal models of a reasoning
theory is modeled as a composition of two subtasks. The rst subtask generates all
possible continuations (of one state) of the current initial part of a model, and the
second subtask selects a continuation. Within the rst task, rst it is determined
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which rules are applicable. Applicable rules are the rules
 ^  ^ ' ^  ! X(K);
where
 =
V
fH
0
(K) j  2 Ag for a set of propositional formulae A,
 =
V
f:H
0
(K) j  2 Bg for a set of propositional formulae B,
' =
V
f:F (K) j  2 Cg for a set of propositional formulae C,
 =
V
fK j  2 Dg for a set of propositional formulae D, and
 is a propositional formula.
for which the conditions that refer to the past and present (i.e., ,  ,  ) are fullled.
Next, for each of the applicable rules, for the future-directed conditions ' two
possibilities are generated:
 either the conditions that refer to the future will be fullled in the reasoning
trace that is generated, or
 these future-directed conditions will not be fullled.
In the rst case the rule will contribute its conclusion to the reasoning process and
we have to make sure in the future that the future conditions were indeed fullled
(we add constraints to ensure this). In the second case no explicit contribution will
be made by the rule. However, in this second case, by the subsequent generation of
the reasoning trace it will have to be guaranteed that the future-directed conditions
indeed will be violated (and we again add constraints to ensure this).
The design of the compositional nonmonotonic reasoning system has been speci-
ed in desire, according to the ve types of knowledge discussed earlier. Five levels
of abstraction are distinguished in the task hierarchy (see Figure 6.2).
6.2.2.1 Top level of the system
At the highest level the system consists of four components. During the reasoning
process, in the component maintain current state the facts are represented that have
been derived. The component maintain history stores relevant aspects of the reason-
ing process in order to perform belief revision if required. The reasoning is performed
by the component generate possible continuations, which generates the possible next
steps of the reasoning trace and select continuation which chooses one of these possi-
bilities. By this selection the actual next step in the reasoning trace is determined.
In Figure 6.3 the information exchange at the top level of the system is depicted. In
this picture and the following ones, a rectangle is a component, and the arrows are
information links. The small rectangles on the left and right of the components are
the input, respectively output, interfaces. (In these pictures we have left out some
information links which go from a component to itself. For instance, such links are
sometimes needed to model a closed-world assumption.)
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Figure 6.2: Complete task hierarchy of the system.
determine reasoning traces task control
generate
possible
continuations
select
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retrieve current facts
store current facts
store combinations and constraints
retrieve combinations and constraints
current facts
Figure 6.3: Information exchange at the top level of the system.
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6.2.2.2 Generate possible continuations
Within the component generate possible continuations two subcomponents are dis-
tinguished: test applicability of rules and determine combinations; see Figure 6.4 for
the information ow at this level.
generate possible continuations task control
test
applicability
of rules
determine
combinations
applicable rules
retrieved
 applicable
 rules
initial
and
current
facts
applicable rules to be stored
possible
 continuations
rule conditions
Figure 6.4: Information exchange within generate possible continuations.
The former component is primitive and determines the rules that are applicable
in the current state of the reasoning process. Its knowledge base consists of rules,
for example of the form:
if pos H0 condition(L: Literals, R: Rules) if current condition(L: Literals, R: Rules)
and not initial fact(L: Literals) and not current fact(L: Literals)
then not applicable(R: Rules) then not applicable(R: Rules)
By application of a form of the closed world assumption, the applicable rules are
derived. The second component determines for each of the applicable rules two
possibilities: it is assumed that either (+) the conditions of the rule that refer to
the future will be fullled in the reasoning trace that is generated, or (-) these
future-directed conditions will not be fullled.
The component determine combinations is rather simple (see Figure 6.5). The
applicable rules are treated one by one and combinations are constructed. Both sub-
components are primitive. The knowledge base of the rst subcomponent, choose rule
just consists of one rule:
if applicable(R: Rules)
and not covered(R: Rules)
then in focus(R: Rules)
This means that any applicable rule that has not been chosen before, can be deduced
to be chosen (in focus). By invoking this component in such a way that it will only
deduce one new fact, one new rule is chosen at every invocation.
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Figure 6.5: Information exchange within determine combinations.
The knowledge base of the second subcomponent, extend combinations consists
of the following two rules:
if old combination(C: combinations) if old combination(C: combinations)
and in focus(R: rules) and in focus(R: rules)
and future dependent(R: rules) then new combination(
then new combination( app(C: combinations, tup(R: rules, pos)));
app(C: combinations, tup(R: rules, neg)));
These rules build new combinations from old combinations and the rule in focus.
The predicate app (for append) is used to build up a list, and the predicate tup
(for tuple) is used to make tuples. Only rules with a part that refers to the fu-
ture (future dependent) are allowed not to be applied (meaning that tup(R: rules,
neg) may occur in a combination). Which rules are future dependent is deduced in
test applicability of rules.
6.2.2.3 Select continuation
Within the component select continuation, focus combinations are chosen one by one
and processed (see Figure 6.6).
Processing a combination is performed by rst making an interpretation of the
information represented by a combination, and subsequently checking on consistency
against the current facts and checking the constraints (see Figures 6.7 and 6.8).
The knowledge base of the primitive component check consistency consists of
three rules, an example of which is:
if next(A: Atoms)
and current(neg(A: Atoms))
then inconsistency
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Figure 6.6: Information exchange within select continuation.
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Figure 6.7: Information exchange within process combinations.
6.2.3 Example trace
In this subsection we will give an example of the execution of our generic reasoning
system. The theory of reasoning is the translation of the following example default
theory hD;W i with D = f(a : b)=b; (d : c)=c; (b : :c)=eg and W = fa; d; b ! :cg.
(Notice that this is the example default theory of Example 5.2.) The atoms a and
d will be initial facts. Formally, the formula b ! :c should also be a fact, but
since the generic reasoning system to be described below does not perform general
propositional reasoning (it uses a subset of natural deduction called chaining), we
will translate it into the following two rules which describe the application of the
formula:
1. Kb! X(K:c),
6.2 A compositional reasoning system 155
check combination task control
check
consistency
check
constraints
candidate
facts
current facts to
check consistency
constraints
to be stored
current facts to
check constraints
new and retrieved constraints
Figure 6.8: Information exchange within check combinations.
2. Kc! X(K:b).
The default rules are translated as follows:
3. Ka ^ :F (K:b)! X(Kb),
4. Kd ^ :F (K:c)! X(Kc),
5. Kb ^ :F (Kc)! X(Ke).
When this theory is given to the generic reasoning system, the following will
happen (in this list, on the left we will indicate the facts that are derived, on the
right the component in which it is derived, in brackets; not everything derived in
every component is listed and no information links are listed):
- a, d (maintain current state)
- applicable(r3), applicable(r4) (test applicability of rules)
- new combination(app(app(nil, tup(r3, pos)),
tup(r4, pos))), new combination(app(app(nil,
tup(r3, neg)), tup(r4, pos))),
new combination(app(app(nil, tup(r3, pos)),
tup(r4, neg))), new combination(app(app(nil,
tup(r3, neg)), tup(r4, neg)))
(determine combinations)
- selected combination(app(app(nil, tup(r3, pos)),
tup(r4, pos)))
(choose combination)
- next(c), next(b) (interpret combination)
- c, b (maintain current state)
- applicable(r1), applicable(r2) (test applicability of rules)
- new combination(app(app(nil, tup(r1, pos)),
tup(r2, pos)))
(determine combinations)
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(since these rules do not refer to the future, only one combination will be generated,
in which both rules are applied)
- selected combination(app(app(nil, tup(r1, pos)),
tup(r2, pos)))
(choose combination)
- next(neg(b)), next(neg(c)) (interpret combination)
- inconsistency (check consistency)
(this uses the rule if next(neg(A: atoms)) and current(A: atoms) then inconsistency
with next(neg(b)) and current(b); now maintain history will be invoked with target
set retrieve. Then choose combination will fail, since there was only one combination
at this point | app(app(nil, tup(r1, pos)), tup(r2, pos)) | so another retrieve is
performed.)
- selected combination(app(app(nil, tup(r3, neg)),
tup(r4, neg)))
(choose combination)
- sometimes true(neg(c), r4),
sometimes true(neg(b), r3)
(interpret combination)
(after maintain current state, test applicability of rules will nd no more applicable
rules).
- incorrect(r4) (check constraints)
(this is derived from the constraint sometimes true(neg(c), r4)) and
not current(neg(c)); a retrieve will occur)
- selected combination(app(app(nil, tup(r3, pos)),
tup(r4, neg)))
(choose combination)
- sometimes true(neg(c), r4), next(b),
never true(neg(b))
(interpret combination)
- b (maintain current state)
- applicable(r1), applicable(r5) (test applicability of rules)
- new combination(app(app(nil, tup(r5, pos)),
tup(r1, pos))), new combination(app(app(nil,
tup(r5, neg)), tup(r1, pos)))
(determine combinations)
(r1 has to be applied (it does not refer to the future), but for r5 there is a choice)
- selected combination(app(app(nil, tup(r5, pos)),
tup(r1, pos)))
(choose combination)
- next(neg(c)), next(e), never true(c) (interpret combination)
- neg(c), e (maintain current state)
(no more applicable rules are found by test applicability of rules, so check constraints
is invoked, which nds no violated constraints)
- at this point user interaction, a component of the top level of the system left out
so far, will display the window of Figure 6.9.
6.3 Conclusions and related work 157
Figure 6.9: User interaction.
The minimal model displayed corresponds to the extension based on the literals
fa; b;:c; d; eg. When the user clicks \no", the execution will stop. Otherwise a
retrieve will be performed by maintain history, after which choose combination will
choose the combination in which r5 is not applied (but r1 is). This will eventually
lead to a violated constraint, so another retrieve will occur. Then choose combination
will take the last combination (for r3 and r4), in which r3 is not applied and r4 is.
Ultimately, the second minimal model will be found and displayed (corresponding to
the literals fa;:b; c; dg). If the user wants to search for another minimal model, none
will be found, and a message indicating this will be displayed, after which execution
ends.
6.3 Conclusions and related work
In this chapter we rst described an algorithm to execute temporal theories of a
certain format. Thus, our approach falls into the area of executable temporal logic
(see for instance [Gab89, BFG
+
96]), or more generally, executable modal logic (see
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[FO95]). As mentioned before, the main dierence with most other executable tem-
poral logics is in the interpretation of the \:FK" part on the left hand side (or
\FK" on the right hand side) of a rule, which we interpret declaratively, while the
other approaches interpret it imperatively. Of course, our focus on modeling (possi-
bly) non-monotonic reasoning is not shared by the other approaches. Furthermore,
our states are three-valued information states, whereas the states are (two-valued)
propositional valuations or assignments of values to parameters in most other ap-
proaches. One framework we would like to mention explicitly, is MetateM, which
is the executable version of the temporal belief logic TBL already mentioned at the
end of Chapter 4. The two main dierences between MetateM and our approach
(apart from the dierence in states | three-valued in our approach, two-valued in
MetateM) are the interpretation of the future operator (mentioned above), and
the fact that an (information) state in MetateM holds the beliefs of more than
one agent (whereas our logic is for one agent only, but see also Section 8.1). In the
second section of this chapter, the framework desire for the design of compositional
reasoning systems and multi-agent systems was applied to build a generic nonmono-
tonic reasoning system. The main advantages of using desire (compared to a direct
implementation in a programming language such as prolog) are:
 the design is generic and has a transparent compositional structure; it is easily
readable, modiable and reusable. The generic nonmonotonic reasoning sys-
tem is easily usable as a component in agents that are specied in desire.
For example, if an agent is designed that has default knowledge, then the
generic reasoning system can be included as one of the agent's components
and the representation of the agent's default knowledge can be translated to
the temporal representation of the generic reasoning system.
 explicit declarative specication of both the static and dynamic aspects of the
nonmonotonic reasoning processes is possible, including their control. The
current system generates one or all reasoning traces that are possible with-
out any specic guidance. However, a number of approaches to nonmonotonic
reasoning have been developed that in addition use explicit knowledge about
priorities between nonmonotonic rules (e.g., [Bre94a], [TT92]). This knowl-
edge can easily be incorporated within the component select continuation, in
particular within its subcomponent choose combination.
Even though the eciency of the reasoning system can be improved (by adding
knowledge to prevent generating possible continuations that can easily be seen to
violate constraints, by adding heuristic knowledge in the selection of continuations,
etc.), implementations for specic nonmonotonic formalisms (e.g. for default logic,
see [Nie95], [CMT96], or [RS94]) can often be made more ecient. In general they
lack, however, the ability to handle dierent kinds of nonmonotonic reasoning, and
the extendibility of our approach. Also, they cannot handle dynamic queries (for
example, the query whether a literal has been derived before time point 3).
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Chapter 7
Expressiveness
In Chapter 2, it was argued that reasoning can be formalized (by operators) on a
number of levels of abstraction. These formalizations (operators) can be specied
by specication languages. Chapter 3 introduced some of these languages, and a
number of temporal specication languages were introduced in Chapter 4. When
assessing a specication language, a major criterion is its expressiveness. There are
at least two sides to expressiveness. On the one hand, one may ask whether it is
easy to write down a specication in practice: does the language contain enough
primitives and operators to allow you to conveniently write down what you intend?
The temporal theories in Chapter 5 suggest that temporal logics of information have
a good expressiveness for specifying reasoning behavior. On the other hand, there is
a more theoretical concern to expressiveness: which objects can be specied in the
language, and which objects cannot? The semantics of a specication language helps
in answering the question: given a specication, which object does it denote? Here,
we are interested in the reverse question: given an object, is there a specication
whose meaning is that object?
This latter side to expressiveness is the concern of this chapter. Of course, all
the dierent specication languages mentioned so far in this thesis, have their own
expressiveness, and it would be a rather tiresome exercise to treat all of them.
Therefore, in this chapter the expressiveness of two languages will be explored, one
based on temporal logic, and one based on default logic.
7.1 Innitary theories of reasoning
In this section, the expressiveness of innitary theories of reasoning is investigated.
An innitary theory of reasoning is a variation on the theories of reasoning intro-
duced in Chapter 6 using innite conjunctions. The interpretation of an innite
conjunction in a (conservative closed) TEL-model is straightforward.
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Denition 7.1 (Innite conjunction) LetM be a closed conservative TEL-
model, t 2 N, and let A be a set of TEL-formulae. Then the interpretation of the
innite conjunction of A, denoted
V
A, is as follows:
(M; t) j=
^
A, (M; t) j= ' for all ' 2 A:
The following denition of innitary theories of reasoning is completely analogous
to Denition 6.3, but without the word \nite".
Denition 7.2 (Innitary theory of reasoning) An innitary theory of reason-
ing is a set consisting of temporal formulae of the form  ^  ^ ' ^  ! X(K);
where
 =
V
fH
0
(K) j  2 Ag for a set of propositional formulae A.
 =
V
f:H
0
(K) j  2 Bg for a set of propositional formulae B.
' =
V
f:F (K) j  2 Dg for a set of propositional formulae D.
 =
V
fK j  2 Fg for a set of propositional formulae F .
 is a propositional formula.
If all conjuncts in all formulae are nite, the theory is called nitary.
The ordering on closed TELC models we use is the ordering 
g
0
introduced in
Chapter 6. Denition 4.63 tells us which reasoning frame operator is specied by an
innitary theory of reasoning S:
T
S
(X) = fM j M j=

g
0
S and Th(M
0
) = Cn(X)g:
This reasoning frame operator is based on the information state frame IS
ep
of epis-
temic states, with the restriction that the information states are closed sets of mod-
els. So the (reverse) expressiveness question now becomes: given a reasoning frame
operator R based on this information state frame, does there exist an innitary
theory of reasoning S such that T
S
= R?
The reasoning frame operators specied by an innitary theory of reasoning
are particularly well-behaved, in that they satisfy all the properties mentioned in
Section 2.3. Moreover, these properties exactly characterize the reasoning frame
operators that can be specied by an innitary theory of reasoning, as the following
theorem shows.
Theorem 7.3
1. For any innitary theory of reasoning S, the associated reasoning frame oper-
ator T
S
is conservative and eager, and satises non-inclusiveness, uniqueness
of traces, and invariance (see Denition 2.21).
2. Suppose R is a conservative and eager reasoning frame operator satisfying
non-inclusiveness, uniqueness of traces, and invariance. Then there exists an
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innitary theory of reasoning S such that T
S
= R. If the language contains
only nitely many propositional atoms, then S can be taken nite and nitary.
Proof: Throughout this proof, we will make use of the following characterization
result for 
g
0
-minimal models of an innitary theory of reasoning. This result is very
similar to Corollary 4.55, and as the proof is also very similar, we leave it to the
interested reader. The characterization is as follows: M is a 
g
0
-minimal model of an
innitary theory of reasoning S if and only if for each s 2 N, M
s+1
= Mod(Th(M
s
)[
f j there is a rule ^  ^'^ ! X(K) 2 S such that (M; s) j= ^  ^'^ g).
We will now proceed to prove the two claims.
1. Suppose we have an innitary theory of reasoning S. Let us consider T
S
. We
will prove the properties one by one.
 conservative: Take any M 2 T
S
(X), then M is a 
g
0
-minimal model of
S, so for any s 2 N we have M
s+1
= Mod(Th(M
s
) [ f j there is a rule
 ^  ^ ' ^  ! X(K) 2 S such that (M; s) j=  ^  ^ ' ^  g). We have
to prove that M
s
M
s+1
, which is by denition equivalent to M
s
M
s+1
.
Take a valuation m 2 M
s+1
, then m j= Th(M
s
), and as M
s
is closed, we
have m 2M
s
.
 eager: Again take an M 2 T
S
(X), then again the characterization result
holds. Now suppose for some s 2 N we have M
s
= M
s+1
. We will prove
that the same rules are applicable in M at time s, as at time s + 1. So let
us take any rule (from S), of the form  ^  ^ ' ^  ! X(K), where, as
before,  is a conjunction of formulae of the form H
0
(K),  a conjunction
of formulae of the form :H
0
(K), ' a conjunction of formulae of the form
:F (K), and nally  is a conjunction of formulae of the form K. It is easy
to see that (M; s) j= ^ , (M; s+1) j= ^ since it only depends onM
0
.
As M
s
= M
s+1
, it is straightforward that (M; s) j=  , (M; s + 1) j=  .
As we are dealing with closed models, whether (M; s) j= ' only depends on
whether lim M 6j= K for all conjuncts :F (K) in  , and the same holds for
time point s + 1. This means that M
s+2
= Mod (Th(M
s+1
[ f j there is a
rule  ^  ^ ' ^  ! X(K) in S, applicable in M at time point s + 1g) =
Mod (Th(M
s
[ f j there is a rule  ^  ^ ' ^  ! X(K) in S, applicable in
M at time point sg) =M
s+1
. Using induction, this argument can be used to
show that M
t
=M
s
for all t > s, showing eagerness.
 non-inclusiveness and uniqueness of traces: Take M;N 2 T
S
(X) and sup-
pose that lim M  lim N . We will prove that N
t
 M
t
for all t 2 N,
using induction. Since M;N 2 T
S
(X), we have by denition that Th(M
0
) =
Cn(X) = Th(N
0
), and as both are closed models, we have M
0
= N
0
. Now
suppose that for some s 2 N, it holds that N
i
M
i
for all i  s. Take a rule
^ ^'^ ! X(K) of S as above, and suppose (N ; s) j= ^ ^'^ . As
N
0
= M
0
, we have (M; s) j=  ^ . As N
s
 M
s
, we have (M; s) j=  .
Now take a formula :F (K) from '. Since (N ; s) j= :F (K), we have
(as N is closed), lim N 6j= K, but as lim M  lim N by assumption, we
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have lim M 6j= K, whence (M; s) j= :F (K). This means that (M; s) j=
 ^  ^ ' ^  . So all rules applicable in N at time s, are also applicable in
M at time s. Furthermore, as N
s
 M
s
, we have Th(N
s
)  Th(M
s
). As
both are minimal models, and therefore satisfy the characterization above, we
must have that Th(N
s+1
)  Th(M
s+1
), which means that N
s+1
 M
s+1
.
This, however, together with the fact that N
0
= M
0
, means that N 
g
0
M.
But since M is a 
g
0
-minimal model of S (and so is N ), this must mean
that M = N . Of course this also implies that lim M = lim N . As also
lim M = lim N ) lim M  lim N , we have proved both non-inclusiveness
and uniqueness of traces.
 invariance: We have to prove that, for any set X , it holds that T
S
(X) =
T
S
(Cn(X)). Now T
S
(X) collects all minimal modelsM of S for which Th(M
0
)
= Cn(X), and T
S
(Cn(X)) collects all minimal models for which Th(M
0
) =
Cn(Cn(X)), which is obviously equal as Cn(X) = Cn(Cn(X)).
2. Suppose R is a reasoning frame operator satisfying all of the above mentioned
properties. We will construct an innitary theory of reasoning S such that
T
S
= R. This theory S will be the union of theories S
X
, one for each possible
input set X  L. In fact, as R satises invariance, whenever Cn(X) = Cn(Y ),
we will take S
X
= S
Y
. The formulae in S
X
are meant to be applicable only for
traces inR(X), therefore such a trace must start with (exactly) the information
in X . Formulae in S
X
will have the following formula 
X
^
X
as part of their
left hand side:
^
fH
0
(K) j  2 Cn(X)g ^
^
f:H
0
(K) j  =2 Cn(X)g:
In words: all formulae from Cn(X) must be known in the initial state, but
no formula outside of Cn(X) must be known. As an aside, it is not necessary
to take all formulae from Cn(X): all formulae from X is sucient (for the
left part), or even all formulae from a set of generators A (where A is a set
of generators for Cn(X) if Cn(A) = Cn(X)). Now let us consider R(X). If
R(X) = ;, then we must make sure that there are no minimal models of S
starting with X . So in this case we let S
X
contain a single rule

X
^ 
X
! X(K?):
Let us now consider the situation that R(X) 6= ;. In this case S
X
will be the
union of theories S
X;M
for eachM2 R(X). The rules in a theory S
X;M
should
be applicable only in M, so we need part of the precondition to distinguish
between the traces in R(X), and we can use a conjunction of formulae of
the form :F (K) for this purpose. As R satises uniqueness of traces, we
know that two dierent traces in R(X) have two dierent limits. Thus we
can distinguish between traces on the basis of the limit. Furthermore, as R
satises non-inclusiveness, we know that these limits are not in the relation ,
which means that they are not subsets of each other. As the traces in R(X)
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are closed (remember that this was an additional property of the information
state frame), the limits are closed too. The relevance of this is that if for
two closed information states M;N , we have that M 6 N , then there exists
a propositional formula ' such that N j= K' but M 6j= K'. For any two
dierent traces M;N in R(X), let 
M;N
be any propositional formula such
that lim N j= K(
M;N
), but lim M 6j= K(
M;N
). Then dene formulae '
X;M
as follows:
'
X;M
=
^
f:FK(
M;N
) j N 2 R(X);N 6=Mg:
It can easily be veried (using closedness of the traces) that '
X;M
is only
applicable in M (for every other trace N 2 R(X), the formula FK(
M;N
)
is true, making the disjunction false). If R(X) contains just one trace, we
may set '
X;M
= > (or leave it out altogether). By using the conjunction

X
^ 
X
^ '
X;M
on the left hand side, we can make implications which are
applicable only on M. Now we have to make sure that the information of
M is added at the right moments. We will have to use the formulae of the
form K on the left hand side for this. Now consider a part of M consisting
of three states, M
s
;M
s+1
;M
s+2
. Then the formulae newly known in M
s+2
,
i.e. Th(M
s+2
) n Th(M
s+1
) can be added after state M
s+1
. So how can we
express that we are inM
s+1
? Well,M
s+1
is the rst state where we know the
formulae from Th(M
s+1
)nTh(M
s
)! This means we can use any formula from
that set as a precondition (preceded by a K operator) for adding the (new)
conclusions for M
s+1
. This will now be formalized.
Let k
M
be the index where the trace M is no longer strictly increasing (if
there is such a point). Then eagerness ensures that after that index, the trace
is constant. Dene
k
M
=

minfs j M
s
=M
s+1
g if there exists s with M
s
=M
s+1
1 otherwise
For 0 < s < k
M
, let 
s;M
be a propositional formula in Th(M
s
) n Th(M
s 1
).
Furthermore, let 
0;M
be any formula in Th(M
0
). We are now ready to dene
the set of rules for the traceM:
S
X;M
= f
X
^ 
X
^ '
X;M
^K(
s;M
)! X(K) j
 2 Th(M
s+1
) n Th(M
s
); 0  s  k
M
g:
As announced earlier, we set
S
X
=
[
M2R(X)
S
X;M
and nally
S =
[
XL
S
X
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where this last union can be taken over deductively closed sets X only.
It now remains to prove that T
S
= R. Take any X  L. We will rst show that
R(X)  T
S
. So let M2 R(X). Then it easy to see that rules from S
Y
where
Cn(Y ) 6= Cn(X) are not applicable (at any time point) in M. Concentrating
on S
X
, None of the rules in S
X;N
for any N 6=M, N 2 R(X) are applicable
anywhere in M, since (M; s) j= FK(
N ;M
), whereas the negation of this
formula is part of the left hand side of every formula in S
X;N
. Turning to the
formulae in S
X;M
, the part 
X
^
X
^'
X;M
is true inM at all points in time.
As for the part 
s;M
, this part is true inM at time point s and later, but false
earlier. Thus we see that the rules rst applicable in M at time point s are
exactly the rules
f
X
^ 
X
^ '
X;M
^K(
s;M
)! X(K) j  2 Th(M
s+1
n Th(M
s
)g:
The conclusions of other applicable rules are already in Th(M
s
). Furthermore,
Mod (Th(M
s
) [ f j  2 Th(M
s+1
n Th(M
s
)g) = M
s+1
(as M is closed and
conservative). But that means that M is a 
g
0
-minimal model of S by the
characterization result with which we started the proof of this theorem. And
as Th(M
0
) = Cn(X), we haveM2 T
S
(X).
For the converse, suppose M 2 T
S
(X). First of all, suppose no rule from
S is applicable in M. Using the characterization result of the start of this
proof (and the fact that, by denition, T
S
(X) contains 
g
0
-minimal models of
S), this means that M
s
= Mod(X) for all s. If R(X) contains any trace N ,
then from the rst part of the proof we have that N 2 T
S
(X). We then have
M
g
0
N : M
0
= N
0
(as both are in T
S
(X)), andM
s
=M
0
= N
0
 N
s
(using
conservativity). As N is a minimal model of S (being a member of T
S
(X))
this must mean that N =M whence M 2 R(X). On the other hand, R(X)
cannot be empty, since in that case S would contain a rule 
X
^
X
! X(K?),
which is obviously false in M.
Now suppose that there is a rule from S applicable inM at time point s. Then
this rule must be of the form

X
^ 
X
^ '
X;N
^K
t;N
! X(K) (7.1)
for some N 2 R(X), 
t;N
2 N
t
n N
t 1
(or if t = 0, we have 
t;N
2 N
0
), and
 2 Th(N
t+1
) n Th(N
t
) for some t  s. We will prove that N 
g
0
M using
induction. First of all, as (M; s) j= 
X
^ 
X
, we have Th(M
0
) = Cn(X), and
as N 2 R(X), we also have Th(N
0
) = Cn(X). Closedness of these two traces
implies that M
0
= N
0
. Let u 2 N be such that N
x
 M
x
for all x  u. We
will prove that N
x+1
 M
x+1
. As N 2 R(X) and R(X)  T
S
(X) (rst part
of the proof), we know that both N andM are 
g
0
-minimal models of S. This
means that both t the characterization at the beginning of the proof, which
implies (as N
u
 M
u
) that we only have to prove that all rules applicable
in N at time point u are also applicable in M at time point u. The rules
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applicable in N at time point u are exactly the rules

X
^ 
X
^ '
X;N
^ 
v;N
! X(K)
where v  u. However, since the truth of 
X
^ 
X
only depends on M
0
, and
the truth of '
X;N
only depends on lim M, the fact that formula 7.1 is true in
M at time point s, means that (M; u) j= 
X
^ 
X
^ '
X;N
. Furthermore, as
N  M, and (N ; u) j= 
v;N
, we also have (M; u) j= 
v;N
, which means that
this rule is applicable in M at time point u. This proves that N
u+1
M
u+1
.
By induction we now get that N 
g
0
M, but as both N and M are 
g
0
-
minimal models of S, it must be the case that actuallyM = N , which means
that M2 R(X), which had to be proven.
2
The theorem shows that innitary theories of reasoning are in a sense `expressively
complete' for the class of these well-behaved reasoning frame operators. For other
temporal specication languages, other expressiveness results will be the case. As
an example, if we allow a formula in an innitary theory of reasoning to contain,
as part of its premise, a conjunction of formulae of the form F (K), and we take
the ordering 
gel
0
(which compares two models according to 
gel
, but only if their
initial states are equal), then this language is expressively complete for the class of
reasoning frame operators which satisfy all the properties mentioned above, except
non-inclusiveness. The proof of this fact is analogous to the above proof and is
therefore skipped. In the next section we will look at the expressiveness of a variant
of default logic.
7.2 Innitary default logic
In this section, the expressiveness of an innitary variant of default logic, IDL, will be
studied. It was shown in Section 3.1 that default logic (or actually, sets of defaults)
can be seen as a specication language for reasoning frame operators. For a set of
defaults D, we dened
Tr
D
(X) = fTr(E) j E 2 Ext(D;X)g:
It was also shown earlier (Example 2.12) that a set of defaults D species a multiple
belief state operator B
dl
D
given by
B
dl
D
(X) = Ext(D;X):
Analogously to the previous section, the representability questions would be:
 Given a reasoning frame operator R, does there exist a set of defaults D such
that R = Tr
D
?
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 Given a multiple belief state operator  , does there exist a set of defaults D
such that   = B
dl
D
?
We will not solve these questions here, but instead look at a (arguably easier) dier-
ent representability question. A set of defaults species a reasoning frame operator.
But a default theory, that is, a set of defaults together with a set of formulae, speci-
es a set of (deductively closed) theories, namely the set of its extensions. Likewise,
it species a set of traces, namely the traces of its extensions. In a sense, this means
that we are keeping the initial facts xed. So we will investigate the expressiveness
of (a variant of) default logic as a specication language for these semantical objects.
In the next subsection we will introduce terminology for a certain class of sets of
theories and sets of traces, and we will introduce innitary default logic.
7.2.1 Preliminaries
In this section, by L we denote a language of propositional logic with a denumerable
set of atoms P . These atoms will be denoted by p; q; r; ::: with or without subscripts.
In this section, by a theory we always mean a subset of L closed under propositional
provability. We will often refer to a theory as a belief set. For formulae '
1
; '
2
; :::; '
n
we introduce the notation h'
1
; '
2
; :::; '
n
i as an abbreviation of Cn(f'
1
; '
2
; :::; '
n
g).
As already mentioned, we are interested in sets of theories. Of particular interest
are sets of theories that form anti-chains (no belief set is a proper subset of another).
Denition 7.4 (Belief frame) A belief frame is a collection of belief sets (theories)
such that no belief set is a proper subset of another.
Throughout this subsection we will use a running example to illustrate the ideas
and constructions.
Example 7.5 (Running example) Dene the following theories:
T
1
= hp; s; ti;
T
2
= hp; s;:ui;
T
3
= hp;:r;:q; ti; and
T
4
= hp;:r;:q;:ui:
It is easy to see that B = fT
1
; T
2
; T
3
; T
4
g is a belief frame.
Also, we are interested in sets of traces. Throughout this subsection we will
use the following notational convention. If an upper case symbol, say E, stands
for a sequence of theories, then the elements of the sequence will be referred to
as E
1
; E
2
; : : : , and their union,
S
1
i=1
E
i
, will be denoted by E
1
. Note that such
a sequence forms a trace in the information state frame IS
syn
of syntactic states
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(Denition 2.6), and that E
1
is the same as the limit of E. From here on, we will
be working in IS
syn
.
Denition 7.6 (Reasoning frame) A collection T of eager and conservative rea-
soning traces from IS
syn
is called a reasoning frame if for every T; S 2 T :
1. T
0
= S
0
, and
2. If T
1
 S
1
, then T = S.
It is easy to see that the limit of a conservative and eager reasoning trace is a
theory, that is, it is closed under propositional provability, and that the limits of
reasoning traces in a reasoning frame form a belief frame, that is, form an anti-
chain. Furthermore, if we take a reasoning frame operator R in IS
syn
consisting
of eager and conservative traces, which in addition satises non-inclusiveness and
uniqueness of traces, then for every X  L, we have that R(X) is a reasoning frame.
So reasoning frames are generated by xing the initial facts for a reasoning frame
operator satisfying some properties. In the same vein, belief frames result from
keeping the initial facts xed for a multiple belief state operator (in IS
syn
) satisfying
non-inclusiveness. Just as there were connections between reasoning frame operators
and multiple belief state operators, one can associate a belief frame to each reasoning
frame.
Denition 7.7 (Belief frame of a reasoning frame) Let T be a reasoning
frame. The belief frame B
T
associated with T is dened by:
B
T
= fT
1
: T 2 T g:
Example 7.8 The following is an example of a reasoning frame:
F = f(hpi; hp; si; hp; s; ti; hp; s; ti; :::);
(hpi; hp; si; hp; s;:ui; hp; s;:ui; :::);
(hpi; hp;:r;:qi; hp;:r;:q; ti; hp;:r;:q; ti; :::);
(hpi; hp;:r;:qi; hp;:r;:q;:ui; hp;:r;:q;:ui; :::)g:
It is easy to show that this is indeed a reasoning frame. The reader can check that
B
F
= B where B was dened in Example 7.5.
In this section, we intend to show that innitary default logic can specify belief
frames and reasoning frames (using default theories, not sets of defaults as was done
earlier), but more importantly, that any belief frame and any reasoning frame can be
specied by an IDL-theory. Some results in this direction were already obtained in
[MTT97], where the problem of encoding belief frames by nitary default theories
was studied in detail. In addition to a number of positive results, it is proved
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in [MTT97] that not every belief frame can be represented as the family of all
extensions of a default theory. In this section we will generalize default logic by
allowing innite sets of justications. Then we will prove that innitary default
logic is powerful enough to serve as a specication language for arbitrary belief and
reasoning frames. We will now proceed by dening innitary default logic.
An innitary default (IDL-default, for short) is an expression d:
d =
 :  

; (7.2)
where  and  are formulae from L, and   is a set, possibly innite, of formulae
from L. The intended reading of this expression is analogous to the nitary case:
if you believe , and all formulae in   are consistent with what you
believe, then you can conclude .
The formula  is called the prerequisite of d (p(d), in symbols) and  is called the
consequent of d (c(d), in symbols). The set of formulae   is called the justication
set of d and is denoted by j(d). If p(d) is a tautology, d is called prerequisite-free.
In such a case, p(d) is usually omitted from the notation of d. This terminology is
naturally extended to a set of defaults D. Namely, the prerequisite, consequent and
justication sets of D, in symbols p(D), c(D) and j(D), are dened by:
p(D) =
[
d2D
fp(d)g; c(D) =
[
d2D
fc(d)g; j(D) =
[
d2D
j(d):
A pair (D;W ), where D is a set of IDL-defaults and W  L is a set of formulae, is
called an innitary default theory (or IDT ). Rules with innite sets of justications
were considered in [Fer91] in the context of logic programs.
We will now generalize the notion of an extension, introduced by Reiter [Rei80b]
for standard default theories, to the case of IDTs. To this end, we will introduce the
concept of an S-trace. This notion is closely related to the xpoint construction of
extensions presented by Reiter [Rei80b].
Denition 7.9 Let (D;W ) be an IDT. Let S  L be a theory. By the S-trace of
(D;W ) we mean the sequence E of theories dened recursively as follows:
1. E
0
= Cn(W ),
2. for every integer n  0:
E
n+1
= Cn(E
n
[ fc(d) : d 2 D; p(d) 2 E
n
and for all  2 j(d), : =2 Sg):
The notion of an S-trace allows us to introduce the notion of an IDL-extension
of an IDT.
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Denition 7.10 Let (D;W ) be an IDT. A set S  L is an IDL-extension of (D;W )
if
S = E
1
;
where E is the S-trace for (D;W ).
Clearly, each standard (nitary) default theory (with each default having only
nitely many justications) is, in particular, an IDT. Moreover, it is straightforward
to check that if an IDT happens to be nitary, then the notion of an IDL-extension
coincides with that of extension. Therefore, throughout this subsection we will refer
to the IDL-extensions simply as extensions.
We will denote by Ext(D;W ) the collections of all extensions of an IDT (D;W ).
The collection of all S-traces of (D;W ), where S 2 Ext(D;W ) will be denoted by
tr(D;W ). Two IDTs ;
0
are called limit-equivalent if Ext() = Ext(
0
).
There are several alternative characterizations of extensions of standard default
theories (see e.g., [MT93]). We will now generalize one of them to the case of
innitary default theories. It can be stated in terms of the reduct of the set of
defaults. A default d (a set of defaults D) is applicable with respect to a theory S
(is S-applicable) if S 6` : for every  2 j(d) (j(D), respectively). By the reduct D
S
of D with respect to S we mean the set of monotone inference rules:
D
S
=



: for some    L,
 :  

2 D; and
 :  

is S-applicable

:
Each set B of standard monotone inference rules determines a formal proof system,
denoted by PC +B, in which derivations are built by means of propositional prov-
ability and rules in B. The corresponding provability operator will be denoted by
`
B
and the consequence operator by Cn
B
() ([MT93]). In particular, each set D
S
determines the provability operator `
D
S
and the consequence operator Cn
D
S
().
Proposition 7.11 Let D be a set of IDL-defaults, and let W and S be subsets of
L. Then, S is an extension of (D;W ) if and only if S = Cn
D
S
(W ).
Proof: Completely analogous to the proof of this property for Reiter default logic
in [MT93]. 2
Let us introduce one more useful notion. A default d is generating for a theory
S if p(d) 2 S and S 6` : for every  2 j(d). The set of all defaults from D which
are generating for S is denoted by GD(D;S).
Once the reduct is computed the distinction between innitary and standard
defaults disappears. This explains why many of the properties of default logic remain
true in the innitary case. In particular, we have the following results.
Proposition 7.12 Let (D;W ) be an IDT. Then:
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1. If S is an extension of (D;W ), then S is a belief set (theory).
2. The operator Cn
D
S
(W ) is monotone in D and W , and antimonotone in S.
3. The collection Ext(D;W ) is a belief frame. That is, if T
1
; T
2
2 Ext(D;W ) and
T
1
 T
2
, then T
1
= T
2
.
4. If S is an extension of (D;W ) then S = Cn(W [ c(GD(D;S))).
5. If all defaults in D are prerequisite-free then S is an extension of (D;W ) if
and only if S = Cn(W [ c(GD(D;S))).
Parts (1) and (3) of Proposition 7.12 show that IDTs can be used to represent
belief frames. The next result shows that they can also be used to represent reasoning
frames.
Proposition 7.13 Let (D;W ) be an IDT.
1. Let S be a theory in L. If E is the S-trace for (D;W ) then E is an eager and
conservative reasoning trace.
2. The collection of reasoning traces tr(D;W ) is a reasoning frame.
The proofs of both of the above propositions are again analogous to the proofs
for the nitary case (see [MT93]) and are therefore omitted.
We can now formally introduce the notions of representability of belief frames
and reasoning frames by default theories.
Denition 7.14 Let B be a family of belief sets contained in L. The family B is
representable by an IDT  if Ext() = B. Similarly, if T is a family of reasoning
traces, then it is representable by an IDT  if tr() = T .
Example 7.15 It turns out that the belief frame B of Example 7.5 is representable.
Dene the IDT (D;W ) by
W = fpg; and
D = f
p : q _ r
s
;
p : :s
:r
;
: :s
:q
;
s _ :r : u
t
;
s _ :q : :t
:u
g:
It can be easily veried that Ext(D;W ) = B. Furthermore, it can also be checked
that tr(D;W ) = F , where F was dened in Example 7.8. This means that F is also
representable. Of course, since this IDT is nitary, B and F are also representable
in standard default logic.
The notion of representability by default theories was studied in [MTT97]. A
complete description of families of theories that are representable by default theo-
ries with a nite set of defaults was given there. However, the general question of
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representability by arbitrary default theories has not been settled yet. The main
dierence between a standard and an innitary default is that the latter can encode
an innite set of constraints determining its applicability (in the form of innite sets
of justications). Our results in the next section show that the innitary default
logic is more expressive than the default logic by Reiter. In particular, we show
that every family of theories satisfying the necessary condition for representability,
described in Proposition 7.12(3), is representable by an innitary default theory.
7.2.2 Representability of belief frames by IDTs
We start with the result that allows us to replace any IDT with a limit-equivalent
IDT in which all defaults are prerequisite-free.
Theorem 7.16 For every IDT , there is a prerequisite-free IDT 
0
, limit-equivalent
to .
Proof: Let  = (D;W ). By a quasi-proof from D and W we mean any proof from
W in the system PC +D
m
, where
D
m
=



: for some    L,
 :  

2 D

:
For every quasi-proof  from D and W , let D

be the set of all defaults used in .
For each such proof , dene
d

=
: j(D

)
V
c(D

)
(observe that D

is nite and, so, d

is well-dened). Next, dene
Q = fd

:  is a quasi-proof from Wg:
Each default in Q is prerequisite-free. Put 
0
= (Q;W ). We will show that 
0
has
exactly the same extensions as (D;W ). To this end, we will show that for every
theory S and for every formula ',
W `
D
S
' i W `
Q
S
':
Assume rst that W `
D
S
'. Then, there is a quasi-proof  of ' such that all defaults
in D

are applicable with respect to S. Moreover, W [ c(D

) ` '. Observe that
c(d

) ` c(D

). Since d

is prerequisite-free and S-applicable, W `
Q
S
W [ c(D

).
Hence, W `
Q
S
'.
To prove the converse implication, observe that since all defaults in Q are pre-
requisite-free,
f' : W `
Q
S
'g = Cn(W [ c(Q
S
)):
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Hence, it is enough to show that
W `
D
S
W [ c(Q
S
):
Clearly, for every ' 2 W , W `
D
S
'. Consider ' 2 c(Q
S
). It follows that there is a
quasi-proof  such that d

is S-applicable and c(d

) = '. Consequently, all defaults
occurring in  are S-applicable. Thus, for every default d 2 D

,
W `
D
S
c(d):
Since ' =
V
c(D

),
W `
D
S
':
2
Example 7.17 Let us look at the IDT (D;W ) dened in Example 7.15. Every
default d

dened in the proof of Theorem 7.16 is uniquely determined by the set
D

of defaults used in . This means that for (D;W ), which consists of ve defaults,
at most 2
5
= 32 defaults d

can be dened. It turns out that the IDT dened in
this way actually contains 24 defaults (the other subsets of the defaults in D can
not be combined into a proof). Rather than listing all 24, we will give a number of
them. First of all, the defaults with prerequisite in W are proofs, so for instance
: q _ r
s
and
: :s
:q
are in Q. The second, third and fth defaults in D give rise to the
following default:
: f:s;:tg
:r ^ :q ^ :u
:
But there are also defaults that contradict their own justication, such as:
: fq _ r; u;:tg
s ^ t ^ :u
:
These defaults are present in Q, but they are harmless given the other defaults in
Q.
Proposition 7.12 implies that for every innitary default theory (D;W ), its family
of extensions Ext(D;W ) is a belief frame (cf. parts (1) and (3)). To answer the
question whether the converse is true as well, by Theorem 7.16 we can concentrate
on prerequisite-free IDTs. It turns out that every belief frame is representable by a
(prerequisite-free) IDT.
Theorem 7.18 Let B be a family of belief sets. Then the following statements are
equivalent:
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(i) B is a belief frame,
(ii) B is representable by a prerequisite-free IDT.
Proof: It suces to prove that any belief frame is representable by a prerequisite-
free IDT. To this end, let us consider a belief frame B. If B = ; then take any
(Reiter) default theory without extensions. If B = fTg, then dene D = ;. Clearly,
Ext(D;T ) = B.
Hence, assume that B contains at least two theories. Since no theory in B is a
proper subtheory of another, it follows that all theories contained in B are consistent.
For every S; T 2 B such that S 6= T , dene '
S;T
to be any formula belonging to
S n T . For every T 2 B, dene
D
T
=

: f:'
S;T
: S 2 B; S 6= Tg
 
:  2 T

:
Finally, dene
D =
[
T2B
D
T
:
We will show that Ext(D; ;) = B.
Consider T 2 B. Then D
T
= f
:
 
:  2 Tg. Hence, Cn
D
T
(;) = T and T is an
extension of (D; ;).
Conversely, let T be an extension of (D; ;). We have just proved that B 
Ext(D; ;). Consequently, (D; ;) has at least two extensions. It follows that Cn(;)
is not an extension of (D; ;) (the theory Cn(;) is a subset of every extension of
(D;W )). In particular, T 6= Cn(;). Therefore, the set D
T
is not empty.
Consider a set S 2 B. Observe that all defaults in D
S
have the same set of
justications. Consequently, either all of them are generating for T or none. It
follows that T is the union of a nonempty (since D
T
6= ;) family of theories in B. If
T is the union of at least two theories, than D
T
= ;, a contradiction. Hence, T = S,
for some S 2 B. That is, T 2 B. 2
Example 7.19 We already know that our example belief frame B is representable,
and we know it is representable by a prerequisite-free IDT. In order to illustrate the
construction process of the proof of Theorem 7.18, we will perform this for B. Note,
rst of all, that in the denition of D
T
, we need not add defaults for every ' 2 T ,
but that it is sucient to do this for a set of generators of T (T is generated by a
set of formulae if it is the propositional closure of this set). Furthermore, when a
formula '
S;T
is a negation, we will eliminate the double negation in the default. We
will now construct the sets D
T
:
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1. T
1
: rst we must choose the formulae '
S;T
1
. Take '
T
2
;T
1
= :u, '
T
3
;T
1
= :r,
and '
T
4
;T
1
= :r, then
D
T
1
= f
: fu; rg
p
;
: fu; rg
s
;
: fu; rg
t
g:
Note that these defaults have the same set of justications, so instead of taking
3 defaults, we can also form one by taking the conjunction of the consequents.
We will do this for the remaining theories.
2. T
2
: Let '
T
1
;T
2
= t, '
T
3
;T
2
= t, '
T
4
;T
2
= :r, and dene
D
T
2
= f
: f:t; rg
p ^ s ^ :u
g:
3. T
3
: Let '
T
1
;T
3
= s, '
T
2
;T
3
= s, '
T
4
;T
3
= :u, and dene
D
T
3
= f
: f:s; ug
p ^ :r ^ :q ^ t
g:
4. T
4
: Let '
T
1
;T
4
= s, '
T
2
;T
4
= s, '
T
3
;T
4
= t, and dene
D
T
4
= f
: f:s;:tg
p ^ :r ^ :q ^ :u
g:
If we dene D = D
T
1
[ D
T
2
[ D
T
3
[ D
T
4
, then it can be checked that indeed
Ext(D; ;) = B.
Theorem 7.18 and the results in [MTT97] imply that innitary default logic is
a more powerful knowledge representation formalism than classical default logic. In
other words, allowing innite justication sets leads to a more expressive specica-
tion language.
Corollary 7.20 There are belief frames representable by an IDT but not repre-
sentable by a standard default theory.
We will give an example. Let fp
0
; p
1
; : : : g be a set of propositional atoms. Dene
T
i
= Cn(fp
i
g), i = 0; 1; : : : , and B = fT
i
: i = 0; 1; : : :g. It is clear that B consists
of non-including theories, and is therefore representable by an IDT. If we dene
W = ; and
D = f
: f:p
j
j j 6= ig
p
i
j i  0g;
then it can be easily veried that Ext(D;W ) = B. It was shown, however, in
[MTT97] (Theorem 3.5), that B is not representable by a (Reiter) default theory.
As another corollary, we obtain the result already proved in [MTT97].
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Proposition 7.21 Let B be a nite belief frame. Then B is representable by a
(Reiter) default theory (possibly with an innite set of defaults).
This is actually a special case of a more general criterion for representability by
(Reiter) default theories. Let us call a family of theories B nitely distinguishable
if for all T 2 B there exists a nite set FD(T) such that FD(T ) \ T = ; and
8S 2 B : S 6= T ) FD(T ) \ S 6= ;. We have the following result.
Proposition 7.22 Every nitely distinguishable belief frame is representable by a
Reiter default theory.
Proof: In the proof of Theorem 7.18, we can always choose the formulae '
S;T
from
FD(T ), a nite set. Then the sets D
T
contain only defaults with nite justication
sets, so that the IDT dened in the proof is in fact a Reiter default theory. 2
It is easy to see that a nite belief frame is nitely distinguishable. Hence,
Proposition 7.22 applies to nite belief frames.
7.2.3 Representability of reasoning frames by IDTs
In the previous section we proved that any belief frame can be represented by a
prerequisite-free IDL-theory. In this section we will look not only at the outcomes of a
reasoning process, a belief frame, but also at the process in which these outcomes are
constructed. Note that by using prerequisites that logically depend on consequents of
other defaults, it is possible to express constraints on the order in which states occur
in a trace. Using this observation, we will study the question whether innitary
default logic can be used as a specication language for collections of traces |
reasoning frames. The main result of this section is that every reasoning frame is
representable by an IDT.
Theorem 7.23 Let T be a collection of reasoning traces. Then the following state-
ments are equivalent:
(i) T is a reasoning frame,
(ii) T is representable by an IDT.
Proof: If there is an IDT  such that T = tr(), then T is a reasoning frame by
Proposition 7.13. To prove the converse implication, we proceed as follows. If T is
empty, we can take  to be any default theory without extensions. So suppose that
T 6= ;. Take any trace T 2 T , and dene W = T
0
. As T is a reasoning frame, we
have that W = S
0
for all traces S 2 T .
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Consider a trace T 2 T . Then T is increasing, and may become constant from a
certain index on. We dene this index k
T
by
k
T
=

minfi : T
i
= T
i+1
g if there exists an i with T
i
= T
i+1
1 otherwise.
Now for 0 < i < k
T
, dene  
i;T
to be any formula in T
i
n T
i 1
, and dene  
0;T
as
any formula in T
0
. These formulae will serve as prerequisites for defaults that will
`re' in order to form T
i+1
.
For the justications of rules, we will use the same construction as used in the
proof of Theorem 7.18. For any S 2 T such that S 6= T , dene '
S;T
to be any
formula belonging to S
1
nT
1
. Since T is a reasoning frame and S 6= T , S
1
6 T
1
.
Hence, '
S;T
can indeed be found. Now dene
D
T
=

 
i;T
: f:'
S;T
: S 2 T ; S 6= Tg

:  2 T
i+1
n T
i
; 0  i < k
T

:
Finally, dene
D =
[
T2T
D
T
:
We will show that tr(D;W ) = T .
Consider T 2 T . First observe that, by denition, T
0
= W = Cn(W ). Further-
more, the set of defaults in D which are applicable for T
1
is exactly D
T
. It follows
that
fc(d) : d 2 D; p(d) 2 T
i
; d is T
1
{applicableg = f :  2 T
i+1
n T
0
g:
As T
0
 T
i
, we have that
T
i+1
= Cn(T
i
[ fc(d) : d 2 D; p(d) 2 T
i
; d is T
1
{applicableg):
From this we conclude that T 2 tr(D;W ).
For the converse, suppose that T 2 tr(D;W ). If none of the defaults in D
are T
1
{applicable, then T
i
= W for all i. Consider an S 2 T . Then, we have
S 2 tr(D;W ). Now, since S
1
 W and extensions form an anti-chain, S
1
= W .
Hence, S = T and T 2 T .
So suppose there is a T
1
{applicable default in D. Then there exists a trace
S 2 T such that all defaults in D
S
are T
1
{applicable. We will show by induction
that S
i
 T
i
. Indeed, if i = 0, then S
0
= W = T
0
. For the induction step, observe
that
T
i+1
= Cn(T
i
[ fc(d) : d 2 D; p(d) 2 T
i
; d is T
1
{applicableg) 
Cn(S
i
[ fc(d) : d 2 D; p(d) 2 S
i
; d 2 D
S
g)
7.2 Innitary default logic 179
Since S 2 tr(D;W ) and D
S
is exactly the set of defaults of D which are S
1
{
applicable, the last term is equal to S
i+1
.
Now we have that S
1
 T
1
. Moreover, since both S
1
and T
1
are extensions
of (D;W ), it follows that S
1
= T
1
. But then a default is S
1
{applicable if and
only if it is T
1
{applicable, so that S
i
= T
i
for all i, or S = T . We conclude that
T 2 T . 2
Notice the similarity between some of the constructions in this proof (the '
S;T
and
 
i;T
) and constructions in the proof of Theorem 7.3 (the '
X;M
and 
s;M
).
Example 7.24 We will give a reasoning frame such that its associated belief frame
is B (dierent from the one we gave earlier), and construct an IDT that represents
it. The reasoning frame consists of the following traces:
T
1
: (hpi; hp; s _ ti; hp; s; ti:::);
T
2
: (hpi; hp; s;:ui:::);
T
3
: (hpi; hp; t! :r ^ :qi; hp; t;:r;:qi:::);
T
4
: (hpi; hp;:ri; hp;:r;:qi; hp;:r;:q;:ui::::):
It can again easily be seen that this is a reasoning frame. We dene W = Cn(fpg).
We will take the '
S;T
the same as in Example 7.19. Then we have to dene the
formulae  
i;T
. We will not enumerate all of these explicitly, but just give an example.
Consider  
1;T
4
. This has to be a formula in (T
4
)
1
n (T
4
)
0
= hp;:rinhpi, so we could
take  
1;T
4
= :r. We now give the sets of defaults:
D
T
1
= f
p : fu; rg
s _ t
;
s _ t : fu; rg
s ^ t
g;
D
T
2
= f
p : f:t; rg
s ^ :u
g;
D
T
3
= f
p : f:s; ug
t! :r ^ :q
;
t! :r ^ :q : f:s; ug
t
g;
D
T
4
= f
p : f:s;:tg
:r
;
:r : f:s;:tg
:q
;
:q : f:s;:tg
:u
g:
The reader can check that, setting D = D
T
1
[D
T
2
[D
T
3
[D
T
4
, indeed tr(D;W ) =
fT
1
; T
2
; T
3
; T
4
g.
As was the case in the construction of an IDL-theory in the previous section, we
again have considerable freedom in choosing the formulae '
S;T
. A second source of
freedom comes from the choice of the prerequisites in the above construction. Thus,
in general there are many dierent theories which all specify the same reasoning
frame.
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From the construction in the proof it is clear that, analogous to the case of belief
frames, reasoning frames with a nite number of reasoning traces can be represented
by a (Reiter) default theory.
One could ask if nitary representability of the belief frame of a reasoning frame
implies that the reasoning frame itself has a nitary representation. A cardinality
argument shows that this is not the case. Specically, let us consider the belief
frame B consisting of all complete theories over the set of atoms fp
1
; p
2
; : : : g. This
belief frame has a nitary representation (see [MTT97], Corollary 5.5). It is easy
to see that there are more than continuum reasoning frames with belief frame B:
there are continuum many dierent complete theories over these atoms, and for each
complete theory, there are at least continuum many dierent traces leading to it (for
each atom p
i
we have a choice at which time point j to add it to the trace). On the
other hand, there are only continuum many nitary default theories.
7.2.4 Multiple belief state operators and reasoning frame op-
erators
In the preceding sections we have seen that innitary default logic can be used for
the specication of belief frames and reasoning frames. These two notions describe
the reasoning process of an agent (on two levels of abstraction) from a xed set
of initial facts. As already mentioned earlier, we are also interested in the expres-
siveness of default logic for specifying multiple belief state operators and reasoning
frame operators (which formalize reasoning from any set of initial facts). For every
X  L, we have that B(X) (R(X) respectively) is a belief frame (reasoning frame,
respectively) if B is a multiple belief state operator (R a reasoning frame operator) in
IS
syn
. So by taking a dierent set of defaults for every set of inputs, such operators
can be specied.
Denition 7.25
1. Let B be a multiple belief state operator. The operator B is representable
by an indexed family of sets of defaults (D
X
)
XL
if for all X  L: B(X) =
Ext(D
X
; X).
2. Let F be a reasoning frame operator. The operator F is representable by
an indexed family of sets of defaults (D
X
)
XL
if for all X  L: F(X) =
tr(D
X
; X).
Given the results in the previous sections, the following is easy to see:
Proposition 7.26
1. A multiple belief state operator B is representable by an indexed family of sets
of (prerequisite-free) defaults i B(X) is a belief frame for all X  L.
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2. A reasoning frame operator F is representable by an indexed family of sets of
defaults i F(X) is a reasoning frame for all X  L.
In principle, this is a valid way of specifying multiple belief state operators and
reasoning trace operators. However, it is intuitively not very likely that an agent
should use a (completely) dierent set of defaults in every situation. Instead, it seems
more plausible that the agent has one set of defaults which (s)he uses regardless of the
initial facts (meaning that D
X
= D
Y
for all X;Y ). This leads to the representability
question posed in the beginning of this section: given a multiple belief state operator
B, does there exist a set of (prerequisite-free) defaults D, such that for all X  L
we have B(X) = Ext(D;X) (and similarly for reasoning frame operators)? It seems
that this is a non-trivial question; we will leave this for future research.
7.3 Conclusions and related work
In this chapter, we investigated the expressiveness of two specication languages,
innitary theories of reasoning and innitary default logic. It was shown in the
rst section that there is a natural class of reasoning frame operators such that the
reasoning frame operator associated with an innitary theory of reasoning always
falls into this class, and that any member of this class can be represented by an
innitary theory of reasoning. This shows that innitary theories of reasoning are
especially suited for representing this class.
In [MTT97] the usefulness of Reiter's default logic for specifying multiple belief
sets of an agent was investigated. It was established that every nite non-including
family of belief sets is representable by a default theory. However, examples of denu-
merably innite non-including families were constructed that are not representable
by a default theory. In the second section these results have been extended in two
directions. Firstly, a new variant of default logic was introduced, innitary default
logic, that allows to represent every non-including family of belief sets, independent
of its cardinality.
Secondly, not only the representability of families of belief sets as an outcome of
default reasoning processes was investigated, but also the representability of default
reasoning traces constructing these belief sets. Here a positive answer was also
obtained for innitary default logic, whereas Reiter's default logic fails for the non-
nite case.
It is interesting to note that from a representation viewpoint, the only role played
by the prerequisites lies in guiding the construction process. Of course, even when
specifying only belief sets, it may be the case that an IDL-theory with prerequisites
exists which is more concise or intuitive than a prerequisite-free theory. However,
this would also give a specication at a lower level of abstraction since it not only
species the outcomes of the reasoning but also the way outcomes are generated.
One can then choose to commit to this particular specication of the traces, but one
could also consider the specication as meant only to specify the outcomes and give
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a dierent specication for the traces. One way of changing the specication for
the traces is by introducing so-called lemma default rules (see e.g. [Sch92a]). This
causes conclusions to be added earlier in a trace.
Further issues for research include representability of multiple belief state oper-
ators and reasoning frame operators using default logic (as mentioned in Subsection
7.2.4) and the general question of representability using nitary default logic (with
innite sets of defaults). It may be possible to adapt some of the topological meth-
ods used in [Fer94], which solves the representability question for logic programming
(under some dierent semantics).
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Chapter 8
Applications of the Theory
In this chapter we will discuss two applications of the theory developed so far.
The rst section describes the use of a temporal logic to describe compositional
multi-agent systems. This allows the formalization of (compositional) proofs for
verication purposes. The second section describes the formalization in terms of (a
slight variation of) a multiple belief state operator of a reasoning task concerning
the classication of objects, and in particular the ecological classication of terrains.
This formalization is the basis for an implemented system aiding ecologists.
8.1 Compositional multi-agent systems
In this section we will consider the reasoning (and acting) processes generated by
multi-agent systems. A multi-agent system (MAS) consists of a number of au-
tonomous entities (agents), each of which reasons about its environment (including
the other agents), communicates with other agents and interacts with the external
world (observation and execution of actions). We will not discuss the notion of
agency any further here, but concentrate on architectures for multi-agent systems.
The goal is to translate a description or specication of a multi-agent system into
temporal logic. On the one hand, this can be used to give a formal semantics (a tem-
poral semantics) to specication languages for multi-agent systems. This has been
done for the language desire, for example. On the other hand, temporal logic can
be used to formalize verication and validation proofs for MASs, where both static
and dynamic properties of such systems can be veried. This enables the construc-
tion of tools to check proofs or even automatically generate proofs. We shall start
by giving a brief description of what we mean by a multi-agent system architecture.
In the literature, there are already quite a number of architectures for MASs
which have been proposed (for example, see [RG92], or [BDJT95]; [WJ95] provides
an overview). In our opinion, temporal logic can be used for all of them, to provide
a formal semantics and / or to formalize verication and validation proofs. For a
number of them, temporal semantics have indeed been dened. In order to make the
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discussion concrete, we will take one specication language for multi-agent systems,
desire (see Subsection 6.2.1), as a case study.
In order to illustrate the formalization and constructions in this section, we will
briey describe an example of a multi-agent system. This example multi-agent model
is composed of two co-operative information gathering agents, A and B, and a com-
ponent EW representing the external world. This system is visualized in Figure 8.1.
Agent A
Agent B
External
World
Figure 8.1: Multi-agent system for co-operative information gathering.
Each of the agents is able to acquire partial information about the external world
(by observation). Each agent's own observations are insucient to draw conclusions
of a desired type, but the combined information of both agents is sucient. There-
fore, communication is required to be able to draw conclusions. The agents can
communicate their own observation results and requests for observation information
of the other agent. This (quite common) situation is simplied to the following
materialized form. The world situation consists of an object whose shape has to
be determined. One agent can only observe the bottom view of the object (e.g., a
circle), the other agent the side view (e.g., a square). By exchanging and combining
observation information they are able to classify the object (e.g., a cylinder).
Communication from the agent A to B takes place in the following manner:
 Agent A generates at its output interface a statement of the form:
to be communicated to(htypei, hatomi, hsigni, B).
 The information is transferred to B; thereby it translated into
communicated by(htypei, hatomi, hsigni, A).
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In the example, htypei can be lled with a label request (for requesting information
from B) or world info (to provide B with A's information about the world), hatomi
is an atom expressing information on the world, and hsigni, is one of pos or neg, to
indicate truth or falsity. Interaction between agent A and the world takes place as
follows:
 Agent A generates at its output interface a statement of the form:
to be observed(hatomi).
 The information is transferred to EW; thereby it is translated into
to be observed by(hatomi, A).
 The external world EW generates at its output interface a statement of the
form:
observation result for(hatomi, hsigni, A).
 The information is transferred to A; thereby it is translated into
observation result(hatomi, hsigni).
Part of the output of an agent are conclusions about the classication of the object
of the form object type(s), where s is a shape; these are transferred to the output of
the system.
To be able to perform its tasks, each agent is composed of four components, see
Figure 8.2: three for generic agent tasks (world interaction management, which rea-
sons about the interaction with the outside world, agent interaction management,
which reasons about the interaction with other agents, and own process control,
which reasons about the control of the agent itself; in this example it determines
the agent characteristics, for example whether the agent is pro-active or reactive),
and one for an agent specic task (object classication). Additionally, there are a
number of information links, which have been left out of the picture.
The example used to illustrate the formalization in the current section is re-
stricted to a pro-active agent A and a reactive agent B.
8.1.1 Formalization in temporal logic
Our goal in this subsection is to describe a method to translate a multi-agent system
(in desire) into a theory of temporal logic describing its reasoning behavior. So let
us rst assume that we have a (desire) multi-agent system given. The language
in which information can be stated in components, is an order-sorted rst-order
predicate language. However, the components can only have factual information
(that is, their knowledge only contains closed atomic statements: in a component,
186 Applications of the Theory
World
Interaction
Managament
Object
Classification
Own
Process
Control
Agent
Interaction
Management
Figure 8.2: Components within the agents.
a fact can be true, false, or unknown). Therefore, we can assume a propositional
language. Each component C has a language associated with its input interface (we
will denote this language by L
in
C
), one for its output interface (denoted by L
out
C
), and
it has an internal language (denoted by L
int
C
). The total language of the component,
L
C
, is then dened by
L
C
= L
in
C
[ L
int
C
[ L
out
C
where the three languages are assumed to be disjoint. As the information a com-
ponent has, is three-valued, we use the information states of IS
3val
to formalize the
state of the input and output interfaces, and the internal state of the agent. We
will use temporal partial logic (TPL) to describe the behavior of the components
over time. The underlying propositional language should at least contain L
C
for all
components C in the system. Additionally, it may contain a language L
E
in which
facts that hold in the world outside the system can be described (for describing input
and output of the system).
We will now describe a system in temporal partial logic. This will be done com-
positionally, meaning that a theory will be dened for each component separately.
First, consider a composed component C. Then C in a sense `controls' its internal
state (the truth-values of the atoms in L
int
C
), and its output interface. It also con-
trols the input interfaces of its subcomponents: we make the assumption that when
C activates one of its information links, it is C who reads the source interface, and
writes onto the target interface. It may read (but does not control) its own input
interface and the output interfaces of its subcomponents. Temporal formulae de-
scribing C should use the atoms in the language of C, and atoms in the input and
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output languages of its subcomponents. This motivates the following denition.
Denition 8.1 (Language composition) Let COMPS be a set of component
names with a subcomponent relation sub, such that COMPS together with sub
forms a nite tree. For each component D 2 COMPS, dene its interface language,
denoted by L
if
D
, as
L
if
D
= L
in
D
[ L
out
D
;
and dene its bridge language, denoted by L
+
D
, as
L
+
D
= L
D
[
[
C sub D
L
if
C
:
The collection (L

D
)
D2COMPS
is inductively dened as
L

D
= L
D
if D is primitive
L

D
= L
D
[
S
C sub D
L

C
if D is composed:
Using these bridge languages, we can formulate a temporal theory for each of the
components. Let us rst focus on a primitive component.
Primitive components: knowledge base
We rst have to mention some additional facts. The input, output, and internal
state of an agent are in fact divided into two parts: an object level part and a
meta-level part. In the object level, the information about which the component is
reasoning is contained. This is the language L
C
. The meta-level of a component
holds information about the reasoning process: whether the component is active or
not, what its goals are, and also epistemic information (for example, which atoms
have been derived to be true or false). A second point is that the internal language
contains the input and output languages. We shall denote an atom p in the input
language by input :p, and the corresponding atom in the internal language by int :p,
(similarly for the output: there we may have int :p and output :p for the internal atom
and its corresponding output interface atom).
The rst thing a primitive component does when it is activated, is to copy its
input to its internal state. We assume that the input interface at the meta-level
of the component has an atom active that is set to activate the component. The
formula describing this action is as follows
C(active) ^ Y (:C(active)) ^ C(input :l)! X(C(int :l))
C(active) ^ Y (:C(active)) ^ :C(input :l)! X(:C(int :l))
for all input literals l. The rst two parts of these rules express that the component
was just activated. After this copying, it sets a control variable to denote that it
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will now be performing reasoning using its knowledge base:
C(active) ^ Y (:C(active))! X(C(reason)):
The knowledge base of the component consists of rules of the form
l
1
^ : : : ^ l
n
! l
where each of the l
i
and l may be a literal. The component performs chaining on this
set of rules (the negation is interpreted as strong, classical negation, not as negation
as failure as in logic programming), computing the minimal three-valued model of
the knowledge base. Each such rule can be translated as
C(active) ^ C(reason) ^XC(int :l
1
) ^ : : : ^XC(int :l
n
)! XC(int :l):
This temporal description makes sure that if reason is true, then the next state is
closed with respect to the rules. We have to reset the control variables, and empty
the output.
C(active) ^ C(reason)! :X(C(reason)) ^X(C(copyout))
C(active) ^ C(reason)! :X(C(output :l)):
In the last step, we copy the internal state to the output, and set an output meta-
level variable to denote that we are ready.
C(active) ^ C(copyout) ^ C(int :l)! X(C(output :l))
C(active) ^ C(copyout)! X(:C(copyout)) ^X(C(ready)):
This ready fact has to be reset at the beginning, when the component just starts:
C(active) ^ Y (:C(active))! X(:C(ready)):
In desire, components have a further meta-level predicate, succeeded, the value
of which depends on the output literals (on the object level) and on its target. The
component has a number of output literals as targets, and its goal may be to derive
either as much as possible (indicated by the input literal all p), or to derive at least
one (any), or to derive every literal in the target set, or to derive a literal that was
not derived before. So a few of the rules setting succeeded are
C(active) ^ C(copyout) ^ C(all p)! X(C(succeeded))
C(active) ^ C(copyout) ^ C(any)!
(X(C(succeeded))$
W
(C(int :l) ^ C(input :target:l))):
In fact, the target set and goal also determine which literals are copied to the output,
so the rules for copying actually have to be adapted somewhat. There are some other
subtle points in desire that have to do with target sets and goals, but this is not
the place to go into these issues further.
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The approach taken above lets the component compute the total closure of the
input facts under the rules, in one time step. It is of course also possible to let the
application of a rule take a step in time (similarly to what is done in Section 5.4 on
proof systems), and to translate a rule l
1
^ : : : ^ l
n
! l into the rule
' ^ C(int :l
1
) ^ : : : ^ C(int :l
n
)! X(C(int :l))
where the ' represents the control information. This also allows more netuning of
the process: when the goal of the component is to derive one literal of the target
set (any is true), then the derivation process can be stopped as soon as a literal is
derived. It is even possible to change the formulae so that every application of a
single rule takes a single step in time (no two rules re simultaneously).
To give an example of a rule, consider the primitive component object classication
within agent A. Its knowledge base contains a number of rules to determine the type
of the object, based on its own and B's view of the object. One of them is
if view(A, circle) and view(B, square) then object type(cylinder).
Its formalization is
C(OC.active) ^ C(OC.reason) ^X(C(OC:int :view(A, circle)))^
X(C(OC:int :view(B, square)))! X(C(OC:int :object type(cylinder))):
We have prexed the atoms with \OC." to make them unique for the signatures of
OC.
Composed component: links and task control
Composed components are composed of other components and links between them.
As mentioned earlier, these links transfer facts from an interface of one component to
an interface of (usually) another component. The task control knowledge of a com-
posed component may derive that a certain link should be up to date, meaning that
the transfer of facts should have been made. We give an example, building on our ear-
lier description of the communication from agent A to agent B. This communication
is done via a link communication from A to B. The task control of the component for
the entire system has an internal atom, link state(communication from A to B, upto-
date). If this atom is derived, the link communication from A to B should be up to
date. This link is described by the following rules setting the facts communicated by
to true
Y (C(to be communicated to(htypei, hatomi, hsigni, B)))^
C(link state(communication from A to B, uptodate))!
C(communicated by(htypei, hatomi, hsigni, A));
and rules setting the fact to unknown again:
Y (:C(to be communicated to(htypei, hatomi, hsigni, B)))^
C(link state(communication from A to B, uptodate))!
:C(communicated by(htypei, hatomi, hsigni, A)):
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If to be communicated to can also be set to false, then the two above types of rules
should be copied for the literal :to be communicated to. It is assumed here that
to be communicated to occurs (only) in the output interface of the component of
agent A, and that communicated by occurs (only) in the input interface of the com-
ponent of agent B. If an atom occurs in more than one place, it should be replaced
by distinct copies.
The task control knowledge consists of rules linking the current and previous state
(of the subcomponents) to the next state: some component(s) should be active, and
some link(s) should be up to date. Our example multi-agent system may not be too
instructive regarding the task control knowledge, as basically all components are
active all the time, awaiting new input. But a basic kind of task control rule would
be of the form \if component X is just ready, then component Y should be started,
and the information link k should be up to date". This can be formalized as
C(X:output :ready) ^ Y (:C(X:output :ready))
! X(C(Y:input :active)) ^X(C(link state(communication from A to B, uptodate)):
Compositionality
Above, a way was sketched to translate parts of a multi-agent system into temporal
partial logic (many details were left untreated that would have to be claried in
order to get a complete and faithful translation). This should lead to a temporal
theory for each component. If this component is primitive, it consists of the temporal
description of its knowledge base. Otherwise, it consists of the temporal description
of its task control knowledge, together with the temporal description of all of its
links. This leads to a family of temporal theories.
Denition 8.2 Let (L
+
D
)
D2COMPS
be the collection of bridge languages. A compo-
sitional temporal theory for this collection is a collection (T
D
)
D2COMPS
of temporal
theories such that each T
D
is in the language L
+
D
. The collection of cumulative
theories (T

D
)
D2COMPS
is dened by
T

D
= T
D
[
S
C sub D
T

C
if D is a composed component
T

D
= T
D
if D is a primitive component:
The theory T

D
should provide a complete description of what T

D
's behavior is (with
its subcomponents).
8.1.2 Persistence
The reader may have noticed that in the temporal descriptions above, only the
changes of information were described. There were no formulae indicating that
some things should remain the same. But in desire, as is the case in many systems,
information does not change at random: there is a default persistence of information.
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If we just consider the temporal partial models of the temporal description, however,
information is allowed to change without a cause for its change. Of course, we do
not want to leave the burden of describing when information does not change to
the person who makes the temporal specication. There are at least two possible
solutions to this problem.
First of all, we have in fact seen a number of situations where information should
change as little as possible, only when there is a rule stating it should change. This
was the case in the temporal descriptions of, for instance, default logic. So, one
solution is to consider only those models of a description where information change
is minimal. For this purpose, we can use the preferential ordering 
sc
of sequential
minimal change, dened in Section 4.4.3, and the associated minimal consequence
relation j=

sc
to infer properties of the system. This provides a minimal change
semantics to any description of a system.
Another solution is to provide a method by which a temporal specication of
a system (describing only the changes) can be transformed (mechanically) into a
description that takes into account the minimal change. The temporal partial models
of the new description are the intended models of the original theory. An example of
this kind of semantics is the completion semantics of logic programs. The advantage
of this solution is that ordinary, classical theorem provers can be used on the resulting
theory (whereas the rst solution requires tools especially made for j=

sc
). In this
section, we will describe such a semantics.
The temporal completion method we will describe, works only for a restricted
fragment of temporal partial logic. Fortunately, the rules described so far fall within
this fragment. It consists of a kind of executable temporal formulae. Roughly
spoken, executable temporal formulae are temporal formulae of the form
declarative past implies imperative future
For more details on this paradigm, and the dierent variants within, see, apart from
Section 6.1 in this thesis, also [BFGH91, BFG
+
96]. We will consider here an even
simpler form, called simplied executable temporal formulae:
past and present ! present
where `past' and `present' are further restricted, see below. Two remarks are in order
here. First of all, the rules described so far are not in this format, they are of the
format `previous and current and next imply next'. But a simple shift in the current
time point transforms this into `two time points ago and previous and current imply
current'. We feel the completion is slightly easier to understand for rules in the
format of simplied executable temporal formulae. Secondly, we allow rules with
both precondition and conclusion referring to the present. This is to allow changes
to happen instantaneously. A rule like C(a)! C(b) expresses the constraint that if
a is set to true, then b should be true as well. The formalization of a knowledge base
refers to facts at the same point in time in the precondition and conclusion of a rule
(referring to the next point in time, but see the rst remark). A formal denition of
simplied executable temporal formulae follows.
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Denition 8.3 (Simplied executable temporal formulae) A simplied exe-
cutable temporal formula is a temporal formula F of the form
'!  
where the right hand side,  , is called the head, denoted by head(F ), and is taken
from the set HEADS , dened as
HEADS = fC(l) j l literalg [
f:Ca ^ :C:a j a atomg:
The left hand side, ' is called the body, and is denoted by body(F ). It must be a
conjunction of temporal literals of the following form: Y Y Cl, :Y Y Cl, Y Cl, :Y Cl,
Cl, :Cl, where l is a propositional literal.
We can dene a form of Clark's completion on simplied executable temporal
formulae.
Denition 8.4 (Temporal completion) Let T be a temporal theory consisting
of simplied executable temporal formulae. For each h 2 HEADS , let
T
h
= fF 2 T j head(F ) = hg:
For a literal l, dene
tc(T
Cl
) =
2
6
6
4
W
fbody(F ) j F 2 T
Cl
g_
0
@
:
W
fbody(F ) j F 2 T
C:l
g^
:
W
fbody(F ) j F 2 T
:Cl^:C:l
g^
Y Cl
1
A
3
7
7
5
$ Cl:
For an atom a, dene
tc(T
:Ca^:C:a
) =
2
6
6
4
W
fbody(F ) j F 2 T
:Ca^:C:a
g_
0
@
:
W
fbody(F ) j F 2 T
Ca
g^
:
W
fbody(F ) j F 2 T
C:a
g^
:Y Ca ^ :Y C:a
1
A
3
7
7
5
$ :Ca ^ :C:a:
The intuition behind this denition is that an atom a should have a certain
truth value (expressed as Ca, C:a or :Ca ^ :C:a), just in case there is either an
applicable rule setting it to this value, or it had this value in the previous moment,
and there is no rule applicable that could change it.
It may seem that a rule for :Ca^ :C:a is unnecessary, as the rules for Ca and
C:a already determine what :Ca^:C:a should be. In general this is true, except
in the situation that there is a rule for Ca (or for C:a) which is applicable, as well
as an applicable rule with head :Ca ^ :C:a. The extra :Ca ^ :C:a temporal
completion then eliminates such a model. Without this rule, the Ca rule takes
precedence.
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Denition 8.5 (Temporal completion, continued) Let T be a temporal theory
consisting of simplied executable temporal formulae. The temporal completion of
T is dened by
tc(T) = ftc(T
Cl
) j l literal g [
ftc(T
:Ca^:C:a
) j a an atomg:
So the temporal partial models of tc(T) are the intended, minimal change models
of T. One may wonder what the relation is with the SCTEL semantics, which were
dened to model minimal change. The question is: for a theory T, what is the
relation between the 
sc
-minimal models of T, and the temporal partial models
of tc(T)? In general, they may be dierent. Consider, for example, the theory
T = fY Ca ^ Ca ! Cb;:Y Ca ! Cag. The completion of T contains the formulae
(Y Ca ^ Ca) _ Y Cb $ Cb and :Y Ca _ Y Ca $ Ca (as well as formulae for C:a
and C:b). This means that in any model of the completion of T , the atom a
is always true, and therefore, the atom b is true from time point 1 onwards (and
not in time point 0). This model is also a 
sc
-minimal model of T . However,
there are more 
sc
-minimal models of T , in which a is true at time point 0, and
nothing is true at time point 1. The rule Y Ca ^ Ca ! Cb may have the eect
of setting a to unknown at time point 1, instead of setting b to true, as intended.
This behavior only occurs when there are rules with a C-atom occurring in the left
hand side of a rule. Some of the formulae used before to describe the behavior of
a multi-agent system were of this form (modulo the shift in time). The formulae
describing the application of the knowledge base of a primitive component, however,
can be changed so that this application is not done in one time step, but takes
time, as remarked earlier. The resulting formulae do not contain C-atoms on the
left hand side. The same can be done for the formulae describing the application
of a link (using extra control variables). We have to assume one extra condition
on the theory describing a multi-agent system: whenever the left hand sides of a
subset of formulae are jointly satisable (in TPL), then their corresponding right
hand sides must also be jointly satisable. If we have made a correct and complete
theory (in the sense that in every temporal situation, the theory describes what the
system will do) then this requirement will be satised, and our completion semantics
is the same as the SCTEL semantics, with one proviso. The SCTEL semantics allow
any rst state that satises the rules, whereas in the completion the rst state is
determined by the rules satised in time point 0. As an example, if we consider the
rule :Y Ca! Ca, then there is just one model of the completion, in which a is true
from the beginning, and all other atoms remain unknown. The SCTEL semantics
also allow the model in which both a and b are known from the start (this model does
not satisfy the formula Y Cb $ Cb of the completion). This behavior could easily
be built into the completion by changing a formula tc(T
Cl
) into :Y> ! tc(T
Cl
)
(making it applicable only at time points greater than zero) and adding T itself to
the completion (to ensure that time point zero satises T ).
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Proposition 8.6 Let T be a temporal theory of simplied executable temporal
formulae, such that for each F 2 T, body(F ) does not contain temporal literals of
the form Cl or :Cl. Suppose that for any S  T, if fbody(F ) j F 2 Sg is TPL-
satisable, then fhead(F ) j F 2 Sg is TPL-satisable. Then for any TPL-modelM
the following are equivalent:
1. M is a model of tc(T).
2. M is a 
sc
-minimal model of T and M
0
is a -minimal model of the right
hand sides of the rules in T applicable at time point zero.
Proof: Use the rst and third statements of Proposition 4.61. The completion is
the formalization in TPL of the third statement of that proposition. 2
We have placed considerable emphasis on the compositional nature a description
of a compositional system should have. Each component C has its own theory, T
C
.
Taking the temporal completion, however, can destroy the compositionality. Let us
take an example component hierarchy consisting of three components, A, B, and C
with C sub B sub A. Suppose that p 2 L
A
; q 2 L
if
B
, and r 2 L
if
C
. Furthermore,
suppose there is one rule, Y (Cp) ! Cq, in T
A
(note that this rule is in L
+
A
!) and
that there is one rule, Y (Cr) ! Cq, in T
B
(again, note that this rule is in L
+
B
).
When taking the temporal completion of T
A
and T
B
separately, we end up with
Y (Cp) _ Y (Cq)$ Cq
as well as
Y (Cr) _ Y (Cq)$ Cq
which may obviously lead to undesired results. On the other hand, if we take the
completion of the union of all theories, T

A
, we get a rule
Y (Cp) _ Y (Cr) _ Y (Cq)$ Cq
which is the intended formula dening Cq, but which is neither in L
+
A
, nor in L
+
B
,
destroying compositionality. The example is constructed in such a way that an
atom (of B) directly depends on information in a higher component (A), as well as
on information in a lower component (C). By inspecting the temporal description
of components in desire, it can be seen that this situation does not occur: the
input atoms of a component are set (`controlled') by its super-component, whereas
it sets (`controls') its own internal and output atoms. Therefore, for every atom a,
the rules dening it (T
Ca
, T
C:a
and T
:Ca^:C:a
) are all contained in the theory of
one component. Under the assumption that all rules dening an atom are contained
in T
C
for some component C, the problem above does not occur, as the temporal
completion of the union of all theories is the same as the union of the completions
of the individual theories:
tc(T

A
) =
[
C2COMPS
tc(T
C
):
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One of the goals of translating desire specications into temporal logic is to
provide a formal (temporal) semantics to the former (see [BTWW96]). The other
reason is that it allows the formalization of proofs of properties of a system (for
verication and validation purposes). The next subsection is devoted to the second
subject.
8.1.3 Compositional verication
Compositional theories describing a compositional system allow compositional ver-
ication. In [CJT97, JT97] a compositional verication method is described and
applied to diagnostic reasoning and multi-agent systems, respectively; we will briey
summarize this method. Remember that we have a hierarchy described by the set
of components, COMPS, and a subcomponent relation sub. This hierarchy should
form a (nite) tree. Each component in this hierarchy is part of a level (also called
level of abstraction). The top component is at level 0 (denoted L
0
), its descendants
are of level 1 (L
1
), and so on. In general, if the distance from a component to the
top component is n, then the component is of level n.
A. Verifying one abstraction level against the other
For each abstraction level the following procedure is followed:
1. Determine which properties are of interest for the (higher level) component D.
2. Determine assumptions (properties for the lower level components) that guar-
antee D's properties.
3. Prove D's properties on the basis of the properties of its subcomponents.
B. Verifying a primitive component
For primitive knowledge-based components a number of verication techniques exist
in the literature, see for example [TW94].
C. The overall verication process
To verify the complete system:
1. Determine the properties are that are desired for the whole system.
2. Apply the above procedure A iteratively.
In the iteration the desired properties of abstraction level L
i
are either:
 those determined in step A(1), if i = 0, or
 the assumptions made for the higher level L
i 1
, if i > 0.
3. Verify the primitive components according to B.
The results of verication are:
 Properties and assumptions at the dierent abstraction levels.
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 Logical relations between the properties of dierent abstraction levels.
Both static and dynamic properties and connections between them are covered. Fur-
thermore, process and information hiding limits the complexity of the verication
per abstraction level (see [JT97]). An example of some properties of dierent com-
ponents for our multi-agent system is given in Figure 8.3.
S is successful
or
conclusion 
successfulness, A
effective interaction 
from A to S
conclusion 
successfulness, B
effective interaction 
from B to S
A provides output information of S B provides output information of S
& def & def
Figure 8.3: Logical relations between properties of components.
One can also distinguish dependencies between properties within one level, see
Figure 8.4.
conclusion successfulness, A
information saturation, A
communicated info
saturation, A
observation info saturation, A
pro-active observation
info saturation, A
reactive observation
info saturation, A
observation
pro-activeness, A
observation
effectiveness, A
request
saturation, A
conclusion pro-activeness, A
or
&
&
strongly reactive
information provision, A
or
spontaneous observation
info saturation, A
observation
reactiveness, A
weakly
reactive
information
provision, A
& def
& def & def
Figure 8.4: Logical relations between properties of one component.
These pictures (from [JT97]) mention properties (of components) which have a
formal (mathematical) denition. If we want to use temporal logic to formalize the
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verication process, these properties should be expressible in temporal logic, and
this indeed turns out to be the case. To give just one example, the property of
`observation pro-activeness of A' (see Figure 8.4) means that agent A will eventually
try to observe the object whose type should be determined, independent of its input.
This can be formalized by the following formula
^
r
F (C(to be observed(view(A,r))))
where r ranges over the possible shapes. This means that A wants to know, for every
shape, whether that shape is observed or not (usually the answer will be that just one
is observed, and the others are not). The other properties can be formalized as well
(see [JT97] for a formalization in `general' mathematical notation; the translation
into temporal logic is rather straightforward). The compositional verication process
needs compositional proofs.
Denition 8.7 A composition of properties for the collection of languages
(L
C
)
C2COMPS
is a collection (P
C
)
C2COMPS
where for each C the set P
C
is a set of
temporal formulae in the language L
if
C
.
Given the theories describing the components, and the properties of components,
we can dene compositional provability.
Denition 8.8 (Compositional and global provability) For a collection of lan-
guages (L
C
)
C2COMPS
, let a composition of properties (P
C
)
C2COMPS
and a composi-
tional temporal theory (T
C
)
C2COMPS
be given. Let j

tpl
be an entailment relation
for temporal partial logic.
1. The composition of properties (P
C
)
C2COMPS
is compositionally provable with
respect to j

tpl
from the compositional temporal theory (T
C
)
C2COMPS
, if for
each component D the following holds:
T
D
[
S
C sub D
P
C
j

tpl
P
D
if D is composed
T
D
j

tpl
P
D
if D is primitive:
2. The composition of properties (P
C
)
C2COMPS
is globally provable with respect
to j

tpl
from the compositional temporal theory (T
C
)
C2COMPS
, if for each com-
ponent D the following holds:
T

D
j

tpl
P
D
:
Compositional provability does not necessarily imply global provability. How-
ever, the implication holds if the entailment relation satises, apart from reexivity
(if V W , then W j

tpl
V ), the property of transitivity:
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T j

tpl
U & U j

tpl
W ) T j

tpl
W (Transitivity)
for all sets of formulae T, U, W. It is well-known that transitivity and reexivity
imply monotonicity.
Proposition 8.9 If the entailment relation j

tpl
satises reexivity and transitivity
then compositional provability with respect to j

tpl
implies global provability with
respect to j

tpl
.
So in particular any sound classical proof system for TPL satises this require-
ment (see Section 9.1.1 for a classical proof system sound and complete for TEL). The
complete procedure we envisage is the following. Suppose we have a specication (for
example in desire) of a compositional multi-agent system. This specication can be
(automatically) translated into a compositional temporal theory (T
C
)
C2COMPS
. Tak-
ing the temporal completions (also automatically) leads to (tc(T
C
))
C2COMPS
. Then
the compositional verication method is applied to this compositional theory, using
a classical proof system which is sound (and preferably complete) for TPL. Tools
can (partly) automate the process of nding and / or verifying the proofs.
8.1.4 Conclusions and related work
The compositional verication method formalized in this section can be applied to
a broad class of multi-agent systems. Compositional verication for one abstraction
level deep is based on the following very general assumptions:
1. A multi-agent system consists of a number of agents and external world com-
ponents.
2. Agents and components have explicitly dened input and output interface lan-
guages; all other information is hidden; information exchange between compo-
nents can only take place via the interfaces (information hiding).
3. A formal description exists of the manner in which agents and world com-
ponents are composed to form the whole multi-agent system (composition
relation).
4. The semantics of the system can be described by the evolution of states of
the agents and components at the dierent levels of abstraction (state-based
semantics).
This non-iterative form of compositional verication can be applied to many existing
approaches, for example, to systems designed using Concurrent MetateM [Fis94,
FW97]. Compositional verication involving more abstraction levels assumes, in
addition:
1. Each agent or component is composed of subcomponents or it is described by
a knowledge base.
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2. A formal description exists of the manner in which agents or components are
composed of subcomponents (composition relation).
3. Information exchange between components is only possible between two com-
ponents at the same or adjacent levels (information hiding).
Currently not many approaches to multi-agent system design exist that exploit it-
erative compositionality. One approach that does is the compositional development
method for multi-agent systems desire. The compositional verication method
formalized in this section ts well to desire, but not exclusively.
Two main advantages of a compositional approach to modeling are the transpar-
ent structure of the design and support for reuse of components and generic models.
The compositional verication method extends these main advantages to (1) a well-
structured verication process, and (2) the reusability of proofs for properties of
components that are reused.
The rst advantage entails that both conceptually and computationally the com-
plexity of the verication process can be handled by compositionality at dierent
levels of abstraction. Apart from the work reported in [JT97], a generic model for di-
agnosis has been veried [CJT97] and a multi-agent system with agents negotiating
about load-balancing of electricity use [BCG
+
98]. The second advantage entails: if
a modied component satises the same properties as the previous one, the proof of
the properties at the higher levels of abstraction can be reused to show that the new
system has the same properties as the original. This has high value for a library of
reusable generic models and components. The verication of generic models forces
one to nd the assumptions under which the generic model is applicable for the con-
sidered domain, as is also discussed in [FSGW96]. A library of reusable components
and generic models may consist of both specications of the components and models,
and their design rationale. As part of the design rationale, at least the properties of
the components and their logical relations can be documented.
The usefulness of temporal partial logic was investigated to formalize verica-
tion proofs. As a test, the properties and proofs that were found for verication of
an example multi-agent system for co-operative information gathering [JT97] were
successfully formalized within this logic. Our study shows that temporal partial
logic provides enough expressivity for dynamics and reasoning about time, and for-
malizes incomplete information states in an adequate manner. To obtain the right
structure in accordance with the compositional system design, the logic is equipped
with a number of compositional structures: compositions of sublanguages, compo-
sitional theories, and compositional provability. It was established that under the
assumption that the provability relation is reexive and transitive, compositional
provability implies global provability. Therefore this logic is adequate if the exe-
cutable temporal theories formalizing a specication are temporally completed, a
temporal variant of Clark's completion [Cla78] for logic programs. In this case clas-
sical provability can be used, which is more transparent than the more complicated
non-classical provability relations that are possible. In this section, the components
are all supposed to have a dierent language. When an atom needs to be used in
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two dierent components, then two copies have to be made, one for each component.
A more structured way is to introduce operators for the dierent components (or
agents): instead of the single C operator, we could dene dierent C operators for
dierent components. Within one component, we may have that an atom is known
in the input, internally, or in the output. Therefore, in a recent paper ([EJT98]) we
introduced operators Cin
X
, Cint
X
, and Cout
X
for the input, internal and output
information known to component X . On the semantics side, this is paralleled by
structured information states.
Let us briey come back to the temporal belief logic (TBL) of [FW97] that was
used to dene semantics and verify properties for systems specied in Concurrent
MetateM [Fis94]. A dierence with our temporal logics mentioned earlier lies in
the fact that TBL uses modal operators to distinguish knowledge of dierent agents;
as mentioned, our logic can easily be transformed to do the same [EJT98]. Other
than that, TBL and temporal partial logic both use the natural numbers as ow
of time. A main dierence in comparison to [FW97] is that our approach exploits
compositionality. In Concurrent MetateM no iterated compositional structures
can be dened, as is the case in desire. Therefore verication in TBL always
takes place at the global level, instead of the iterated compositional approach to
verication described in this section. Another dierence is that in our approach the
states in the base logic are in principle three-valued, whereas the states in Concurrent
MetateM are two-valued: an atom in a state that is not true is assumed false in
this state.
We already mentioned the use of temporal logic for specication and verica-
tion of processes in theoretical computer science. The compositional approach to
verication has been recognized as valuable in that area as well (see for example
[Cha95]).
A future continuation of this work will consider the development of tools for
compositional verication. To support the hand-work of verication it would be
useful to have tools to assist in the creation of the proof.
8.2 Approximate classication
In this section, we will apply some of the theory developed in previous chapters to
formalize the analysis of approximate classication. The multiple belief state oper-
ators dened in Chapter 2 capture the phenomenon that the reasoning of an agent,
starting from an initial set of beliefs, may lead to a number of dierent information
states, each holding a possible set of conclusions. In the examples, this multiplicity
of outcomes was usually attributable to incompleteness, vagueness or uncertainty of
the input. The set of initial beliefs is enlarged, or (in the case of belief revisions) is
reduced. So the set of inputs is altered, and this can often be done in more than
one way. In this section, we will add a second aspect to this, namely interpretation:
information coming from the outside world (observations) are to be given a meaning.
In logic the notion of interpretation mapping has been introduced to describe the
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interpretation of one logical theory in another logical theory, for example geometry
in algebra (cf. Chapter 5 in [Hod93]). This notion assumes a choice for one inter-
pretation, and does not cover cases in which multiple interpretations at the same
time are relevant. Therefore, we will introduce multi-interpretation operators and
apply them to formalize multiple interpretations of observation information. The
notion of multi-interpretation operator is rather general: it subsumes on the one
hand the notion of interpretation in logic, and on the other hand the notion of a
multiple belief state operator (using the information state frame IS
syn
). The main
dierence between multi-interpretation operators and multiple belief state operator
based on IS
syn
, is that the input language of a multi-interpretation operator may be
dierent from the language in which the possible belief sets (a better word would be
`interpretations') are expressed.
A specic type of multi-interpretation operator is dened to interpret observation
information in approximate classication tasks. The generic task formalized by
such an operator is as follows. Suppose there is an object in the world, and one is
interested in the values of attributes of this object. It is possible to observe the object
leading to input information consisting of observable properties. On the basis of
these properties information on the values of attributes of the object is derived. This
task involves interpretation: interpreting observable properties in terms of values of
attributes (which may be dicult or impossible to observe directly).
Two problems occurring often in such classication tasks in real-world domains
are underspecication and overspecication. Underspecication occurs when the ob-
servations are sucient to exclude some of the values of attributes, but insucient
to determine unique values for each of the attributes: a range of values may still
be possible. Overspecication occurs when the observation information is contra-
dictory: for some of the attributes no value is possible. Underspecication can lead
to an approximation (an upper bound) of the solution of the classication: a set
of possibilities, one of which is the right solution. If the number of observations
increases, the approximation may come closer to a unique solution: the resulting
sets of possible classications will decrease with the increase of observation informa-
tion. Overspecication leads to a trivial approximation from the other direction: the
empty set as a lower bound (no classication at all). The combination of underspec-
ication and overspecication as it occurs often in practical domains is problematic.
The occurrence of contradictory observation information interferes with the approx-
imations that can be used as upper bound of the solution.
Multi-interpretation operators can be used to clarify this interference: such an
operator formalizes the phenomenon that there is more than one possibility of inter-
preting the observed ndings. A generic multi-interpretation operator is introduced
to formalize such tasks. The input language of the operator is restricted to observa-
tion information only; interpretations of this observation information are expressed
in terms of the output language of the operator. This formalization identies and
separates the overspecication and underspecication and entails an approximate
solution of a classication problem in the form of multiple approximations.
One domain in which multi-interpretable observations can be analyzed using a
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technique based on the distinction of dierent views, is the domain of ecology. Here
the possible values of abiotic factors such as moisture and acidity of a terrain, are
determined on the basis of the plant species found on the terrain.
We will rst introduce multi-interpretation operators and selective interpretation
operators and some properties they may have.
8.2.1 Multi-interpretation operators and approximate classi-
cation
In this subsection the notion of multi-interpretation operator is introduced, a spe-
cic type of multi-interpretation operator is dened that formalizes approximate
classication, and some properties of this multi-interpretation operator are proven.
Multi-interpretation operators
A multi-interpretation operator is an operator that assigns to each set of input infor-
mation a set of interpretations. The input information is described by propositional
formulae in a propositional language L
1
. An interpretation is a set of propositional
formulae, which is closed under the standard propositional consequence operator
Cn. Such a closed set will be called a belief set, and we assume that they are based
on a (possibly dierent) propositional language L
2
. A belief set can be seen as a
possible set of beliefs of an agent with perfect (propositional) reasoning capabilities.
The denition of multi-interpretation operator, along with some properties, is anal-
ogous to the case of multiple belief state operators for IS
syn
, with the exception of
the dierence in input and output language.
Denition 8.10 (Multi-interpretation operator)
1. A multi-interpretation operator MI with input language L
1
and output lan-
guage L
2
is a function MI : P(L
1
)! P(P(L
2
)) that assigns a set of belief sets
to each set of input facts.
2. A multi-interpretation operator MI satises non-inclusiveness if for all X 
L
1
and all S; T 2 MI (X), if S  T then S = T .
3. The kernel K
MI
: P(L
1
) ! P(L
2
) of MI is dened by K
MI
(X) =
T
MI (X)
for all X  L
1
.
4. If L
1
 L
2
, then a multi- interpretation operator MI satises inclusion if for
all X  L
1
and all T 2 MI (X) it holds X  T .
If L
1
= L
2
, then it is easy to verify that a multi-interpretation operator is
a multiple belief state operator in IS
syn
. The kernel is then just the nal belief
state operator associated to the multiple belief state operator. In fact, by taking
L = L
1
[L
2
, a multi-interpretation operator can be seen as a partial multiple belief
state operator (dened only on those input sets X  L for which X  L
1
). Note
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that when MI (X) has exactly one element this means that the set X  L
1
has a
unique interpretation under MI .
Selection operators (see Denition 2.16) can be used to select a subset of the
possible interpretations in MI (X).
Denition 8.11 (Selective interpretation operator) A selective interpretation
operator for the multi-interpretation operator MI is a function C : P(L
1
)! P(L
2
)
that assigns a belief set to each set of facts, such that for all X  L
1
it holds that
C(X) 2 MI (X).
An operator P(L
1
)! P(L
2
) is the analogue of a nal belief state operator. It is
straightforward to check that if s : P(P(L
2
)) ! P(P(L
2
)) is a single-valued selec-
tion operator, then a selective interpretation operator C for a multi-interpretation
operator MI can be dened by setting C(X) = s(MI (X)) for all X  L
1
.
Below, we will describe a generic type of operator applicable for a specic clas-
sication task.
A multi-interpretation operator for approximate classication
Suppose we have an object in the real world (a car, for example), and we are in-
terested in the values of certain attributes of this object (such as the amount of
horsepower of the engine). All we can do is observe a number of properties of the
object (such as the color, or maybe that it is a Ford). Knowledge relating observable
properties to the possible values of attributes is needed to perform this classication
task. Using this knowledge, for each attribute certain values can be excluded. In a
situation of underspecication for each of the attributes this results in a remaining
range of possible values. However, if also overspecication occurs, then in a classical
manner it can be derived that for a certain attribute no value at all is possible, which
is a contradiction.
A formalization of this approximate classication task can be made using the
notions dened above. The language L
1
is the propositional language of which the
atoms are the ground atoms dened by the following signature:
 A nite set Props of property names: p
1
; : : : ; p
k
.
 A unary predicate: observed.
The meaning of observed(p
i
) is (not surprisingly) that the property p
i
has been
observed of the object. A variable over the set Props will be denoted by P .
The language L
2
is the propositional language extending L
1
, of which the addi-
tional atoms are the ground atoms dened by the following signature:
 A nite set of attribute names: a
1
; : : : ; a
m
.
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 A nite set of values for each of the attributes:
v
1;1
; : : : ; v
1;k
1
;
.
.
.
v
m;1
; : : : ; v
m;k
m
:
A variable over attributes will be denoted by A; a variable over values will be denoted
by V .
 Predicates:
is incompatible with(P;A; V )
has value(A; V )
is indicative(P ):
The basic idea is that certain (observed) properties may rule out certain values for
certain attributes. A fact is incompatible with(P;A; V ) means that if the observed
object has property P , then the attribute A of the object can not have the value
V . The predicate has value(A; V ) means that attribute A of the object has value V .
The last predicate requires a bit more explanation. The basic assumption on the
domain is that we may have (potentially) many observations, which can be contra-
dictory. That is, two (or more) observed properties may both rule out values for one
attribute, such that together they rule out all possible values of that attribute. This
may happen for a number of reasons. It may be that our observations are fallible:
sometimes we observe a property the object does not have. It is also possible that our
knowledge about which properties are incompatible with which values of attributes
is uncertain or even not completely correct. Another possibility is that the object
is not strictly delineated or strictly homogeneous with respect to its attributes, and
some properties are observed from dierent parts of the object. To deal with this
situation, we may label some observed properties as being indicative. If the obser-
vations are uncertain, `indicative' may simply mean `assumed true'. If the object is
not homogeneous, then an indicative property is a property related to the view on
the object we are interested in. The idea is that some properties are used to infer
the values of attributes (in this sense they are `indicative' of these values), whereas
the others are for example wrong, not of interest or coincidental for this view.
There is a knowledge base, KB , in language L
2
, that consists of propositional
formulae expressing knowledge which is of the following form:
 A (large) number of ground instances of:
is incompatible with(P;A; V ):
These instances represent the experts' knowledge of which properties rule out
which values of certain attributes.
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 All ground instances of the generic rule
is indicative(P ) ^ is incompatible with(P;A; V )! :has value(A; V ):
This rule makes it possible to conclude that certain attributes of the object
do not have a certain value. This derivation can be made if an indicative
property has been found that does not (generally) occur in objects for which
the attribute A has value V .
 Statements expressing that for each attribute at least one value should apply
has value(a
1
; v
1;1
) _ : : : _ has value(a
1
; v
1;k
1
)
.
.
.
has value(a
m
; v
m;1
) _ : : : _ has value(a
m
; v
m;k
m
):
For a given set of observed properties OBS  Props , i.e., input of the form
fobserved(p) j p 2 OBSg
the set
X = KB [ fis indicative(p) j p 2 OBSg
may be inconsistent. That is, it may be inconsistent to assume that all observed
properties are indicative for the object. This may occur if there is an attribute A
such that for all of its possible values v
j;k
, a property P is observed that negatively
indicates this value (which means we have both is indicative(P ) and
is incompatible with(P;A; v
j;k
)). With the generic rule, the conclusion
:has value(A; v
j;k
) is drawn for all possible values v
j;k
of A. But this is inconsistent
with the statement
has value(A; v
j;1
) _ : : : _ has value(A; v
j;k
j
)
which is in KB . However, the set of maximal indicative subsets consistent with KB
may be considered. This is dened as follows:
Denition 8.12 (Maximal indicative subset)
1. A set of properties S  Props is an indicative set of properties if the theory
KB [ fis indicative(p) j p 2 Sg
is consistent.
2. Let OBS  Props be a given set of observed properties. A set S  OBS is a
maximal indicative subset of OBS if it is an indicative set of properties and
for each indicative set of properties T with S  T  OBS it holds S = T . The
set of maximal indicative subsets of OBS is denoted by maxind(OBS ).
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Note that, since Props is nite, for each indicative subset S of a set OBS , there
exists at least one maximal indicative subset S
0
of OBS such that S  S
0
. Moreover,
if OBS is an indicative set of properties itself, there is only one maximal indicative
subset of OBS , namely OBS itself.
Based on these notions the following multi-interpretation operator can be dened.
Denition 8.13 (Generic multi-interpretation operator for approximate
classication)
For a set X  L
1
, dene the set of observations implied by X by
OBS(X) = fp j observed(p) 2 Cn(X)g:
The operator MI
maxind
is dened by
MI
maxind
(X) = fCn(X [KB [ fis indicative(p) j p 2 Sg) j S 2 maxind(OBS (X))g
for each X  L
1
.
Note that X  Y  L
1
implies OBS(X)  OBS(Y ). Actually, the sets X
will often be sets of the form fobserved(p) j p 2 OBSg for some set of properties
OBS  Props .
Properties of the generic multi-interpretation operator for approximate
classication
The operator MI
maxind
satises a number of properties of well-behavedness. The
proofs are rather straightforward.
Proposition 8.14 The multi-interpretation operator MI
maxind
satises inclusion
and non-inclusiveness.
In Chapter 10 some further conditions of well-behavedness for belief set opera-
tors are introduced (generalizing corresponding properties of inference operations).
These properties can be dened for multi-interpretation operators as well; a number
of them are formulated below.
Denition 8.15 (Properties of multi-interpretation operators)
1. Let A;B be sets of belief sets. The set B contains more information than A,
denoted A  B, if for all T 2 B there exists S 2 A such that S  T .
2. Let MI be a multi-interpretation operator. Then MI satises belief monotony
if for all X;Y  L
1
:
X  Y ) MI (X) MI (Y ):
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3. Let MI be a multi-interpretation operator for which L
1
 L
2
.
(a) MI satises weak belief monotony if for all X;Y  L
1
:
X  Y  K
MI
(X)) MI (X) MI (Y ):
(b) MI satises belief transitivity if for all X;Y; T  L
1
:
T 2 MI (X) & X  Y  T ) K
MI
(Y )  T:
(c) MI satises belief cut if for all X;Y  L
1
:
X  Y  K
MI
(X)) MI (Y )  MI (X):
Apart from belief monotony (which should in general not be expected), our
multi-interpretation operator is well-behaved.
Theorem 8.16 The multi-interpretation operator MI
maxind
satises weak belief mo-
notony, belief transitivity and belief cut. It does not generally satisfy belief monot-
ony.
Proof: Abbreviate MI
maxind
to MI . Starting with belief monotony, consider a
situation in which we have two properties, P
1
and P
2
(for simplicity), and suppose
KB contains information which prevents P
1
and P
2
from both being indicative at
the same time: there is an attribute A which has possible values 0 and 1. This
means that KB contains the formula has value(A; 0)_ has value(A; 1). Furthermore,
suppose that we have is incompatible with(P
1
; A; 0) and is incompatible with(P
2
; A; 1)
in KB . Now let
X = fobserved(P
1
)g;
Y = fobserved(P
1
); observed(P
2
)g:
Then MI (X) contains one element (in which P
1
is indicative), and MI (Y ) contains
two elements, one in which only P
1
is indicative, and one in which only P
2
is in-
dicative. For this latter element there is no smaller set in MI (X). Therefore, belief
monotony does not hold.
Let us now consider weak belief monotony and belief cut. Suppose X  Y 
K
MI
(X) and let T 2 MI (X), then
T = Cn(X [KB [ fis indicative(p) j p 2Mg)
for some M 2 maxind(OBS (X)) and Y  T (since Y  K
MI
(X)). But as X and Y
contain only the predicate observed which is not present in KB or in fis indicative(p) j
p 2 Mg, it must be the case that Cn(Y )  Cn(X), so that Cn(X) = Cn(Y ). This
implies that MI (X) = MI (Y ), proving both weak belief monotony and belief cut.
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If T 2MI(X) & X  Y  T , then the same argument shows that MI (X) = MI (Y ),
from which immediately follows that K
MI
(Y ) = K
MI
(X)  T . This proves belief
transitivity. 2
Each of the belief sets is an approximation in the sense of an upper bound of the
solution. If the number of observations increases, this upper bound decreases, as is
established in the following theorem.
Theorem 8.17 For each pair of subsets X;Y  L
1
the following holds: X  Y )
for all S 2 MI
maxind
(X) there exists a T 2 MI
maxind
(Y ) such that S  T .
Proof: From X  Y it follows OBS(X)  OBS (Y ) (see note just below Deni-
tion 8.13). Therefore every maximal indicative subset of OBS (X) is an indicative
subset S of OBS (Y ). Within OBS(Y ) this indicative subset can be extended to a
maximal indicative subset S
0
(see note just below Denition 8.12). This implies the
theorem. 2
This theorem guarantees that an increasing sequence of observations
X
0
 X
1
 X
2
 : : :
results in increasing belief sets within the sets MI (X
i
). These increasing belief sets
correspond to decreasing sets of classications, i.e., for each of the increasing belief
sets the ranges of the possible values of attributes are decreasing: this provides an
approximation of the classication by a sequence of decreasing upper bounds. Note
that Theorem 8.17 leaves open the possibility that belief sets remain constant, or
new belief sets arise in some stage, i.e., sets of which no subset occurs in the previous
set of belief sets. In general, for a given sequence of observations the resulting belief
sets will form a set of trees as depicted in Figure 8.5. Here
MI
maxind
(X
0
) = fS
0
g;
MI
maxind
(X
1
) = fS
11
; S
12
; S
13
g; and
MI
maxind
(X
2
) = fS
211
; S
212
; S
221
; S
231
; S
232
g:
The following proposition covers the case of an observed set of properties OBS
which has a unique interpretation:
Proposition 8.18 For each subset of properties OBS  Props the following are
equivalent:
1. MI
maxind
(fobserved(p) j p 2 OBSg) contains just one element.
2. the set OBS is an indicative set of properties.
If these (equivalent) conditions are satised, all observed properties are indica-
tive, and there are no alternative interpretations. This means there is no need for
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S0
X0   	 X1   	 X2     	....
 
 S12
S11
 
 S212
S211
     S221 
S13
 
 S232
S231
   ....
   ....
   ....
   ....
   ....
Figure 8.5: Example approximate classications resulting from an increasing se-
quence of observations.
further selection from alternatives. The possible values of the attributes are con-
tained in MI
maxind
(fobserved(p) j p 2 OBSg).
If MI
maxind
(fobserved(p) j p 2 OBSg) contains more than one element, then a
further selection process can be started. But even before this selection process,
conclusions can be drawn: the kernel of the MI
maxind
operator contains the most
certain conclusions, so K
MI
maxind
(fobserved(p) j p 2 OBSg) may be inspected. For
instance, there may be two possible views in MI
maxind
(fobserved(p) j p 2 OBSg)
due to the fact that there is an attribute A
1
for which no value is compatible
with all the observed properties. However, all of these properties may indicate
that another attribute A
2
must have a certain value, and this conclusion will be in
K
MI
maxind
(fobserved(p) j p 2 OBSg). If A
2
is all one is interested in, there is no need
for selection. If one is interested also in A
1
, this selection has to take place. If one
is interested in the properties which are indicative in both maximal indicative sets,
one can either examine K
MI
maxind
(fobserved(p) j p 2 OBSg), or the intersection of
the maximal indicative sets:
K
MI
maxind
(X) \ fis indicative(p) j p 2 Pg =
fis indicative(p) j p 2
T
maxind(OBS (X))g:
For the multi-interpretation operator MI
maxind
, the language and the format (the
kinds of rules) of the knowledge base KB were xed. When the language and format
of KB is left open, we get a general class of multi-interpretation operators that can
deal with input which is contradictory in the sense that it is inconsistent with a
knowledge base.
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8.2.2 Representation in default logic
The previous subsection described the generic multi-interpretation operator MI ,
which formalizes the interpretation of (possibly inconsistent) observation information
using maximal indicative sets. A specication of this multi-interpretation operator in
a (well-known) logical formalism would mean that known results about this logic can
be applied to this situation, but it would also allow for the use of proof mechanisms
for this logic to be used in an implemented system based on such an operator. In
Section 7.2 and in [MTT97] default logic is used as a specication language for belief
frames. These results can be applied to the formalization of the previous subsection.
In [MTT97] the following theorem was proven (Corollary 5.2):
Theorem 8.19 A family F of theories is representable by a normal default theory
if and only if F = fLg or there is a consistent set of formulae W and a set of formulae
C such that
F = fCn(W [) j  is a maximal subset of C consistent with Wg:
In Section 7.2 the question is posed whether a multiple belief state operator in
IS
syn
can be represented by a set of defaults. Below, the denition of representability
is slightly generalized to deal with a dierent input and output language. Also, we
allow some axioms besides the input facts. Recall that L
1
is the input language, and
L
2
is the output language. We make the assumption that L
1
 L
2
.
Denition 8.20 (Representability of a multi-interpretation operator) Let
 = hD;W i be a default theory. A multi-interpretation operator MI is representable
by , if for all X  L
1
it holds that MI (X) = Ext(hD;W [Xi). The operator MI
is called representable by a default theory if there exists such a default theory.
Consider the family of belief sets MI
maxind
(X) whereX  L
1
. Then Theorem 8.19
can be applied to MI
maxind
(X) by setting:
W = X [KB ; and
C = fis indicative(p) j p 2 OBS (X)g:
Therefore Theorem 8.19 implies that for each X  L
1
there exists a normal default
theory that represents the belief sets of MI
maxind
(X). The theorem does not imply
that there exists one set of defaults D which works for all sets X  L
1
, so this
does not imply that the multi-interpretation operator MI
maxind
is representable by a
default theory. However, the normal default theory can actually be found by dening
the following generic set of defaults D:
observed(p) : is indicative(p)
is indicative(p)
for all properties p 2 Props :
This set of defaults is independent of X , so MI
maxind
is representable.
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Theorem 8.21 The multi-interpretation operator MI
maxind
is representable by the
normal default theory hD;KBi.
Proof: Let X be a set of formulae in L
1
. Let KB [X be consistent (if it is not,
verication is straightforward and omitted). The extensions of hD;KB [Xi are sets
of the form Cn(KB [X [ S), where S is a subset of fis indicative(p) j observed(p) 2
Cn(X)g, which is maximal such that Cn(KB [X [ S) is consistent. This is proved
below. The sets Cn(KB [X [ S) with S as above together comprise MI
maxind
(X).
First of all, let S be such a maximal set, and let E = Cn(KB [X [ S). Then if
the E
i
are dened as in Denition 3.1, the following holds:
E
0
= Cn(KB [X); and
E
1
= Cn(E
0
[ fis indicative(p) j observed(p) 2 E
0
;:is indicative(p) =2 Eg):
As E
1
does not contain more instances of the observed predicate than E
0
(this follows
from the fact that X contains only the observed predicate, whereas KB does not),
E
i
= E
1
for all i > 1. The claim is that
fis indicative(p) j observed(p) 2 E
0
;:is indicative(p) =2 Eg = S:
Suppose observed(p) 2 E
0
and :is indicative(p) =2 E. Then observed(p) is in Cn(X)
and Cn(KB [X[S[fis indicative(p)g) is consistent. But as S was maximal with re-
spect to these properties, is indicative(p) 2 S. On the other hand, if is indicative(p) 2
S, then observed(p) 2 E
0
and :is indicative(p) =2 E (as E = Cn(KB [X [S) is con-
sistent).
Now let E be an extension of hD;KB [ Xi. Then E is of the form Cn(KB [
X [ S), where S contains (only) formulae of the form is indicative(p). Examina-
tion of KB (and the fact that X  L
1
), shows that only if observed(p) 2 Cn(X)
is is indicative(p) 2 E. As extensions are always consistent (if each rule has a jus-
tication and the axioms are consistent), Cn(KB [ X [ S) must be consistent.
Suppose there exists a T  S (strict inclusion) respecting the conditions, then
there must be a default rule (observed(p) : is indicative(p))=is indicative(p), with
observed(p) 2 Cn(X)  E and Cn(KB [ X [ S [ fis indicative(p)g) consistent,
implying that :is indicative(p) =2 E. But that means there is an applicable default
rule for which the conclusion is not in E, contradicting the assumption that E is an
extension. Therefore S must be maximal. 2
At this point the reader may wonder what the benet is of the representation in
default logic. The multi-interpretation operator MI
maxind
arose during the analysis
and formalization of an application to be described in the next section. A system,
EKS, was implemented based on this operator MI
maxind
. The implementation in
fact follows the denition (Denition 8.13) rather closely. The results of the current
section indicate that alternatively a theorem prover for default logic (or, rather, a
program computing extensions of default theories) could be used. A highly optimized
theorem prover for default logic obviates the need to optimize this part of the system
ourselves. This is one of the subjects of current work on the system.
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8.2.3 Application: EKS
In this section we will briey describe a domain to which the formalization above
was applied (see also [BET98]). Nature conservationists are interested in a number
of so-called abiotic factors of terrains. These factors, examples of which are the
moisture, acidity and nutrient value, give an indication of how healthy a terrain is.
As these factors are dicult to measure directly, a sample of plant species growing on
a terrain is taken. For each species, the experts have knowledge about the possible
values of the abiotic factors of a terrain on which the species lives. An example
of such a sample, together with the knowledge about the values of abiotic factors
for each plant in the sample, is given in Table 8.1. Combining such knowledge for
Moisture Acidity Nutrient Value
Species vd fd fm vm fw vw bas neu sac fac ac np fnr nr vnr
Angelica sylvestris x x x x x x
Caltha palustris ssp palustris x x x x x x x x
Carex acutiformis x x x x x x
Carex acuta x x x x x x x x x
Deschampsia caespitosa x x x x x x x x x
Epilobium parviorum x x x x x x x
Equisetum palustre x x x x x x x x x x
Galium palustre x x x x x x x x x
Glyceria uitans x x x x x x x x x x
Juncus articulatus x x x x x x x x x
Lathyrus pratensis x x x x x x x
Myosotis palustris x x x x x x x x
Phalaris arundinacea x x x x x x x x
Phleum pratense ssp pratense x x x x x x
Poa trivialis x x x x x x x
Scirpus sylvaticus x x x x x x x x
Moisture (vd: very dry, fd: fairly dry, fm: fairly moist, vm: very moist, fw: fairly wet,
vw: very wet), Acidity (bas: basic, neu: neutral, sac: slightly acid, fac: fairly acid, ac: acid),
Nutrient value (np: nutrient poor, fnr: fairly nutrient rich, nr: nutrient rich, vnr: very nutrient
rich)
Table 8.1: Example sample.
each of the plant species observed on a terrain leads to conclusions about the abiotic
factors of the terrain. If we look, for example, at Caltha palustris L., then we see
that the terrain must be:
 very moist or fairly wet,
 basic, neutral or slightly acid, and
 nutrient poor, fairly nutrient rich or nutrient rich.
For the species Poa trivialis L. the terrain needs to be
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 fairly moist, very moist or fairly wet,
 basic or neutral, and
 nutrient rich or very nutrient rich.
When both species occur in a terrain, this implies that the terrain can only be:
 very moist or fairly wet,
 basic or neutral, and
 nutrient rich.
Analysis of the abiotic conditions for all plant species presented in Table 8.1 shows
that only a restricted number of possibilities (but more than one) for the abiotic
conditions can be found in which all of these plant species can abide. This greatest
common denominator for the given plant species is dened by the following set of
abiotic conditions:
 very moist,
 basic or neutral, and
 nutrient rich.
The combination of these plant species indicates that a terrain on which these plant
species are found has to fulll these conditions.
During the development of a knowledge-based system, EKS to automate this
classication process, however, it turned out that the samples of species taken were
often incompatible. That is, there was at least one abiotic factor for which no value
could be found that was permissible for all species. An example of such a sample
(taken at the Pommeren site), is presented in Table 8.2. For this sample, there is
no common denominator of abiotic conditions. Focusing on the acidity of a terrain
shows that the plant species Angelica sylvestris L., for example, only grows on a
basic or neutral terrain, whereas the species Carex panicea L., also found in the
same sample, only grows on a slightly or fairly acid terrain. These two species,
however, are in the same sample. One common set of possible values of the abiotic
factors for all plant species can not be derived. This is not due to errors in the
knowledge of abiotic factors needed by species to live, but due to other eects. For
example, a terrain may lie on the transition of a dry and a wet piece of land. Some of
the observed species may occur on the drier, and others on the wetter side. This can
also be due to the presence of ponds in an otherwise dry terrain. Also transitions of
a terrain over time, or vertical inhomogeneity may be causes.
The approximate classication task described above is an example of the task
performed by the multi-interpretation operator MI
maxind
. The object to be studied
is a terrain, and the attributes of interest are the abiotic factors. The presence of
certain species are the observable properties of the object. So we can specialize the
214 Applications of the Theory
Moisture Acidity Nutrient Value
Species vd fd fm vm fw vw bas neu sac fac ac np fnr nr vnr
Angelica sylvestris x x x x x x
Anthoxanthum odoratum x x x x x x x
Caltha palustris ssp palustris x x x x x x x x
Carex acutiformis x x x x x x
Carex acuta x x x x x x x x x
Carex nigra x x x x x x x x
Carex panicea x x x x x x x
Carex riparia x x x x x x x
Cirsium oleraceum x x x x x x
Cirsium palustre x x x x x x x
Crepis paludosa x x x x x x x x
Deschampsia caespitosa x x x x x x x x x
Epilobium palustre x x x x x x
Epilobium parviorum x x x x x x x
Equisetum palustre x x x x x x x x x x
Filipendula ulmaria x x x x x x x
Galium palustre x x x x x x x x x
Glyceria uitans x x x x x x x x x x
Juncus articulatus x x x x x x x x x
Juncus conglomeratus x x x x x x x
Lathyrus pratensis x x x x x x x
Lotus uliginosus x x x x x x x x x
Lychnis os cuculi x x x x x x x
Lysimachia vulgaris x x x x x x x x x
Myosotis palustris x x x x x x x x
Phalaris arundinacea x x x x x x x x
Phleum pratense ssp pratense x x x x x x
Poa trivialis x x x x x x x
Scirpus sylvaticus x x x x x x x x
Moisture (vd: very dry, fd: fairly dry, fm: fairly moist, vm: very moist, fw: fairly wet,
vw: very wet), Acidity (bas: basic, neu: neutral, sac: slightly acid, fac: fairly acid, ac: acid),
Nutrient value (np: nutrient poor, fnr: fairly nutrient rich, nr: nutrient rich, vnr: very nutrient
rich)
Table 8.2: Second example sample.
generic knowledge base to this case. The language is as follows:
properties: (occurrence of) plant species achillea millefolium,
achillea ptarmica, : : : .
attributes: abiotic factors moisture, acidity, nutrient value
values for each of the attributes: very dry, fairly dry, : : : ,
(abiotic factors) basic, neutral, : : : ,
nutrient poor, fairly nutrient rich, : : :
The experts' knowledge about the possible values of abiotic factors for a species
(as presented in the Tables 8.1 and 8.2 above), is formalized by (a large number of)
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instances of the predicate is incompatible with(P;A; V ), where P is one of the plant
species names, A is an abiotic factor, and V is a value of that factor. This knowledge
leads to a specic instantiation of MI
maxind
, which we will denote by the same name.
The alternative interpretations given by MI
maxind
(X) are extremely useful. Each of
the alternatives leads to a dierent set of (possible) values for the abiotic factors.
The two alternatives created for the second example sample, are indicated by ovals
in Table 8.3. If this is for instance due to the fact that the terrain consists of a
drier portion and a wetter portion, then a selection can be made for the portion of
interest, whose possible values for abiotic factors are contained in the corresponding
interpretation. This selection process can be formalized by a selection operator. At
this moment, that process has not been analyzed in more detail, but that is one of
the future directions of research.
As mentioned before, a system called EKS has been developed, using the envi-
ronment desire described earlier, to help a user in establishing the abiotic factors
of a terrain. The correspondence between the formalization of the expert reason-
ing task and the interactive knowledge-based system EKS that models the approxi-
mate classication task is as follows. The rst component of the system, determina-
tion of maximal indicative subsets, is formalized by the belief set operator MI
maxind
dened earlier. The second component of the system,
selection of a maximal indicative subset, which models (an interface to) the selection
process by the user of the system, is formalized by a single-valued selection function
s
user
.
The composition C
EKS
of MI
maxind
and s
user
dened by
C
EKS
(X) = s
user
(MI
maxind
(X)) for X  L
1
is a selective interpretation operator for MI
maxind
(as described in Denition 8.11; see
also the remark immediately following the denition). This operator formalizes the
reasoning of the system in interaction with the user. Note that from the two functions
of which this overall function is composed, one is xed and dened by the system
itself (i.e., MI
maxind
), whereas the other can be changed dynamically, depending on
the user (i.e., s
user
). For more details on this application, see [BET98].
8.2.4 Conclusions and related work
In most real-life classication problems, the information about the object to be
classied can be interpreted in dierent ways. In this section, multi-interpretation
operators were introduced to formalize this interpretation process. In particular,
observation results of the world may underspecify or overspecify a classication.
Overspecication means that the observations are in contradiction with knowledge
about the world. A generic multi-interpretation operator was introduced for approx-
imate classication tasks where attribute values of an object are determined on the
basis of imperfect interpretation of observable properties of the object. The multi-
interpretation operator formalizes in an integrated fashion the dierent variants of
approximate classications of the object. This operator is rather well-behaved, and
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Moisture Acidity Nutrient Value
Species vd fd fm vm fw vw bas neu sac fac ac np fnr nr vnr
Angelica sylvestris x x x x x x
Carex acutiformis x x x x x x
Carex riparia x x x x x x x
Cirsium oleraceum x x x x x x
Phalaris arundinacea x x x x x x x x
Phleum pratense ssp pratense x x x x x x
Poa trivialis x x x x x x x
Caltha palustris ssp palustris x x x x x x x x
Carex acuta x x x x x x x x x
Cirsium palustre x x x x x x x
Crepis paludosa x x x x x x x x
Deschampsia caespitosa x x x x x x x x x
Epilobium parviorum x x x x x x x
Equisetum palustre x x x x x x x x x x
Filipendula ulmaria x x x x x x x
Galium palustre x x x x x x x x x
Glyceria uitans x x x x x x x x x x
Juncus articulatus x x x x x x x x x
Lathyrus pratensis x x x x x x x
Lotus uliginosus x x x x x x x x x
Lychnis os cuculi x x x x x x x
Lysimachia vulgaris x x x x x x x x x
Myosotis palustris x x x x x x x x
Scirpus sylvaticus x x x x x x x x
Anthoxanthum odoratum x x x x x x x
Carex nigra x x x x x x x x
Carex panicea x x x x x x x
Epilobium palustre x x x x x x
Juncus conglomeratus x x x x x x x
Moisture (vd: very dry, fd: fairly dry, fm: fairly moist, vm: very moist, fw: fairly
wet, vw: very wet), Acidity (bas: basic, neu: neutral, sac: slightly acid, fac: fairly acid, ac:
acid), Nutrient value (np: nutrient poor, fnr: fairly nutrient rich, nr: nutrient rich, vnr:
very nutrient rich)
'
&
$
%
'
&
$
%
Table 8.3: Maximal indicative subsets for the second example sample.
can be represented by a default theory. This can be a basis for the use of (highly op-
timized) theorem provers for default logic, to implement a system formalized by the
multi-interpretation operator. For the domain of ecological classication an applica-
tion for the theory has been developed, and the resulting system, EKS, that has been
implemented has shown great promise to be a useful tool for nature conservationists.
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Classication tasks form an important application area for knowledge-based sys-
tems (see for example [Ste95]). The phenomenon of underspecication leading to
more than one candidate solution is ubiquitous and handled by any approach to
classication. The phenomenon of overspecication as a result of conicting infor-
mation from dierent sensors is also known, and often handled by some numeric
method of sensor information fusion. As far as we know, our approach is the rst
integrated qualitative treatment of classication with both kinds of phenomena.
After multiple interpretations of observation information have been identied, of-
ten a choice is made for one of them. Which view is (or which views are) most appro-
priate presumably requires additional heuristic (strategic) knowledge (cf. [Bre94a],
[Bre94b], [TT92]). One of the areas of future research is to further analyze this
choice process, in general terms, but also in particular for the knowledge-based sys-
tem. Future research will focus on the acquisition of this knowledge to be able to
support users in the selection process.
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Chapter 9
Some Logical Themes
In this chapter, we will treat a number of items linked with the temporal logics of
information described in Chapter 4. The rst section looks at logical properties of
MTEL, such as decidability, complexity and axiomatizability. In the next section,
classes of formulae are studied under which the consequence relation behaves mono-
tonically, not only for MTEL, but for preferential logics in general (MTEL falls into
this category). Lastly, the consequence relation of MTEL is not cumulative and
therefore does not belong to the class of relations studied in [KLM90]. Given our
interest in this logic, we develop a framework analogous to the one of [KLM90],
but for consequence relations that do not necessarily satisfy the rule of Cautious
Monotonicity.
9.1 Axioms, decidability and complexity of MTEL
We begin this section by looking at a proof system for temporal epistemic logic.
9.1.1 Axiom systems for TEL and TELC
As TEL can be seen as a logical combination of S5 and tense logic over the natural
numbers, we shall combine the axioms of both logics in order to obtain a proof
system for TEL. Instead of proving soundness and completeness for the resulting
system from scratch, we will use results from [FG92] (see also [FG96]) where a general
method for temporalizing a given logic system is presented. In their notation, TEL
would be T(S5)). We cannot directly apply their results since they use the temporal
operators Since and Until, but adaptation to our situation is easy.
Axiomatizations for S5 are known from the literature (e.g. [HM85a]):
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Denition 9.1 (Axiom system for S5) The axiom system of S5 consists of:
1. All instances of propositional tautologies
2. K('!  )! (K'! K ) (K )
3. K'! ' (T )
4. K'! KK' (Positive Introspection)
5. :K'! K:K' (Negative Introspection)
and the following two rules:
1.
' '!  
 
(Modus Ponens)
2.
'
K'
(Necessitation)
If there is a proof for ' using this system, we will denote this by `
S5
'.
It is well-known that this system is sound and complete with respect to the class
of normal S5-models (see for instance [MH95]).
The results in [FG92] concern temporalizing a logic over a class of ows of time.
Our class of ows of time contains only the set of natural numbers. First we will give
an axiomatic system for propositional tense logic over the natural numbers (from
[Gol92]), which is sound and complete with respect to N:
Denition 9.2 (Tense logic over the natural numbers) The axiom system
for tense logic over N consists of:
1. All instances of propositional tautologies
2. G('!  )! (G'! G )
3. H('!  )! (H'! H )
4. '! HF' (C
P
)
5. '! GP' (C
F
)
6. H'! HH' (4
P
)
7. G'! GG' (4
F
)
8. F (>) (D
F
)
9. G(G'! ')! (FG'! G') (Z
F
)
10. H(H'! ')! H' (W
P
)
and the following rules:
1.
' '!  
 
(Modus Ponens)
2.
'
G'
'
H'
(Necessitation)
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Using the axiom systems for S5 and tense logic, Denition 2.6 of [FG92] allows
us to give an axiomatization for TEL:
Denition 9.3 (Axiomatization for TEL) The axiom system of TEL consists
of:
1. The axioms 1-10 of Denition 9.2.
2. The inference rules 1 and 2 of Denition 9.2.
3. For every formula  2 L
S5
, if `
S5
 then `
TEL
 (Preserve).
Using Theorem 2.2 of [FG92], soundness of S5 and soundness of the axiom system
for tense logic over N, we immediately have:
Theorem 9.4 (Soundness of TEL) The axiom system TEL is sound: for every
' 2 L
TEL
it holds
j= ' ) `
TEL
':
Theorem 2.3 of [FG92] states that if the system to be temporalized is complete
and the axiomatization of the logic with Since and Until is complete over a class of
linear ows of time, then the `merged' axiomatization is complete for the tempor-
alized logic. Our class of ows of time (consisting only of the natural numbers) is
a subclass of the linear ows of time. A slight adaptation of their proof yields the
same result for temporalizing over the temporal operators used in TEL. Therefore
we have:
Theorem 9.5 (Completeness of TEL) The axiom system TEL is complete: for
every ' 2 L
TEL
it holds
`
TEL
' ) j= ':
Again borrowing from [FG92], Theorem 3.1, and using the fact that both S5 (see
[MH95]) and tense logic over the natural numbers (see [SC85]) are decidable, we
have:
Theorem 9.6 (Decidability of TEL) The logic TEL is decidable.
Remember that the logic TELC was formed by restricting attention to conserva-
tive TEL-models (see Denition 4.6). We can easily nd an axiom system for TELC
by adding axioms for conservativity.
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Proposition 9.7 (Axiomatization of TELC) Let Cons = f2(K! G(K)) j
 a propositional formula g. For each closed TEL-modelM the following are equiv-
alent:
1. M is conservative,
2. M j= Cons,
3. (M; t) j= Cons for some t 2 N.
Furthermore, the axiom system TELC, consisting of TEL plus the axioms of Cons,
is sound and complete with respect to the class of TELC-models: for every ' 2 L
TEL
it holds:
j=
c
' , `
TELC
':
Proof: LetM be a conservative TEL-model, not necessarily closed, and let t 2 N.
Suppose (M; t) j= K and take s > t arbitrary. Then for all m 2 M
t
, m j= . Take
m 2M
s
, then sinceM is conservative we haveM
s
M
t
, so m 2M
t
and m j= .
Therefore (M; s) j= K, and since s was arbitrary we have (M; t) j= G(K), so
(M; t) j= K ! G(K). As t was arbitrary, we have that for any s 2 N it holds
that (M; s) j= 2(K! G(K)). This shows that statement 1 implies statement 2,
and also that TELC is sound with respect to the class of conservative models.
Now let M be a closed TEL-model. Suppose that (M; t) j= Cons for some
t 2 N, but M is not conservative. Then there exists s 2 N such that M
s
6 M
s+1
.
As M is closed, this means that there must exist a propositional formula  such
that (M; s) j= K whereas (M; s + 1) 6j= K. Thus (M; t) 6j= 2(K ! G(K)),
a contradiction. This means that statement 3 implies statement 1. It is immediate
that statement 2 implies statement 3.
The only thing left to prove is completeness, so suppose j=
c
'. As the notion j=
c
is independent of the (propositional) signature P (a fact we will prove later on, see
Proposition 9.9), we take it nite (actually, we can restrict it to the propositional
atoms occurring in '). So we have for all TEL-models M: if M is conservative
then M j= '. Since there are only a nite number of non-equivalent propositional
formulae over P , we can take Cons to be nite and therefore we can take the
conjunction of its elements. So if (M; s) j=
V
Cons then M is conservative (by the
rst part of this proposition;M is closed as all models are closed when the signature
is nite), so M j= ' and therefore (M; s) j= '. Thus we have
V
Cons j= ', and
using the deduction lemma for TEL (which can be easily veried), j=
V
Cons !
', from which by the completeness of TEL (Theorem 9.5) it follows that `
TEL
V
Cons! '. Since TELC contains TEL and the axioms of Cons, and has Modus
Ponens as inference rule, we conclude `
TELC
'. 2
We also have that TELC is decidable:
Proposition 9.8 (Decidability of TELC) The logic TELC is decidable.
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Proof: Checking whether `
TELC
' reduces to checking `
TEL
V
C ! ' where C
is the set of rules 2(K! G(K)) for all non-equivalent propositional formulae 
in the proposition letters of '. This is decidable by Theorem 9.6. 2
We conclude this section with some other logical characteristics of TEL and its
derived logics.
The notions j= (of TEL) and j=
c
are not compact: the set fP
i
(>) j i 2 Ng (where
P
i
stands for a sequence of P operators of length i) is not satisable, whereas each
nite subset is (for both notions).
Both notions above, as well as consequence in MTEL, are independent of the
signature. From now on, we will consider entailment in MTEL only as a rela-
tion between formulae, instead of a relation between sets of formulae and formulae.
Equivalently, we could restrict the set T in Denition 4.45 to be a nite set.
Proposition 9.9 The notions j=, j=
c
and j=

g
are independent of the propositional
signature P .
Proof: For a propositional signature P we write L
P
to denote the temporal epis-
temic language based on P and P -j=, P -j=
c
, P -j=

g
to denote the corresponding
relations based on this signature.
In the proof, we will need a number of constructions. Let P;Q be two proposi-
tional signatures with P  Q (note that we can make the assumption that P  Q
without loss of generality) . For a propositional valuation m of signature Q, let mj
P
denote the restriction of m to atoms of P . Now dene:
 For a TEL-modelM based on Q, we dene its restriction to P , denotedMj
P
,
by:
(Mj
P
)
s
= fmj
P
: m 2M
s
g:
 For a TEL-model M based on P , we dene its extension to Q, denoted Mj
Q
,
by:
(Mj
Q
)
s
= fm 2 Val(Q) : mj
P
2M
s
g:
A straightforward induction on ' 2 L
P
shows that truth of ' at a point in time is
preserved under these constructions.
Independence of the signature for j= is now straightforward since any counter-
model that denies P -j= ' can be transformed to a countermodel which denies Q-j= '
and vice versa. The same holds for j=
c
since both constructions above preserve con-
servativity.
For j=

g
, suppose that M is a conservative TEL-model based on Q and M is a

g
-minimal model of ' (with 
g
dened over models of signature Q). Then Mj
P
is a 
g
-minimal of ' (with 
g
dened over models of signature P ): for suppose N
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is a conservative TEL-model based on P with N 
g
Mj
P
and N j= ', then (!)
Nj
Q

g
M and Nj
Q
j= '.
Conversely, suppose that M is a conservative TEL-model based on P and M is
a 
g
-minimal model of ' (with 
g
dened over models of signature P ). ThenMj
Q
is a 
g
-minimal of ' (with 
g
dened over models of signature Q) : for suppose
N is a conservative TEL-model based on Q with N 
g
Mj
Q
and N j= ', then (!)
Nj
P

g
M and Nj
P
j= '.
It is now easy to see that ' P -j=

g
 if and only if ' Q-j=

g
 . 2
We showed that both TEL and TELC have sound and complete (Hilbert-style)
proof systems, and that they are decidable. These same issues are also of interest for
MTEL. The next section treats decidability of MTEL, and complexity of MTEL (and
TEL) are the subject of the section thereafter. As far as a proof system for MTEL
is concerned, this seems to be much harder to nd. In general, proof systems for
nonmonotonic logics are hard to nd (proof systems for default logic were proposed
only recently: [Bon96] proposes a sequent calculus for credulous entailment, and
[BO97] contains a calculus for skeptical entailment). Instead of giving a direct
proof system, another possibility is to embed (or translate) minimal entailment into
another logic, for which there is a proof system. We will briey sketch such an
approach.
Consider the set of TELC-models (which we denote by TELC) with the relation

g
. This can be seen as a pair, with a set of states and an accessibility relation.
This relation (or its converse) can be used to interpret a modal operator  in the
standard way:
(TELC;M) j= ' , there is N 2 TELC with N 
g
M and (TELC;N ) j= ':
For ' which do not contain this new modal operator, we can dene
(TELC;M) j= ' , M j= ':
This denes a modal logic `over' TELC (whereas usually, modal logics are dened
over propositional logic or rst-order predicate logic). A formula is a theorem in this
logic if it is true in all states in the above `super-model' TELC. We can translate
entailment in MTEL in this new logic: we have that ' j=

g
 exactly when  holds
in all minimal models of '. A minimal model of ' is a model in which ' holds, but
for which there is no 
g
smaller model in which ' holds. So ' j=

g
 holds exactly
when the following formula is a theorem in this new modal logic:
(' ^ :')!  :
It is easy to see that this logic is monotonous (or actually, the consequence
relation j=
Smtel
dened by  j=
Smtel
 if and only if !  is a theorem), so nding
a proof system for it may be easier. Such an approach was successfully tried for
the `easier' logic Ground S5, which is essentially the non-temporal variant of MTEL
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(see [EV98]). Ground S5 is a slight generalization of Halpern & Moses logic of `Only
Knowing' (see [HM85b]). A denition of Ground S5 can be found in Section 9.2.2.
We are interested in the complexity of minimal entailment in MTEL; we will rst
concentrate on the decidability.
9.1.2 Decidability of MTEL
The rst question to be asked when investigating the complexity of a notion is
whether it is decidable or not. The notion of minimal entailment of MTEL will turn
out to be decidable, but in order to prove that we will rst need some lemmas. As
the notion j=

g
is independent of the propositional signature, when deciding whether
' j=

g
 , we may take the signature to consist of the atoms occurring in ' and  .
Therefore, some of the results below are proved for nite signatures.
Observation 9.10 Suppose the signature P is nite. A conservative TEL-model
M consists of a sequence of normal S5-models. These models consist of a nite
number of propositional valuations, since P is assumed to be nite. Furthermore
the sequence is (not necessarily strictly) decreasing. Therefore there must exist a
time point s 2 N such that for all t > s :M
t
=M
s
. If s
0
is the smallest point for
which this is true, we say that M stabilizes at s
0
.
Since all TELC-models stabilize when the signature is nite, it is possible to store
them in nite space.
The idea in the proof of decidability is that for each formula  there is a number
n
 
such that a minimal model of  must stabilize before n
 
. Then there is only a
nite number of models to be checked (taking P nite), and since they stabilize, it
is always possible to check whether a temporal formula holds in them. To obtain the
upper bound n
 
one reasons that if there exists a long enough sequence of identical
states in a model before it stabilizes, then it is possible to insert an extra (identical)
state into this sequence, without disturbing the truth of  . Since this enlarged model
is smaller (with respect to 
g
) than the original, the original model could not have
been a minimal model of  . The length of such a sequence depends on the depth of
nesting of temporal operators in  . We will now formalize these ideas.
Denition 9.11 (Depth) The depth of nesting of temporal operators in a formula
', denoted depth('), is dened inductively as follows:
 depth(') = 0, if ' 2 L
S5
;
 depth( ^ ) = maxfdepth(); depth()g;
 depth(:) = depth();
 depth(P) = depth(F) = depth() + 1.
226 Some Logical Themes
The rst lemma states that in a sequence of identical states, formulae with small
enough depth cannot discriminate between states in the middle of the sequence.
The Lemmas 9.12 and 9.13 and Observation 9.14 are also valid for non-subjective
formulae.
Lemma 9.12 If M is a TEL-model such that for some N  1, s  N :
M
s
=M
s+i
=M
s i
for all 1  i  N;
then for all ' with depth(') < N and 1  j  N   depth('):
(M; s  j) j= ', (M; s) j= ', (M; s+ j) j= ':
Proof: By induction on ', where the only interesting cases are the temporal oper-
ators (the abbreviation `i.h.' stands for induction hypothesis):
F: Let 1  j  N   depth(F). The implications from right to left are trivial, so
we will only prove (M; s  j) j= F) (M; s+ j) j= F.
Suppose (M; s  j) j= F. There exists n 2 N, n > s  j with (M; n) j= . If
n > s + j then (M; s + j) j= F, so suppose s   j < n  s + j. Then there
are a number of cases:
{ If n = s   k with 1  k < j then 1  k < j  N   depth(F) <
N   depth() and with the i.h. we get (M; s) j= .
{ If n = s then (M; s) j= .
{ If n = s + k with 1  k  j then 1  k  j  N   depth(F) <
N   depth(), so by the i.h.we get (M; s) j= .
So we have (M; s) j=  and 1  j+ 1  N   (depth(F) 1) = N  depth(),
so by the i.h. we have (M; s+ (j + 1)) j=  so (M; s+ j) j= F.
P: Analogous to F.
2
We will often use this lemma with j = 1 and N = depth(') + 1.
The example model M depicted in Figure 9.1 shows that we really need that
many identical states. In this model, nothing is known at time point 0, and p is
known from time point 1 onwards, and q is known from time point 5. We have
(M; 3) 6j= G(Kq) but (M; 3 + 1) j= G(Kq) (we need an extra Kp state between 4
and 5); also (M; 2   1) j= H(:Kp) but (M; 2) 6j= H(:Kp) (we need an extra Kp
state between 0 and 1).
The next lemma shows that if we have a sequence of identical states, a middle
state can be duplicated or removed without changing the truth of formulae with
suciently small depth of operator-nesting:
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-
Kp
Kp, Kq
Figure 9.1: The model M.
Lemma 9.13 Let M be a model as in Lemma 9.12. Dene f : N ! N as follows:
f(n) =

n if n  s
n  1 if n > s
and let N be the model dened by N
i
=M
f(i)
for all i 2 N. Then for all formulae
' with depth(')  N we have:
(N ; i) j= ', (M; f(i)) j= ' for all i 2 N:
Proof: By induction on ', where the only non-trivial cases are the operators (for
which we will take H and G):
H': Suppose (N ; i) j= H'. Take k < f(i). Then there exists t < i such that f(t) =
k and then (N ; t) j= ', so by the i.h. (M; k) j= '. Thus (M; f(i)) j= H'.
Suppose (M; f(i)) j= H'.
{ If i  s: take k < i then f(k) < f(i), so (M; f(k)) j= ' and by the i.h.
(N ; k) j= '. We have (N ; i) j= H'.
{ If i  s+ 1: take k < i;
 If k 6= s then f(k) < f(i), so (M; f(k)) j= ' and by the i.h. (N ; k) j=
'.
 If k = s then s 1 < f(i), so (M; s 1) j= '. As depth(H')  N we
have 1  1  N   depth(') and by Lemma 9.12 we have (M; s) j= '
and by the i.h. (N ; s) j= ', or (N ; k) j= ':
So we have (N ; i) j= H'.
G': Analogous.
2
Figure 9.2 sketches the situation with N = 2.
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M
N
ss - N s + N
Figure 9.2: Duplicating or removing a state.
Another way of proving this lemma is to show that there exist bisimulations up
to N between these two models. The main use of the lemma lies in the possibility
of enlarging or reducing sequences of identical states in a model without disturbing
truth of formulae with suciently small depth of nesting.
Observation 9.14 For the modelsM;N of Lemma 9.13 the following holds: ifM
is conservative then N is conservative and vice versa, N 
g
M , and if there exists
t  s+N such that M
t
M
t+1
then N 
g
M .
Proof: Take s 2 N, then N
s
= M
f(s)
. Since f(s)  s and M is conservative we
have M
f(s)
 M
s
so N
s
 M
s
. If there exists t  s + N such that M
t
 M
t+1
then N
t+1
=M
f(t+1)
=M
t
M
t+1
. 2
This observation and the previous lemma allow us to conclude that for each
formula there is a time point such that the minimal models of the formula must
stabilize before this point. From now on we will again restrict ourselves to subjective
formulae.
Lemma 9.15 Suppose the propositional signature P consists of n atoms. If a con-
servative model M of signature P is a 
g
- minimal model of a subjective formula
' then it stabilizes on or before time point (2
n
  1)  2  depth(').
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Proof: First we will show that a minimal model M of ' cannot have more than
2 depth(') successive identical states before it stabilizes. SupposeM j=

g
' and it
has at least 2  depth(') + 1 successive identical states before it stabilizes. So there
exists s  depth(') such that M
s
= M
s+i
= M
s i
for all 1  i  depth('), and
t  s + depth(') such that M
t
 M
t+1
. Now consider the model N as described
in Lemma 9.13. Since M j= ' we have N j= ', and by Observation 9.14 we have
N 
g
M . ThereforeM cannot be a minimal model of '.
As P has n atoms, there exist 2
n
dierent propositional models. Since a conserva-
tive modelM consists of a decreasing sequence of (non-empty) sets of propositional
models, there are at most 2
n
  1 points s such that M
s
 M
s+1
. If M is a

g
-minimal model of ' then there can be at most 2  depth(') successive identical
states before it stabilizes, and therefore M must stabilize on or before time point
(2
n
  1)  2  depth('). 2
Lemma 9.16 Suppose P is nite. For a conservative modelM, s 2 N and a formula
' it is decidable whether (M; s) j= '.
Proof: Suppose we have a conservative modelM and s 2 N. By Observation 9.10,
M stabilizes at some point s
0
. It is easily seen from Lemma 9.12 that for a formula '
we have (M; t) j= ', (M; u) j= ' for all t; u  s
0
+ depth('). Then use induction
on '. 2
Most importantly, it is decidable if a model is a minimal model of a subjective
formula:
Lemma 9.17 Let P be nite. For a conservative modelM and a subjective formula
' it is decidable whether M j=

g
'.
Proof: First, we need to check whether M j= ', which is equivalent to checking
(M; 0) j= 2', which is decidable by Lemma 9.16. Suppose P has n atoms. If
M stabilizes after time point (2
n
  1)  2  depth(') it is not a minimal model of
' by Lemma 9.15. So suppose M j= ' and M stabilizes on or before time point
(2
n
  1)  2  depth(').
In order to check whetherM j=

g
' we have to see if there exists a conservative
model smaller (in the sense of 
g
) than M which satises '. Of course in general
there are an innite number of conservative models smaller than M , but we will
show that we only have to consider models which stabilize not later than time point
(2
n
  1)  (4  depth(') + 1). In other words, we will show that if there exists a
conservative model smaller than M satisfying ', there also exists such a model
which stabilizes on or before point (2
n
  1)  (4  depth(') + 1). The converse of this
statement is of course trivial.
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Suppose we have a conservative model N with N 
g
M and N j= ', and let s
be the stabilizing point of N . If s  (2
n
  1)  (4  depth(') + 1) then we are done,
so suppose not. Now consider the following procedure for constructing a model
N
0
: if there exists a sequence of more than 2  depth(') + 1 successive identical
states in N between time points (2
n
  1)  2  depth(') and s then we delete as
many points from this sequence until it has length 2  depth(') + 1. Lemma 9.13
ensures that we can do this without disturbing the truth of '. It is also easy to see
that the result is conservative and still (strictly) smaller than M. Let N
0
be the
model which results from applying this procedure for every such sequence. Then
N
0
j= ' and N
0

g
M. Let s
0
be the stabilizing point of N
0
. Then in N
0
there
are at most 2
n
  1 points t with (2
n
  1)  2  depth(')  t < s and N
0
t
 N
0
t+1
.
Between such points there are at most 2 depth(') + 1 identical states and therefore
s  (2
n
  1)  2 depth(') + (2
n
  1)  (2 depth(') + 1) = (2
n
  1)  (4 depth(') + 1).
It is easy to see that, given the nite signature, there are only a nite number of
conservative models which stabilize not later than time point (2
n
 1) (4 depth(')+
1). For each such model N we can check whether N 
g
M (only the rst (2
n
  1) 
(4  depth(') + 1) time points have to be considered), and we can check if N j= '
(again decidable). If we nd such a model thenM 6j=

g
', otherwiseM j=

g
'. 2
Now we are ready to prove decidability of entailment in MTEL:
Theorem 9.18 (Decidability of entailment in MTEL) For two subjective for-
mulae ';  it is decidable whether ' j=

g
 .
Proof: We can take the signature P to consist of the atoms occurring in ' and
 . Suppose there are n such atoms. Then Lemma 9.15 states that we only have to
consider models which stabilize not later than time point (2
n
  1)  2  depth('), and
since the signature is nite, there are only nitely many such models. For each such
model M it is decidable by Lemma 9.17 whether M j=

g
'. Now we only have to
check for each of these (nitely many) 
g
-minimal modelsM of ' whetherM j=  ,
which is decidable by Lemma 9.16. 2
Of course the procedure given in the proof is quite inecient.
Having established that both TELC and MTEL are decidable, in the next sec-
tion we will look at the complexity of these notions, and in particular whether the
minimization process has a structural impact on complexity.
9.1.3 Complexity
We will rst give a brief overview of the relevant concepts of complexity theory
needed in the rest of this subsection. This is meant as a reminder for the reader,
not as an introduction to this eld (see [Joh90] for a good introduction). Especially
the Polynomial Hierarchy (PH) will concern us here. The Polynomial Hierarchy is a
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hierarchy of classes of problems of increasing complexity. The two most well-known
complexity classes in PH are P and NP. The basic notion in dening complexity
classes is the Turing Machine (TM). The class P consists of all problems solvable by
a deterministic TM running in time polynomial in the length of the input. Problems
solvable by a non-deterministic TM running in polynomial time form the class NP.
For any complexity class C, the class co-C consists of the problems whose comple-
ment is in C. In order to dene the other classes in PH, we need the notion of
an oracle TM, which is a TM that has access to an oracle for a particular decision
problem: all instances of that problem can be solved in one time step by consulting
the oracle. Formally, if C is a complexity class then the class NP
C
consists of those
problems solvable by a nondeterministic TM with access to an oracle for a problem
in C, running in time polynomial in the input size. Now set:

P
0
= 
P
0
= P; and for k  0 :

P
k+1
= NP

P
k
and 
P
k+1
= co-
P
k+1
:
Note that 
P
1
= NP and 
P
1
= co-NP. For a problem p, if for any problem in class C
there is a polynomial transformation of that problem to p, then p is called C-hard.
If p is in C and is C-hard, it is called C-complete. If a C-hard problem can be
(polynomially) transformed to p, then p is also C-hard.
In order to study the complexity we will rst look at satisability of TELC.
Without loss of generality we restrict ourselves to satisability of subjective formulae
in time point 0. For future use we give the following denition. (Here O
i
stands for
a sequence of O operators of length i, where O 2 fP;H; F;G;2g. Furthermore O
0

stands for .)
Denition 9.19 For i 2 N dene at
i
:= P
i
>^H
i+1
?.
It is easy to see that (M; j) j= at
i
if and only if i = j.
Denition 9.20 (TELC(0)-SAT) A subjective formula ' is in TELC(0)-SAT if
there exists a TELC-modelM such that (M; 0) j= '.
Remark 9.21 It is easy to see that TELC(0)-SAT is polynomially reducible (and
vice versa) to satisability (in any time point): ' is satisable if and only if '_F' is
in TELC(0)-SAT , and ' is in TELC(0)-SAT if and only if 2(at
0
! ') is satisable.
Denition 9.22 (Size of a TELC-model) For a TELC-modelM we call its sta-
bilizing point the size of M, denoted size(M). If M does not stabilize then
size(M) =1.
Denition 9.23 (Subformula) Let Subf(') denote the subformulae of ', where
maximal S5-subformulae of ' are not further decomposed, and let SubfS5(') denote
the set of subformulae of ' which are in L
S5
.
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We give an example to clarify this denition: Subf(G(Kp ^ Kq)) = fG(Kp ^
Kq);Kp^Kqg and SubfS5(G(Kp^Kq)) = fKp^Kq;Kp;Kq; p; qg. So Subf(') [
SubfS5(') is the set of all subformulae of '.
First we will prove a small-model theorem for TELC. Let length(') denote the
length of the formula ' as a string.
Lemma 9.24 (Small model theorem)
If a subjective formula ' is in TELC(0)-SAT then there exists a TELC-model M
such that (M; 0) j= ', size(M)  4  (length('))
2
, and for all i 2 N the S5-model
M
i
contains not more than 2  length(') valuations.
Proof: We may take the signature P nite (in fact, we can take it to be the set
of atoms occurring in '). Let L
0
denote the propositional language based on P .
Suppose for some TELC-model N we have (N ; 0) j= ' and let s
N
be the stabilizing
point of N .
Now let A = f ;: j  2 SubfS5(') \ L
0
g and for i 2 N: B(i) = fK j  2
A;N
i
j= K g [ f:K j  2 A;N
i
6j= K g. Based on these sets we will dene a
TELC-model N
0
:
 For each :K 2 B(s
N
) choose a valuation m 2 Val(P ) such that m 6j=  and
m j=  for each K 2 B(s
N
) (such a valuation exists since (N ; s
N
) 6j= K and
(N ; s
N
) j= K for each K 2 B(s
N
)). Let M be the set of these valuations.
We have M j= B(s
N
). If there are no formulae :K 2 B(s
N
) then choose
any valuation m with m j=  for each K 2 B(s
N
) (which again exists). Set
N
0
j
= M for all j  s
N
. It easy to verify that N
0
j
j= B(j) for all j  s
N
.
 Now using induction on s
N
> j  0:
Let B(j) n B(j + 1) = f:K 
1
; : : : ;:K 
n
g (because N is conservative there
will be no formulae K in this set!). For k = 1 : : : n choose a valuation m
k
with m
k
6j=  
k
and m j=  for each K 2 B(j) (again such valuations exist).
Let N
0
j
= N
0
j+1
[ fm
1
; : : : ;m
k
g. It is again easy to verify that N
0
j
j= B(j).
The resulting model N
0
has the following properties:
1. N
0
is a TELC-model.
2. N
0
j
j= B(j) for all j 2 N.
3. The number of valuations of N
0
j
is smaller than the number of elements in A
( 2  length(')).
4. (N
0
; 0) j= ': take  2 Subf(')\L
S5
(which must be subjective!). Then using
a normal form described in [MH95] it is easy to see that  is equivalent to a
formula  
0
= 
1
_ : : : _ 
m
with for i = 1 : : :m : 
i
= K'
1;i
^ : : : ^K'
k(i);i
^
:K 
1;i
^ : : : ^ :K 
l(i);i
with '
j;k
;  
j;k
2 A. So using the second property we
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have:
N
0
i
j= K'
j;k
, N
i
j= K'
j;k
and
N
0
i
j= :K 
j;k
, N
i
j= :K 
j;k
so
N
0
i
j=  
0
, N
i
j=  
0
so N
0
i
j=  , N
i
j=  . An easy induction gives: for
all i 2 N, for all  2 Subf('): (N
0
; i) j=  , (N ; i) j=  and therefore
(N
0
; 0) j= '.
5. The number of i for which N
0
i
 N
0
i+1
is less than 2  length('): real changes
occur at most once for each :K with  2 A and A contains at most 2 
length(') elements.
Now construct the modelM as follows: for each sequence of more than 2depth(')+1
identical states in N
0
, before its stabilizing point, delete (as many) states from this
sequence until it has length 2  depth(') + 1. Let M be the resulting model. Now
Lemma 9.13 ensures that (M; 0) j= '. Furthermore 2  depth(') + 1  2  length(')
so that size(M)  (2  length('))
2
. 2
With this lemma we can show that TELC(0)-SAT is in NP, using methods similar
to those in e.g. [SC85], [Lad77]:
Theorem 9.25 TELC(0)-SAT is in NP.
Proof: For a subjective formula ' we present the following nondeterministic al-
gorithm to verify if ' is in TELC(0)-SAT. A nondeterministic Turing Machine M
guesses 4  (length('))
2
Kripke models M
i
with each not more than 2  length(')
valuations, such that M
i
 M
i+1
. Call this model M, remaining constant af-
ter time point 4  (length('))
2
. Then it veries if (M; 0) j= ' as follows: for each
i 2 f0; :::; 4 (length('))
2
+length(')g, M maintains a set label(i) which is initialized
to the empty set and at the end will contain the subformulae of ' true at time point
i. Now for each  2 Subf(') we do the following (starting with the S5- subformulae,
and treating  only if all of its subformulae have already been treated): for each
i 2 f0; :::; 4  (length('))
2
+ length(')g update label(i) as follows:
1. Add  2 L
S5
to label (i) iM
i
j=  (this can be checked in time polynomial in
number of states inM
i
, using a labeling algorithm similar to the one described
here, see e.g. [HM85a]).
2. Add : to label (i) i  =2 label (i).
3. Add  ^  to label(i) i  2 label (i) and  2 label (i).
4. Add F to label(i) i  2 label (j) for some j > i (If i = 4  (length('))
2
+
length(') then add F to label (i) i  2 label (i)).
5. Add P to label (i) i  2 label (j) for some j < i.
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Now we have (M; 0) j= ' if and only if ' 2 label(0) at the end of this procedure. It
is easy to verify that this algorithm works properly in time polynomial in length(').
Lemma 9.24 ensures that there is a guess for which M halts in an accepting state if
and only if ' is in TELC(0)-SAT. 2
This gives us:
Corollary 9.26 TELC satisability is NP-complete.
Proof: The reduction given in Remark 9.21 ensures that TELC satisability is in
NP, and clearly a propositional formula ' is satisable if and only if M' is TELC-
satisable, and as satisability of propositional formulae is NP-complete, TELC
satisability is also NP-complete. 2
We would like to show that the minimization of models makes the consequence
relation more complex, and we can do this using the reduction of Ground S5 to min-
imal conservative consequence, which will be described later (see Proposition 9.40).
Proposition 9.27 Entailment of MTEL (j=

g
) is 
P
3
-hard.
Proof: The reduction of Proposition 9.40 is clearly polynomial, and Ground S5 is

P
3
-complete [DNR97]. 2
So entailment in MTEL is harder than TELC-consequence (which is 
P
1
-complete,
or co-NP-complete), provided that the polynomial hierarchy does not collapse (see
[Joh90]).
In Chapters 6 and 7, execution and expressiveness of a sublanguage of L
TEL
,
consisting of theories of reasoning, is studied. We will now look at the complexity of
entailment in MTEL restricted to this language. As entailment is a relation between
formulae, we should consider nite theories of reasoning, and take the conjunction
of its elements. Furthermore, we also allow formulae that describe facts, of the form
K with  propositional (let L
0
be the propositional language). The conclusion
formula may be arbitrary (but subjective, of course).
Denition 9.28 The language L
0
is the smallest set such that:
1. If  2 L
0
then K 2 L
0
,
2. If ; ; ;  and ' 2 L
0
then H
0
(K)^H
0
(:K)^K^:F (K )! X(K') 2
L
0
, and
3. If ';  2 L
0
then ' ^  2 L
0
.
For ' 2 L
0
and  any subjective TEL-formula, we dene ' j=
ttr

g
 if and only if
' j=

g
 .
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Since we can reduce sceptical consequence of default logic to this fragment (see
Theorem 5.5) and sceptical consequence is 
P
2
-complete (see [Got92], [Sti92], see
also [PS92]), j=
ttr

g
is 
P
2
-hard. However, it is no harder than that:
Proposition 9.29 j=
ttr

g
is 
P
2
-complete.
Proof: We will describe a nondeterministic Turing Machine M with access to an
NP-oracle for determining whether not ' j=
ttr

g
 (similar to the proofs in [Sti92],
[PS92] or [Got92]). A minimal model of ' can have no identical states before it
stabilizes. For each conjunct H
0
(K) ^H
0
(:K) ^K ^ :F (K)! X(K) in ' ,
M guesses a time point i  1 but less than the number n of these conjuncts, from
which time onwards  will be assumed to hold (or it guesses that  will never hold).
Denote for i 2 f0; : : : ; ng, the set of formulae assumed to hold at i plus the formulae
 for which there is a conjunct K in ', by A(i). Then M uses the NP- oracle to
perform the following:
1. Let f() be the point from which  is assumed to hold (so f() 2 f1; : : : ; n;1g).
Now it checks for all i 2 f1; : : : ; ng if fK j f()  ig [ f:K j f() > ig is
S5- satisable (using the oracle; note that S5-satisability is in NP). If not, it
halts in a rejecting state (the guess does not induce a TELC-model).
2. For each conjunct H
0
(K)^H
0
(:K)^K^:F (K)! X(K) and for each
time point i 2 f0; : : : ; ng it computes whether A(0) j= , whether A(0) 6j= ,
whether A(i) j=  and whether for no i < j  n, A(j) j= , using the NP-
oracle. If this is true for no time point then it checks whether  is assumed
never to hold; otherwise it takes the rst such point and checks whether  is
assumed to hold from the next time point on. If these conditions are violated
then M halts in a rejecting state (the guess does not induce a minimal model
of ').
3. It checks if the induced TELC-model satises  using a labeling algorithm
similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 9.25, and using the NP-oracle for
checking whether A(i) j= K for the base case. If this is the case then in this
minimal model of ',  holds, so M halts in a rejecting state (the guess does
not induce a minimal model of ' in which  fails). Otherwise it halts in an
accepting state (the guess induces a minimal model of ' in which  does not
hold).
This nondeterministic algorithm is polynomial in ' and  (using an NP-oracle for
propositional consequence and S5-satisability) so the converse of j=
ttr

g
is in 
P
2
which implies that j=
ttr

g
is in 
P
2
. Together with 
P
2
-hardness this gives the desired
result. 2
Apart from default logic, sceptical consequence relations of many other well-
known nonmonotonic logics such as McDermott and Doyle's nonmonotonic logic,
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autoepistemic logic and nonmonotonic logic N are 
P
2
-complete ([Got92]) which
means that we can reduce these relations to MTEL entailment (or even j=
ttr

g
), using
a polynomial reduction (autoepistemic logic was translated into MTEL* earlier).
Further research is needed to nd these reductions.
We would also like to have an upper bound on the complexity of MTEL entail-
ment. In order to get this, we need to sharpen some previous lemmas. Lemma 9.15
gave an upper bound on the size of minimal models of ', but it is not polynomial in
the length of '. We already know that the length of a sequence of identical states in
a minimal model is polynomially bounded, so we will try to nd a polynomial bound
on the number of transitions between non-identical states in a minimal model. The
key is that in a minimal model of ', after such a transition occurs, the agent will
know (at least) one of the subformulae of ' he did not know before. In fact, a
minimal model of ' is uniquely determined by the subformulae of ' which are true
at any moment in time. We will now make this formal.
Denition 9.30 For a subjective formula ', dene A(') = f ;: j  2 L
0
\
SubfS5(')g. A TELC-model M of ' is called based on ' (abbreviated bo(')) if
there exist sets A(i) for each i 2 N with A(0)  A(1)  : : :  A(') and M
i
=
Mod (A(i)) = fm 2 Val(P ) j m j= A(i)g.
Lemma 9.31 Suppose P is nite. If M j=

g
' then M is bo(') and size(M) 
4  (length('))
2
.
Proof: SupposeM is not based on '. Dene A(i) = f j  2 A(') and M
i
j= Kg
and let N
i
= Mod(A(i)). Clearly A(0)  A(1)  : : :  A(') so N is a TELC-model
and N 
g
M. Furthermore, for all  2 L
0
\ SubfS5(') we haveM
i
j= K, N
i
j=
K and M
i
j= M , N
i
j= M, so using the same argument as in the proof of
Lemma 9.24 we have N j= '. This contradicts the assumption that M j=

g
', so
M is based on '. But then the number of changes in M (the points i 2 N where
M
i
M
i+1
) cannot be larger than the number of elements of A(') and in-between
such updates there cannot be sequences of identical states longer than 2depth(')+1
so size(M)  4  (length('))
2
. 2
Notice that a model M based on ' can equivalently be described by giving for
each formula in A(') the time point at which it is known in M , or `innity' if this
is never the case. We have a similar result for models which refute that M is a
minimal model of ':
Lemma 9.32 If M j= ' but M 6j=

g
', then there exists a TELC-model N such
thatN 
g
M ,N j= ' andN is based on ' with size(N )  size(M)+4(length('))
2
.
Proof: Suppose M j= ' but M 6j=

g
' then there is a TELC-model M
0
with
M
0

g
M and M
0
j= '. In the same way as in the proof of Lemma 9.31 we
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can make a model M
00
which is a model of ' based on ' and M
00

g
M
0
. Now
from any sequence of identical states in M
00
after size(M) but before size(M
00
)
with length more than 2  depth(') + 1 we can delete states until it has length
2  depth(') + 1. Let N be the resulting model (this construction is the same
as the one used in the proof of Lemma 9.17). So we have N 
g
M , N j= '
and N is based on '. Furthermore, N has less than 2  length(') updates, and
sequences between size(M) and size(N ) have length no greater than 2 depth(')+1,
so size(N )  size(M) + 2  length(')  2  length(') = size(M) + 4  (length('))
2
. 2
Lemma 9.33 Deciding for a formula ' and a modelM based on ' whetherM j=

g
' is in 
P
2
.
Proof: We assume the modelM encoded as described in the remark after Lemma
9.31: there is a function f : A(') ! N [ f1g such that f() gives the time point
from which  is known. We will show that deciding whether M 6j=

g
' is in 
P
2
by
describing a nondeterministic Turing Machine M with access to an NP-oracle. Let
size(M) = max(f [A(')] n f1g) (if f [A(')] = f1g, then let size(M) = 0). First we
check if size(M)  4  (length('))
2
; if not we halt in an accepting state. Otherwise
we use a labeling algorithm as described earlier to check if M j= '. The range of
time points we have to check is from 0 to size(M) + length('). The subformulae
in Subf(') \ L
S5
are treated as follows: for such a formula  and time point i it
is checked (using the NP- oracle) if fK j f()  ig [ f:K j f() > ig j=
S5
.
If so,  is added to label (i), otherwise not. If M 6j= ', M halts in an accepting
state (certainly M 6j=

g
'). Otherwise M guesses a TELC- model N by guessing a
function g : A(')! N [ f1g such that:
1. f()  g(),
2. either g()  size(M) + 4  (length('))
2
or g() =1, and
3. for at least one  2 A(') we have g() > f().
Then it checks for i 2 f0; : : : ; size(M) + 4  (length('))
2
g whether fK j g() 
ig[ f:K j g() > ig is S5-consistent, using the oracle. If not, we halt in a rejecting
state (g does not describe a TELC-model). Otherwise we know that g induces a
TELC-model N with N 
g
M (if such a guess is not possible then we halt in a
rejecting state because M j=

g
'). Next we use the labeling algorithm to check if
N j= '; if not we halt in a rejecting state, otherwise in an accepting state: N is a
smaller model of '. It is clear that the algorithm works in polynomial time (using
the NP-oracle).
Lemma 9.32 ensures that there is a guess for which M halts in an accepting state
if and only if M 6j=

g
'. Thus deciding if M 6j=

g
' is in 
P
2
so the complement is
in 
P
2
. 2
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Theorem 9.34 Deciding whether ' j=

g
 is in 
P
3
.
Proof: We will show that deciding whether not ' j=

g
 is in 
P
3
by giving a
nondeterministic Turing Machine M with access to an oracle for a problem in 
P
2
.
First M guesses a TELC-model M based on ' by guessing a function f : A(') !
N[f1g such that for all  2 A(') either f()  4(length('))
2
or f() =1. Then it
checks for i 2 f0; : : : ; 4  (length('))
2
g whether fK j f()  ig[f:K j f() > ig is
S5-consistent, using the oracle. If not it halts in a rejecting state (f does not induce
a TELC-model). Now it uses the 
P
2
-oracle to determine ifM j=

g
'. If not it halts
in a rejecting state. Otherwise it uses a labeling algorithm to check if M j=  (as
in the proof of the previous lemma, using the 
P
2
-oracle for S5-consequence); if this
is true M halts in a rejecting state, otherwise in an accepting state. The algorithm
works in polynomial time, and Lemma 9.31 ensures there is a guess for which M
halts in an accepting state if and only if not ' j=

g
 . So as this is in 
P
3
, the
complement is in 
P
3
. 2
Combining this with Proposition 9.27, we immediately get:
Corollary 9.35 Entailment in MTEL (j=

g
) is 
P
3
-complete.
9.1.4 Conclusions and related work
In this section, we gave Hilbert-style axiomatizations for the logics TEL and TELC,
and showed MTEL to be decidable. Furthermore, the computational complexity of
these logics was investigated. The minimization process of MTEL really makes the
consequence relation more complex: TELC is co-NP-complete, whereas MTEL is

P
3
-complete. If we restrict the antecedent to theories of reasoning, the consequence
relation of MTEL is 
P
2
-complete (and 
P
2
is the complexity class where consequence
relations of many nonmonotonic formalisms, such as default logic and auto-epistemic
logic, reside).
The fact that the interaction between the epistemic part and the temporal part
is very limited in TELC (only conservativity provides such a link) allowed us to
use techniques from [FG92]. It probably also accounts for the fact that TELC is no
harder than its constituent logics (S5 is co-NP-complete, and so is the linear temporal
logic with only F and P ), an eect also noted in [HV89]. This latter publication
lists a number of complexity results for logics of knowledge and time (varying the
number of agents, the language | both temporal and epistemic operators | and
some other parameters).
In further research, the eect of extensions of TELC and MTEL on the com-
plexity can be investigated. Such extensions include allowing more agents, dropping
conservativity, adding temporal operators such as Next or Until, taking another
epistemic logic (such as S4), adding observations and communications, etc. Further-
more, we would like to nd a deduction system for MTEL, possibly in the same way
as was done for Ground S5 ([EV98]).
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9.2 Monotonicity and persistence in preferential
logics
The logic MTEL we have studied before, is easily seen to be nonmonotonic: it holds
that Kp j=

g
:Kq but Kp ^ Kq 6j=

g
:Kq. This nonmonotonicity is a general
feature of so-called preferential logics, of which MTEL belongs: it consists of a
class of models (conservative TEL-models) and a preference relation (
g
) between
them. The current section explores the relationship between preferential logics and
monotonicity restricted to subsets of the language.
9.2.1 Restricted monotonicity
Over the past decades, many non-classical logics for Articial Intelligence have been
dened and investigated. The need for such logics arose from the unsuitability of
classical logics to describe defeasible reasoning. These classical logics are monotonic,
which means that their consequence relation (j

) satises:
8; ; ' : ( j

 )  ^ ' j

) (Monotonicity)
This means that whenever we learn new information (') and add this to what
we already know (), all the old theorems () are still derivable. This is clearly
undesirable when describing defeasible reasoning. Therefore, monotonicity is not
satised by many logics for Articial Intelligence.
On the other hand, monotonicity is a very attractive feature from a practical
point of view. When learning new information, we do not have to start all over
again, but we can retain our old conclusions, and focus on deriving possible new
ones. Furthermore, when we have a lot of information, we are allowed to focus
on only part of it. Conclusions derived from this part are then automatically also
valid when considering all the information we have (this is sometimes called local
reasoning).
Even though it is clear that we do not want monotonicity to hold in general for
logics for defeasible reasoning, it might be worthwhile to investigate restricted vari-
ants of monotonicity. In the past, such variants have been dened which allow us to
keep the old theorems, when either the new information follows from the old premise
(this variant is called Cautious Monotonicity in [KLM90], see also Section 9.3) or
its negation can not be derived from the old premise (this is called Rational Mono-
tonicity in [KLM90]).
We will take a somewhat dierent perspective, and consider two classes of formu-
lae: the class of formulae that can always be added to a premise without invalidating
old conclusions (we say these formulae respect monotonicity), and the class of formu-
lae which can always be retained as conclusions, no matter which new information
is added to the premise (we say these formulae are conservative). The advantages
of monotonicity sketched above would still hold when we restrict ' to the class
of formulae that respect monotonicity, or when we restrict  to be conservative.
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Whether such classes exist, and what these classes are, depends of course on the
particular nonmonotonic logic considered. We will focus here on an important class
of nonmonotonic logics: the class of preferential logics [Sho87, Sho88]. These log-
ics are based on a monotonic logic (such as propositional logic, predicate logic or
modal logic) augmented with a preference order on its models. The nonmonotonic
consequences of a formula  are those formulae which are true in all models of 
which are minimal in the preference order among all models of , analogously to
the denition of MTEL (an extensive discussion of preferential logics is provided in
[Ben89]). We will give a formal denition.
Denition 9.36 (Preferential logic) A preferential logic consists of a language
L, a class of models Mod together with a satisfaction relation j= between models
and formulae, and a partial order  on Mod. A model m 2 Mod is called a minimal
model of a formula  (denoted m j=

) if m j=  and for all models n, if n  m
and n j=  then n = m. Preferential entailment (j=

) between formulae is dened
as follows for ;  2 L :  j=

 if  is true in all minimal models of .
Our presentation uses a partial order, i.e., a reexive, antisymmetric and transi-
tive relation, as the preferential logics dened in Section 4.4 have these properties.
Shoham [Sho87] uses a strict partial order, i.e., an irreexive transitive relation, with
a slightly dierent notion of minimal model. The presentations can be translated
into each other.
It will turn out that formulae whose truth is preserved when going to more
preferred or less preferred models, play an important role with respect to the two
classes of formulae dened above (the class of formulae that respect monotonicity,
and the class of conservative formulae). We will rst give a denition.
Denition 9.37 (Persistence) Given a preferential logic (L;Mod; j=;), a for-
mula  2 L is called downward persistent in this logic, if
8m;n 2 Mod : (m j=  and n  m)) n j= ;
and it is called upward persistent if
8m;n 2 Mod : (n j=  and n  m)) m j= :
In the next subsection, we will introduce some preferential logics to illustrate the
material in the rest of this section.
9.2.2 Some preferential logics
The logic MTEL is easily seen to be a preferential logic in the sense of Denition 9.36.
In this subsection, we will describe two more preferential logics: Ground S5 and
circumscription. Since we have already dened preferential entailment in general,
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for each logic we only have to give its ingredients, i.e., L;Mod; j=, and . The
preferential entailment relation is then xed by Denition 9.36. We will rst consider
Ground S5.
Ground S5
Ground S5 is a nonmonotonic modal logic for autoepistemic reasoning, originally
proposed by Halpern and Moses [HM85b]. Their aim was to formalize statements
of the form \I only know '". It allows, for example, to derive that an agent which
only knows p, does not know q. Ground S5 falls into the general scheme of ground
nonmonotonic modal logics [DNR97]. A lot of interest is devoted to logics of minimal
knowledge, see for example [Lev90, ST94, Che97, Hal97].
Semantically, states in which an agent only knows ', are states in which ' is
known, but otherwise the amount of knowledge is minimal. We will use a modal
propositional language to express the knowledge of the agent, and S5 will be the
monotonic logic. We will give a treatment of Ground S5 slightly dierent, but
equivalent to the one given in [HM85b].
The language of Ground S5 consists of the subjective formulae of S5, and the
models are the normal S5-models described in Subsection 4.1.1.
A subjective formula describes the knowledge of an agent, but we want to for-
malize that this is all the agent knows. Therefore we are looking for models in which
the knowledge of the agent is minimal, or in other words, in which the ignorance of
the agent is maximal. But this is formalized exactly by the ordering  on IS
ep
intro-
duced in Denition 2.5. To summarize, we will give a formal denition of Ground
S5.
Denition 9.38 (Ground S5) Ground S5 is the preferential logic with the sub-
jective formulae of L
S5
as its language, the set of normal S5-models as its class of
models, the satisfaction relation j=
S5
and the ordering  of Denition 2.5. We will
denote preferential entailment (as dened in Denition 9.36) of Ground S5 by j=
GS5
.
The reader can now check that, for instance, Kp j=
GS5
:Kq. The (unique)
minimal S5-model of Kp consists of all propositional valuations in which p is true,
and this indeed contains a model in which q is false. The entailment relation is
nonmonotonic since Kp^Kq 6j=
GS5
:Kq. Another example illustrates the minimality
of the agent's knowledge: Kp _Kq j=
GS5
:(Kp ^Kq).
Let us dene a consequence relation j

by ' j

 if K' j=
GS5
K . Then it
turns out that this is the consequence relation of [HM85b], apart from the fact that
Halpern and Moses only dened it for premises which have a unique minimal model.
Premises with a unique minimal model are called honest. To give an example, the
formula Kp is honest, but Kp _ Kq is not: both the S5-model consisting of all
valuations in which p is true, and the model with all valuations in which q is true,
are minimal models.
Our logic MTEL can now be seen as a `temporalization' of Ground S5: the
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knowledge (or beliefs) of the agent are minimized; in Ground S5 only the knowledge
at one xed instance in time is minimized, whereas in MTEL all knowledge over
time is minimized. Ground S5 indeed subsumes MTEL in the sense that we can
(trivially) embed Ground S5 in MTEL. Before showing this more formally, we will
rst slightly alter the denition of MTEL. The reason is that we will later make the
general assumption on preferential logics that the language contains negation, and
that m j= :' if and only if m 6j= ' (Assumption 9.42). This is not the case for
the notion of satisfaction of a formula in a model, M j= ', used in the denition of
MTEL. Therefore we will use (M; 0) j= ' for satisfaction in a model.
Denition 9.39 (Anchored MTEL) In this section we dene satisfaction of a
formula ' in a TELC-model M, which we will denote as M j= ', by (M; 0) j= '.
Let TCIS denote the set of TELC-models. In this section, MTEL is the preferential
logic which uses the subjective TEL-formulae as its language, TCIS as the class of
models, satisfaction of a formula in a model as above, and 
g
as its ordering.
We could call this variant MTEL
0
, but in order to keep the notation clean, we will
refer to the variant used in this section again simply as MTEL. The two denitions
can be translated into each other, since (M; 0) j= ' if and only if (M; t) j= :P> ! '
for all t 2 N and (M; t) j= ' for all t 2 N if and only if (M; 0) j= ' ^ G'. The
assumption leading to the altered denition of MTEL is also one of the reasons we
gave a slightly dierent presentation of Ground S5 (using subjective formulae).
We can now prove the following.
Proposition 9.40 (Ground S5 in MTEL) Let ' and  be subjective S5-formu-
lae. Then
' j=
GS5
 , ' j=

g
 :
Proof: If M is an S5-model which is a minimal model of ' in Ground S5, then the
model M dened by M
s
= M for all s 2 N can easily be seen to be a 
g
-minimal
model of '. On the other hand, any 
g
-minimal model M of ' must be constant,
and M
0
is then a minimal model of ' in Ground S5. From these two observations,
which are not hard to prove, the proposition follows in a straightforward manner. 2
Circumscription
One of the earliest approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning is circumscription [McC77,
McC80, Dav80a, Lif94, Eth88], a preferential logic based on rst-order predicate
logic. The main idea behind circumscription is a kind of completeness of informa-
tion given to us: \the premises as stated give us `the whole truth' about the matter"
[Ben89]. This leads to at least two kinds of minimality: predicate-minimality and
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domain-minimality. The intuition behind predicate-minimality is that for some rel-
evant property (predicate), all objects that have this property are explicitly said
to have this property in the premise. This allows us to formulate defaults stating
that all normal objects have some property. Minimizing abnormality will allow us
to conclude an object has this property, unless we can deduce from the premise
that this object is abnormal. The intuition behind domain-minimality, is that the
domain (of discourse) contains no other objects than those that can be deduced to
exist from the premise. (This intuition is strongly tied to the domain-closure as-
sumption of [Rei80a].) These two kinds of minimality are formalized by two variants
of circumscription. Both of them will be treated below.
The classical logic underlying circumscription is rst-order predicate logic. We
assume a standard rst-order language L with a nite number of predicate symbols,
including equality. We will also assume that the language contains no function or
constant symbols. This is not a severe limitation, since we can eliminate function
and constant symbols by introducing new predicate symbols (see [Dav80a]). We
will rst give the denition of the orderings and then dene predicate and domain
circumscriptive consequence.
Denition 9.41
1. Let P be a predicate symbol in the language L. For a structure M for the
language, P
M
denotes the interpretation of P in M (so P
M
is a subset of
dom(M)
n
, where dom(M) is the domain of M , and n is the arity of P ). For
two structures M;N , we say M is P -preferred to N , denoted M 
P
N , if they
have the same domain, the same interpretation of predicate symbols other
than P , and P
M
 P
N
. Predicate circumscription of P is the preferential
logic which uses rst-order predicate logic for the language, models and satis-
faction relation, augmented with the ordering 
P
. We will denote preferential
entailment (as dened in Denition 9.36) in this logic by j=
PC
P
.
2. For two structures M;N for the language L, we say N is a substructure of
M , denoted N 
d
M , if the domain of N is a subset of the domain of M ,
and the interpretation of each predicate symbol in N is the restriction of the
corresponding interpretation in M to dom(N). Domain circumscription is
the preferential logic which uses rst-order predicate logic for the language,
models and satisfaction relation, augmented with the ordering 
d
. We will
denote preferential entailment in this logic by j=
DC
.
3. If we restrict the model class to nite structures, the resulting preferential logics
are called nite predicate circumscription and nite domain circumscription.
We refer the reader to the references given above for standard results and moti-
vation of circumscription.
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9.2.3 Respecting monotonicity
In this subsection we will study formulae which respect monotonicity. We will rst
make some basic assumptions about the (underlying logic of the) preferential logic.
Assumption 9.42 From now on we will assume that any preferential logic satises
the following:
 the language has conjunction (^) and m j= ' ^  , m j= ' and m j=  .
 the language has implication (!) and m j= '!  , m 6j= ' or m j=  .
 the language has negation (:) and m j= :', m 6j= '.
Note that Ground S5, MTEL (the anchored version) and both versions of circum-
scription satisfy these assumptions (for Ground S5 it is essential that the language
only contains subjective formulae).
We will now give a formal denition of respecting monotonicity.
Denition 9.43 (Respecting monotonicity) Given a preferential logic, we say
a formula ' respects monotonicity, if
8;  :  j=

 )  ^ ' j=

:
We can immediately identify a class of formulae that respect monotonicity:
Proposition 9.44 Downward persistent formulae respect monotonicity.
Proof: Suppose ' is downward persistent. Let ;  be formulae and suppose
 j=

. Let m be a minimal model of ^'. Then it is also a minimal model of .
For suppose it is not, then there exists n  m, n 6= m and n j= . Since m j= ' and
' is downward persistent, we have n j= '. But then n j=  ^ ' which contradicts
the assumption that m was a minimal model of  ^ '. Since m is a minimal model
of  and  j=

, we have m j= . We have proved that  ^ ' j=

. Thus, '
respects monotonicity. 2
Of course, both valid and unsatisable sentences are downward persistent. But
the question is whether non-trivial downward persistent formulae exist. For the
preferential logics introduced in Subsection 9.2.2, the answer is armative.
Denition 9.45 (DIAM) Dene the class of S5-formulae DIAM by:
DIAM ::= M(') j DIAM ^ DIAM j DIAM _ DIAM jM(DIAM)
where ' is propositional.
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Formulae from DIAM essentially only contain the M operator (the `diamond' of
S5, and not the `box' operator K). Formulae in this class are the only subjective
formulae (up to equivalence) which are downward persistent in Ground S5.
Theorem 9.46 A subjective S5-formula ' is downward persistent in Ground S5 if
and only if it is S5-equivalent to a formula in DIAM.
Proof: Using Proposition 4.3 it is easy to see that a formula equivalent to one in
DIAM is downward persistent in Ground S5. So suppose ' is downward persistent.
Then we may restrict the signature P to be nite. If there is no S5-modelM such that
M j=
S5
', then ' is S5-equivalent to the formula M(p ^ :p) 2 DIAM. So suppose
such a model M exists. Then let A = minfN  Val(P ) j N 6= ; and N j=
S5
'g,
where for a set B of S5-models, minB = fN 2 B j there is no M 2 B such that M is
a proper subset of Ng. For m 2 Val(P ), dene 
m
:=
V
fp j p 2 P;m j= pg^
V
f:p j
p 2 P;m 6j= pg and for an S5-model N , '
N
=
V
fM
m
j m 2 Ng. It is easy to see
that for an S5-model M we have that N M if and only if M j=
S5
'
N
. Finally, let
 =
_
f'
N
j N 2 Ag:
Then  is in DIAM, and  is equivalent to ':
 Suppose that N j=
S5
'. Then there exists an M 2 A with M  N , so
N j=
S5
'
M
and therefore N j=
S5
 .
 Suppose that N j=
S5
 . Then there must be an M 2 A such that N j=
S5
'
M
,
so that M  N and M j=
S5
'. But as ' is downward persistent, this means
that N j=
S5
'.
We have proved that N j=
S5
 , N j=
S5
', and as both formulae are subjective,
this implies that they are S5-equivalent. 2
So in Ground S5 there is a non-empty class of downward persistent formulae,
that respect monotonicity by Proposition 9.44. Essentially, these formulae only say
something about the ignorance of the agent.
One might think that formulae from DIAM are completely uninteresting, and
never yield any new insights in Ground S5. The converse of monotonicity for these
formulae,  ^ ' j=
GS5
 )  j=
GS5
, however, does not hold, even when ' is
consistent with . We do not have that Kp_Kq j=
GS5
Kq, whereas we do have that
(Kp_Kq)^M(:p) j=
GS5
Kq with M(:p) 2 DIAM. So knowledge of ignorance can
be useful.
An analogous result holds for minimal temporal epistemic logic.
Denition 9.47 (TD)
1. Dene
TD ::= DIAM j TD ^ TD j TD _ TD j F (TD) j G(TD) j P (TD) j H(TD):
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2. For two subjective TEL-formulae ';  :
' 
0
 ,
def
for all TELC-modelsM : (M; 0) j= ', (M; 0) j=  :
TD stands for `temporal diamond' formulae. As was the case for Ground S5, in
MTEL too TD contains all downward persistent formulae, up to equivalence.
Theorem 9.48 In MTEL, a formula ' is downward persistent if and only if it is
equivalent (in the sense of 
0
) to a formula in TD.
Proof: For a subjective (!) formula ' in TD one can easily prove that for all
TELC-modelsM;N and i 2 N : if M
g
N and (N ; i) j= ' then (M; i) j= '. This
implies that a formula equivalent (in the sense of 
0
) to one in TD is downward
persistent.
Suppose ' is a subjective downward persistent formula. We will construct its
equivalent in TD. If there is no TELC-model M such that (M; 0) j= ' then ' is

0
-equivalent to ?. Note that ? is equivalent to M(p ^ :p) which is a subjective
formula in TD. We may again restrict the signature P to the atoms occurring in
'. Suppose the propositional signature P has r atoms. For a set of TELC-models
B dene maxB = fM 2 B j there is no N 2 B with M 
g
Ng. If there is a
TELC-modelM such that (M; 0) j= ', then we dene A = maxfM j (M; 0) j= 'g.
Suppose (M; 0) j= ' and M stabilizes after time point (2
r
  1)  (2  depth(') + 1).
Then we can delete points in sequences of more than (2  depth(') + 1) identical
states before the stabilizing point, without disturbing the truth of '. If we do
this for each such a sequence we end up with a model of ' which is larger (with
respect to 
g
) thanM and stabilizes not later than (2
r
 1) (2 depth(')+1). Thus:
A = maxfM j (M; 0) j= ' andM stabilizes not later than (2
r
 1)(2depth(')+1)g.
As the set we take the maximal elements of, is non-empty and nite and the relation

g
on TELC-models is transitive and irreexive, A is non-empty and nite. Note
that the argument used here (for maximal models) is similar to the one used for
minimal models in the proof of Lemma 9.15: there the idea was that a model which
is too long can be enlarged (yielding a smaller model with respect to 
g
), whereas
here the idea is that if a model is too long, it can be reduced (yielding a bigger model
with respect to 
g
).
Suppose Val(P ) = fm
1
; : : : ;m
n
g (with of course n = 2
r
). Again dene for
j = 1 : : : n : 
j
:=
V
fp j p 2 P;m
j
j= pg ^
V
f:p j p 2 P;m
j
6j= pg. Now dene for
i = 1 : : : n and for a TELC-model M :
n(i;M) = supfj 2 N j m
i
2 M
j
g where sup ; =  1:
Let
 (i;M) =
8
<
:
2(at
n(i;M)
!M
i
) if n(i;M) 2 N
2(M
i
) if n(i;M) =1
> if n(i;M) =  1
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(Note that > is equivalent to M(p _ :p)). Furthermore, dene  
M
=
V
f (i;M) j
i = 1 : : : ng. Now it can easily be proven that (N ; 0) j=  
M
, N 
g
M : the
formulae  (i;M) make sure that the valuation m
i
is in N
t
at least until the last
time point s for which m
i
is in M
s
. Finally, dene:
 =
_
f 
M
j M 2 Ag:
Then  is in TD and ' 
0
 :
 Suppose (M; 0) j= '. Then there exists N 2 A withM
g
N (!), so (M; 0) j=
 
N
and (M; 0) j=  .
 Suppose (M; 0) j=  . Then there existsN 2 Awith (M; 0) j=  
N
, soM
g
N
and as N 2 A we have (N ; 0) j= ', and ' was downward persistent, so
(M; 0) j= '.
2
As in the case of Ground S5, these formulae express (temporal) ignorance of the
agent.
Denition 9.49 (Positive and universal formulae) A rst-order predicate for-
mula is negative in a predicate P , if all occurrences of the predicate P are in the
scope of an odd number of negations. A formula is universal if it is of the form
8x
1
: : : x
n
 where  is quantier free.
The following result links these formulae to downward persistence in circumscrip-
tion. The rst is a variant of Lyndon's theorem and is folklore (we leave the details
to the reader); the second result is known as the  Los-Tarski theorem (Theorem 3.2.2
in [CK90]).
Theorem 9.50
1. A rst-order predicate formula ' is downward persistent in predicate circum-
scription (of P ) if and only if it is equivalent to a formula that is negative in
P .
2. A rst-order predicate formula ' is downward persistent in domain circum-
scription if and only if it is equivalent to a universal formula.
So downward persistent formulae in predicate circumscription essentially only say
something about elements not having property P (besides the other properties they
mention), and downward persistent formulae in domain circumscription essentially
only mention universal properties (and do not say anything about the existence of
objects).
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For our examples, we have shown that non-trivial classes of formulae that respect
monotonicity exist. The question is whether there are more such formulae, besides
those that are downward persistent. We will give a criterion that ensures that there
are no more formulae that respect monotonicity.
Denition 9.51 (Expressibility of preference) A preferential logic satises ex-
pressibility of preference if the following holds:
8m 2 Mod : 9'
m
2 L : 8n 2 Mod : (n j= '
m
, m  n):
The formula '
m
expresses: \I am less preferred than m," and describes ex-
actly those models which are larger in the preferential ordering. The criterion of
expressibility of preference poses a requirement on the expressiveness of the lan-
guage, given its semantics. We will prove that in preferential logics that satisfy
the condition in this denition, the downward persistent formulae are the only ones
that respect monotonicity. The above condition can be generalized by taking into
account equivalent models; we have not done this immediately as it makes things
rather cumbersome. If whenever n  m and m  k (where m  k means that m
and k satisfy the same formulae), there exists a model l such that l  n and l  k,
then we can generalize the condition to: 8m 2 Mod : 9'
m
2 L : 8n 2 Mod : (n j=
'
m
, 9k 2 Mod : m  k & k  n).
Theorem 9.52 (Only if : : : ) For a preferential logic that satises expressibility
of preference we have: if a formula respect monotonicity, then it is downward per-
sistent.
Proof: Suppose a formula ' is not downward persistent, then there exist models
m and n such that m j= ', n 6j= ' and n  m. Dene  = '
n
^ (' ! '
m
) and
 = :'. First we claim that  j=

. Since n  n, we have n j= '
n
, and as n 6j= '
we get n j= . Furthermore, for any model k, if k j=  then in particular k j= '
n
so n  k. Therefore, n is the only minimal model of , and since n 6j= ', we have
n j= . On the other hand,  ^ ' 6j=

: n  m so m j= '
n
and m  m so m j= '
m
from which we conclude that m j=  so m j=  ^ '. Furthermore, for any model k,
if k j=  ^ ', then k j= ' and k j= ' ! '
m
so k j= '
m
. From this it follows that
m  k, but this means that m is a (actually, the only) minimal model of  ^ ' and
m j= ' so m 6j= . We conclude that ' does not respect monotonicity, since we have
found formulae  and  such that  j=

 but  ^ ' 6j=

. 2
It may seem that the condition of expressibility of preference is too restrictive.
However, we will see that it is useful for the examples.
Proposition 9.53 For Ground S5, MTEL and nite predicate and domain circum-
scription, only downward persistent formulae respect monotonicity.
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Proof: Remark that all of these logics satisfy Assumption 9.42. First consider
Ground S5. Let us rst take the language to be nite (that is, P is nite). Take
any S5-model M . For each propositional valuation m, dene the formula 
m
by

m
=
V
fp 2 P j m j= pg ^
V
f:p j p 2 P;m 6j= pg. This is a well-dened formula
since P is nite. Now construct '
M
=
V
fK(:
m
) j m =2Mg, which is again a well-
dened formula since Val(P ) is nite. It can easily be seen that any S5-model N
satises '
M
if and only if M  N . So expressibility of preference is satised, whence
Theorem 9.52 ensures that only downward persistent formulae respect monotonicity
for this nite language. Now let P be arbitrary, and suppose ' in this language
respects monotonicity. Then it is easy to see that if we restrict the language to
atoms occurring in ', it still respects monotonicity, so it is downward persistent
in the restricted language. It follows easily that ' is also downward persistent in
the full language. Note the dierence with the formulae '
N
dened in the proof of
Theorem 9.46 which express \I am more preferred than N". The same holds for the
formulae '
M
below in relation to the formulae  
M
of the proof of Theorem 9.48.
For MTEL, the same considerations make it sucient to give a formula '
M
for
a nite language only, so let us take P nite. LetM be a TELC-model. Then every
S5-modelM(i) is a nite set of propositional valuations. Since the sequence fM(i)g
is decreasing with respect to set-inclusion (as M is conservative), there will be an
index k such that M(j) =M(k) for all j > k. Now dene:
'
M
=
^
f2(at
i
! '
M(i)
) j 0  i  kg;
where '
M(i)
is the formula as dened in the case of Ground S5 for the S5-model
M(i) . It is easy to show that N j= '
M
if and only if MN .
For nite circumscription, we need the more general denition of expressibility
of preference hinted at before (in rst-order logic, there may be equivalent models:
dierent models that satisfy the same rst-order formulae). Here we need not restrict
the language. In predicate circumscription, the required formula '
M
for a nite
structure M expresses: (i) the exact number of elements of the domain of M , (ii) for
which of these elements P holds, and (iii) for all other predicates Q it expresses for
which elementsQ holds, and for which its negation holds. In domain circumscription,
the required formula '
M
for a nite structure M expresses the fact that there are
(at least) as many elements as in M , and for each predicate Q, it expresses for which
of these elements Q holds, and for which elements its negation holds. 2
It is not possible to nd the required formula '
M
in (non-nite) circumscription
in general: for innite structures we are not in general able to express the number
of elements, and we can not describe the entire extensions of predicates in general.
Indeed, the above result does not hold for domain circumscription. It is still an open
question whether it holds for predicate circumscription.
Proposition 9.54 For domain circumscription, there exists a rst-order predicate
formula which respects monotonicity but is not downward persistent.
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Proof: Consider the rst-order language L = f<;=g, and let ' be a sentence
stating that < is a dense linear ordering without begin- or endpoint. This is a
complete theory (see Theorem 4 in [Rab77]), which means that for any  2 L, either
' j=  or ' j= :. Now suppose  j=
DC
. If ' j= : then  ^ ' is inconsistent,
so  ^ ' j=
DC
 trivially. Otherwise we have that ' j=  so  ^ ' is equivalent to
'. But it is easy to see that ' does not have a minimal model, so again we have
 ^ ' j=
DC
. However, ' is not downward persistent: it holds in the real numbers,
but not in the substructure of the natural numbers. 2
Until now we have considered formulae that can be added to any premise, but
we can also ask the question whether a formula respects monotonicity for a given,
xed premise.
Proposition 9.55 Given a preferential logic such that Mod is nite and for all
m 2 Mod there exists 
m
2 L such that n j= 
m
if and only if n = m, let  be a
xed formula in L. Then we have for all ' 2 L:
8 : ( j=

 )  ^ ' j=

), 8m 2 Mod : (m j=

 ^ ') m j=

):
Proof: The right to left direction is trivial (and does not depend on the assumption).
For the other direction, suppose that 8 : ( j=

 )  ^ ' j=

). Let m 2 Mod
be arbitrary and suppose m j=

 ^ '. Now dene  =
W
f
n
j n j=

g; this is a
well-dened formula since Mod was assumed nite. It is easy to see that  j=

:
suppose n j=

, then 
n
is one of the disjuncts of , and by denition of 
n
, we
have n j= 
n
, so n j= . But the assumption now gives that  ^ ' j=

. As
m j=

 ^ ', we have m j= , so there is an n 2 Mod with n j=

 and m j= 
n
.
But by denition of 
n
this means that m = n so m j=

. 2
Proposition 9.55 states that a formula ' respects monotonicity for a xed premise
 if and only if the minimal models of ^' are minimal models of . Of course the
criterion on the right-hand side is hard to check; we can give another criterion, but
for that, we rst need the following denition [KLM90]:
Denition 9.56 (Smoothness) A preferential logic is called smooth, if the follow-
ing holds:
8 2 L : 8m 2 Mod : (m j= ) 9n 2 Mod : n  m & n j=

):
This condition, which is also called stopperedness or well-foundedness, and is
akin to the limit assumption of [Lew73], forbids chains of ever-decreasing models
satisfying a formula. It is one of the basic properties in the framework of [KLM90].
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Proposition 9.57 Given a smooth preferential logic, we have:
8m 2 Mod : (m j=

 ^ ') m j=

)
if and only if
8m 2 Mod : (m j=  ^ ') 9n 2 Mod : (n  m;n j=

 and n j= ')):
The proof of this proposition is straightforward, and again it may not help much.
As far as the examples are concerned, the conclusion of Proposition 9.55 holds for
both Ground S5 and MTEL (the properties depend only on  and ' so we may re-
strict the signature and then use the proposition). Proposition 9.57 holds for Ground
S5 (which is smooth). From these propositions we can nd some sucient conditions.
If ' is downward persistent in the models of , then Proposition 9.55 ensures that
' respects monotonicity with respect to . If  j=

' then Proposition 9.57 ensures
that ' respects monotonicity with respect to  (but this also follows immediately
with the rule of Cautious Monotonicity, which is satised in smooth preferential
logics, [KLM90]). It seems hard to nd a simple criterion necessary and sucient
for respecting monotonicity for a given premise. We leave this for further research.
9.2.4 Conservativity
In the previous subsection we have considered formulae that can always be added
to a premise without invalidating any of the conclusions. In this subsection we will
focus on the conclusions, and study formulae that, when they are concluded, can
always be kept, no matter which new information is added to the premise. We will
call these formulae conservative.
Denition 9.58 (Conservative) Given a preferential logic, we say a formula  is
conservative, if
8; ' :  j=

 )  ^ ' j=

:
We have the following result connecting upward persistent and conservative for-
mulae, in analogy with Proposition 9.44.
Proposition 9.59 Given a preferential logic that is smooth, if a formula is upward
persistent, it is conservative.
Proof: Let  be upward persistent in a smooth preferential logic. Now suppose
 j=

 . Take any model m such that m j=

^', then m j=  so by smoothness,
there is a model n with n  m and n j=

. Then, as  j=

, we have n j= . Since
n  m and  is upward persistent, we have m j= . This shows that  ^ ' j=

,
so  is conservative. 2
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Again, we can ask if the upward persistent formulae are the only conservative
formulae, and this is true under the same conditions as in the case of respecting
monotonicity.
Proposition 9.60 (Only if : : : ) For a preferential logic that satises expressibil-
ity of preference we have: if a formula is conservative, then it is upward persistent.
Proof: Suppose  is not upward persistent, then there are n;m 2 Mod such that
n  m, and n j=  but m 6j= . Now take  = '
n
and ' = '
m
. Then n is the
only minimal model of  and n j=  so  j=

, but m is a (actually, the only one)
minimal model of  ^ ', and m 6j= , so  ^ ' 6j=

. Thus,  is not conservative.
2
Let us rst identify the upward persistent formulae for our examples. This is
relatively straightforward, since we have the following elementary result.
Proposition 9.61 For any preferential logic, ' is upward persistent if and only if
:' is downward persistent.
This gives us the following.
Proposition 9.62
1. Dene BOX ::= K(') j BOX ^ BOX j BOX _ BOX j K(BOX) with ' propo-
sitional. Then a subjective S5-formula ' is upward persistent in Ground S5 if
and only if it is S5-equivalent to a formula in BOX.
2. Dene TB ::= BOX j TB ^ TB j TB _ TB j F (TB) j G(TB) j P (TB) j H(TB).
Then a subjective TEL-formula ' is upward persistent in MTEL if and only
if it is equivalent (in the sense of 
0
) to a formula in TB.
3. A rst-order formula is upward persistent in predicate circumscription (of P ) if
and only if it is equivalent to a formula that is positive in P (meaning that all
occurrences of the predicate P are in the scope of an even number of negations).
A rst-order formula is upward persistent in domain circumscription if and only
if it is equivalent to an existential formula (a formula of the form 9x
1
: : : x
n
 
where  is quantier free).
Proof: Straightforward. 2
In the above denition, formulae from BOX essentially only contain the K op-
erator (the `box' of S5); TB stands for `temporal box' formulae. Now let us see
what Propositions 9.59 and 9.60 say about the examples. Ground S5 satises ex-
pressibility of preference (for a nite language) and is smooth, so the conservative
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formulae are exactly the upward persistent formulae, which express only knowledge
(and not ignorance). This can be lifted again to an innite language. The fact that
in Ground S5, formulae that express propositional knowledge, are conservative, was
already noted in [DNR97]. MTEL also satises expressibility of preference (for a
nite language), so any formula that is conservative, must be upward persistent,
and must be equivalent to a formula in TB, expressing knowledge over time (not
ignorance). This can be lifted to an innite language. Unfortunately, MTEL is not
smooth: the formula F (Kp) is satisable, but has no minimal model. In MTEL, we
have that F (Kp) j=

g
F (Kq), but F (Kp) ^ Kp 6j=

g
F (Kq) (F (Kp) ^ Kp has a
minimal model, in which only p is known, from the rst point in time onwards). This
means that the formula F (Kq) is not conservative, although it is upward persistent.
It is easy to see that in any preferential logic, valid formulae are always conservative,
but in MTEL, these are (almost) the only ones, as will be shown below.
Denition 9.63 We call a TEL-model M totally ignorant, if for all propositional
formulae ' we have: if M j= F (K') then ' is a propositional tautology. Dene the
totally ignorant model M
ti
by M
ti
(i) = Val(P ) for all i.
In a totally ignorant model, no knowledge is ever gained. The totally ignorant model
is certainly a totally ignorant model, and if P is nite, it is the only one.
Proposition 9.64 For MTEL, in case P is innite, we have that a formula is con-
servative if and only if it is true in all models. When P is nite, a formula is
conservative if and only if it is true in all models except possibly the totally ignorant
model.
Proof: We will prove that  is conservative if and only if it is true in all models that
are not totally ignorant (both when P is nite and when it is innite). First, suppose
M is a model that is not totally ignorant, in which  is not true. SoM j= F (K) for
some propositional formula  that is not a propositional tautology. If P is nite, we
can consider the formula '
M
(see the proof of Proposition 9.53 for the denition of
'
M
). If P is innite, one can show thatM can be chosen in such a way that it is an
`inherently nite' model, allowing the construction of a formula '
M
with the same
properties as for the case when P is nite (using essentially the same construction).
The details of this argument are left to the reader. The formula F (K) does not
have a minimal model ( must be known sometimes in the future, but this moment
can always be postponed, yielding a smaller model), so F (K) j=

g
. On the other
hand, it can easily be shown that the only minimal model of F (K) ^ '
M
is M ,
which gives us F (K) ^ '
M
6j=

g
. This means that  is not conservative.
Now suppose that  is true in all models that are not totally ignorant, and
suppose  j=

g
. LetM be a minimal model of ^'. IfM is not totally ignorant,
then M j= . If it is totally ignorant, then also M
ti
j=  ^ ' (it can be shown
by induction that all totally ignorant models satisfy the same formulae). But then
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M
ti
j= . Since no model is preferred over M
ti
, this means that M
ti
j=

 so
M
ti
j= , whence M j= . It follows that  ^ ' j=

g
, so  is conservative.
Let us look at the case when P is innite. Suppose M 6j= , with M totally
ignorant. Now take a propositional atom p not occurring in . It can easily be
shown that we can nd a model of Kp in which  is not satised. This model is of
course not totally ignorant. This shows that if  is true in all models that are not
totally ignorant, then it is true in all models. In case P is nite, M
ti
is the only
totally ignorant model. 2
So in MTEL with an innite P , valid formulae are the only conservative formulae.
These formulae are of course upward persistent (in a trivial way), and they are
equivalent to a formula in TB, for instance K(>). When the signature is nite,
there are some extra formulae that are conservative, for example if P = fp; qg, then
the formula F (K(p_ q) _K(:p_ q) _K(p_ :q) _K(:p _:q)) is also conservative
(it is true in all models except the totally ignorant one). Of course, this formula is
upward persistent, and it is in TB.
Finite predicate and domain circumscription satisfy both expressibility of pref-
erence and smoothness, so the conservative formulae coincide with the upward per-
sistent formulae which have the syntactic characterization of Proposition 9.62.
Full circumscription satises neither of the conditions.
Proposition 9.65 In predicate and domain circumscription there are upward per-
sistent formulae that are not conservative.
Proof: First consider predicate circumscription. Let the language consist of three
predicates besides equality, namely P , Succ (for `successor') and < (and P is cir-
cumscribed). Dene the formulae  and ' as follows:
 = 8x9!y(Succ(x; y))^ ' = 8xy(Px ^ Succ(y; x)! Py)
8x9!y(Succ(y; x))^
8xy(Succ(x; y)! x < y)^
8xyz(x < y ^ y < z ! x < z)^
8x(:(x < x))^
8xy(x < y _ y < x _ x = y)^
9xPx^
8xy(Px ^ Succ(x; y)! Py)
The intuitive meaning of  is that there are Succ-chains of elements, extending
innitely in both directions. If P occurs somewhere on such a chain, it must be
true in all successors as well. A model of  can be made smaller (more preferred) by
making P false in a point and all of its predecessors (leaving it true in all successors).
We will now make this argument formal. The rst claim is that  has no 
P
-
minimal models. Let M be a model of . Then there must be an x 2 dom(M) with
x 2 P
M
. Dene A = fxg [ fy 2 P
M
j (y; x) 2<
M
g. Let N be the structure with
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the same domain as M , the same extension of Succ and <, and P
N
= P
M
nA. It is
straightforward to verify that N is a model of , and that N 
P
M and N 6= M .
On the other hand,  ^ ' has minimal models. Let M be the structure with
dom(M) = Z (the integers), (a; b) 2 Succ
M
, b = a + 1, (a; b) 2<
M
, a < b in
the natural ordering on the integers, and P
M
= Z. It can easily be checked that
M j=  ^ '. Now suppose N 
P
M , N 6= M and N j=  ^ '. This means that
P
N
 Z (strict inclusion), and P
N
6= ; (as N j= 9xPx). But then there must be
x; y 2 Z with y = x + 1, and either x 2 P
N
and y =2 P
N
, or x =2 P
N
and y 2 P
N
,
contradicting either N j= 8xy(Px^Succ(x; y)! Py) (N j= ) or N j= '. Therefore
M is a minimal model of  ^ '.
Now dene  = 9x(x 6= x), which is trivially upward persistent. Since  has no
minimal models, we have  j=
PC
P
, but M 6j= , so  ^ ' 6j=
PC
P
. This shows that 
is not conservative.
For domain circumscription, the example is quite similar. Again take  = 9x(x 6=
x). Now dene the formulae  and ' as follows:
 = 8x9!y(Succ(x; y))^ ' = 8y9x(Succ(x; y))
8xy(Succ(x; y)! x < y)^
8xyz(x < y ^ y < z ! x < z)^
8x(:(x < x))^
8xy(x < y _ y < x _ x = y)^
8xyz(Succ(x; z) ^ Succ(y; z)! x = y)
One can now check that  has no 
d
-minimal models, but  ^ ' does, so the same
 is upward persistent but not conservative in domain circumscription. The details
are left to the reader. 2
Until now, we have looked at formulae which, once concluded, are never lost,
regardless of what new information comes in, but also regardless of what the initial
premise was. However, we can also consider the situation with the premise xed
(analogously to the last part of the previous subsection): given a premise, which
conclusions may be kept regardless of new information?
Proposition 9.66 For a preferential logic that satises expressibility of preference,
if  j=

, then
(8' :  ^ ' j=

),  j= :
Proof: Suppose  j=

.
\(" If  j=  then for any ' we have  ^ ' j=  so  ^ ' j=

.
\)" Suppose  6j= , then there exists m 2 Mod such that m j=  but m 6j= . Then
m j=

 ^ '
m
(!), so  ^ '
m
6j=

. 2
Note that the condition  j=

 was not used in the proof; if  6j=

 then
the equivalence is still true, as both sides are false. The proposition shows that the
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monotonic consequences of a premise are the only ones conservative with respect to
this xed premise.
Corollary 9.67 Let  be a conservative formula for a preferential logic that satises
expressibility of preference, then  j=

 ,  j= .
Proof: If  j=  then in any preferential logic it follows that  j=

. On the other
hand, if  j=

 , then for any ' we have ^' j=

 , since  is conservative. With
Proposition 9.66 it follows that  j= . 2
Given the usefulness of persistent formulae, we are interested in the complexity
of determining persistence. We have some preliminary results.
Proposition 9.68 For a subjective TEL-formula ' it is decidable whether ' is
downward persistent in MTEL. Similarly, it is decidable whether ' is upward per-
sistent in MTEL.
Proof: First note that if downward persistence is decidable, then upward persis-
tence is decidable as well, using Proposition 9.61. Furthermore, as persistence is
independent of the propositional signature (which is straightforward to prove), we
may assume the signature is nite. So suppose P contains n propositional atoms.
We will prove that ' is downward persistent if and only if for all TELC-modelsM;N
with size(M)  (2
n
  1)  (2 depth(') + 1), size(N )  2  (2
n
  1)  (2 depth(') + 1):
if N  M and (M; 0) j= ' then (N ; 0) j= '. This implies the decidability of
downward persistence.
Suppose ' is not downward persistent, then there exist TELC-modelsM;N with
N 
g
M , (M; 0) j= ' and (N ; 0) 6j= '. Now we construct a TELC-model M
0
by
deleting points from sequences of more than 2depth(')+1 identical states before the
stabilizing point fromM until each such sequence is at exactly 2 depth(')+1 states
long. Then size(M
0
)  (2
n
  1)  (2  depth(') + 1), N 
g
M
0
and (M
0
; 0) j= ' (by
Lemma 9.13). Now we construct a model N
0
using the following procedure. First we
identify all sequences of identical states inN after time point (2
n
 1)(2depth(')+1)
but before the stabilizing point of N of length more than (2  depth(') + 1) points.
From each such sequence we delete points until it has length (2 depth(')+1). Then
size(N )  2  (2
n
  1)  (2  depth(') + 1), (N ; 0) 6j= ' (Lemma 9.13), and it is easily
checked that N
0

g
M
0
. 2
This gives us another way of verifying TELC-theorems since `
TELC
',M
ti
j=
' and ' is upward persistent (note that for all TELC-models N we haveM
ti

g
N ;
then use soundness and completeness of TELC). Since TELC-theoremhood is co-
NP-complete, we have as an immediate consequence:
Corollary 9.69 Upward persistence (and downward persistence) for subjective TEL-
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formulae is co-NP-hard.
For a valuation m 2 Val(P ) we can dene the TELC-model M
m
by (M
m
)
t
=
fmg for all t. It is easy to see that such a model is maximal in the ordering 
g
,
and this gives us another way of checking TELC-theorems since `
TELC
' , ' is
downward persistent and (M
m
; 0) j= ' for all m 2 Val(P ). Furthermore we have:
' upward and downward persistent ,`
TELC
at
0
! ' or ' 
0
?, which gives us:
Corollary 9.70 Checking whether a subjective TEL-formula is both downward and
upward persistent is co-NP-complete.
In the last two subsections, we have derived a number of results on formulae
that respect monotonicity and conservative formulae and the links with persistent
formulae. In the next subsection we will discuss the impact of these results in
practice.
9.2.5 Practical implications
The results in this section may improve the eciency of theorem provers for pref-
erential logics, depending on a number of factors. In the rst place, it is important
how the theorem prover is used.
Consider the situation where we have a stand-alone theorem prover which gets
dierent (unrelated) queries. Furthermore, suppose the theorem prover is asked to
prove 
1
^: : :^
n
j=

. Then there are at least two possibilities for using the results
in this section. First of all, suppose the preferential logic satises expressibility of
preference. Then if  is upward persistent, we do not have to prove 
1
^: : :^
n
j=

,
as it is equivalent to prove 
1
^ : : : ^ 
n
j=  (Corollary 9.67). In most preferential
logics, preferential entailment is harder to compute than entailment in the underlying
logic.
In the second place, sometimes local reasoning is possible (which is not possible
in general for nonmonotonic logics): the theorem prover may derive the conclusion
from part of the premise. So it may be the case that there is a 1  k < n such
that 
1
^ : : : ^ 
k
j=

 which is easier to verify than the original query. Then if

k+1
; : : : ; 
n
are downward persistent, Proposition 9.44 implies that 
1
^: : :^
n
j=

. If  is upward persistent (and the preferential logic is smooth), Proposition 9.59
sanctions 
1
^ : : : ^ 
n
j=

. For these results to be usable in a theorem prover,
we need heuristic knowledge to decide if there is a promising split of the premise
into two parts A and B. For such a split, we can then try to prove A j=

 and
downward persistence of B or upward persistence of . In case 
1
^ : : : ^ 
k
j=


can not be proved, we may have to directly prove 
1
^ : : : ^ 
n
j=

 after all.
These two methods will of course only improve eciency if the determination of
persistence is easier than the original query (we will treat this question below).
The second kind of situation is when we have a theorem prover which is used
by an agent which has a lot of knowledge about the world, and from time to time
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performs observations to increase its knowledge. Then, although sometimes the
agent will need to perform revisions, we are often in the situation that (many)
conclusions from a premise () have been proved, and the premise is augmented by
a new formula ('). If this new formula is downward persistent, then the agent can
retain all the old conclusions (and may only need to derive some new conclusions). If
it is not, it can at least retain all the upward persistent conclusions (if the preferential
logic is smooth). We may also try to determine if ' is downward persistent given ,
or if  is conservative given . Again, these methods only improve eciency if it is
easier to determine if ' respects monotonicity (possibly given ) than recomputing
all old conclusions, or if it is easier to determine that  is conservative (possibly
given ) than checking  ^ ' j=

.
The possible eciency improvement in both cases heavily depends on the cost of
determining persistence relative to the cost of determining preferential consequence.
Unfortunately, it is very hard to say anything about this issue in general. It depends
on the preferential logic at hand, on the representation of the logic (syntactically, as
a proof calculus, or semantically, as models with a preference relation), and on other
implementation issues. For instance, it can be important how much information is
retained from previous queries: whether proofs or minimal models are stored. Let
us consider the examples again.
Preferential entailment in both Ground S5 and MTEL is 
P
3
-complete, whereas
full circumscription is undecidable (restricted versions of circumscription exist which
are decidable, but still highly complex). Unfortunately, determining downward or
upward persistence is not easier for these logics. We have seen, however, that the
classes of persistent formulae have syntactic representations of the form: ' is up-
ward/downward persistent if and only if it is equivalent to a formula in C, where
C is a (syntactic) class of formulae. Now, of course, determining equivalence to a
formula in C is as complex as determining persistence, but there may be subclasses
of a class of persistent formulae, with a lower complexity. For instance, determining
membership of C is much easier, namely polynomial. The members of C are per-
sistent. So what we propose is to check membership of C, instead of equivalence
to a member of C. In that case, we will miss some persistent formulae (and have
to prove the original query), but this disadvantage is outweighed by the complexity
advantage of checking membership. The checking of membership can be improved
upon by adding some (easy) checks for equivalence to a formula in C. For instance,
in Ground S5, if we consider, for a formula ', for each propositional subformula, the
nearest K operator in which scope it lies, then if all of these K operators are in the
scope of an odd number of negations, we can conclude that ' is downward persis-
tent. The formula :K(q _Kp), for example, satises this condition, and although
it is not a member of DIAM, it is equivalent to :Kq ^ :Kp 2 DIAM. This check is
obviously polynomial.
Given a preferential logic, the designer of a theorem prover could proceed as fol-
lows. First, syntactic classes of formulae that are downward and upward persistent
have to be identied. For Ground S5, MTEL and predicate and domain circum-
scription, these can be found in Denitions 9.45, 9.47, 9.49 and Proposition 9.62.
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For other preferential logics, if such classes are trivial (they may, for instance, only
include tautologies and contradictions), then the usefulness of the results is limited.
Otherwise, the theorem prover could work as follows. Given a query of the form
 ^ ' j=

, rst it is checked if ' belongs to the syntactic class of downward
persistent formulae or if  belongs to the syntactic class of upward persistent for-
mulae (this latter test should only be performed if the preferential logic is smooth).
If  is conservative and the logic satises expressibility of preference, it tries to
prove  ^ ' j=  (this usually has a lower complexity than the original query; for
Ground S5 and MTEL, we saw in the previous section that monotonic consequence
is NP-complete). The answer of this query is the answer to the original query (see
Corollary 9.67). Otherwise, if ' belongs to the syntactic class of downward persis-
tent formulae or if  belongs to the syntactic class of upward persistent formulae
(but the logic does not satisfy expressibility of preference), then the theorem prover
tries to prove  j=

. If this succeeds, it outputs yes. Otherwise, it will try to
answer the original query directly.
As stated before, the practical savings partly depend on representation and im-
plementation aspects. It also depends on the application domain and use of the
theorem prover: if formulae in these syntactic classes occur often, the eciency
improvement is higher than if they are infrequent.
9.2.6 Conclusions and related work
The results in this section may lead to more ecient implementations of preferential
logics. Experimenting with theorem provers which use these results is necessary in
order to determine the eciency improvement in practice.
It would be nice to nd a better characterization of formulae that can be added
to a given, xed premise without destroying conclusions.
Syntactic characterizations of persistent formulae were given for a number of
example preferential logics, but we would like to have a result for broader classes
of preferential logics, such as the class of ground nonmonotonic modal logics (see
[DNR97]). In that publication it is already stated that in Ground S5, formulae that
express propositional knowledge are conservative.
9.3 Non-cumulative reasoning: rules and models
In the previous section, we looked at monotonicity for subclasses of formulae in
preferential logics. This was inspired by the fact that our logic MTEL, a prefer-
ential logic, is nonmonotonic, and we indeed found classes of formulae for which
monotonicity holds. Another variant of monotonicity we already mentioned, is Cau-
tious Monotonicity (CM, see [KLM90]). This rule states that any formula can be
added to the premises without invalidating earlier conclusions, if it follows from
these premises:
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If  j

 and  j

 then  ^  j

 (Cautious Monotonicity)
This rule is not satised by MTEL: if we take  = F (Kp),  = Kp and  = ?, then
 has no 
g
-minimal model, so that by denition we get  j=

g
 and  j=

g
.
However,  ^  has a minimal model (in which p and its consequences are known
from time point zero onwards, and nothing else), in which  is obviously not true,
so  ^  6j=

g
.
The idea of preferential logics, with standard models augmented with a pref-
erence relation, has been quite inuential, and many variations on Shoham's se-
mantics [Sho87, Sho88] have been proposed and studied. Probably one of the most
well-known studies dealing with this subject is [KLM90]. In that paper it is shown
that for a number of classes of nonmonotonic logics, semantics can be dened using
models with states and a preference ordering. For dierent classes, various restric-
tions can be placed on such models (see also [GM94a], [Mak89], [Mak94], and e.g.
[Sch92b]). The logics considered in [KLM90], however, all satisfy the rule of Cau-
tious Monotonicity. In this section, we will try to complement the work of [KLM90]
by performing a similar analysis, but for logics that need not satisfy CM.
9.3.1 Cautious Monotonicity and smoothness
The condition on the preferential semantics that ensures that the logic satises
Cautious Monotonicity, is the following:
for every formula  and for every state s satisfying , either s is minimal
among all states satisfying , or there exists a more preferred state t
satisfying , which is minimal among all states satisfying .
(Smoothness)
Notice that MTEL does not satisfy this condition: if  = FKp, and we have any
model for it, then there is always a smaller model of , so that it does not have any
minimal models. Smoothness, also called well-foundedness or stopperedness, is sim-
ilar to the Limit Assumption ([Lew73]), and the Uniqueness Assumption ([Sta68])
used in semantics for conditional logic (see e.g., [Nut84]), which state that for any
formula  there should be a (respectively a unique) state which is minimal among all
states satisfying . In conditional logic, it is widely acknowledged that both of these
assumptions are highly suspect from an ontological point of view ([Nut84, Bou94a]).
Consider the example (similar to the one in [Lew73]) of a premise  which says:
\Pete is over eight feet tall". Since we know that people are rarely over eight feet
tall, among states in which Pete is over eight feet tall, we prefer a state s to a state t
whenever Pete's height in s is less than his height in t. But then there can surely be
no most preferred state where  holds: for each state where  holds, there is always
another state in which Pete's height is less, but still over eight feet. So there is a
conict between wanting to retain Cautious Monotonicity on the one hand, and the
undesirability of conditions like smoothness on the other hand.
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9.3.2 Resolving the conict
If one is committed to using some sort of preferential semantics for nonmonotonic
logics, there are a number of ways to deal with the aforementioned conict. One
solution is to impose smoothness anyway: by not mentioning any problems (as is
done in [KLM90]), by stating that it is ugly but necessary, or even by denying the
possibility of innite sequences of ever more preferred states.
Recently a number of researchers have proposed a dierent denition of prefer-
ential entailment (e.g. [Bou94a, Bou94b]), which validates CM without the need for
smoothness. When minimal -states exist, it is equivalent to the normal denition,
but innite sequences of more and more preferred states are handled dierently (see
[Bou94a] for details). Although this approach is certainly viable, it has the disadvan-
tage that the denition of entailment becomes more dicult, and has less intuitive
clarity.
An obvious third candidate, which has nevertheless not been investigated thor-
oughly, is to reject Cautious Monotonicity. In [KLM90] it is argued (but also by
others, e.g. Gabbay), that a system which does not satisfy CM (and some other
basic properties we will mention later), should not be considered a logical system.
But even there it is said: \This appreciation probably only reects the fact that,
so far, we do not know anything interesting about weaker systems" ([KLM90], p.
176). However, many interesting weaker logics exist: default logic [Rei80b], circum-
scription [McC80] (when innite models are also considered), and of course our logic
MTEL. There are also some intuitive practical examples in which CM should not
hold: see for instance [ZR97], or [Vre92] which argues against CM. In [Voo93] it is
argued that the fact that default logic does not satisfy CM is not a disadvantage of
default logic, but that rational agents (and [Voo93] also states that not all agents
need to be perfectly rational) should not adopt a set of defaults giving rise to a
non-cumulative consequence relation (just as rational agents should not adopt an
inconsistent set of beliefs).
One situation in which CM may be violated is with `nonmonotonically inconsis-
tent' premises. In [KLM90], when we have j

?, this is because  is inconceivable (a
statement like \I am the queen of England" uttered by myself), and there should be
no state in the preferential model where  holds. In MTEL, however, a formula like
FKp does not denote an inconceivable state of aairs, but it is nonmonotonically
inconsistent in that it is not preferentially satisable.
One explanation of the fact that CM intuitively sounds good, whereas there are
systems which do not satisfy it, lies in the reading of the symbol j

: often,  j


is read as \if  then normally ". But there are many other possible readings: \if
 then  is a reasonable assumption", \If  is all I know, then " or \if  holds
then  holds in most cases". In all of these readings, examples can be constructed
where CM should not intuitively hold. More in general, intuition does not provide
a very rm basis for judging logics (see the rst chapter of [Vel85] for an extensive
discussion of this point). When accepting rules on the basis of intuitive examples,
we quickly end up with systems satisfying monotonicity after all.
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As mentioned earlier, in this section we shall attempt to perform an analysis
similar in spirit to the one of [KLM90], but for logics that do not necessarily sat-
isfy CM. The selection of rules we shall consider, and the order in which they are
treated, are partly inspired by [KLM90], partly by the rules satised by MTEL.
We shall start with four basic rules in Subsection 9.3.3, for which we will give a
representation result in Subsection 9.3.4. In Subsection 9.3.5 we will add the rule
\Cut", in Subsection 9.3.6 the rule \Or", and in Subsection 9.3.7 the rule \Weak
Rational Monotonicity". Subsection 9.3.8 discusses other rules and Subsection 9.3.9
gives some nal remarks.
9.3.3 The four basic rules
The most basic rule which should hold for an inference relation j

, as opposed to
relations that describe some sort of revision, is reexivity. (When stating a rule,
we will leave out quantication; all formulae appearing in the rules are universally
quantied. The name of the rule appears between brackets; for ease of reference we
will also number them)
 j

 (Rule 1: Reexivity)
From this point on, we shall make the restriction that all inference relations are built
`on top of' a classical logic (formally, this will mean that they satisfy the rules 1-4).
Concerning this classical, underlying logic, we shall make the following assumptions,
corresponding to those in [KLM90]:
Assumption 9.71
 we have a language, L, of well-formed formulae, closed under the classical
propositional connectives.
 the semantics of this language is given by a set U , the elements of which will
be called worlds, and a binary relation j= of satisfaction between worlds and
formulae, which satises, for ;  2 L; u 2 U :
{ u j= : i u 6j= , and
{ u j=  _  i u j=  or u j= .
By j=  we denote that u j=  holds for all u 2 U .
 we have compactness: a set of formulae is satisable if all of its nite subsets
are.
Except for compactness, these assumptions are the same as Assumption 9.42. Re-
member that MTEL (and also the altered version of Section 9.2) are not compact.
Therefore, the results of this section do not apply to MTEL, although this section
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and our interest in logics that do not satisfy CM was originally inspired by MTEL.
The rules we shall treat in the sequel (Rules 1 through 7) are all satised by the
altered version of MTEL.
The next two rules concern the interaction with the underlying logic:
If  j

 and j=  !  then  j

 (Rule 2: Right Weakening)
If j= $  then ( j

 i  j

 ) (Rule 3: Left Logical Equivalence)
The rst rule states that if  is a consequence of  and  holds whenever  holds,
then  should be a consequence of  too. The second rule states that only the mean-
ing of the premise should matter, not its syntactical form. These three rules are also
in the basic ve rules of [KLM90], along with Cut and Cautious Monotonicity. We
will treat Cut in the next subsection, and, as said before, we explicitly do not want
to consider CM. Instead, we will take the following rule, which follows from the basic
ve rules of [KLM90], as basic:
If  j

 and  j

 then  j

 ^  (Rule 4: And)
This rule states that the conjunction of two consequences of a formula is also a
consequence. There exist systems in which this rule is not satised: credulous
entailment in default logic (see [Poo89]; sceptical entailment does satisfy And). This
rule causes the Lottery Paradox: in a lottery, since each ticket may have only a small
chance of winning the prize, we could infer for every ticket that it will (normally)
not win the prize. But if we take the conjunction of all these statements, we end
up with the (obviously undesirable) conclusion that normally no ticket will win the
prize. Still many interesting systems satisfy it, and we will adopt it here.
For ease of reference, we shall now list and explain some of the rules that will
be needed and discussed later. For a more thorough explanation and for intuitive
examples of why these rules should hold, we refer the reader to [KLM90]. In these
rules, j

 is an abbreviation for >j

, where > is an abbreviation for any tautology.
If  j

 and  ^  j

 then  j

 (Rule 5: Cut)
If  j

 and  j

 then  _  j

 (Rule 6: Or)
If  ^  j

 then  j

 !  (Conditionalization)
If  j

 then j

!  (Weak Conditionalization)
If 6 j

: and j

!  then  j

 (Rule 7: Weak Rational Monotonicity)
The rst rule, Cut, expresses that in order to prove a conclusion from a premise, one
may add a hypothesis to the premise and derive the conclusion from this enlarged
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premise, after which one has to prove that this hypothesis in fact follows from the
original premise. This rule is one of the basic rules of [KLM90], and we will consider
it in Section 9.3.5.
The rule Or states that if a conclusion follows independently from two premises,
it should also follow from their disjunction. This rule is also covered in [KLM90],
and we shall treat this rule in Section 9.3.6.
The rule Conditionalization (called S in [KLM90]) corresponds to the deduction
theorem (or one half of the deduction theorem according to some books) in classical
logics. It expresses the possibility of proving an implication from a premise by
proving the consequent from the premise augmented with the antecedent. Weak
Conditionalization is (obviously) a weaker variant of Conditionalization, in which
the premise must be a tautology.
The last rule we shall consider is Weak Rational Monotonicity, which gives a
partial converse of Weak Conditionalization. It states that in order to prove a
formula from a premise, one can prove the corresponding implication from the empty
premise, provided that the negation of the original premise can not be proved from
the empty premise. The reason we shall consider this rule (in Section 9.3.7), is that
entailment in MTEL satises this rule and all rules considered up till now (Rules
1-7, and (Weak) Conditionalization), and none of the other rules of [KLM90] which
can not be proved from these rules (this is left as an exercise for the reader).
Not all of the above rules are independent. We shall give a few dependencies.
Conditionalization (and thus also Weak Conditionalization) is implied by the combi-
nation of Reexivity, Right Weakening , Left Logical Equivalence, and Or ([KLM90],
p. 191). Furthermore, And, Right Weakening, and Conditionalization imply Cut
([KLM90], p. 191). We shall not treat Conditionalization and Weak Conditional-
ization separately, but focus on Rules 1-7.
We shall begin with a representation result for the four basic rules.
9.3.4 Representation for the four basic rules
The rules of Reexivity, And, Left Logical Equivalence, and Right Weakening imply
that the set of consequences of a formula  is a deductively closed set of formulae
containing , and that formulae equivalent to  have the same set of consequences
as .
We can give semantics to such consequence relations, borrowing from the theory
of nonmonotonic model operators (see e.g. [DH94]). In a way analogous to the
techniques in [KLM90] we dene inference models to base consequence relations on.
Denition 9.72 (Inference models) An inference model W is a triple hS; `; P i
where S is a set (the set of states), ` is a function ` : S ! U which assigns a world
to every state and P is a function P : L ! P(S) which assigns to every formula a
set of states (the intended states) such that:
1. P ()  fs 2 S j `(s) j= g, and
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2. j= $  implies P () = P ().
Note that there may be two dierent states which are labeled with the same world.
Although this is not necessary (we could have dened an inference model as a tuple
hS; P i where S is a subset of U) for the representation result (Proposition 9.76),
we need labeled states for later representation results. For uniformity, we have used
separate states and a labeling function already here. When using preference relations
later on, we will need states that are labeled with sets of worlds instead of single
worlds. It is possible to dene the labeling function in such a way for inference
models, but that would make proofs needlessly complicated.
Denition 9.73 (Consequence relation of an inference model) Given an in-
ference model W = hS; `; P i we dene the associated consequence relation j

W
by:
 j

W
 i P () j= , where P () j=  i for all s 2 P () we have `(s) j= .
Before we prove a representation theorem, we need a denition from [KLM90]:
Denition 9.74 (Normal world) A world u 2 U is called a normal world for 
with respect to a consequence relation j

if for all  2 L for which  j

 we have
u j= .
So a normal world for  satises all consequences of . A crucial lemma for many
of the representation theorems is the following (Lemma 3.18 from [KLM90]):
Lemma 9.75 If j

satises And, Reexivity and Right Weakening then all normal
worlds for  satisfy  if and only if  j

.
Now we will show the representation result for consequence relations satisfying
the above mentioned four basic rules (Rules 1-4):
Proposition 9.76 (Representation for inference models) A consequence re-
lation j

satises Reexivity, And, Left Logical Equivalence, and Right Weakening
if and only if j

= j

W
for some inference model W .
Proof: The proof from right to left is easy and left to the reader. For the other
direction dene W = hS; `; P i with S = U , the labeling function ` is the identity
function and for all  2 L: P () = fm 2 U j m is a normal world for  with
respect to j

g. By Reexivity we have that  j

 so P ()  fs 2 S j `(s) j= g.
Furthermore, by Left Logical Equivalence we have that if j=  $  then ( j


i  j

) so a world m is a normal world for  i it is a normal world for , so
P () = P (). Thus, W is an inference model. It follows immediately from the
denitions and Lemma 9.75 that for all ;  2 L:  j

 if and only if  j

W
. 2
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Now we want to look at consequence relations which satisfy in addition to the
above four rules also the rule Cut, and we will see that we can get a similar repre-
sentation result, but also one which uses a preference relation.
9.3.5 Adding the rule \Cut"
A representation result for Rules 1-5 using model operators (similar to Proposi-
tion 9.76) is easily obtained:
Proposition 9.77 A consequence relation j

satises Reexivity, Left Logical Equiv-
alence, And, Right Weakening, and Cut if and only if j

= j

W
for some inference
model W which satises: if P () j=  then P ()  P ( ^ ).
Proof: Straightforward (use the same denition as in the proof of Proposition 9.76).
2
What we really want is not a model operator, but a preference relation which
singles out the most preferred worlds. We will show that this is possible, using the
most liberal notion of model, which is the same as a cumulative model in [KLM90],
but without the smoothness condition dened in the introduction. We will rst
give a denition of such a model and its associated model operator and consequence
relation.
Denition 9.78 (Ordered model) An ordered model W is a triple hS; `;i where
S is a set (the set of states), ` is a function ` : S ! P(U) which assigns a set of
worlds to every state and  is a binary relation on S.
Denition 9.79 (Consequence relation of an ordered model) Given an or-
dered model W = hS; `;i we dene:
 the model operator P
W
: P
W
() = min

fs 2 S j `(s) j= g, where min
R
A =
fa 2 A j there exists no b 2 A such that bRag. The states in P
W
() are called
-minimal states (with respect to W ). If  = >, these states are just called
minimal.
 the associated consequence relation j

W
:  j

W
 i P
W
() j= . Here
P
W
() j=  means that `(s) j=  for all s 2 P
W
(), and `(s) j=  means
that m j=  for all m 2 `(s).
We want to prove that the class of consequence relations of ordered models is
exactly the class of consequence relations which satisfy the basic four rules (Rules
1-4) and the Cut rule. First we show that the consequence relation of an ordered
model satises the ve rules:
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Lemma 9.80 (Soundness) For any ordered model W , its associated consequence
relation satises Reexivity, Left Logical Equivalence, And, Right Weakening, and
Cut.
Proof: These properties are all straightforward; as an example we will check Cut.
So suppose that  j

W
 and  ^  j

W
. Take any -minimal state s. Then
`(s) j=  and obviously `(s) j= , so `(s) j=  ^ , but it is also  ^ -minimal: if
t  s and `(t) j=  ^  then in particular `(t) j= . This is impossible, since s was
an -minimal state. Therefore, we have that  j

W
 which proves Cut. 2
We now intend to show that for any consequence relation satisfying the ve rules
(Rules 1-5) we can dene an ordered model with a consequence relation identical to
the one we started with:
Denition 9.81 Given a consequence relation j

which satises Reexivity, Left
Logical Equivalence, And, Right Weakening, and Cut we dene its associated ordered
model W = hS; `;i by:
 S = f(X;) j X  U ;  2 Lg,
 `((X;)) = X , and
 (X;)  (Y; ) i
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
Y j= ;
Y contains a world not normal for  with respect to j

;
X j= ; and
if Y = fm 2 U j m is normal for  with respect to j

g
then X 6j= :
The intuition behind this denition is as follows. We want the preference relation to
select only sets of worlds which are all normal for  (we want to use Lemma 9.75).
So whenever a state (Y; ) satisfying  contains a world which is not normal for ,
there must be a state satisfying  below it (in the ordering). Such a state (X;)
can be considered as a `witness' for the non-normality with respect to  of (Y; )
(therefore X is `labeled' with ). But at the same time, if Y is the set of all normal
 worlds, we want it to be selected by the preference relation, so any state below it
should not satisfy . So here the `labeling' of Y with  serves another purpose: this
is the state (for ) which should be selected.
We want to show that the consequence relation based on this model is identical
to the one we started with:
Lemma 9.82 (Completeness) For a consequence relation j

which satises Re-
exivity, Left Logical Equivalence, And, Right Weakening, and Cut, its associated
ordered model W induces a consequence relation j

W
with j

= j

W
.
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Proof: We will rst show that
[
`[P
W
()] = fm 2 U j m is normal for  with respect to j

g:
: Suppose m is a world which is not normal for . Furthermore, suppose that
m 2 Y for some state (Y; ) with Y j= . We consider two cases:
{ Y 6= fm 2 U j m is normal for  with respect to j

g. Then we have
(Y; )  (Y; ) so (Y; ) =2 P
W
().
{ Y = fm 2 U j m is normal for  with respect to j

g. Remember that
with Lemma 9.75 we have that for all , Y j=  ,  j

. As m is not
normal for , there must be a formula  such that  j

 but m 6j= . We
would like to show that a world n 2 U exists such that n j=  and n 6j= .
To this end we will show that 6j=  ! ; So suppose by contradiction
that j= ! . Then we have that j= $ ( ^ ), and with Left Logical
Equivalence this gives  ^  j

. As Y j=  also  j

 and then Cut
yields  j

. Because m 2 Y , it is normal for  so m j=  contradicting
the assumption. So we do not have that j=  !  and therefore there
exists n 2 U with n j=  and n 6j= . It can be easily checked that
(fng; )  (Y; ) so (Y; ) =2 P
W
().
We have proved that m =2
S
`[P
W
()].
: Dene Y = fm 2 U j m is normal for  with respect to j

g and consider the
state (Y; ). By Reexivity,  j

 so Y j= . Suppose (X; )  (Y; ), then
by denition X 6j= . We have proved that (Y; ) 2 P
W
().
To conclude our argument, note that  j

W
 i
S
`[P
W
()] j=  i fm 2 U j m is
normal for  with respect to j

g j=  i  j

. 2
Theorem 9.83 (Representation for ordered models) A consequence relation
j

satises Reexivity, Left Logical Equivalence, And, Right Weakening, and Cut if
and only if j

= j

W
for some ordered model W = hS; `;i.
Proof: Follows immediately from Lemma 9.80 and Lemma 9.82. 2
We can restrict the relation  to an irreexive one. Each reexive point s in an
ordered model W = hS; `;i can be replaced by an innite sequence (s
i
) of states
labeled with `(s) and s
i
 s
i+1
. Each element s  t has to be replaced by s
i
 t for
all i, and the same for elements t  s. It is easy to see that j

W
is not aected by
these changes.
We would like to nd a similar representation result when the rule Or is included,
which will be done in the next subsection.
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9.3.6 Adding the rule \Or"
We would like to have a representation result when we add the rule Or to our set
of ve rules (Rules 1-5). As the basic four rules (Rules 1-4) together with Or imply
Cut, we will no longer mention that rule. For the representation, we will rst need
a small lemma:
Lemma 9.84 If a consequence relation j

satises Reexivity, Left Logical Equiv-
alence, And, Right Weakening, and Or, then for any ;  and : if j=  !  and
 j

 then  j

! .
Proof: From j= !  we have j= $ ( ^ ) and with Left Logical Equivalence
we have  ^  j

. Using Conditionalization (which follows from the other rules),
we get  j

! . 2
Proposition 9.85 A consequence relation j

satises Reexivity, Left Logical Equiv-
alence, And, Right Weakening, and Or if and only if j

= j

W
for some inference
model W = hS; `; P i with P such that for all ; : if j= !  then P () \ fs 2 S j
`(s) j= g  P ().
Proof:
 Going from right to left we have to prove that j

W
satises Or: suppose j

W

and  j

W
. Choose s 2 P (_). Then `(s) j= _, so `(s) j=  or `(s) j= .
Suppose `(s) j= . As j=  ! ( _ ) we have s 2 P () by the right-hand
condition and as  j

W
 we have `(s) j= . So P (_) j= , and by denition
 _  j

W
 as required.
 For the other direction we take the same denition for W as in Propositions
9.76 and 9.77, and we only have to prove the extra condition. So suppose
j= !  and take m 2 P () \ fs 2 S j `(s) j= g. Suppose that  j

. Then
Lemma 9.84 gives us that  j

 !  and as m is a normal world for  by
the denition of P , we have m j=  ! , but as m 2 fs 2 S j `(s) j= g we
have m j=  and so m j= . We have proved that m is a normal  world, so
m 2 P ().
2
Note that the condition in Proposition 9.85 indeed implies the condition in Propo-
sition 9.77. As before, we would also like a representation result using preference
relations.
Denition 9.86 (Sv-model) A single-valued ordered model (or sv-model) W is a
triple hS; `;i where S is a set (the set of states), ` is a function ` : S ! U which
270 Some Logical Themes
assigns a world to every state and  is a binary relation on S. The model operator
P
W
is dened as in Denition 9.79, and the associated consequence relation j

W
is
also dened as in Denition 9.79, viewing `(s) as a singleton set.
We want to prove that the class of consequence relations of sv-models is exactly
the class of consequence relations which satisfy the basic four rules (Rules 1-4) and
the Or rule. First we show that the class of consequence relations of an sv-model
satises the ve rules:
Lemma 9.87 (Soundness) For any sv-model W , its associated consequence re-
lation satises Reexivity, Left Logical Equivalence, And, Right Weakening, and
Or.
Proof: This is again straightforward. 2
We now intend to show that for any consequence relation satisfying the ve rules
(Rules 1-4 and 6) we can dene an sv-model with a consequence relation identical
to the one we started with:
Denition 9.88 Given a consequence relation j

which satises Reexivity, Left
Logical Equivalence, And, Right Weakening, and Or we dene its associated sv-
model W = hS; `;i by:
 S = fhm;i j m 2 U ;  2 Lg,
 `(hm;i) = m, and
 hn; i  hm;i i
8
>
<
>
>
:
m j= ;
m is not normal for  with respect to j

;
n j=  and
if m is normal for  with respect to j

then n 6j= :
The intuition behind this denition is the same as in Denition 9.81. We want to
show that the consequence relation based on this model is identical to the one we
started with:
Lemma 9.89 (Completeness) For a consequence relation j

which satises Re-
exivity, Left Logical Equivalence, And, Right Weakening, and Or, its associated
sv-model W induces a consequence relation j

W
with j

= j

W
.
Proof: We want to show that `[P
W
()] = fm 2 U j m is normal for  with
respect to j

g. Suppose we have hm; i with m j=  and m is not normal for . We
distinguish two cases:
 m is not normal for , then we have hm;i  hm; i , so hm; i =2 P
W
().
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 m is normal for . Now we want to nd a world n such that n j=  but n 6j= .
So suppose j=  ! . Then as m is not normal for  there exists a  such
that  j

 and m 6j= . Then with j=  !  we have j=  $ ( ^ ) and
with Left Logical Equivalence we have  ^  j

 and with Conditionalization
(which follows from the ve rules) we have  j

 ! . However, since m is
normal for  we have m j= !  and m j=  so m j= , in contradiction with
our assumption. Therefore we have 6j= ! , so there exists an n with n j= 
and n 6j= . Then we have hn; i  hm; i and therefore hm; i =2 P
W
().
So if m 2 `[P
W
()] then m is normal for . Now suppose m is normal for . Then
`(hm;i) j=  (using Reexivity). Furthermore, if we have hn; i  hm;i, then as
m is normal for  we must have n 6j= , so hm;i 2 P
W
(), so m 2 `[P
W
()].
So then we get:  j

W
 i `[P
W
()] j=  i fm 2 U j m is normal for  with respect
to j

g j=  i  j

. Indeed we have j

= j

W
as required. 2
Theorem 9.90 (Representation for sv-models) A consequence relation j

sat-
ises Reexivity, Left Logical Equivalence, And, Right Weakening, and Or if and
only if j

= j

W
for some sv-model W .
Proof: Follows immediately from Lemma 9.87 and Lemma 9.89. 2
In the next subsection we will add the rule Weak Rational Monotonicity.
9.3.7 Adding the rule \Weak Rational Monotonicity"
It will turn out that the following property of models will do the trick for a repre-
sentation result for the Rules 1-4, 6 and Weak Rational Monotonicity:
Denition 9.91 (Homogeneity of minimal states)
 An sv-model W satises homogeneity of minimal states if the following holds
for all formulae : if there is a minimal state in W satisfying , then all
-minimal states are minimal.
 An hms-model is an sv-model satisfying homogeneity of minimal states. Its
associated consequence relation is dened as in Denition 9.86.
First we will show that all hms-models satisfy all of the rules mentioned before,
and Weak Rational Monotonicity.
Proposition 9.92 (Soundness) For any hms-modelW , its associated consequence
relation satises Reexivity, Left Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening, And, Or
and Weak Rational Monotonicity.
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Proof: Since W is an sv-model, j

W
satises rules 1 through 6. Now suppose
6 j

W
: and j

W
 ! . We have to prove that  j

W
. From 6 j

W
: we know
that there exists a (>-)minimal state which satises . Let s be any -minimal
state, then because W satises homogeneity of minimal states, s is a minimal state.
Therefore `(s) j=  !  and since `(s) j= , we have that `(s) j= . We conclude
that  j

W
. 2
To get a representation result, we need to nd, given a consequence relation j

which satises all six rules (Rules 1-4, 6 and 7), an hms-model W such that j

W
= j

.
It turns out that the construction in Denition 9.88 will do this. In order to prove
this, we rst need the following lemma:
Lemma 9.93 Let j

be a consequence relation which satises Reexivity, Left Log-
ical Equivalence, Right Weakening, And, Or and Weak Rational Monotonicity. Let
W be the associated sv-model as dened in Denition 9.88. Then we have the
following: If hm;i is minimal, then for any formula ', the state hm;'i is also
minimal.
Proof: Let j

and W be as above and suppose hm;i is minimal. Now suppose
hm;'i is not minimal. Then there exists a state hn; i with hn; i  hm;'i. By
denition we have that n j= , that m j= , that m is not normal for  (with respect
to j

), and that if m is normal for ' then n 6j= '. We will distinguish two cases to
prove that hm;i is not minimal.
 Suppose m is not normal for . Then it is easy to verify that hn; i  hm;i.
 Suppose m is normal for . Suppose that j=  ! , then j=  $ ( ^ ). As
m is not normal for , there exists a formula  such that  j

 but m 6j= .
With Left Logical Equivalence we have  ^  j

 and with Conditionalization
(which is a derived rule) we have  j

 ! . As m was normal for , we have
m j=  !  and because m j=  we have m j= , a contradiction. So 6j=  ! 
and we can nd k with k j=  but k 6j= . Then we have that hk; i  hm;i.
In both cases we nd that hm;i is not minimal, a contradiction, so hm;'i must be
minimal. 2
We are now ready to prove that the construction of Denition 9.88 can be used
again.
Lemma 9.94 For a consequence relation j

which satises Reexivity, Left Logi-
cal Equivalence, Right Weakening, And, Or, and Weak Rational Monotonicity, its
associated sv-model W satises homogeneity of minimal states.
Proof: Suppose hm;i is minimal and m j= . Suppose hn; i is -minimal but not
minimal. From the contraposition of Lemma 9.93 we know that for any formula ',
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the state hn; 'i is not minimal. In the proof of Lemma 9.89 we saw that `[P
W
(>)] =
fm 2 U j m is normal for > with respect to j

g. As n is not in `[P (>)] we have that
n is not normal for >. Distinguishing two cases, we will show that hn; i is not -
minimal:
 Suppose that n is not normal for , then hm;>i  hn; i and m j= .
 Suppose that n is normal for . Suppose that j= ! . As n is not normal for
> there exists a formula  such that j

 but n 6j= . As j

 and j=  ! (! )
we have with Right Weakening that j

 ! . Because m is normal for >
(again because `[P (>)] = fm 2 U j m is normal for > with respect to j

g),
and m 6j= :, we have that 6 j

:. With Weak Rational Monotonicity we
conclude that  j

. Furthermore, since j=  ! , we have j=  $ ( ^ ),
so with Left Logical Equivalence we have  ^  j

. Conditionalization yields
 j

 ! . As n is normal for , we have n j=  ! . Also n j=  (hn; i is
-minimal), so n j=  which is a contradiction. Therefore 6j= ! , so there is
a k with k j=  and k 6j= . But then we have that hk;>i  hn; i and k j= .
In both cases we conclude that hn; i is not -minimal, which is a contradiction.
Therefore hn; i is minimal. 2
Now we can prove the representation result.
Theorem 9.95 (Representation for hms-models) A consequence relation j

satises Reexivity, Left Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening, And, Or and Weak
Rational Monotonicity if and only if j

= j

W
for some hms-model W .
Proof: The direction from right to left is given in Proposition 9.92. For the
other direction we use Theorem 9.90 to nd an sv-model W such that j

= j

W
.
Lemma 9.94 ensures that W is an hms- model. 2
9.3.8 Other rules
A number of rules which are mentioned in [KLM90] have not been treated yet. Nat-
urally, we have not included CM, which we reject. A rule which we reject for similar
reasons, is Consistency Preservation (CP):
If  j

? then  j= ? (Consistency Preservation)
The restriction on our models corresponding to this rule is very easy: every consistent
formula should have a minimal state satisfying it. This is similar to, but independent
of smoothness: there are smooth models in which CP is not satised, and there are
non-smooth models where it is satised. But we reject this condition for a similar
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reason: we do allow models in which for every state satisfying a certain formula,
there is a more preferred state in which it is also true.
Another restricted variant of monotonicity is the following rule:
If  j

 and  6 j

: then  ^  j

 (Rational Monotonicity)
Since this rule allows monotonicity under (intuitively) weaker circumstances than
CM, we have not incorporated it.
When rejecting CM, we even have to reject at least one of Rational Monotonicity
and Consistency Preservation:
Proposition 9.96 Consistency Preservation and Rational Monotonicity imply Cau-
tious Monotonicity in the presence of And, Reexivity, and Right Weakening.
Proof: Suppose  j

 and  j

.
 If  j

: then  j

 ^ : (And), so that CP gives  j=  ^ :, but then
^ j= ? and ^ j= . Using Reexivity and Right Weakening we conclude
 ^  j

.
 If  6 j

: then with RM we have  ^  j

.
2
An alternative rule (which has not been mentioned in the literature, to the best
of our knowledge) that together with Rational Monotonicity also implies CM, is
Inconsistency Monotonicity:
If  j

? then  ^  j

? (Inconsistency Monotonicity)
In the presence of Right Weakening, this is implied by CM. The same argument as
before holds for our rejection of this rule.
We also mention the following two rules:
If  j

 and  j=  then ( j

 ,  j

) (Cumulativity)
If  j

 and  j

 then ( j

 ,  j

) (Reciprocity)
The latter rule is also called Equivalence. Both of these rules imply CM:
Proposition 9.97 Cumulativity implies Cautious Monotonicity in the presence of
Reexivity and And. Moreover, Reciprocity implies Cautious Monotonicity in the
presence of And, Reexivity, and Right Weakening.
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Proof:
 Suppose  j

 and  j

. Using Reexivity we have  j

 and And gives
 j

 ^ . Furthermore,  ^  j= , so Cumulativity gives  ^  j

.
 Suppose  j

 and  j

. With Reexivity and And we have  j

 ^ .
As  ^  j= , using Reexivity and Right Weakening, we have  ^  j

.
Reciprocity implies that  ^  j

.
2
As these two rules are stronger than CM, we do not treat them.
9.3.9 Conclusions and related work
We have given a classication of inference relations that do not (necessarily) satisfy
Cautious Monotonicity. Representation results were given for a number of classes
of such inference relations, starting from a class larger than the class of cumulative
inference relations as dened in [KLM90]. Given the fact that known nonmonotonic
formalisms as default logic and circumscription, but also our own MTEL, have non-
cumulative inference relations, it seems worthwhile to investigate properties of such
relations. We do not share the opinion of [Gab85] and [KLM90] that such relations
can not be considered to be \logical systems". They only give a weak (intuitive)
argumentation for this statement, and systems satisfying (just) the basic four rules
(1-4) would also seem to be logical systems, so maybe the border between logical and
non-logical should be drawn there. The current section can be seen as supplementing
the work in [KLM90] to the non-cumulative case.
All of the rules described in this section can be disputed, even the basic four
rules (of those four, maybe especially the And rule). These four rules are necessary
if one wants to give semantics based on picking out the preferred (classical) interpre-
tations, to inference relations. Of course many dierent combinations of rules can
be considered. The selection made in this section is inspired by the rules in [KLM90]
and the rules satised by MTEL.
One rule we have not considered here is Loop [KLM90], corresponding to tran-
sitivity of the preference relation for cumulative relations. Transitivity seems a
plausible property for any preference relation, and we would like to nd a rule which
characterizes it in the non-cumulative case; it may be Loop, but this is not neces-
sarily the case for non-cumulative relations. Other rules from [KLM90] we have not
considered are Disjunctive Rationality and Negation Rationality.
Apart from [KLM90], there are a number of other publications dealing with
various kinds of preferential models and properties of their associated consequence
relation. It started with [Sho87], and was continued by [Mak89]. In [Voo93], a rep-
resentation result is given in terms of inference operations (see Section 10.1) and
so-called epistemic preference models, which are just like our ordered models, with
the set of states equal to the set of closed S5-models (see Denition 4.8), and the
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labeling function is the identity function. The required properties of the inference
operations are inclusion (corresponding to Reexivity), cumulative transitivity (cor-
responding to Cut) and L-invariance (corresponding to Left logical Equivalence)
(And is not incorporated here since the language and the models for it are kept
abstract; there may not even be conjunction in the language). This would suggest
that the labeling function of an ordered model is not necessary. More representation
results for the innitary case (inference operations) can be found in [Sch92b, Sch95a].
Acknowledgments
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Chapter 10
Belief Set Operators
In Chapter 1 we introduced four levels of abstraction for describing reasoning pro-
cesses. A formalization of descriptions on the rst three levels was given in Chap-
ter 2. On level two, reasoning can be described by multiple belief state operators
(MBSOs). These operators assign a set of information states to each set of input
formulae. In this chapter we will concentrate on MBSOs of the following information
state frame. The language L is a propositional language, with the consequence oper-
ator Cn , and the states are sets of formulae (not necessarily closed under Cn). The
(natural) information ordering is set-inclusion. (Note that this information state
frame is almost the same as the frame of syntactical states IS
syn
, but without the
restriction of states to sets closed under provability.) An MBSO in this informa-
tion state frame will be called a belief set operator, and these operators are almost
the same as the multi-interpretation operators of Section 8.2, with two dierences:
a multi-interpretation operator may have a dierent input and output language,
whereas these are identical for belief set operators; the other dierence is that the
family of sets of formulae assigned by a multi-interpretation operator must consist
of sets closed under provability, whereas this is not required for belief set operators.
In contrast to the rest of this thesis, in this chapter we will call any set of formulae,
not necessarily closed under provability, a belief set.
FBSOs of the same information state frame as above will also be introduced,
and will be called inference operations. In this chapter we will study belief set
operators and selection functions, the link with inference operations, and the link
with semantical operators.
10.1 Inference operations
The study of inference operations is already well-established (see [Mak94] for an
overview). In this section, we will briey review the main notions, properties and
results concerning inference operations. For completeness, let us give a formal de-
nition.
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Denition 10.1 (Inference operation) Let L be a language. An inference op-
eration is a function C : P(L) ! P(L). The pair (L; C) is called an inference
system.
Inference operations can be formalizations of nonmonotonic reasoning processes,
but also of more classical closure operations, modeling classical logics.
Denition 10.2 (Closure operation) An inference system (L; C
L
) is a closure
system (and C
L
a closure operation) if it satises the following conditions:
1. X  C
L
(X) (inclusion),
2. C
L
(C
L
(X)) = C
L
(X) (idempotence), and
3. X  Y ) C
L
(X)  C
L
(Y ) (monotony).
Inference operations that formalize a classical compact kind of logic are called
deductive:
Denition 10.3 (Deductive inference operation) A closure system (L; C
L
) is
a deductive system (and C
L
is a deductive (inference) operation), if C
L
satises
compactness : whenever ' 2 C
L
(X), there must exist a nite subset Y  X such
that ' 2 C
L
(Y ).
Let (L
0
;Cn) denote the inference system based on classical propositional logic.
A semantics for a closure system (L; C
L
) can be dened by a model-theoretic system.
Denition 10.4 (Model-theoretic system) A model-theoretic system (L;Mod;
j=) is determined by a language L, a set (or class) Mod whose elements are called
worlds and a relation of satisfaction j=  Mod  L between worlds and formulae.
Given such a system we dene:
1. For X  L, dene Mod
j=
(X) = fm : m 2 Mod and m j= Xg, where m j= X if
for every ' 2 X : m j= '.
2. For K  Mod, dene Th
j=
(K) = f' : ' 2 L and K j= 'g, where K j= ' if for
all m 2 K : m j= '.
3. For X  L, dene C
j=
(X) = f' : Mod
j=
(X)  Mod
j=
(')g, and X j= ' if
' 2 C
j=
(X).
It is not dicult to verify that (L; C
j=
) is a closure system and if C
j=
(X) = X
then Th
j=
(Mod
j=
(X)) = X . A system (L;Mod; j=) is called compact if the closure
operation C
j=
is compact.
A model-theoretic system is meant to give semantics to an inference operation.
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Denition 10.5 An inference system is (L; C
L
) correct with respect to a model-
theoretic system (L;Mod; j=) if C
L
(X)  C
j=
(X), and complete if C
L
(X) = C
j=
(X).
So deductive inference operations formalize `classical' logics. Nonmonotonic rea-
soning is a method of inferring extra conclusions, `on top of' what the deductive
operation can yield. This nonmonotonic reasoning can again be formalized by an
inference operation, but this time one not satisfying monotony.
A condition on inference operations is said to be pure if it concerns the operation
alone without regard to its interrelations to a deductive system (L; C
L
) representing
an underlying monotonic and compact logic. The most important pure conditions
are the following (the rst two were already mentioned in Section 2.1 for FBSOs
in general; also they were mentioned as conditions on consequence relations in Sec-
tion 9.3):
Denition 10.6 Let C be an inference operation. We dene the following pure
properties of C.
 X  Y  C(X)) C(Y )  C(X) (cut),
 X  Y  C(X)) C(X)  C(Y ) (cautious monotony),
 X  Y  C(X)) C(X) = C(Y ) (cumulativity).
Some impure conditions are
 C(X) \ C(Y )  C(C
L
(X)
T
C
L
(Y )) (distributivity),
 C
L
(X) 6= L) C(X) 6= L (consistency preservation).
Denition 10.7 (Inference frame)
1. A system IF = (L; C
L
; C) is said to be an inference frame if C
L
is a deductive
inference operation on L, and C is an inference operation satisfying :
C
L
(X)  C(X) for all X  L (supradeductivity).
2. The operation C satises left absorption if C
L
(C(X)) = C(X), and C satises
congruence or right absorption if C
L
(X) = C
L
(Y ) ) C(X) = C(Y ). C
satises full absorption if C satises left absorption and congruence.
3. An inference frame DF = (L; C
L
; C) is said to be a deductive inference frame
if it satises full absorption.
If C
L
= Cn then the property of supradeductivity is usually called supraclassi-
cality.
The semantics of a deductive frame can be described by introducing a model
operator based on a model-theoretic system ([DH94]). In fact, such a model operator
can again be seen as an FBSO, but this time based on the information state frame
of epistemic states, IS
ep
.
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Denition 10.8 (Semantical frame)
1. SF = (L;Mod; j=;) is a semantical frame if (L;Mod; j=) is a model-theoretic
system and  : P(L)! P(Mod) is a functor (called model operator) such that
(X)  Mod
j=
(X).
2. Let C

(X) = Th
j=
((X)). The operator  is said to be C
L
-invariant if
(8X  L)((X) = (C
L
(X))).
Note that the inference operation C

satises supradeductivity, and hence (L; C
j=
;
C

) is an inference frame associated to SF . Again we can dene completeness of a
syntactical notion with respect to a corresponding semantics.
Denition 10.9 An inference frame I = (L; C
L
; C) is said to be complete for a
semantical frame (L;Mod; j=;) if (L; C
L
) is complete with respect to (L;Mod; j=)
and C = C

.
Representation theorems for classes of inference frames can be proved by using
semantical frames based on the Lindenbaum-Tarski construction of maximal consis-
tent sets. We recall the ingredients of this construction. Let (L; C
L
) be a deductive
system. A set X  L is said to be relatively maximal consistent (r-maximal) i there
is a formula ' 2 L such that ' 62 C
L
(X) and for every proper super set Y  X the
condition ' 2 C
L
(Y ) is satised. Let rmax(L) be the set of all r-maximal subsets of
L. The Lindenbaum-Tarski semantics (abbreviated by LT-semantics) is dened by
the model-theoretic system (L;M; j=) where M = rmax(L) and m j= ' i ' 2 m.
Then C
j=
= C
L
. We collect some elementary results that can be formulated and
proved within this framework (see [DH94]).
Proposition 10.10 Let F = (L; C
L
; C) be an inference frame satisfying left ab-
sorption. Then there exists a semantical frame SF = (L;M; j=;) such that F is
complete with respect to SF , i.e. C
L
= C
j=
and C = C

.
Proof: Let (L;M; j=) be the LT-semantics for (L; C
L
) and (X) = fm : m 2
M;C(X)  mg. It is easy to show that C = C

. 2
Left absorption does not imply congruence. We get a completeness result for
deductive inference frames by using invariant semantical frames ([DH94]).
Proposition 10.11
1. Let F = (L; C
L
; C) be a deductive inference frame. Then there exists a se-
mantical frame S = (L;M; j=;) such that  is an invariant model operator
and F is complete for S.
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2. If  is an invariant model operator for the logical system (L;M; j=) then
(L; C
j=
; C

) is a deductive inference frame.
Proof:
1. Let (L;M; j=) be the LT-semantics for (L; C
L
) and (X) = Mod
j=
(C(X)).
Left-absorption implies C

= C. Invariance of  follows from right absorption:
since C(C
L
(X)) = C(X) we have (X) = Mod
j=
(C(X)) = Mod
j=
(C(C
L
(X)))
= (C
L
(X)).
2. Let (L; C
j=
; C

) be a semantical frame and  an invariant model operator. By
denition C

(X) = Th
j=
((X)). Hence C
L
(C

(X)) = C

(X). By invariance
of  we have (X) = (C
L
(X)), hence C

(X) = C

(C
L
(X)), i.e. C

satises
right-absorption.
2
10.2 Properties of belief set operators
A belief set operator was dened before as an MBSO in the information state frame
of sets of formulae; the FBSO associated to a belief set operator is then xed by
Denition 2.17. Such an associated FBSO (or inference operation) will be called the
kernel of the belief set operator. To make these notions more clear, we will give a
direct denition. Remember that in this chapter, a belief set is any set of formulae.
Denition 10.12 (Belief set operator) A belief set operatorB is a function that
assigns a belief set family to each set of initial facts: B : P(L) ! P(P(L)). The
kernel of B, denoted K
B
, is dened by K
B
(X) =
T
B(X).
The properties of inclusion, non-inclusiveness and invariance are as dened in
Denition 2.15. Examples of belief set operators (for default logic, autoepistemic
logic and belief revision) are given in that same section; we will give one extra
example here.
Example 10.13 (Poole Systems) Let  = (D;E), D [ E  L; the elements of
D are called defaults, the elements of E are said to be constraints. A set   D
is a basis for X  L if the set X [  [ E is consistent and  is maximal with
this property. Let Cons

(X) = f :   D and  is a basis for Xg. Then dene
B

(X) = fCn(X [ ) :  2 Cons

(X)g. Then B

is a belief set operator.
Structural properties of inference operations (like monotony, cut or cautious mo-
notony) can be generalized to properties of belief set operators, usually in more than
one way. The simplest way is to relate everything to the kernel. For instance, we
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could say that B is monotonic if and only if its kernel K
B
is. But this denition
does not at all consider the structure of the belief set families, and we can dene
more rened versions of such properties that do take into account this structure.
In order to dene these properties, it will be convenient to introduce an informa-
tion ordering on belief set families. For belief sets there is already a natural notion
of degree of information (a belief set T contains more information than a belief set
S if S  T ). Using this new ordering of information, the properties of belief set
operators resemble their counterparts for inference operations.
Denition 10.14 Let A, B be belief set families. We say B contains more infor-
mation than A, denoted A  B, if (8T 2 B)(9S 2 A)(S  T ). We write A  B if
A  B and B  A.
If one of the arguments in the above denition is a singleton belief set family,
we will often omit the parentheses and write X  A instead of fXg  A. Thus,
we can also write X  Y instead of X  Y . In words this denition says that a
belief set family B is considered to have more information than A if any of the sets
of B extends some of the sets of A. This also means that it may happen that a
belief set in A has no extending belief set in B. One can think of the belief sets as
(partial) possible worlds: the less possible worlds the agent considers, the more sure
she is of the state of aairs of the outside world. So the more possibilities, the less
knowledge an agent has. On the other hand, the possible states in B must contain
more information (or the same information) than their counterparts in A. Note that
this condition implies that
T
A 
T
B. We introduce the following formal properties
of belief set operators capturing essential features of a rational agent.
Denition 10.15 Let B be a belief set operator.
1. B satises belief monotony if (8X8Y )(X  Y ) B(X)  B(Y )).
2. B satises weak belief monotony if
(8XY )(X  Y  B(X)) B(X)  B(Y )).
3. B satises belief transitivity if
(8XY S)(S 2 B(X) and X  Y  S ) K
B
(Y )  S).
1
4. B satises belief cut if (8XY )(X  Y  B(X)) B(Y )  B(X)).
5. B satises belief cumulativity if it satises weak belief monotony and belief cut.
6. B satises strong belief cumulativity if it satises belief cumulativity and belief
transitivity.
7. B satises strong belief cut if
(8XY S)(S 2 B(X) and X  Y  S ) (9T 2 B(Y ))(T  S)).
1
This property is called cumulative transitivity in [Voo93].
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It is easy to check that strong belief cut implies belief cut and belief transitivity.
In [Voo93] a belief set operator B satisfying inclusion is said to be cumulative if
it satises belief transitivity and the following condition: (8XY S)(S 2 B(X) and
X  Y  S ) B(Y )  B(X)). A weaker form of this notion is dened by the
following condition: (8XY S)(S 2 B(X) and X  Y  S ) B(X)  B(Y )). All
these properties are generalizations of the notion of cautious monotony for inference
operations to the case of belief set operators. Similarly, there are alternative versions
of the generalization of cut and cumulativity to belief set operators. There is not
yet a complete analysis of these properties and their interrelations. The following
holds:
Proposition 10.16 Let B be a belief set operator satisfying inclusion.
1. If B is belief monotonic then K
B
is monotonic.
2. If B satises belief transitivity or belief cut then K
B
satises cut.
3. If B satises weak belief monotony then K
B
satises cautious monotony.
Proof:
1. X  Y ) B(X)  B(Y ))
T
B(X) 
T
B(Y ).
2. Suppose B satises belief cut, and suppose X  Y  K
B
(X), then certainly
X  Y  B(X), so B(Y )  B(Y ) whence
T
B(Y ) 
T
B(Y ). Now suppose
B satises belief transitivity, and suppose X  Y  K
B
(X). Let T 2 B(X),
then X  Y  T so
T
B(Y )  T . It follows that
T
B(Y ) 
T
B(X).
3. If X  Y 
T
B(X) then X  Y  B(X) so B(X)  B(Y ). It follows that
T
B(X) 
T
B(Y ).
2
So all of the properties of Denition 10.15 are generalizations of the corresponding
properties of inference operations. Given a belief set operator B with desirable
properties, the associated inference operation K
B
has analogous properties.
Given an inference operation C, there are of course in general many belief set
operators B such that K
B
= C, the most trivial being B(X) = fC(X)g. One could
ask whether there are non-trivial belief set operators B with K
B
= C which have
interesting structural properties, and if there is a general way of obtaining them.
The results in [Mak94], building on results in [KLM90], show that this can be done
using preferential models. We will briey sketch this. A preferential model is a
triple hMod; j=; <i where Mod is a set of states, j= is any relation between states
and formulae and < is a relation between models. A state m 2 Mod preferentially
satises a set of formulae A, denoted m j=
<
A, if m j= A and there is no n 2 Mod
such that n < m and n j= A. An inference operation C
<
can then be dened by
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C
<
(X) = f' 2 L j 8m 2 Mod;m j=
<
X ) m j= 'g. A preferential model is
called smooth, if for any X  L and m 2 Mod such that m j= X , there exists a
state n 2 Mod such that n  m and n j=
<
X (cf. Section 9.3). The basic result
of [KLM90], proved independently by [Mak89], is that for any cumulative inference
operation C, there is a smooth preferential model hMod; j=; <i such that C = C
<
.
But this also gives rise to a belief set operator, in the sense that the theory of each
state preferentially satisfying X can be seen as a belief set. If we set (in the notation
of [Mak94]) E
m
= f' 2 L j m j= 'g for each m 2 Mod, then a belief set operator
B can be dened by B(X) = fE
m
j m j=
<
Xg. It is easy to see that K
B
= C
<
.
Moreover, this belief set operator satises the properties dened in Denition 10.15.
Proposition 10.17 Given a cumulative inference operation C, there exists a non-
trivial belief set operator B satisfying all the properties in Denition 10.15 such that
K
B
= C.
Proof: Given C, let B be dened as above. Then B satises weak belief monotony:
suppose X  Y  B(X). Let E
m
2 B(Y ), then m j=
<
Y so m j= X , and by
smoothness there exists n  m such that n j=
<
X . As Y  B(X) we have n j= Y ,
so n = m. We have found E
n
 E
m
and E
n
2 B(X) so B(X)  B(Y ). Furthermore,
B satises strong belief cut. Suppose E
m
2 B(X) and X  Y  E
m
, then m j= Y
so there exists n  m such that n j=
<
Y . Since X  Y we have n j= X so n = m.
We have found E
n
2 B(Y ) such that E
n
 E
m
. These two properties imply all the
other ones. 2
Propositions 10.16 and 10.17 state that when going from a level 2 description
(belief set operators) to a level 1 description (inference operations), properties of
well-behavedness transfer, and that we can go from a level 1 description to a level 2
description without losing such properties.
10.3 Belief frames
We now connect a belief set operator with a compact monotonic logic which can be
considered as a deductive basis.
Denition 10.18
1. A system BF = (L; C
L
; B) is said to be a belief set frame if the following
conditions are satised:
(a) L is a language and C
L
is a deductive inference operation on L.
(b) B is a belief set operator on L satisfying non-inclusiveness and inclusion.
2. B satises belief left absorption i C
L
(T ) = T for every T 2 B(X), and
B satises belief congruence or C
L
-invariance i C
L
(X) = C
L
(Y ) implies
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B(X) = B(Y ). B satises full absorption i B satises left belief absorption
and congruence.
3. A belief set frame DF = (L; C
L
; B) is said to be a deductive belief set frame if
it satises full absorption.
Proposition 10.19 Let BF = (L; C
L
; B) be a belief set frame satisfying strong
belief cumulativity. Then BF satises belief left absorption and belief congruence,
i.e. BF is a deductive belief set frame.
Proof:
 From belief transitivity it follows that for every T 2 B(X) the condition
K
B
(T )  T is satised, hence K
B
(T ) = T . By supradeductivity we get
C
L
(T )  K
B
(T ), thus C
L
(T ) = T .
 Assume C
L
(X) = C
L
(Y ). Since K
B
: P(L) ! P(L) is cumulative, it follows
that (L; C
L
;K
B
) is a deductive frame, hence K
B
(X) = K
B
(Y ). It is sucient
to prove B(X) = B(K
B
(X)), because this condition implies B(X) = B(Y ).
Let S 2 B(X), by belief cut there is an extension T 2 B(K
B
(X)) such that
T  S. By weak belief monotony there exists an S
1
2 B(X) satisfying S
1
 S.
Because the sets in B(X) are pairwise non-inclusive we get S = S
1
, which
implies T = S, hence S 2 B(K
B
(X)).
Let T 2 B(K
B
(X)); by weak belief monotony there is an S 2 B(X) such that
S  T . By the previous proved condition this implies S 2 B(K
B
(X)), hence
by non-inclusiveness of B we get T = S.
2
Further important impure properties of inference frames can be generalized to belief
set frames.
Denition 10.20 Let (L; C
L
; B) be a belief set frame.
1. B satises belief distribution if
(8XY S)((S 2 B(C
L
(X)
T
C
L
(Y ))) (S 2 B(X) or S 2 B(Y ))).
2. B satises belief consistency preservation if
(8X)(C
L
(X) 6= L ) B(X) 6= fLg and B(X) 6= ;).
In the last condition, both when B(X) = fLg and when B(X) = ;, the input can be
considered `nonmonotonically inconsistent'. Both possibilities occur in for instance
default logic: there are default theories with just one inconsistent extension, and
there are default theories without extensions.
The following proposition holds.
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Proposition 10.21
1. If B satises belief distribution then K
B
satises distributivity.
2. If B satises belief consistency preservation then K
B
satises consistency
preservation.
Proof:
1. Suppose B satises belief distribution. Take any S 2 B(C
L
(X)\C
L
(Y ), then
S 2 B(X) or S 2 B(Y ) so
T
B(X)  S or
T
B(Y )  S. In both cases we have
T
B(X)\
T
B(Y )  S. It follows thatK
B
(X)\K
B
(Y ) 
T
B(C
L
(X)\C
L
(Y ).
2. Suppose C
L
(X) 6= L, then B(X) 6= fLg and B(X) 6= ; from which we imme-
diately get
T
B(X) 6= L.
2
The semantics of a belief set is a set of models. Since there can be many belief
sets we have to take into consideration functors associating to sets of assumptions
sets of sets of models. Such functors are called semantic belief state operators. They
are again MBSOs, but semantic ones, dened in the information state frame of
epistemic states. We will nonetheless give a denition, including the denition of
some properties dened for MBSOs in general.
Denition 10.22 (Semantic belief state operator)
1. A semantic belief state operator   is a function   : P(L)! P(P(Mod)).
2. The tuple (L;Mod; j=; ) is said to be a semantic belief state frame.
3.   satises non-inclusiveness if (8KJ 2  (X))(J  K ) J = K).
4.   satises inclusion if (8X)(8K 2  (X))(K  Mod (X)).
5.   satises left absorption, or L-invariance, if  (X) =  (C
L
(X)) for all X  L.
For a given semantic belief state operator   the following belief set operator B
 
can be introduced: B
 
(X) = fTh(K) : K 2  (X)g.
The following examples summarize some types of semantic belief state operators
associated to belief set operators investigated in the literature.
Example 10.23 (Poole systems (continued)) Let  = (D;E), D [ E  L be
a Poole system and Cons

(X) = f :   D and  is a basis for Xg. Let B

(X) =
fCn(X [ ) :  2 Cons

(X)g. A semantic belief state operator  

providing a
semantics forB

can be introduced by  

(X) = fMod(T ) : T 2 B

(X)g. Obviously,
 

is Cn-invariant.
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Example 10.24 (Generalized belief revision) Let A  L be an arbitrary xed
consistent deductively closed set and X  L an arbitrary set. Dene Cons(A;X) =
fY : Y  A; Y [ X is consistent and Y is maximal with this propertyg. Let
B(X) = fCn(Y [ X) : Y 2 Cons(A;X)g. If A [ X is consistent then B(X) =
fCn(A [X)g. If A [X is inconsistent then B(X) contains all complete extensions
of X . This can be shown using a generalization of results in [Gro88]. To get belief
set operators derived from A, subsets from Cons(A;X) have to be selected. Let
S : P(L) ! P(P(L)) satisfying S(X)  Cons(A;X) be such that S(X) 6= ; if
Cons(A;X) 6= ;. Then the following belief set operator B
S
can be introduced:
B
S
(X) = fCn(Y [ X) : Y 2 S(X)g. Again, we may introduce a semantic belief
state operator  
S
for B
S
by dening  
S
(X) = fMod(T ) : T 2 B
S
(X)g.
Example 10.25 (Stable generated models of logic programs) Stable gener-
ated models were introduced in Section 5.3. The following system (L
seq
;M; j=; )
is a semantic belief state frame: L
seq
is the set of sequents, M the set of all partial
models, j= the partial satisability relation and  (P ) = ffmg j m is a stable
generated model of Pg.
10.4 Representation
The methods described in Section 10.1 can be generalized to the case of belief set
operators and semantic belief state frames. In particular, there is a canonical method
to introduce a semantics for a given belief set frame.
Proposition 10.26 Let F = (L; C
L
; B) be a belief set frame satisfying belief left
absorption. Then there exists a semantic belief state frame SF = (L;M; j=; ) such
that (L; C
L
) is complete with respect to (L;M; j=) and B = B
 
. If F is a deductive
belief set frame then SF can be taken to be (L; C
L
)-invariant.
Proof: Let F = (L; C
L
; B) be a belief set frame satisfying belief left absorption.
We construct a semantic belief state frame SF = (L;M; j=; ) such that C
L
= C
j=
and B = B
 
. Let (L;M; j=) be the LT-semantics for (L; C
L
), and dene  (X) =
fMod
j=
(T ) j T 2 B(X)g. Then B
 
= B. B
 
(X) = fTh(Mod
j=
(T ) j T 2 B(X)g,
and since C
L
(T ) = T for T 2 B(X) it follows Th(Mod
j=
(T )) = T , hence B
 
(X) =
B(X).
Now assume that F is a deductive belief set frame. Then C
L
(X) = C
L
(Y ) implies
B(X) = B(Y ). We show that the semantic belief state operator dened above is
invariant. Since C
L
(X) = C
L
(C
L
(X)), and by congruence B(X) = B(C
L
(X)),
 (X) = fMod
j=
(T ) j T 2 B(X)g =  (C
L
(X)) = fMod
j=
(T ) j T 2 B(C
L
(X))g. 2
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The question arises whether a belief set operator B can be extended to a de-
ductive belief set frame (L; C
L
; B). Of course, there is the following trivial solution:
C
L
(X) = X , which cannot be considered as adequate. We will assume that the
desired logic for B should be as close as possible to K
B
; i.e. C
L
should be maximal
below K
B
with respect to the following partial ordering between inference opera-
tions C
1
; C
2
: C
1
 C
2
, (8X  L)(C
1
(X)  C
2
(X)). In this fashion, as many
conclusions as possible are the result of classical (monotonic) reasoning.
Proposition 10.27 Let B be a belief set operator on L satisfying strong belief
cumulativity. Then there exists a deductive system (L; C
L
) such that following
conditions are satised:
1. (L; C
L
; B) is a deductive belief set frame.
2. If (L; C
1
; B) is a deductive belief set frame then C
1
 C
L
, i.e. C
L
is the
greatest deductive system for (L; B).
Proof: Since B is strongly cumulative the inference system (L;K
B
) is cumulative.
By the main result in [Die94] there exists a largest deductive operation C
L
 K
B
such that (L; C
L
;K
B
) is a deductive inference frame. Since BF = (L; C
L
; B) is
a strong cumulative belief set frame it follows by Proposition 10.19 that BF is a
deductive belief set frame. BF satises the desired properties. 2
The semantical approach presented here can be summarized as follows. We start
with a belief set operator B on a language L; in the next step we construct a belief set
frame (L; C
L
; B) such that the compact logic (L; C
L
) satises additional properties,
e.g. maximality. Then for (L; C
L
; B) we may introduce the standard semantics
indicated in Proposition 10.26 (see Figure 10.1).
Belief set operator
(L; B)
+
Deductive Belief Set Frame
(L; C
L
; B)
+
Semantic Belief State Frame
(L;Mod; j=; )
Figure 10.1: Standard semantics of belief set operators.
Finally, we return to the connections between deductive inference frames and
deductive belief set frames. Obviously, as mentioned before, deductive inference
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frames (L; C
L
; C) can be considered as a special case of belief set frames by tak-
ing B
C
(X) = fC(X)g. On the other hand, for every deductive belief set frame
(L; C
L
; B) there exists exactly one deductive inference frame dened by the kernel
K
B
. The converse is not true: for a given deductive inference frame there can be
many deductive belief set frames with the same kernel. Belief set frames can be un-
derstood as specializations of deductive inference frames and a deductive inference
frame can be interpreted as an abstract representation of a family of deductive belief
set frames. We will make this precise.
Denition 10.28 Let F = (L; C
L
; C) be a deductive inference frame.
1. Dene 
(F) = fB : (L; C
L
; B) is a consistency preserving deductive belief set
frame such that C = K
B
g.
2. The binary relations  and  between belief set operators in 
(F) are dened
as follows:
B
1
 B
2
i (8X)(B
1
(X)  B
2
(X)); and
B
1
 B
2
i B
1
 B
2
and B
2
 B
1
:
3. Let BF(F) = (
(F);) and Max(X) = fS : S is a maximal consistent
extension of Xg.
4. A belief set operator B 2 
(F) is said to be a maximization operator i
(8X  L)(B(X) Max(C(X))).
We collect a number of results about the structure of BF(F).
Proposition 10.29 Let F = (L; C
L
; C) be a deductive inference frame. Then
BF(F) = (
(F);) is a partial ordering.
Proof: Obviously, the relation  satises reexivity and transitivity. We show
anti-symmetry. Assume B
1
 B
2
and B
2
 B
1
for B
1
; B
2
2 
(F). Let U 2 B
1
(X),
by assumption there is a V 2 B
2
(X) such that V  U ; since B
1
(X)  B
2
(X) there
is a set W 2 B
1
(X) satisfying W  V . Non-inclusiveness of B
1
(X) implies U = V ,
hence U 2 B
2
(X). Analogously one shows B
2
(X)  B
1
(X). 2
Proposition 10.30 Let F = (L
0
;Cn; C) be a deductive inference frame over classi-
cal logic (L
0
;Cn). The system BF(F) has a least element and a least maximization
operator. A belief set operator B 2 BF(F) is a maximal element with respect to 
if and only if B is a maximization operator such that for every X  L and T 2 B(X)
the following condition () C(X) 6=
T
(B(X)  fTg) is satised.
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Proof: Let F = (L
0
;Cn; C); the least element B
min
of 
(F) is dened by B
min
(X)
= fC(X)g, and the least maximization operator is determined by B
max
(X) =
Max(C(X)). Now, let B be a maximal element. We rst show that B is a maxi-
mization operator. Assume this is not the case. Then there is a belief set T 2 B(X)
(for a certain set X  L
0
), such that T is not maximal. We dene a new operator
B
1
as follows: B
1
(Y ) = B(Y ) for all Y 6= X , and B
1
(X) = (B(X) fTg)[Max(T ).
It is easy to show that B  B
1
, but not B
1
 B. Now we will show (). Suppose
there exist X  L
0
and T 2 B(X) such that C(X) =
T
(B(X)  fTg). Then dene
B
1
by setting B
1
(Y ) = B(Y ) for all Y 6= X , and B
1
(X) = B(X)   fTg. Then
B  B
1
2 BF(F), contradicting maximality of B.
Conversely, assume that B is a maximization operator satisfying the condition
(). Suppose B is not maximal. Then there is an operator B
1
2 BF(F), such that
B(X)  B
1
(X), but B(X) 6= B
1
(X). Since every T 2 B
1
(X) is an extension of a
belief set of B(X) and every belief set in B(X) is a maximal extension of C(X) it
holds that B
1
(X)  B(X). Hence, by condition () it follows
T
B
1
(X) 6= C(X).
This gives a contradiction. 2
A belief set operator B 2 
(F) satises C-congruence i (8XY  L)(C(X) =
C(Y )) B(X) = B(Y )). The following observation is straightforward.
Proposition 10.31 Let F = (L
0
;Cn; C) be a cumulative deductive inference frame.
Then every C-congruent belief set operator in 
(F) satises belief cumulativity, i.e.
weak belief monotony and belief cut. Furthermore, the least maximization operator
satises C-congruence.
Remark 10.32 Concerning the structure of BF(F) there is the following question.
Let P be a property on belief set frames, and F is a cumulative deductive inference
frame. Does there exist an element in BF(F) which is maximal with respect to
the property P ? Examples of such properties are distributivity or strong belief
cumulativity.
10.5 Selection operators
In the previous sections we concentrated on the multiple belief set view. The kernel
of a belief set operator represents the most certain inferences the agent can make.
But there is also another way in which the agent can handle the multiple views,
and that is by selecting one (or a subset) of the possible views and focusing on this
view. In the area of design, given some requirements a designing agent may have
multiple (partial) descriptions of objects that do not contradict the requirements. It
may have one of these descriptions (views) in focus, which it will try to complete.
Here the selection indicates which view is in focus. On the other hand, for many
nonmonotonic formalisms in which a theory can have multiple extensions (or expan-
sions), a prioritized or stratied version exists, in which control knowledge (such as
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a preference ordering on the nonmonotonic rules) is used to designate one of the
extensions as the most preferred one ([Bre94a], [ABW88], [Kon88a], [TT92]). This
focusing mechanism can be studied abstractly through selective inference operations
for a given belief set operator which choose one of the sets of beliefs.
Denition 10.33 (Selective inference operation) Let B be a belief set oper-
ator. A selective inference operation for B is an inference operation C such that
8X  L : C(X) 2 B(X).
We consider a typical example of a selective inference operation for the belief set
operator based on default logic.
Example 10.34 (Prioritized default logic, [Bre94a]) Let D be a countable set
of normal defaults, denoted as a=c, and let X be a set of formulae. Earlier we dened
the belief set operator B
D
(X) collecting all Reiter-extensions of X with respect to
D. If X is consistent then, since D contains only normal defaults, the set B
D
(X)
is non-empty. For every strict total ordering  of D we dene a selective inference
operation C

for B
D
as follows. A default  = a=c is said to be active in a set Z of
formulae if a 2 Z, c 62 Z, and :c 62 Z. Let a set X be given and dene a sequence
fE
i
: i < !g as follows:
E
0
= Cn(X); and for i  0 :
E
i+1
=
8
<
:
E
i
if no default is active in E
i
;
Cn(E
i
[ fcg) otherwise, where c is the consequent
of the -least default that is active in E
i
:
We dene C

(X) =
S
i<!
E
i
. It can be shown that C

(X) 2 B
D
(X) ([Bre94a]).
The extension
1
[
i=0
E
i
is called the prioritized extension of (D;X) generated by .
One may argue that the concept of a selective inference operations is already
covered by the notion of a usual inference operation. Obviously, this is not the
case because a selective inference operation is always connected with a belief set
operator as a separate notion. As an example imagine an agent A which acts under
incomplete information in a dynamic environment. It is important for A to have
an appropriate basic space of dierent belief sets and an additional mechanism to
choose and generate one of them to adapt his behavior to a particular situation.
In principle, this idea can also be realized by a suitable family of usual inference
operations and a choice mechanism. To structure the connections between belief set
operators and selective inference operations, we give the following denition:
Denition 10.35
1. Let a belief set operator B be given. The family of selective inference opera-
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tions for B, denoted by C
B
, is dened by
C
B
= fC j C is a selective inference operation for Bg:
2. Let C be a family of inference operations. Dene the belief set operator B
C
by
B
C
(X) = fC(X) j C 2 Cg:
A selective inference operation for a belief set operator will in general be more
informative than the associated kernel: K
B
(X)  C(X). But even if the belief set
operator is well-behaved, a selective inference operation can be badly behaved. The
question arises whether a well-behaved selective inference operation always exists.
That is, given a belief set operator B, the question is whether there exists a C 2 C
B
with certain structural properties. This is a hard question. Sucient conditions can
be found, for instance for monotony: (8Y )(9T 2 B(Y ))(8X  Y )(8S 2 B(X)) :
S  T . But this condition implies (in the presence of non-inclusiveness) that B(X)
is a singleton for all X . Necessary conditions are easier to nd, but quite trivial.
For a belief set operator B and a selective inference operation C for B we have the
following.
If C satises cut then
(8X)(9S 2 B(X))(8Y )(X  Y  S ) ((9T 2 B(Y ))(T  S)) (*1).
If C satises cautious monotony then
(8X)(9S 2 B(X))(8Y )(X  Y  S ) ((9T 2 B(Y ))(S  T )) (*2).
If C satises cumulativity then
(8X)(9S 2 B(X))(8Y )(X  Y  S ) ((9T 2 B(Y ))(S = T )) (*3).
If C satises monotony then
(8XY )(X  Y ) ((9S 2 B(X))(9T 2 B(Y ))(S  T )) (*4).
The preceding paragraph pertains to the situation when a belief set operator B is
given, and we want to study C
B
. Questions about the second item in Denition 10.35
are easier to answer. We will say a family C of inference operations satises one of
the properties of cut, cautious monotony, cumulativity and monotony if all of the
inference operations in C satisfy this property. Then we have:
Proposition 10.36 Let C be a family of inference operations.
1. If C satises monotony then B
C
satises belief monotony.
2. if C satises cautious monotony then B
C
satises weak belief monotony.
3. if C satises cut, then B
C
satises both belief transitivity and (strong) belief
cut.
4. if C satises cumulativity, then B
C
satises strong belief cumulativity.
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Proof:
1. Suppose C satises monotony, and suppose X  Y . Take any C(Y ) 2 B
C
(Y ),
then C(X)  C(Y ) and C(X) 2 B
C
(X). We have B
C
(X)  B
C
(Y ).
2. Suppose X  Y  B
C
(X). Take a C(Y ) 2 B
C
(Y ), then X  Y  C(X) (since
Y  B
C
(X)), so C(X)  C(Y ). It again follows that B
C
(X)  B
C
(Y ).
3. Suppose C satises cut. We only have to prove that B
C
satises strong belief
cut. So suppose C(X) 2 B
C
(X) and X  Y  C(X). Then C(Y )  C(X)
and C(Y ) 2 B
C
(Y ).
4. If C satises cumulativity, it satises cautious monotony and cut, so by 2. and
3. B
C
satises weak belief monotony, belief cut and belief transitivity, hence
it satises strong belief cumulativity.
2
One way of dening selective inference operations for a given belief set operator
is through selection operators. Given a set of views, such a selection operator selects
one (or some) of them. These selection operators were already dened in general in
Section 2.2.
Denition 10.37 A selection operator is a function s : P(P(L)) ! P(P(L)) such
that for all A  P(L) : s(A)  A, and s(A) 6= ; if A 6= ;. The operator s is single-
valued i for all non-empty A  P(L): #(s(A)) = 1. A single-valued selection
function s can be understood as a choice function s : P(P(L)) ! P(L) satisfying
s(A) 2 A for all non-empty A.
Using selection operators we can generate inference operations:
Denition 10.38 Let a belief set operator B and a selection operator s be given.
We dene the inference operation C
B
s
by: C
B
s
(X) =
T
s(B(X)).
We will give some examples of belief set operators with selection operators.
Example 10.39 (Autoepistemic logic and parsimonious expansions) It is
well-known that in autoepistemic logic it may happen that the objective (i.e., non-
modal) part of a stable expansion is contained in the objective part of another
stable expansion. The easiest example is the theory fLp! pg, which has two stable
expansions: the (unique) stable set with objective part Cn(;), and the stable set
with objective part Cn(fpg). Given a modal language L
m
we can dene the belief
set operator B
ael
which assigns to each set I of modal formulae the set of stable
expansions of I . But an agent may want to keep only those expansions with a
minimal objective part (these are called parsimonious expansions in [EG92]). We
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could dene the selection operator s
p
by s
p
(A) = fX 2 A j there is no Y 2 A
such that the objective part of Y is included in the objective part of Xg. Then
s
p
(B
ael
(I)) is the collection of parsimonious expansions of I , and C
B
ael
s
p
gives the
(skeptical) conclusions based on these expansions.
Example 10.40 (Prioritized default logic, continued) In Example 10.34, a
single extension was selected from the set of all extensions on the basis of a total
ordering on the set of defaults D. Often, the priority information will be partial,
and we can select the extensions which comply with this partial information (see
[Bre94a]). Given a partial ordering < on D, we can dene a selection operator that
selects those extensions of (D;X) which are generated by a total ordering  that
extends < (meaning that d
1
< d
2
implies d
1
 d
2
).
Another example is the selection operator s
user
that selects a maximal indicative
subset from the output of the multi-interpretation operator MI
maxind
of Section 8.2.
Single-valued selection operators generate selective inference operations. A rst
observation about when a selective inference operation can be generated by a single-
valued selection operator:
Proposition 10.41 Let a selective inference operation C for a belief set operator
B be given. Then C = C
B
s
for some single-valued selection operator s i
(8X8Y )(B(X) = B(Y )) C(X) = C(Y )).
Proof: Dene s as follows: for A  P(L), if A = B(X) for some X  L, then
s(A) = fC(X)g, and if not, then s selects any set from A (and s(;) = ;). The re-
quirement ensures that s is well-dened, and it is easy to see that s is a single-valued
selection operator. For any X  L we have C
B
s
(X) =
T
s(B(X)) =
T
fC(X)g =
C(X). The other direction is trivial. 2
We can study properties of selection operators and the relation with properties of
belief state operators and selective inference operations. Although a full treatment
is beyond the scope of this chapter, we will give an example.
Denition 10.42 A selection operator s satises selection monotony if for all belief
set families A, B we have A  B ) s(A)  s(B).
Then we have the following:
Proposition 10.43
1. Let a belief set operator B and a selection operator s be given. If B satises
belief monotony and s satises selection monotony then C
B
s
satises monotony.
2. Let a single-valued selection operator s be given. If for any belief set operatorB
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which satises belief monotony, C
B
s
satises monotony, then s satises selection
monotony.
Proof:
1. If X  Y then B(X)  B(Y ) (belief monotony) so s(B(X))  s(B(Y ))
(selection monotony) so C
B
s
(X)  C
s
(Y ).
2. Suppose we have two belief set families A  B. Dene a belief set operator
B by B(;) = A and B(X) = B for X 6= ;. It is easy to see that B satises
belief monotony. Then as ;  L, we must have C
B
s
(;)  C
B
s
(L), and as s is
single-valued this means that s(B(;))  s(B(L)) or s(A)  s(B).
2
The problem with selection operators is that they are blind to the initial facts:
if B(X) = B(Y ), then we may sometimes want to make a dierent selection from
B(X) than from B(Y ). One option would be to dene selection operators s
X
with
an index for the initial facts. An inference operation C
B
s
(X) could then be dened
by C
B
s
(X) =
T
s
X
(B(X)). This would yield results similar to the construction of
B
C
dened earlier.
Example 10.44 (Contraction functions) In [AGM85], eight rationality postu-
lates are given for contraction functions. A contraction function  
.
is a function that
given a belief set K and a formula ' yields a new belief set K  
.
' which is meant
to be the result of `removing' ' from K. We list the eight AGM postulates below.
1. For any sentence ' and belief set K closed under propositional provability, the
set K  
.
' is also closed under propositional provability.
2. K  
.
'  K.
3. If ' 62 K, then K = K  
.
'.
4. If 6j= ' then ' 62 K  
.
'.
5. K  (K  
.
') + '.
6. If j= '$  , then K  
.
' = K  
.
 .
7. K  
.
' \K  
.
  K  
.
(' ^  ).
8. If ' 62 K  
.
(' ^  ), then K  
.
(' ^  )  K  
.
 .
Call a selection operator s
X
invariant if s
X
= s
Cn(X)
for all X . Then a result
from [AGM85] can be given in our terms:
A contraction function  
.
satises the rst 6 postulates i X  
.
' = C
 
 '
s
(X) for
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some invariant s, where  
 '
is the belief set operator dened in Example 2.14.
Furthermore, if we put extra conditions on the selection operator | intuitively, that
it picks maximal elements from  
 '
given some transitive and reexive order |
then this result can be strengthened in the sense that all rationality postulates hold.
Remark: The considerations in the Sections 10.4 and 10.5 reect certain aspects
of knowledge dynamics [Pop77]. Let X
0
be a deductively closed set representing the
knowledge at a certain time point. X
0
can be extended by a combined application
of a belief set operator B
0
whose kernel is X
0
and a selection operator s
0
. The new
knowledge stage X
1
is dened by X
1
= C
B
0
s
0
(X
0
) =
T
s
0
(B
0
(X
0
)). The forming of
belief sets for a knowledge base can be understood as theory formation or hypothesis
building; after new observations are performed those belief sets are left out which
contradict the observations.
10.6 Conclusions and related work
In this chapter, we have analyzed belief set operators, which can be seen as syn-
tactical multiple belief state operators. They are a generalization of the well-known
inference operations. Some properties of belief set operators (generalized from the
inference operation properties) were dened and investigated. A general semantic
counterpart for a belief set operator was treated, and it was shown that for a class
of belief set operators there is a generic way of dening a maximal underlying se-
mantics. The selection operators already introduced in Chapter 2 were applied to
belief set operators.
The idea of investigating belief set operators was already present in [Mak94] and
[Voo93]. The present chapter takes some preliminary steps toward a full study of
belief set operators, in the spirit of what has been done for inference operations.
Acknowledgments
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Chapter 11
Conclusions and Perspectives
Throughout this thesis, we have given detailed conclusions and we have discussed
related work and occasionally further research issues at the end of each chapter, or
sometimes section. Therefore, we will not do that here. Rather, we will give a broad
overview of what we have done in this thesis, and sketch a general perspective for
possible future research in this area.
The most general goal of this work has been to convince the reader that it is
possible, interesting, worthwhile, and sometimes even necessary to analyze complex
reasoning on a level of abstraction in-between the level of inference operations and
the level of system specication. In particular, the nondeterministic and dynamic
aspects of reasoning can and should be modeled and studied. To this end, we
introduced a hierarchy of levels of abstraction for specifying and analyzing reasoning
in Chapter 1. The rst and last level are well-known, but the two intermediate levels
are new (although hinted at in the literature). The exact mathematical formalization
of reasoning at the rst three levels, in terms of nal belief state operators (level 1),
multiple belief state operators (level 2) and reasoning frame operators (level 3), was
given in Chapter 2.
The larger part of the rest of this thesis concentrated on level 3, with the excep-
tion of Section 8.2 and Chapter 10. The latter chapter gave a preliminary analysis
of syntactic multiple belief state operators in terms of possible properties, underly-
ing semantics and links with level 1. A possible use of (a slight variant of) these
operators for formalizing a practical reasoning task was given in Section 8.2. No
specication languages for this level were proposed (although a rst proposal is in
[ET96c]).
We have advocated and hopefully made the reader interested in the dynamic
viewpoint on commonsense reasoning (this is done in [Ben96a] in the eld of Logic).
The dynamic view on default logic and logic programming was introduced in Chap-
ter 3 by showing that they can be viewed as specication languages for reasoning
frame operators. We proposed epistemic variants of temporal logics (or temporal
variants of epistemic logics) as natural candidates for a specication language for
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informational behavior in Chapter 4.
Then in Chapter 5 we specied a number of (known) forms of reasoning in our
temporal logics. This showed at least two things. First, that a dynamic view on these
forms of reasoning is possibly in a meaningful way (for default reasoning and normal
logic programming, this was already shown in Chapter 3). Second, it shows that
our temporal logics are at least powerful enough to, but also natural for, specifying
reasoning.
The expressiveness of (one of our variants of) temporal logic and a variant of
default logic in a more traditional mathematical sense was investigated in Chapter 7.
Both languages are expressively complete for a natural class of reasoning frame
operators (and multiple belief state operators) when allowing innite constructs in
the language.
In Chapter 6 it was shown that a useful fragment of one of our temporal speci-
cation languages is executable. This means that there is an algorithm that auto-
matically performs the reasoning specied by a temporal theory. In other words, it
nds the temporal models of a specication in temporal logic. We gave a generic
task model in desire capable of performing this algorithm. The generic task model
is easy to extend when augmenting the temporal specication language.
As an example of the use of temporal specication, in Section 8.1 it was shown
that it is possible to specify compositional multi-agent systems in a temporal partial
logic. This logic can be used to formalize compositional verication and validation
proofs for such systems.
Finally, some logical themes inspired by the logic MTEL were the subject of
Chapter 9. Axiom systems for TEL and TELC were given in Section 9.1, and
decidability and complexity of these logics were investigated. MTEL was used as an
example in Section 9.2 where it was shown that in preferential logics formulae may
exist that allow us to keep some of the advantages of monotonicity. The inference
relation of that same logic is also an example of a non-cumulative relation; non-
cumulative inference relations were the subject of Section 9.3.
Let us now look at perspectives for further research. One important direction has
been described extensively at the end of Chapter 4: investigating dierent temporal
logics of information (dierent underlying logics, dierent time structures, dierent
languages, etc.).
Secondly, the analysis of multiple belief state operators in this thesis has not been
extensive. So there is a lot of work that could be done in that area. A further analysis
of properties of MBSOs, their interrelationships, the connection with properties of
FBSOs would complement the work done in this area for inference relations. Another
question is whether and how preferential semantics can be used to give semantics
to MBSOs. Furthermore, it would be interesting to consider known formalisms, like
default logic, and identify which properties their associated MBSOs have, and which
they do not have. These (rened) properties of MBSOs may help to explain the
properties the associated FBSO has or does not have. Lastly, we have investigated
specication languages for level 3. The same could be done for level 2.
A large area of further research lies in incorporating aspects of reasoning which
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are inherently dynamic. At the beginning of this thesis (Section 1.1) we gave an
example of the kind of reasoning processes we were interested in. It involved an
agent that wanted to buy a ticket for a movie, and had to make assumptions, revise
its knowledge, reason about observations and perform observations. Although we
have laid the foundations that allow us to model this kind of reasoning, and we have
shown that many kinds of defeasible reasoning can be specied, an integration of
these aspects into one formalism (possibly a family of formalisms) would be very
useful. We would like an integrated account of the reasoning process of an agent
that performs nonmonotonic reasoning, belief revision, that can update its beliefs as
a result of observations and communication, that may reason about actions which
it then can perform, etcetera. Also, it would be useful if the agent can reason about
time itself. This is needed for resource-bounded reasoning, where time is a resource.
In certain situations, the reasoning process of an agent may be adjusted because
it realizes that there is not much time in which to make a decision (this is also a
phenomenon that active logics are meant to be able to model; see [NKP94]).
In this thesis, there was no notion of a real external world (including other agents)
evolving while the agent was reasoning, and this is certainly necessary for practical
reasoning. This also touches the point of the number of agents, another area of
further research. The extension of many concepts and results in this thesis to the
more than one agent case will doubtlessly (much) increase the complexity. In the
multi-agent case, however, the dynamics of reasoning, including communication, are
even more of inuence to the nal conclusions reached, if this is even a well-dened
or interesting notion. An analysis of multi-agent reasoning on level 1 or 2 is not
unthinkable (and would be an interesting subject in certain cases), but the dynamic
stance is even more important here than in the single-agent case reported in this
thesis.
The usefulness of a temporal logic of information for verication and validation
of compositional multi-agent systems (see Section 8.1) would be improved if it had
explicit provisions for the multi-agent case. In Section 8.1 we just used dierent sig-
natures for the dierent agents (and dierent components within agents). A more
structured approach would be to add dierent modal operators for each component.
This has been worked out in [EJT98]. The temporal semantics in that paper, how-
ever, are still `at', and modal operators cannot be nested. It would be even better
if the compositional structure of the system were reected in a compositional se-
mantics. This means that the temporal models of a component (including the top
component) should be composed of the temporal models of its subcomponents. In
order for temporal logics of multi-agent systems to be useful in practice, attention
should be paid to proof systems and executability (for prototyping). The verication
and validation process should be supported by tools that aid the user in building
and managing compositional proofs.
This thesis is by no means a study of all relevant aspects of the nondeterminism
and dynamics of practical reasoning. But we hope to have shown the importance of
these issues, and the possibility of studying them in an abstract setting. Much more
research is needed to obtain a unied view on practical reasoning that integrates
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many known forms of reasoning.
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Samenvatting
De dynamiek van redeneren
In de Kunstmatige Intelligentie probeert men systemen te ontwerpen die intelligent
gedrag vertonen. Redeneren is een vorm van intelligent gedrag en is iets wat men ook
een computer wil kunnen laten doen. Hiertoe moet eerst geanalyseerd worden hoe
dat redeneren werkt. Sinds het begin van de jaren tachtig zijn er veel formalisaties
van menselijk redeneergedrag voorgesteld, maar geen van deze formalisaties bleek in
elke situatie te voldoen. Daarop bedacht men dat het zinnig zou zijn om naar de ab-
stracte eigenschappen van redeneren te kijken, opdat vastgesteld zou kunnen worden
aan welke eisen een formalisatie moet voldoen, afhankelijk van de situatie. Op het
meest abstracte niveau waarop naar redeneren gekeken wordt, beschouwt men re-
deneren als een invoer-uitvoer proces: gegeven bepaalde beginfeiten en beginkennis,
levert een redenerend systeem (kunstmatig of natuurlijk) een verzameling conclusies.
Hier wordt dus alleen naar het eindprodukt van het redeneerproces gekeken en niet
naar hoe dat eindprodukt tot stand gekomen is.
De belangrijkste bijdrage van dit proefschrift is dat er een raamwerk opgezet
wordt waarbinnen ook de dynamische aspecten van redeneren op voldoende ab-
stract niveau beschreven en bestudeerd kunnen worden. In het bijzonder worden
twee elementen van redeneerprocessen bekeken. In de eerste plaats is dat het niet-
deterministische karakter van redeneren. Vaak moeten er tijdens het redeneren keu-
zes gemaakt worden, bijvoorbeeld als er aanvullende aannames gemaakt moeten
worden, of als er conicterende kennis is (welke kennis moet er dan verworpen wor-
den?). Op dit abstractieniveau kan men redeneren dus zien als een proces waarbij
bij een gegeven verzameling beginfeiten en beginkennis meerdere mogelijke conclu-
sieverzamelingen gegenereerd worden. Ten tweede kan men kijken naar het proces
van redeneren: een redenerend systeem begint met de beginfeiten, waarop het bij-
voorbeeld redeneerregels kan toepassen om tot extra conclusies te komen. In deze
toestand kan het systeem weer nieuwe regels op de nieuwe conclusies toepassen. Of
er kunnen extra aannames of observaties gedaan worden. Gedurende het proces
van redeneren (dat niet per se hoeft te eindigen) passeert het systeem meerdere in-
terne informatietoestanden (die bepalen wat het systeem weet op dat moment). Op
dit abstractieniveau kan men kijken naar de opeenvolgingen van informatietoestan-
den van het systeem tijdens het redeneren, daarbij nog steeds abstraherend van de
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implementatie (fysiek of als software) van het redenerende systeem.
In Hoofdstuk 1 worden 4 verschillende abstractieniveaus om redeneren op te
beschrijven, onderscheiden. Op het eerste niveau wordt redeneren beschouwd als
invoer-uitvoer functie, op het tweede niveau als functie die bij gegeven invoer meer-
dere mogelijke conclusieverzamelingen geeft. Op het derde niveau wordt redeneren
gezien als een verzameling informatietoestand-sequenties, traces genoemd, die be-
ginnen in een toestand waarin alleen beginfeiten gekend worden. Op het vierde
niveau is redeneren beschreven door het speciceren van een redenerend systeem
(dat kan een implementatie in een programmeertaal zijn, een blauwdruk van een
fysieke machine, of zelfs een beschrijving van een mens).
De precieze wiskundige beschrijving van deze niveaus (de formalisatie) is het
onderwerp van Hoofdstuk 2. Hoe speciceer je nu redeneerpatronen op deze ab-
stractieniveaus? Dat kan natuurlijk in algemene wiskundige taal, maar nog beter is
het als je een formele taal hebt die speciaal geschikt is voor dit doel. Als er voor
deze taal bovendien nog een bewijssysteem bestaat, is het mogelijk om formele be-
wijzen over redeneergedrag te maken. Dit soort talen noemen we in dit proefschrift
specicatietalen, en in Hoofdstuk 3 passeren enkele mogelijke specicatietalen de
revue.
Het grootste deel van dit proefschrift gaat vervolgens over het derde niveau, met
uitzondering van Sectie 8.2 en Hoofdstuk 10. Dat laatste hoofdstuk geeft een eerste
analyse van de formalisatie van niveau 2, met mogelijke eigenschappen van redeneer-
patronen op dat niveau, onderliggende semantieken en relaties met eigenschappen
op het eerste niveau bekend uit de literatuur. In Sectie 8.2 wordt de formalisatie
op niveau 2 gebruikt voor de beschrijving van een redeneertaak uit de praktijk, te
weten ecologische classicatie van stukken grond op basis van de erop aangetroen
plantensoorten.
Redeneren is een proces dat plaatsvindt in de tijd, en de stapjes tussen opeen-
volgende informatietoestanden zijn stapjes in de tijd. Deze observatie leidt tot een
klasse natuurlijke specicatietalen voor redeneergedrag, namelijk die van temporele
informatielogica's. In zo'n formele taal kan de veranderende informatie door de tijd
heen beschreven worden. De precieze invulling van de informatietoestanden en de
taal om deze te beschrijven en de precieze invulling van de tijd leiden tot meerdere
mogelijke logica's. In Hoofdstuk 4 worden een aantal hiervan beschreven, gebruik-
makend van parti

ele logica en epistemische logica voor de informatietoestanden, en
gebruikmakend van lineaire en vertakkende discrete tijd. Tevens wordt een aan-
tal manieren beschreven waarop met behulp van een ordening bepaalde temporele
informatielogica-modellen geselecteerd kunnen worden (de beoogde of `intended' mo-
dellen).
De geschiktheid van deze logica's om redeneergedrag mee te beschrijven wordt in
Hoofdstuk 5 aangetoond door bestaande formalisaties van verschillende vormen van
redeneergedrag in deze logica's te beschrijven. Dit wordt gedaan voor default-logica
(zowel op basis van lineaire als van vertakkende tijd), logisch programmeren, klas-
sieke bewijsvoering, autoepistemische logica en de logica GK. Dit laat zien dat deze
redeneervormen een natuurlijke beschrijving hebben op het derde abstractieniveau,
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en dat temporele informatielogica's krachtig genoeg zijn om deze redeneervormen op
natuurlijke wijze te beschrijven.
Hoofdstuk 6 gaat in op executie van temporele theorie

en. Het idee is hier dat als
je een algemeen executiemechanisme hebt voor temporele informatielogica-theorie

en,
die vormen van redeneergedrag kunnen beschrijven, dan heb je een algemeen rede-
neermechanisme. Dit `executeren' van theorie

en betekent eigenlijk het vinden van
een model voor zo'n theorie, op gestructureerde wijze (gebruikmakend van heuristi-
sche zoekkennis). Naast een executiealgorithme voor een bepaalde klasse temporele
theorie

en, wordt ook een compositionele architectuur voor een systeem beschreven,
dat dit algorithme kan uitvoeren.
Naast de geschiktheid van een taal om dingen in uit te drukken in meer informele
zin, kan men ook kijken naar de wiskundige expressiviteit. De vraag is dan: wat
kan je precies in principe wel, en wat niet uitdrukken in een bepaalde taal? In
Hoofdstuk 7 wordt gekeken naar de wiskundige expressiviteit van een bepaalde klasse
theorie

en in een van de temporele informatielogica's. Ook wordt er gekeken naar de
expressiviteit van (innitaire) default-logica als specicatietaal voor redeneren op
het tweede en derde abstractieniveau.
Hoofdstuk 8 bevat, naast de analyse van ecologische classicatie, nog een an-
dere toepassing van de ontwikkelde theorie. Dit betreft de mogelijkheid om in een
temporele informatielogica compositionele multi-agentsystemen te beschrijven. Dit
zijn systemen waarin er meerdere onafhankelijke redenerende agenten zijn. Om dit
soort systemen te beschrijven wordt een temporele informatielogica uitgebreid met
de mogelijkheid om er verschillende informatietoestanden op hetzelfde tijdstip (be-
horend bij meerdere agenten) in te beschrijven. Deze logica kan gebruikt worden om
bewijzen van eigenschappen van dit soort systemen mee te formaliseren.
In Hoofdstuk 9 komen een aantal logische thema's aan de orde. Voor een van
de temporele informatielogica's wordt een bewijssysteem beschreven. Tevens wordt
van deze logica, en van een erop gebaseerde, MTEL, de beslisbaarheid bewezen en
de precieze complexiteit. Hoewel deze laatste logica niet-monotoon is, hetgeen wil
zeggen dat conclusies uit een premisse getrokken hun geldigheid kunnen verliezen als
de premisse sterker wordt, blijft monotonie behouden voor een bepaalde klasse for-
mules. Dit fenomeen geldt algemener voor zogenaamde preferenti

ele logica's, en dit
is het onderwerp van de tweede sectie van Hoofdstuk 9. Ook is MTEL niet cumula-
tief. Het laatste gedeelte van dit hoofdstuk geeft semantische representatieresultaten
voor niet-cumulatieve aeidingssystemen.
Na het eerder genoemde Hoofdstuk 10, geeft Hoofdstuk 11 globale conclusies en
suggesties voor verder onderzoek. De belangrijkste conclusie is dat het mogelijk,
interessant, nuttig en soms noodzakelijk is om complexe redeneervormen te analy-
seren op een abstractieniveau tussen niveaus 1 en 4. In het bijzonder kunnen de
niet-deterministische en dynamische aspecten van redeneren gemodelleerd en bestu-
deerd worden en dit heeft een sterke toegevoegde waarde.



